area handbook series
Germany
a country study
Germany
a country study
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Edited by
Eric Solsten
Research Completed
August 1995
On the cover: The Brandenburg Gate in Berlin
Third Edition, First Printing, 1996.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Germany : a country study / Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress ; edited by Eric Solsten. — 3rd ed.
p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)
(DA Pam; 550-173)
"Supersedes the 1988 edition of East Germany : a coun-
try study, edited by Stephen R. Burant; and the 1982 edi-
tion of Federal Republic of Germany : a country study,
edited by Richard F. Nyrop." — T.p. verso.
"Research completed August 1995."
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 545-593) and
index.
ISBN 0-8444-0853-0 (he : alk. paper)
Copy 3 Z663.275 .G47 1996
1. Germany. I. Solsten, Eric, 1943- . II. Library of
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV.
Series: DA Pam ; 550-173.
DD17.G475 1996 96-20927
943— dc20 CIP
Headquarters, Department of the Army
DA Pam 550-173
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword
This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon-
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this
book list the other published studies.
Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun-
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and
national security systems and institutions, and examining the
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are
shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written
by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors
seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society,
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society,
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter-
ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and
extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and
political order.
The books represent the analysis of the authors and should
not be construed as an expression of an official United States
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read-
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions.
Louis R. Mortimer
Chief
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, DC 20540-4840
iii
Acknowledgments
This edition supersedes East Germany: A Country Study, pub-
lished in 1988, and Federal Republic of Germany: A Country Study,
published in 1982. The authors wish to acknowledge their use
of portions of those volumes in the preparation of this book.
The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United
States government agencies who gave their time and special
knowledge to provide information and perspective. These indi-
viduals include Ralph K. Benesch, who formerly oversaw the
Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department
of the Army. Frank J. LaScala reviewed portions of the manu-
script. Margaret A. Murray of the Office of Management and
Budget supplied valuable information.
The authors wish to thank various members of the staff of
the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washing-
ton, D.C., and of the German Information Center in New York.
Uwe Petry, consul in the German Consulate General in Los
Angeles, provided photographs and other assistance. Monika
Dorman of Northern Germany Representation in New York
also provided photographs. Often helpful for specific queries
were the staffs of the German Historical Institute, the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation, and the American Institute for Contempo-
rary German Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, all
located in Washington, D.C. Special thanks for many varieties
of assistance must also go to William Collins, Douglas Griffin,
Hans Kohler, Gisela Peters, and Werner Peters.
Dr. Christa Altenstetter, author of Chapter 4, wishes to
acknowledge the financial support of the GSF Research Center
for Environment and Health in Munich-Neuherberg during
her sabbatical in 1992. She extends particular thanks also to
Professor Dr. Wilhelm van Eimeren, director of MEDIS; to the
organization's scientific staff — Dr. Jiirgen John, Dr. Andreas
Mielck, and Dr. Walter Satzinger — for valuable suggestions;
and to the MEDIS support staff. Dr. Altenstetter is also grateful
to Dr. Bernd Schulte of the Max-Planck-Institut fur Ausland-
isches und Internationales Sozialrecht in Munich for his coun-
sel and to Dorothee Schray, M.A., Staatsinstitut fur
Schulpadagogik und Bildungsforschung, likewise in Munich,
for her library assistance.
v
Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Divi-
sion of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of
the book. Sandra W. Meditz, Federal Research Division coordi-
nator of the handbook series, made helpful suggestions during
her review of all parts of the book, as did Andrea M. Savada.
Tim Merrill reviewed the sections on geography and telecom-
munications. Thanks also go to David R Cabitto, who designed
the cover and some of the chapter art and provided graphics
support; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and also
edited portions of the manuscript; Laura C. Wells, who helped
prepare the Country Profile; Andrea T. Merrill, who managed
production; Harriett R. Blood and the firm of Greenhorne and
O'Mara, who prepared the topographical map; Thomas D. Hall
and the firm of Maryland Mapping and Graphics, who pre-
pared the other maps; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson,
who did the word processing; and David R Cabitto, Janie L. Gil-
christ, and Izella Watson, who prepared the camera-ready copy.
The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as
well: Vincent Ercolano, who edited most of the chapters; Sheila
Ross, who performed the prepublication editorial review; Joan
C. Cook, who compiled the index; and Marty Ittner, who cre-
ated many of the chapter illustrations.
vi
Contents
Page
Foreword iii
Acknowledgments v
Preface xvii
Table A. English Equivalents of Selected German
Place-Names xix
Table B. Selected Abbreviations xxi
Table C. Chronology of Important Events xxiii
Country Profile xxix
Introduction xxxvii
Chapter 1. Historical Setting: Early History to
1945 1
Eric Solsten
EARLY HISTORY 6
MEDIEVAL GERMANY 7
The Merovingian Dynasty, ca. 500-751 7
The Carolingian Dynasty, 752-91 1 7
The Saxon Dynasty, 919-1024 8
The Salian Dynasty, 1 024-1 1 25 9
The Hohenstaufen Dynasty, 1138-1254 11
The Empire under the Early Habsburgs 14
THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION 16
Martin Luther 19
Resistance to Luther anism 21
The Peace of Augsburg 22
THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-48 22
The Counter-Reformation and Religious
Tensions 23
Military Campaigns 24
The Peace of Westphalia 25
vii
THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM, 1648-
1789 26
Austria and Prussia 26
The Smaller States 28
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND GERMANY 30
THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1815-66 31
Economic and Political Trends Toward
Unification 32
The Revolutions of 1848 36
The Restoration 37
BISMARCK AND UNIFICATION , 38
IMPERIAL GERMANY 40
Political Parties 42
The Economy and Population Growth 43
The Tariff Agreement of 1879 and Its Social
Consequences 45
Bismarck's Foreign Policy 45
Foreign Policy in the Wilhelmine Era 46
World War 1 47
THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1918-33 50
The Weimar Constitution 50
Problems of Parliamentary Politics 53
The Stresemann Era 55
Hitler and the Rise of National Socialism 57
THE THIRD REICH, 1933-45. 60
The Consolidation of Power 60
Foreign Policy 62
The Outbreak of World War II 64
Total Mobilization, Resistance, and the
Holocaust 66
Defeat 69
Chapter 2. Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990 71
Bruno F. Steinbruckner
POSTWAR OCCUPATION AND DIVISION 76
The Establishment of Occupation Zones 76
The Nuremberg Trials and Denazification 79
Political Parties and Democratization 81
The Creation of the Bizone 83
The Birth of the Federal Republic of
Germany 86
viii
The Birth of the German Democratic
Republic 89
WEST GERMANY AND THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS 91
Rearmament and the European Defense
Community 93
Social Market Economy 96
Ludwig Erhard and the Grand Coalition 97
THE ULBRICHT ERA, 1949-71 98
Consolidation of the New State 100
Planned Economy 102
The Warsaw Pact and the National People's
Army 103
The Berlin Wall 104
The "Socialist State of the German Nation" 105
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC-FREE DEMOCRATIC
COALITION, 1969-82 106
Willy Brandt 106
Ostpolitik 107
Helmut Schmidt Ill
The Student Movement and Terrorism Ill
The Greens 113
THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC/ CHRISTIAN
SOCIALIST-FREE DEMOCRATIC COALITION,
1983- 114
THE HONECKER ERA, 1971-89 116
The Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe 117
The New East German Constitution and the
Question of Identity 118
Relations Between the Two Germanys 119
The Peace Movement and Internal Resistance .... 122
The Last Days of East Germany 1 23
OPENING OF THE BERLIN WALL AND UNIFICA-
TION 125
Chapter 3. The Society and Its Environment 131
David E. Mc Clave
PHYSICAL SETTING 134
Topography 135
Drainage 141
IX
Climate 142
The Environment 145
POPULATION 149
Historical Background 149
Fertility 152
Age-Gender Distribution 153
Mortality 154
Population Distribution and Urbanization 155
Immigration 157
Ethnic Minorities 162
WOMEN IN SOCIETY 1 64
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 167
HOUSING 170
RELIGION 172
Postwar Christianity 1 73
Judaism 179
Islam 180
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY 180
Social Structure 180
Social Mobility 187
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY 189
Chapter 4. Social Welfare, Health Care, and
Education 193
Christa Altenstetter
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND WELFARE PROGRAMS 198
Historical Development 198
Provisions of the Social Welfare System 202
Current Social Welfare Issues and Outlook for
the Future 210
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND MEDICAL
CARE 211
Development of the Health Care System 212
Health Insurance 215
Health Care Providers 217
Remuneration of Health Care Providers 220
Current Health Care Issues and Outlook for
the Future 222
EDUCATION 223
Historical Background 224
Educational Policy Making and Administration . . . 229
x
Educational Finances 230
The Education System 230
Education in the New Lander 238
Current Education Issues and Outlook for
the Future 240
Chapter 5. The Domestic Economy 245
W.R. Smyser
PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 249
History 249
The Social Market Economy 253
The Economic Miracle and Beyond 254
Unification and Its Aftermath 258
Structural and Technological Questions 264
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHER INSTI-
TUTIONS 267
The Federal Government Role 267
Land and Local Governments 271
Government Subsidies 272
Government Expenditures and the National
Debt 273
The Associations 274
THE CULTURE OF GERMAN MANAGEMENT 276
LABOR AND CODETERMINATION 280
Labor 280
Code termination 282
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 283
Agriculture 283
Forestry 285
Fishing 285
INDUSTRY 286
Manufacturing 286
Energy and Natural Resources 288
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 289
The Bundesbank 289
Banking and Its Role in the Economy 292
Nonbank Financing 296
OTHER SERVICES 297
Transportation 297
Telecommunications 302
Tourism 303
xi
Chapter 6. International Economic Relations 305
W.R. Smyser
GERMANY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 308
Germany in World Finance and in the Group
of Seven 308
The Deutsche Mark as an International
Currency 313
GERMANY IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY 316
Germany in the European Community 316
The European Single Market 319
Germany and the European Union 322
Germany in the European Monetary System 322
Germany and the European Monetary Union .... 329
FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 336
Trade Philosophy and the Trade Balance 336
International Investment in and by Germany 340
FOREIGN AID 342
Chapter 7. Government and Politics 345
Karen E. Donfried
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 348
The Constitution 348
Federalism 349
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 351
The President 351
The Chancellor and the Cabinet 353
The Legislature 356
The Judiciary 362
The Civil Service 365
Land and Local Government 366
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 369
POLITICAL PARTIES 373
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union 375
Social Democratic Party of Germany 378
Free Democratic Party 381
The Greens 383
The Republikaner and the German People's
Union 386
Party of Democratic Socialism 388
EXTRAPARTY POLITICAL FORCES 389
xii
Business and Industry 390
Labor Unions 391
The Churches 393
Agriculture 395
Citizens' Initiative Associations 396
THE MASS MEDIA 398
Newspapers 398
Radio and Television 399
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE UNIFICATION .... 401
Chapter 8. Foreign Relations 413
Jeffrey Gedmin
MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND STRATEGIES ... 417
Early Developments . . 417
Postwar Developments 418
Unification 419
Foreign Reaction to Unification 426
Postunification Developments 428
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 431
Institutional Framework 431
Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy 432
The Out-of-Area Debate 436
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 439
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 439
Western European Union 442
Eurocorps 444
European Union 446
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe 451
United Nations 454
Chapter 9. National Security 457
Jean R. Tartter
MILITARY TRADITION 462
Early History 462
Prussia's Emergence as a Military Power 463
The German Military in Two World Wars 465
Creation of the Bundeswehr 467
STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND MILITARY MISSIONS 468
THE ARMED FORCES 471
Command and Control 471
xiii
Army 472
Navy 477
Air Force 480
Training 481
Reserves 485
Morale 485
INTEGRATION OF EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES .... 487
DEFENSE BUDGET 489
MILITARYJUSTICE 490
UNIFORMS, RANKS, AND INSIGNIA 491
CITIZENS IN UNIFORM 495
Personnel Policies 496
Service Obligations 497
Benefits 498
DEFENSE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT 499
FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS 502
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS 503
INTERNAL SECURITY. 504
Federal Police Agencies 507
Land Police Agencies 508
Criminal Justice 511
Incidence of Crime and Incarceration 512
Dissidence and Terrorist Activity 513
Appendix. Tables 519
Bibliography 545
Glossary 595
Index 603
Contributors 639
List of Figures
1 Administrative Divisions of Germany, 1995 xxxvi
2 The Carolingian Empire Divided by the Treaty of
Verdun, A.D. 843 10
3 Germany at the Time of the Protestant Reformation
in the Sixteenth Century 18
4 The German Struggle for Unification, 1815-71 34
5 The Weimar Republic, 1918-33 52
xiv
6 Germany, 1949-90 88
7 Topography and Drainage 138
8 Population by Age and Gender, 1992 156
9 Structure of the Education System, 1994 232
10 Economic Activity, 1995 290
11 Transportation System, 1995 300
12 Inland Waterways, 1995 301
13 Structure of the Government, 1995 352
14 Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1995 474
15 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1995 492
16 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1995 493
xv
Preface
Like its predecessors, East Germany: A Country Study and Fed-
eral Republic of Germany: A Country Study, this study attempts to
review Germany's history and treat in a concise and objective
manner its dominant social, political, economic, and military
aspects. Sources of information included books, scholarly jour-
nals, foreign and domestic newspapers, official reports of gov-
ernment and international organizations, and numerous
periodicals on German and international affairs.
The name Germany is used in three senses: first, it refers to
the region in Central Europe commonly regarded as constitut-
ing Germany, even when there was no central German state, as
was the case for most of Germany's history; second, it refers to
the unified German state established in 1871 and existing until
1945; and third, since October 3, 1990, it refers to the united
Germany, formed by the accession on this date of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) to the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany). The name Fed-
eral Republic of Germany refers to West Germany from its found-
ing on May 23, 1949, until German unification on October 3,
1990. After this date, it refers to united Germany. For the sake
of brevity and variety, the Federal Republic of Germany is often
called simply the Federal Republic.
The Federal Republic of Germany consists of sixteen states
(Lander; sing., Land). Five of these Lander date from July 1990,
when the territory of the German Democratic Republic was
once again divided into Lander. For this reason, when discuss-
ing events since unification, Germans frequently refer to the
territory of the former East Germany as the new or eastern
Lander and call that of the former West Germany the old or
western Lander. For the sake of convenience and variety, the
text often follows this convention to distinguish eastern from
western Germany.
Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book, and
brief comments on some of the more valuable sources recom-
mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter.
A Glossary also is included.
Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases
those approved by the United States Board on Geographic
Names. Exceptions are the use of the conventional English
xvii
names for a few important cities, rivers, and geographic
regions. A list of these names is found in Table A.
Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion
table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric mea-
surements (see table 1, Appendix).
The body of the text reflects information available as of
August 1995. Certain other portions of the text, however, have
been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events
that have occurred since the completion of research, the Coun-
try Profile and Glossary include updated information as avail-
able, and the Bibliography lists recently published sources
thought to be particularly helpful to the reader.
xviii
Table A. English Equivalents of Selected German Place-Names
English German
Baltic Sea Ostsee
Bavaria Bayern
Bavarian Forest Bayerischer Wald
Black Forest Schwarzwald
Bohemian Forest Bohmer Wald
Cologne Koln
Constance, Lake Bodensee
Danube Donau
Hanover Hannover
Hesse Hessen
Lower Saxony Niedersachsen
North Sea Nordsee
Nuremberg Nurnberg
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Moselle Mosel
Munich Munchen
North Rhine-Westphalia Nordrhein-Westfalen
Rhine Rhein
Rhineland-Palatinate Rheinland-Pfalz
Saxony Sachsen
Saxony-Anhalt Sachsen-Anhalt
Thuringia Thuringen
xix
Table B. Selected Abbreviations
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (Federation of German Indus-
try)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Federation of German Trade Unions)
DIHT Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag (German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce)
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defence Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EMS European Monetary System
EMU European Monetary Union
ERM exchange-rate mechanism
EU European Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR German Democratic Republic
GKV Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (statutory health insurance)
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
MfS Ministerium fur Stadtssicherheit (Ministry for State Security)
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NVA Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PfP Partnership for Peace
RAF Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Ger-
many)
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many)
SS Schutz-Staffel (Guard Detachment)
Stasi Staatssicherheitsdienst (State Security Service)
WEU Western European Union
xxi
Table C. Chronobgy of Important Events
Period
Description
ANCIENT PERIOD
ca. 500 B.C.-A.D. 100
ca. A.D. 100-600
MEDIEVAL GERMANY (500-1517)
Merovingian Dynasty (ca. 500-751'
Carolingian Dynasty (752-911)
Saxon Dynasty (919-1024)
Salian Dynasty (1024-1125)
Germanic tribes settle in Germania. Roman army
defeated bySuevian tribe at Battle of the Teuto-
burg Forest in A.D. 9 and pushed west of Rhine
River. Romans subsequently reconquer some ter-
ritory up to Rhine and Danube rivers and con-
struct fordfied fronders.
Migration of Germanic peoples. Collapse of western
Roman Empire. Last Roman emperor, Romulus
Augustus, deposed in 476 by German armies led
by Odovacar. Frankish tribes setde Gaul (France);
Lombards settle northern Italy, Anglo-Saxons set-
tle Britain.
Merovingian kings rule Frankish tribes. Clovis,
Frankish king (486-511), rules over Gaul's mixed
Germanic-Roman people. Pepin the Younger,
Frankish king (741-68), founds Carolingian
Dynasty in 752. Chrisdanization of Germany
under leadership of Saint Boniface (ca. 675-754).
Frankish rule reaches from Spanish marches into
central Germany. Charlemagne, Frankish king
(768-814) , conquers Lombardy in 774. Caroling-
ian Empire established 800; Charlemagne
crowned Holy Roman Emperor by pope. Louis I
(Louis the Pious) Holy Roman Emperor 814-40.
Treaty of Verdun (843) divides Carolingian
Empire among three of Charlemagne's grand-
sons. Germany, France, and Middle Kingdom
delineated, and imperial dde linked with Middle
Kingdom. Louis II (Louis the German) rules east
Frankish tribes (843-76). Charles EI (Charles the
Fat), German king (876-87) and Holy Roman
Emperor 881. Arnulf of Carinthia, German king
(887-99) and Holy Roman Emperor 896. Barbar-
ian invasions weaken Carolingian rule; German
duchies of Franconia, Saxony, Lorraine, Swabia,
and Bavaria rise to power. Louis rV, German king
(900-91 1) . Conrad I (Conrad of Franconia)
elected German king (911-18) following exdnc-
tion of Carolingian Empire in the east.
Frankish and Saxon nobles elect Henry I German
king (919-36). Subordination of duchies. Otto I
(Otto the Great) , German king (936-73), gains
control of Middle Kingdom, and Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nadon begins with his
coronadon as emperor in 962. German empire
extends to Elbe River and southeast to Vienna.
Otto II, Holy Roman Emperor (973-83) . Otto HI,
Holy Roman Emperor (996-1002). Henry II,
Holy Roman Emperor (1014-24).
Conrad II, Duke of Franconia, founds Salian
Dynasty, elected Holy Roman Emperor (1027-
39). Henry ffl, Holy Roman Emperor (1046-56).
Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor (1084-1106),
Table C. Chronology of Important Events
Period
Description
Hohenstaufen Dynasty (1138-1254)
Early Habsburg Dynasty (1273-
1519)
PROTESTANT REFORMATION AND
RELIGIOUS WARS (1517-1648)
challenges Pope Gregory VII. Investiture Contest
and civil war, 1075-1122; German empire weak-
ens, and German princes begin rise to power.
Henry V, Holy Roman Emperor (1111-25). Com-
promise Concordat of Worms (1122) setdes
papal-imperial struggle. Lothar HI, Saxon noble,
elected Holy Roman Emperor (1133-37).
Hohenstaufen kings struggle to restore imperial
authority. Conrad III elected German king
(1138-52). Frederick I (Frederick Barbarossa),
Holy Roman Emperor (1155-90), seeks long and
unsuccessfully to establish order and stability in
the empire. Beginning of Age of Chivalry,
marked by high achievements in literature. Ital-
ian expeditions to regain imperial control of Mid-
dle Kingdom. Henry VI, Holy Roman Emperor
(1191-97). Civil war (1198-1214). Frederick H,
Holy Roman Emperor (1220-50), restores impe-
rial administration in Italy and Sicily, but German
princes gain concessions. Imperial statute of 1232
establishes secular and ecclesiasdcal princes as
virtually independent rulers within their own ter-
ritories (principalities). Great Interregnum,
1256-73; anarchy and civil war. German princes
gain power and vie for imperial title.
Rudolf of Habsburg elected German king (1273-
91) ; acquires Austria and Styria in 1282 and
makes Habsburgs strongest German dynasty.
Adolf of Nassau elected German king (1292-98).
Albert I (Habsburg) elected German king (1298-
1308). Henry VTI of Luxembourg, Holy Roman
Emperor (1312-13), founds dynasty that seriously
rivals Habsburgs from its power base in Bohemia.
Louis TV (Louis the Bavarian) of House of Wit-
telsbach, Holy Roman Emperor (1328-47).
Charles TV of Luxembourg, Holy Roman
Emperor (1355-78), issues Golden Bull of 1356,
which grants German princes power to elect
emperor and provides basic constitution of Holy
Roman Empire. Wenceslas of Bohemia, German
king (1378-1400). Rupert of Palatinate, German
king (1400-10); Sigismund of Luxembourg, Ger-
man king (1410-37) , Holy Roman Emperor
(1433-37), last non-Habsburg emperor until
1742; with this one exception, Habsburgs of Aus-
tria provide all emperors from mid-fifteenth cen-
tury until dissolution of Holy Roman Empire in
1806. Frederick HI, Holy Roman Emperor (1452-
93). Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor (1508-
1519).
Martin Luther posts his ninety-five theses in Witten-
berg in 1517 and challenges papal authority.
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (1519-56). Pub-
lication in 1520 of Luther's three revolutionary
pamphlets. Luther banned by church and empire
in 1521. Charles V's wars against France in 1521-
26, 1526-29, 1536-38, and 1542^4. Vienna
threatened by Turks in 1529. Diet of Augsburg,
xxiv
Table C. Chronology of Important Events
Period
Description
AGE OF ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUT-
ISM AND FRENCH INVASION
(1648-1815)
REACTION, REVOLUTION, AND
GERMAN UNIFICATION (1815-
71)
1530; Protestant "Augsburg Confession" pre-
sented, and Protestant League of Schmalkalden
formed by German princes. War of Schmalkalden
(1546-47) between Charles V and Protestant
princes. Peace of Augsburg, 1555; Catholicism
and Lutheranism formally recognized in Ger-
many, and each prince given right to decide reli-
gion to be practiced in his territory. Ferdinand I,
Holy Roman Emperor (1558-64). Maximilian II,
Holy Roman Emperor (1564-76). Ferdinand II,
Holy Roman Emperor (1619-37). Rudolf II, Holy
Roman Emperor (1576-1612). Matthias, Holy
Roman Emperor (1612-19). Bohemian Revolt,
1618; imperial armies defeat Bohemians at Batde
of White Mountain near Prague in 1620. Thirty
Years' War (1618-48) ; Treaty of Prague signed in
1635; continuation of war by France; Treaty of
Westphalia, 1648. End of Holy Roman Empire as
a major European power.
Frederick William, the Great Elector of Branden-
burg-Prussia (1640-88), of Hohenzollern
Dynasty, establishes absolute rule. Frederick I,
elector of Brandenburg-Prussia (1688-1713),
assumes tide of king in 1701. Frederick William I,
Prussian king (1713-40), creates Prussian civil
and military bureaucracy. Frederick II (Frederick
the Great), Prussian king (1740-86), reforms his
country as enlightened despot. War of the Aus-
trian Succession (1740-48) and Seven Years' War
( 1756-63) against Austria under Maria Theresa
(1740-80) expand Prussian territory. Frederick
William II, Prussian king (1786-97). Frederick
William IE, Prussian king (1797-1840). French
invade Rhineland in 1792 and eventually control
Germany. Prussia, Austria, and Russia defeat
Napoleon at Batde of Leipzig in 1813.
Congress of Vienna (1814—15) after Napoleon's
defeat in War of Liberation (1813-15) establishes
German Confederation of thirty-seven states.
Prince Clemens von Metternich, Austrian chan-
cellor and foreign minister (1809-48) , heads con-
federation. Reversion to old order of social
distinctions under Age of Metternich. Struggle
between absolutism and liberalism. Student
unions agitate for democratic reform. Carlsbad
Decrees (1819) outlaw radical student organiza-
tions. Weimar, Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemberg
enact constitutions, 1818-19. "July Revolution" in
France, 1830, sparks revolutionary movements in
Germany, Hesse and Saxony enact constitutions.
Brunswick, Hanover, and Oldenburg enact con-
stitutions in 1833. Zollverein (Customs Union)
created in 1834. March 1848 revolution in Ger-
many. National Assembly at Frankfurt ( 1848-49)
plans constitutional German nation-state.
Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Prussian king (1840-58),
refuses German crown in 1849; National Assem-
bly dissolved. German Confederation restored in
1851. Prussia agrees to relinquish plans for a Ger-
XXV
Table C. Chronology of Important Events
Period Description
man union under its leadership in Treaty of
Olmutz. Wilhelm I, Prussian king (1858-88);
Otto von Bismarck, chancellor (1862-90), unites
Germany. Constitutional struggle, 1862-66; Prus-
sian king vies with German liberals in parliament
on issue of budget for military expansion; Prussia
defeats Austria in Seven Weeks' War (1866); Ger-
man Confederation dissolved, and Austria
excluded from German politics. Austria-Hungary
(also known as Austro-Hungarian Empire) cre-
ated in 1867. North German Confederation
formed, headed by Prussia. Franco-Prussian War,
1870-71. Germany united as nation-state — Ger-
man Empire.
IMPERIAL GERMANY (187 1-1 918) Wilhelm I, German emperor (1871-88). Bismarck,
chancellor (1871-90). Kulturkampf against
Roman Catholic Church begins in 1873. Antiso-
cialist legislation enacted 1878. Dual Alliance
(1879) between Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Domestic alliance between aristocrats and indus-
trialists in Tariff Agreement of 1879. Comprehen-
sive social legislation program begins in 1881.
Triple Alliance (1882) among Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy. German colonies established
1884-85 in South-West Africa, Togo, the Came-
roons, East Africa, and some Pacific islands. Fred-
erick HI, German emperor (March 9-June 15,
1888). Wilhelm II, German emperor (1888-
1918). Bismarck's fall, 1890. Leo von Caprivi,
chancellor (1890-94). Prince Chlodwig zu
Hohenlohe, chancellor 1894-1900. Naval Bill
(1898) begins naval race against Britain. Bern-
hard von Bulow, chancellor ( 1900-09) . Moroccan
crisis, 1905, in which Germany intervenes in
French and British sphere of influence. Theobald
von Bethmann Hollweg, chancellor (1909-17).
Moroccan crisis, 1911, in which Germany sends
gunboat to port of Agadir. New Naval Bill, 1912.
Balkan Wars, 1912-13, a nationalist rebellion
against Ottoman rule. Assassination of Austria's
Archduke Franz Ferdinand (June 28, 1914) in
Sarajevo starts events that culminate in World
War I (1914-18); Germany defeated.
WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1918-33) November Revolution, 1918; Wilhelm IPs abdica-
tion. Social Democrats proclaim republic. Sup-
pression of left-wing revolt by army in January
1919. Treaty of Versailles, 1919. Social Democrat
Friedrich Ebert elected president (1919-25).
Right-wing Kapp Putsch attempted, 1920. Com-
munist revolts in central Germany, Hamburg, and
Ruhr district, 1921. Astronomical inflation, 1922-
23. Occupation of Ruhr by French and Belgian
troops, 1923. Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch attempted
in Munich, 1923. Gustav Stresemann, chancellor
(August-November 1923) and foreign minister
(1923-29), formulates policy of rapprochement
with West. Dawes Plan on reparations, 1924.
French and Belgian troops withdrawn from Ruhr,
xxvi
Table C. Chronology of Important Events
Period Description
1925. Paul von Hindenburg, World War I army
commander, elected president (1925-34).
Locarno treaties, 1925, and Treaty of Berlin with
Soviet Union, 1926. Germany joins League of
Nations, 1926. Young Plan on reparations, 1929;
Allied troops withdrawn from Rhineland, 1930.
Economic depression and cabinet crises, 1929-
33. Heinrich Bruning, chancellor 1930-32; gov-
ernment by decree (Article 48 of Weimar Consti-
tution). Franz von Papen, chancellor (May-
December 1932); Hitler's National Socialists win
Reichstag elections and emerge as Germany's
strongest political party, July 1932. Kurt von
Schleicher, chancellor (December 1932-January
1933). President Hindenburg appoints Hitler to
chancellorship, January 30, 1933.
THIRD REICH (1933-45) Reichstag fire; Hitler demands presidential emer-
gency decree, February 1933. Enabling Act
accords Hitler's cabinet dictatorial powers, March
1933. Germany declared one-party National
Socialist state, July 1933. Death of Hindenburg,
August 1934; Hider combines offices of president
and chancellor. German rearmament, 1935.
Rhineland remilitarized and Berlin-Rome Axis
formed, 1936. At secret conference, Hitler
announces intention to begin eastward expan-
sion, November 1937. Austrian Anschluss (annex-
ation), March 1938. Czechoslovak Sudetenland
annexed, October 1938. Germany occupies
Czech-populated provinces of Bohemia and
Moravia, March 1939. Poland invaded, Septem-
ber 1939. World War II (1939-45). Germany
defeated.
POSTWAR DIVISION (1945-90) Yalta Conference (February 1945) determines divi-
sion of Germany into occupation zones. Three
zones under United States, British, and French
control become Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany) in 1949. Soviet zone becomes
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
same year. Konrad Adenauer of Christian Demo-
cratic Union elected first chancellor of West Ger-
many (1949-63); Walter Ulbricht of Socialist
Unity Party of Germany appointed head of East
Germany (1949-71). West German economic
boom in 1950s; Stalinization of East Germany in
same period. Both states remilitarized in mid-
1950s; West Germany becomes member of North
Adantic Treaty Organization (NATO), East Ger-
many joins Warsaw Pact. Treaty of Rome creating
European Economic Community (EEC) signed,
1957, with West Germany as member. Berlin Wall
built by East Germany (1961). Social Democrat
Willy Brandt elected West German chancellor
(1969-74); Ulbricht dismissed, and Erich
Honecker named East German head (1971-89).
Brandt's Ostpolitik results in treaties with Soviet
Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Four Power
Agreement on Berlin. Basic Treaty between East
Germany and West Germany recognizes two Ger-
xxvii
Table C. Chronology of Important Events
Period Description
man states, 1972. Admission of both Germanys to
United Nations, 1973. Social Democrat Helmut
Schmidt replaces Brandt as West German chan-
cellor (1974-82). Christian Democrat Helmut
Kohl becomes West German chancellor (1982- ).
Helsinki Final Act signed, July 1975. NATO's
Dual-Track Decision announced, December
1979. Single European Act signed, December
1985. Growing economic difficulties and internal
opposition, coupled with Mikhail Gorbachev's
attempts to reform Soviet Union and its empire
and his decision not to intervene militarily in East
German affairs, lead to collapse of East German
regime, late 1989-early 1990.
UNITED GERMANY (1990- ) Rapid path to unification of the two German states
according to provisions of Article 23 of Basic Law
chosen by popular pressure. First free elecdons in
East Germany end with Chrisdan Democratic vic-
tory, March 1990. Economic and currency union
established between West Germany and East Ger-
many, July 1, 1990. At meeting with Kohl in Soviet
Union, Gorbachev agrees that united Germany
may remain in NATO and Soviet troops will leave
East Germany in four years, July 1990. Treaty on
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany
(the Two-Plus-Four Treaty) establishing Ger-
many's full sovereignty signed, September 1990.
Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and
Cooperadon between West Germany and Soviet
Union signed, September 1990. Germany united,
October 3, 1990. First all-German Bundestag elec-
tion held; Christian Democratic victory, Decem-
ber 1990. Maastricht Treaty signed, December
1991. Article 16 of Basic Law amended, restrict-
ing right to asylum in Germany, July 1993. Euro-
pean Union established, November 1993. Federal
Constitutional Court decides that Bundeswehr
may participate in international military opera-
tions outside of NATO territory, provided that
Bundestag approves, July 1994. Last Russian
troops leave Germany, August 1994. Second all-
German Bundestag election held; Christian Dem-
ocratic victory, October 1994.
Country Profile
Country
Formal Name: Federal Republic of Germany.
Short Form: Germany or Federal Republic.
Term for Citizen(s): German(s).
Capital: Berlin.
XXIX
Geography
Size: 356,959 square kilometers.
Topography: Terrain rises from northern coastal lowlands to
belt of central uplands, complex and varied in form. To south
of uplands, a high plain suddenly rises to Alps in country's
extreme south. Most important rivers: Rhine, flowing to north;
Elbe, flowing to northwest; and Danube, flowing to southeast.
Climate: Cool, continental climate with abundant rainfall and
long overcast season. Lower temperatures with considerable
snowfall in east and south. Prone to rapid weather variations
from merging of Gulf Stream and extreme northeastern
climate conditions.
Society
Population: 81,338,000 (July 1995 estimate) with growth rate of
0.26 percent (July 1995 estimate).
Ethnic Groups: 95.1 percent German, 2.3 percent Turkish, 1.7
percent Italian, 0.4 percent Greek, and 0.4 percent Polish;
remainder mainly refugees from former Yugoslavia.
Languages: Standard German, with substantial differences in
regional dialects. Three very small linguistic minorities, which
speak Sorbian, Danish, or Frisian.
Religion: Protestants, mostly in Evangelical Church in
Germany, 30 million; Roman Catholics, 28.2 million; Muslims,
2.5 million; free churches, 195,000; and Jews, 34,000.
Education and Literacy: 99 percent literacy rate in population
over age fifteen (1991 estimate). Education compulsory until
age eighteen. At age ten, after primary school (Grundschule) ,
students attend one of five schools: short-course secondary
school (Hauptschule); intermediate school (Realschule); high
school ( Gymnasium) ; comprehensive school ( Gesamtschule) ; or a
school for children with special educational needs (Sonder-
schule) . At about age fifteen, students choose among a variety of
vocational, technical, and academic schools. Higher education
consists of many kinds of technical colleges, advanced voca-
tional schools, and universities.
Health and Welfare: About 90 percent of population covered
by comprehensive compulsory insurance for sickness,
xxx
accidents, disability, long-term care, and retirement. Most of
remainder enrolled in voluntary insurance programs; the very
poor are covered by state-financed welfare programs. Quality of
medical care generally excellent. Comfortable pensions paid
according to life-time earnings and indexed to meet cost-of-
living increases. Wide variety of other social welfare benefits
managed by both government and private agencies available to
those in need. Life expectancy 76.6 years for total population
(73.5 years for males and 79.9 years for females) (1995
estimates). Infant mortality rate 6.3 deaths per 1,000 live births
(1995 estimate). Total fertility rate 1.5 children born per
woman (1995 estimate).
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1994 US$1,840 billion, or
about US$27,800 per capita. Real growth rate 2.4 percent,
inflation rate 3.0 percent, and unemployment rate 8.2 percent.
Agriculture: 3 percent of labor force and 1 percent of GDP in
1992. Main crops wheat, potatoes, sugar beets, and barley.
Industry: 38 percent of labor force and 38 percent of GDP in
1992. Products highly specialized goods, including machine
products of all varieties, chemicals, electrical products,
construction, food and beverages, lignite, textiles, and
petroleum and gas refining.
Services: 59 percent of labor force and 61 percent of GDP in
1992.
Exports: US$428 billion in 1994, mainly highly specialized
industrial products, including motor vehicles, machines,
electronic goods, and chemicals.
Imports: US$376 billion in 1994, including food, petroleum
products, manufactured goods, electrical products,
automobiles, and apparel.
Foreign Trade by Region: Imports in 1994: European Union
(EU) 47.6 percent, European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
14.0 percent, developing countries 11.5 percent, former
European communist bloc countries 8.1 percent, United States
and Canada 7.7 percent, Japan 5.6 percent, other dynamic
Asian economies 3.7 percent, and Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 2.0 percent. Exports
in 1994: EU 48.9 percent, EFTA 15.1 percent, developing
xxxi
countries 11.5 percent, United States and Canada 8.5 percent,
former European communist bloc countries 7.1, Japan 2.6
percent, other dynamic Asian economies 3.5 percent, and
OPEC 2.6 percent.
Balance of Payments: In 1994 trade balance US$52 billion;
current account showed deficit of US$20 billion; capital
account balance US$24 billion.
Fiscal Year: Calendar year.
Currency and Exchange Rate: Deutsche mark (DM) . In April
1996, exchange rate US$1 = DM1.51.
Transportation and Telecommunications
Roads: 226,000 kilometers in 1992, of which 11,000 kilometers
four lanes or more.
Railroads: 40,000 kilometers in 1994, of which 16,000
kilometers electrified.
Airports: 660 total. Twelve civilian airports provide passenger
and cargo service within country and to rest of world.
Ports: Several dozen large, well-equipped ocean and inland
ports.
Inland Waterways: 6,900 kilometers of navigable inland
waterways, including extensive system of canals. Inland
waterways account for about 20 percent of freight shipping.
Telecommunications: Highly developed, modern tele-
communications service linking all parts of the country and
connecting with systems abroad.
Government and Politics
Government: Basic Law of 1949, as amended, functions as
constitution. Federalist system whereby federal government
shares authority with sixteen state (Land; pi., Lander)
governments. Dual executive consists of chancellor, who is
head of government, and president, who is head of state. Two
federal legislative bodies form national parliament: Bundesrat
(Federal Council or upper house), consisting of sixty-nine
members appointed by Land governments in proportion to
population; and Bundestag (Federal Diet or lower house),
main legislative body, consisting of 672 popularly elected
xxxii
members. Chancellor is elected by Bundestag and functions as
prime minister in cabinet.
Politics: Since 1982 a conservative coalition in power con-
sisting of Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demo-
kratische Union — CDU); its sister party, Christian Social Union
(Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU), based in Bavaria; and Free
Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei — FDP). Oppo-
sition consists of Social Democratic Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD), Alliance
90/The Greens (Bundnis 90/Die Grunen), Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozia-lismus —
PDS), based mainly in territory of former German Democratic
Republic, and a number of very small parties. Federal elections
for Bundestag usually held every four years; Land and local
elections scattered throughout term of federal officeholders.
All citizens eighteen and older eligible to vote; high voter
turnout.
Judicial System: Independent judiciary using civil law system.
Highest court is Federal Constitutional Court.
International Affairs: Member of European Union (EU),
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, and Western
European Union (WEU).
National Security
Armed Forces: In October 1995, Federal Armed Forces
(Bundeswehr) consisted of army, navy, and air force, totaling
335,800, including 137,300 conscripts. Army personnel
amounted to 234,000, including 112,800 conscripts; navy
28,500, including 4,500 Naval Air Arm personnel and 5,800
conscripts; and air force 73,300, including 18,700 conscripts.
Reserves totaled 356,200 (337,100 in army, 12,600 in navy, and
6,500 in air force.). Enlisted personnel have reserve obligation
to age forty-five; officers and noncommissioned officers, to age
sixty.
Military Budget: In 1996, US$32.2 billion.
Internal Security Forces: Federal Border Force of 24,000 (early
1995) under Ministry of Interior. Trained and equipped as
xxxiii
light infantry, but duty does not include military activities.
Each Land maintains units of Readiness Police similarly
trained. Readiness Police can be moved across Land lines if
needed for emergency duty, such as during civil disturbances.
xxxiv
■ Brandenburg
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Hannover ^Saxony-7 ^-Berlin'*
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-> 1 ® ^ /
• Magdeburg ^
( < .J \
BELGIUM
North Rhine- ^
Westphalia S J ^'
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is
^"~i/~Sr- "Saarland W
LUXEMBOURG'\ Sa | rb / uc/(en )
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Stuttgart
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CZECH REPUBLIC
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AUSTRIA
Boundary
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Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Germany, 1995
xxx vi
Introduction
GERMANY WAS UNITED on October 3, 1990. Unification
brought together a people separated for more than four
decades by the division of Europe into two hostile blocs in the
aftermath of World War II. The line that divided the continent
ran through a defeated and occupied Germany. By late 1949,
two states had emerged in divided Germany: the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany), a member of
the Western bloc under the leadership of the United States;
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Ger-
many), part of the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union.
Although the two German states were composed of a people
speaking one language and sharing the same traditions, they
came to have the political systems of their respective blocs.
West Germany developed into a democratic capitalist state like
its Western neighbors; East Germany had imposed on it the
Soviet Union's communist dictatorship and command econ-
omy.
Although the leaders of each state were committed to the
eventual unification of Germany and often invoked its neces-
sity, with the passage of time the likely realization of unification
receded into the distant future. Relations between the two
states worsened during the 1950s as several million East Ger-
mans, unwilling to live in an increasingly Stalinized society, fled
to the West. August 1961 saw the sealing of the common Ger-
man border with the construction of the Berlin Wall. In the
early 1970s, however, diplomatic relations between the two
states were regularized by the Basic Treaty, signed in 1972. Dur-
ing the remainder of the decade and during the 1980s, rela-
tions improved, and contacts between the citizens of the two
states increased greatly. In 1987 Erich Honecker became the
first East German leader to make a state visit to West Germany.
As of the late 1980s, however, no well-informed observer
foresaw German unification as being likely in the near future.
In fact, its prospect seemed so remote that some politicians
advocated abandoning unification as a long-term goal. Those
who remained committed to Germany's ultimate unification
frankly admitted that decades would probably pass before it
happened.
xxxvn
The events leading to unification in October 1990 were
unexpected, and they occurred at a frantic pace. In the eleven
months between the opening of the Berlin Wall in November
1989 and unification, the forty-year-old East German dictator-
ship collapsed, Western political and economic systems were
introduced in the East, new treaties altered long-standing dip-
lomatic relationships between Germany and neighboring
states, and two radically different societies began to grow
together.
The rapid collapse of the East German regime surprised
everyone. East Germany appeared to be the most economically
successful of all Eastern-bloc countries. Its citizens enjoyed a
modest yet decent standard of living and cradle-to-grave secu-
rity provided by a government-run welfare system. They trav-
eled to other East European countries for their summer
vacations, watched West German television, and hoped for bet-
ter living conditions and more freedom in the future. Most
East Germans acquiesced in the communist regime's restric-
tions, having fashioned areas of personal freedom in their pri-
vate lives. A small opposition movement operated within the
shelter of the Protestant church, the country's sole relatively
independent social institution. When opposition figures
became too troublesome, the regime dealt with them by
depriving them of their livelihood, sending them to prison, or
expelling them to West Germany.
The regime's elderly, hard-line leadership opposed the
reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who sought to
make socialism more efficient by introducing capitalist incen-
tives and reducing central control. Encouraged by this liberal-
ization and the application of Gorbachev's reforms in
neighboring Poland and Hungary, the regime's opponents
became bolder during the summer and fall of 1989 and
mounted mass demonstrations that doubled and doubled
again in size from week to week.
Soviet officials advised the Honecker regime not to expect
outside support. Without foreign military assistance for the
first time, the GDR leadership decided against the use of force
to quell the burgeoning demonstrations. Honecker was ousted
in mid-October, and more realistic leaders sought to save the
regime by making concessions. In November travel abroad
became possible, and East Germans swarmed into West Ger-
many, many intending to remain there. Reforms could no
xxxviii
longer satisfy East Germans, however, who wanted the free-
doms and living standard of West Germany.
West German chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- ) seized the
political initiative in late November with his Ten-Point Plan for
unification. Yet, even he thought several years and an interven-
ing stage, such as a confederational structure, would be neces-
sary before unification of the two Germanys could occur. By
early 1990, however, the need to stop the massive flow of East
Germans westward made speedy unification imperative. In
addition, revolutionary change in other Eastern-bloc counties
made solutions that a short time earlier had appeared out of
the question suddenly seem feasible. The Treaty on Monetary,
Economic, and Social Union between the two German states
was signed in May and went into effect in July. The two Ger-
manys signed the Unification Treaty in August. The Treaty on
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, the so-called
Two-Plus-Four Treaty, was signed in September by the two Ger-
manys and the four victors of World War II — Britain, France,
the Soviet Union, and the United States. The treaty restored
full sovereignty to Germany and ended the Cold War era.
When unification occurred on October 3, 1990, it was a
happy, yet subdued occasion. The many problems of joining
such diverse societies were already apparent. The vaunted East
German economy was coming to be seen as a Potemkin's vil-
lage, with many of its most prestigious firms uncompetitive in a
market economy. East German environmental problems were
also proving much more serious than anyone had foreseen;
remedies would cost astronomical sums. West Germans had dis-
covered also that their long-lost eastern cousins differed from
them in many ways and that relations between them were often
rife with misunderstandings. A complete melding of the two
societies would take years, perhaps even a generation or two.
The legal unification arranged by the treaties of 1990 was only
the beginning of a long process toward a truly united Germany.
In its long history, Germany has rarely been united. For most
of the two millennia that central Europe has been inhabited by
German-speaking peoples, the area called Germany was
divided into hundreds of states, many quite small, including
duchies, principalities, free cities, and ecclesiastical states. Not
even the Romans united Germany under one government;
they managed to occupy only its southern and western por-
tions. At the beginning of the ninth century, Charlemagne
xxx IX
established an empire, but within a generation its existence was
more symbolic than real.
Medieval Germany was marked by division. As France and
England began their centuries-long evolution into united
nation-states, Germany was racked by a ceaseless series of wars
among local rulers. The Habsburg Dynasty's long monopoly of
the crown of the Holy Roman Empire provided only the sem-
blance of German unity. Within the empire, German princes
warred against one another as before. The Protestant Reforma-
tion deprived Germany of even its religious unity, leaving its
population Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist. These
religious divisions gave military strife an added ferocity in the
Thirty Years' War (1618-48), during which Germany was rav-
aged to a degree not seen again until World War II.
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 left Germany divided into
hundreds of states. During the next two centuries, the two larg-
est of these states — Prussia and Austria — -jockeyed for domi-
nance. The smaller states sought to retain their independence
by allying themselves with one, then the other, depending on
local conditions. From the mid-1 790s until Prussia, Austria, and
Russia defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 and
drove him out of Germany, much of the country was occupied
by French troops. Napoleon's officials abolished numerous
small states, and, as a result, in 1815, after the Congress of
Vienna, Germany consisted of about forty states.
During the next half-century, pressures for German unifica-
tion grew. Scholars, bureaucrats, students, journalists, and busi-
nessmen agitated for a united Germany that would bring with
it uniform laws and a single currency and that would replace
the benighted absolutism of petty German states with democ-
racy. The revolutions of 1848 seemed at first likely to realize
this dream of unity and freedom, but the monarch who was
offered the crown of a united Germany, King Friedrich Wil-
helm IV of Prussia, rejected it. The king, like the other rulers
of Germany's kingdoms, opposed German unity because he
saw it as a threat to his power.
Despite the opposition of conservative forces, German unifi-
cation came just over two decades later, in 1871, when Ger-
many was unified and transformed into an empire under
Emperor Wilhelm I, king of Prussia. Unification was not
brought about by revolutionary or liberal forces, but by a con-
servative Prussian aristocrat, Otto von Bismarck. Sensing the
power of nationalism, Bismarck sought to use it for his own
xl
aims, the preservation of a feudal social order and the triumph
of his country, Prussia, in the long contest with Austria for pre-
eminence in Germany. By a series of masterful diplomatic
maneuvers and three brief and dazzlingly successful military
campaigns, Bismarck achieved a united Germany without Aus-
tria. He brought together the so-called "small Germany," con-
sisting of Prussia and the remaining German states, some of
which had been subdued by Prussian armies before they
became part of a Germany ruled by a Prussian emperor.
Although united Germany had a parliament, the Reichstag,
elected through universal male suffrage, supreme power rested
with the emperor and his ministers, who were not responsible
to the Reichstag. Although the Reichstag could contest the gov-
ernment's decisions, in the end the emperor could largely gov-
ern as he saw fit. Supporting the emperor were the nobility,
large rural landowners, business and financial elites, the civil
service, the Protestant clergy, and the military. The military,
which had made unification possible, enjoyed tremendous
prestige. Led by an aristocratic officer corps sworn to feudal
values and opposed to parliamentary democracy and the rights
of a free citizenry, the military embodied the spirit of the Ger-
man Empire.
Opposition to this authoritarian regime with its feudal struc-
tures was found mainly in the Roman Catholic Center Party,
the Socialist Party, and in a variety of liberal and regional polit-
ical groups opposed to Prussia's hegemony over Germany. In
the long term, Bismarck and his successors were not able to
subjugate this opposition. By 1912 the Socialists had come to
have the largest number of representatives in the Reichstag.
They and the Center Party made governing increasingly diffi-
cult for the empire's conservative leadership.
Despite the presence of these opposition groups, however, a
truly representative parliamentary democracy did not exist. As
a result, Germans had little opportunity to learn the art of
practical politics. With few exceptions, this had also been the
case throughout German history. Although Germany's states
were usually well managed by an efficient and honest civil ser-
vice, they were authoritarian. Government was seen as the busi-
ness of the rulers; the ruled were to be obedient and silent.
Because they were inexperienced in democratic govern-
ment, Germans in the nineteenth century were often viewed as
political children, incapable of governing themselves. In addi-
tion, seeing the excesses of the French Revolution, many
xli
thoughtful Germans came to the conclusion that democracy
was not suitable for Germany. The success of democratic politi-
cal institutions in Britain and the United States did not con-
vince these skeptics; they feared that the passions of the
ignorant masses could too easily be inflamed. Even many Ger-
man liberals found the idea that ordinary citizens ought to
determine how public business should be conducted too radi-
cal a notion. Instead, they recommended that parliaments con-
sisting of the educated and the prosperous should serve as
advisory bodies to noble rulers.
Germany's defeat in World War I in 1918 meant the end of
the German Empire. The emperor was forced to abdicate, and
a republic — the Weimar Republic — was established with a con-
stitution that provided for a parliamentary democracy in which
the government was ultimately responsible to the people. The
new republic's first president and prime minister were con-
vinced democrats, and Germany seemed ready at last to join
the community of democratic nations.
The Weimar Republic ultimately disappointed those who
had hoped it would introduce democracy to Germany. By mid-
1933 it had been destroyed by Adolf Hitler, its declared enemy
since his first days in the public arena. Hitler was a political
genius who sensed and exploited the worries and resentments
of many Germans, knew when to act, and possessed a sure
instinct for power. His greatest weapon in his quest for political
power, however, was the disdain many Germans felt for the new
republic.
Many Germans held the Weimar Republic responsible for
Germany's defeat. At the war's end, no foreign troops stood on
German soil, and military victory still seemed likely. Instead of
victory, however, in the view of many, the republic's Socialist
politicians arranged a humiliating peace. Many Germans were
also affronted by the spectacle of parliamentary politics. The
republic's numerous small parties made forming stable and
coherent coalition governments very difficult. Frequent elec-
tions failed to yield effective governments. Government poli-
cies also often failed to solve pressing social and economic
problems.
These shortcomings undermined the legitimacy of the
Weimar Republic. The upper classes, the judiciary, the police,
the civil service, educators, the military, and much of the mid-
dle class gave the republic only halfhearted support at best.
Many members of these groups despised the republic and
xlii
wanted it replaced with an authoritarian system of government.
The early years of the Weimar Republic saw frequent attempts
to destroy it by force, mostly from the right, but also from the
left.
A modest economic recovery from 1924 to 1929 gave the
Weimar Republic a brief respite. The severe social stress engen-
dered by the Great Depression, however, swelled the vote
received by extreme antidemocratic parties in the election of
1930 and the two elections of 1932. The government ruled by
emergency decree. In January 1933, leading conservative poli-
ticians formed a new government with Hitler as chancellor.
They intended to harness him and his party, now the country's
largest, to realize their own aim of replacing the republic with
an authoritarian government. Within a few months, however,
Hitler had outmaneuvered them and established a totalitarian
regime. Only in 1945 did a military alliance of dozens of
nations succeed in deposing him, and only after his regime and
the nation it ruled had committed crimes of unparalleled enor-
mity.
In the aftermath of World War II, Germany came to consist
of two states. One, East Germany, never attained real legitimacy
in the eyes of its citizens and had to use force to prevent them
from fleeing to the West. The other, West Germany, was
resoundingly successful. Within two decades of defeat, it had
become one of the world's richest nations, with a prosperity
that extended to all segments of the population. The economy
performed so successfully that eventually several million for-
eigners came to West Germany to work as well. West German
and foreign workers alike were protected from need arising
from sickness, accidents, and old age by an extensive, mostly
nongovernment welfare system.
Along with this material success, a vigorous democracy devel-
oped. To avoid the Weimar Republic's weak coalition govern-
ments, the West German constitution, the Basic Law, permitted
only those parties with at least 5 percent of the vote to sit in the
Bundestag, the lower house of its parliament. This provision
meant that stable parliamentary governments could be formed
fairly easily, and efficient government became possible. In con-
trast to the Weimar Republic, the Basic Law banned political
parties opposed to democracy.
From the first national election in 1949, West German poli-
tics has been dominated by two large catchall parties (Volks-
parteien; sing., Volkspartei) , whose support came from voters
xliii
formerly allied to many smaller parties. The moderate Chris-
tian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union —
CDU), allied with its small sister party active in Bavaria, the
Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU), won
the votes of a broad range of Roman Catholic and Protestant
voters. For the first time in German history, members of the
two religions worked together to attain their political goals.
The CDU/CSU also had left and right wings, which had to
cooperate if the alliance were to win elections and exercise
power. After much debate, the CDU/CSU's various wings for-
mulated the concept of a social market economy — free-market
capitalism combined with an extensive social net. The CDU/
CSU alliance has successfully held together its diverse member-
ship and, with the exception of the 1969-82 period, has
headed all the Federal Republic's governments since 1949,
when CDU leader Konrad Adenauer became the country's first
chancellor.
The Federal Republic's other large popular party is the
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands — SPD), which receives much of the work-
ing-class vote. In the early years of the Federal Republic, the
SPD was feared by many voters because of its socialist aims.
With time, however, the party moderated its positions; for
example, it accepted West German rearmament in the mid-
1950s and came to support the social market economy. It also
won the trust of suspicious voters by participating in many local
and state {Land; pi., Lander) governments. After joining with
the CDU/CSU to form a coalition government at the national
level from 1966 to 1969, the SPD and the small, liberal Free
Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei — FDP) formed
a coalition government with SDP leader Willy Brandt as chan-
cellor. The SPD-FDP coalition lasted until 1982. In that year,
the FDP and the CDU/CSU formed a new coalition govern-
ment with Helmut Kohl as chancellor, a coalition still in power
in mid-1996.
Many observers maintain that German democracy is in a
transition stage. The SPD has lost its most steady source of sup-
port as an increasingly advanced economy has reduced the size
of the blue-collar working class. An increasingly secular and
sophisticated society has also cut into the CDU/CSU stable
pool of confessional voters. Thus, since the 1980s, the large
catchall parties have been confronted with an increasingly vola-
tile electorate. Both parties have experienced declining mem-
xliv
berships. As these parties have worked to woo a more diverse
electorate, they have moderated their stances to such a degree
that many voters have difficulty telling them apart.
Despite CDU losses in the October 1994 national elections,
the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition survived, but with a majority of
only ten seats. The SPD's share of the vote rose in these elec-
tions, but not enough to take power at the national level. The
SPD has been more successful in elections at the Land level in
recent years and has often controlled the Bundesrat, parlia-
ment's upper house. However, it lost its sole control of North
Rhine-Westphalia in the elections of May 1995 and did even
worse in October 1995 Land elections in Berlin. SPD leader
Rudolf Sharping was deposed a month later and replaced by
Oskar Lafontaine, who had led the party to defeat in the 1990
national elections. Lafontaine's resurrection did not appear to
solve the party's long-standing leadership problem because it
lost badly in the Land elections of March 1996 in Schleswig-
Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Baden-Wurttemberg.
As the two large parties face diminishing pools of secure
votes, growing numbers of young and educated voters have
come to support the ecological party, Alliance 90/The Greens
(Bundnis 90/Die Grunen), which, after having elected its first
representatives to the Bundestag in 1983, in 1994 became the
body's third-largest party, displacing the FDR As of mid-1996,
the Greens had a skilled leader, Joschka Fischer, who has trans-
formed the party from a group of apolitical idealists into a
highly pragmatic, but still principled, political force that exam-
ines nearly every facet of German life from a fresh standpoint.
Some observers hold that the party represents the future of
German politics.
The party displaced by the Greens, the FDP, has been a part-
ner in all coalition governments at the national level since
1969. Pledged to classic European liberal political values, the
FDP has distinguished itself by its advocacy of the legal rights of
the individual. In recent years, however, the party has struggled
for its survival because of leadership problems and because its
close embrace of the CDU/CSU has caused it to lose its politi-
cal identity in the eyes of many voters. By late 1995, the party
seemed on the verge of political extinction; it suffered a steep
drop in its vote in the national election of October 1994 and a
long string of losses in elections at the Land level. In March
1996, however, the FDP increased its vote and won seats in all
three Land elections held during the month. Although the
xlv
FDP was represented in only four Land parliaments as of mid-
1996, these election results allow the party to retain its role as a
coalition-maker in governments at the national level.
In addition to the Greens, another new party that has altered
German politics is the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei
des Demokratischen Sozialismus — PDS). Able to win votes only
in eastern Germany, the PDS has the support of voters who
regret the extent to which or the way in which East Germany
was swallowed up by the Federal Republic. Although the PDS is
the successor to East Germany's communist Socialist Unity
Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands — SED), it does not recommend that the East German
regime be restored. Rather, it demands that eastern German
interests be given greater respect by western Germans, who are
often seen as arrogant and overbearing by eastern Germans.
The PDS has thirty seats in the Bundestag and is represented in
the parliaments of the eastern Lander, but is not a partner in
any coalition. Because the PDS owes its success to the some-
times legitimate anger of easterners at how they have fared in a
united Germany, observers believe that the influence of the
PDS will wane as these Lander become more integrated into
united Germany.
In addition to the above parties, several small right-wing par-
ties are politically active. None have representatives in the
Bundestag. The Republikaner, which at about 25,000 members
is the largest of these parties, has representatives in the Baden-
Wurttemberg parliament after winning 11 percent of the vote
in 1992 and 9 percent of the vote in elections there in March
1996. The campaigns of these right-wing parties are based
mainly on a fervid nationalism and a dislike of Germany's for-
eign residents. They stop short of clearly espousing Hitlerian
doctrines, however, because doing so would mean their being
banned and their leaders possibly being imprisoned.
In addition to parties of the extreme right, authorities esti-
mate that a few thousand violent right-wing extremists are
active within Germany. Most are disaffected young males with
few job prospects. Although comparatively few in number in a
country of 80 million, they have received international atten-
tion when they have attacked or killed foreign workers living in
Germany or vandalized Jewish cemeteries or synagogues. The
world's alarm at such occurrences is easily understandable,
given Germany's history in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Yet few observers believe that these extreme right-wing
xlvi
elements pose a threat to German democracy or have any
chance of gaining political influence, let alone coming to
power.
Germans of the late twentieth century differ greatly from
those of its first half. The extreme nationalism of the interwar
period finds little support in the Germany of the 1990s, for
example. Unlike Germany's failure to achieve victory in World
War I, which to many Germans of the interwar period
appeared to have been caused by the treachery of Socialist pol-
iticians rather than by military defeat, Germany's uncondi-
tional surrender in 1945 was obviously unavoidable given the
military situation at the war's end. Moreover, because Hitler
clearly started the war, Germany is judged, to some extent at
least, to have deserved its terrible consequences. Thus, in con-
trast to Germans of the interwar period, few postwar Germans
have demanded revenge for Germany's sufferings or advocated
the seizure of lost territory. This absence of an aggressive
nationalism can be seen in the foreign policy of the Federal
Republic. Unlike the diplomacy of the empire and the Hitler
regime, this foreign policy has always had as its first principle
multilateralism, a principle realized through Germany's active
membership in a great variety of international organizations.
Germans have also become convinced democrats. They
understand and appreciate the workings of parliamentary
democracy with its loyal opposition, concessions, and the
peaceful passing of power from one government to another;
they know the importance of an independent judiciary in pro-
tecting individual rights; and they value a free and powerful
press. Under a democratic system of government, West Ger-
mans have experienced the most successful period of German
history, and, whatever the system's failings, they are unwilling
to reject it for panaceas of earlier eras. Eastern Germans are
now learning Western democratic values after decades of polit-
ical repression. Having experienced a multitude of political
and economic disasters under totalitarian regimes of the right
and the left, Germans have matured and become political
adults no longer susceptible to the Utopian promises of dema-
gogues.
Germany does face some serious challenges in the second
half of the 1990s and in the new century. The most immediate
challenge is to fully integrate eastern Germany and its inhabit-
ants into the advanced social market economy and society of
western Germany.
xlvii
As of mid-1996, much had already been done to foster the
formation of a strong eastern economy and to bring its compo-
nents up to global standards. In the 1990-95 period, more than
US$650 billion had been transferred from western Germany to
eastern Germany. This enormous financial infusion has mark-
edly improved eastern living standards, and specialists believe
that by the late 1990s, the east's infrastructure will be the most
advanced in Europe. Unemployment in eastern Germany has
consistently remained at about 15 percent, however, about one-
third above the national level, despite eastern growth rates
about three times higher than those in western Germany. Many
of the older jobless are not likely to find employment compara-
ble to what they had under the communist system. Yet, many
eastern Germans have fared well in the new economy and have
adapted well to its demands.
Achieving complete social unification is expected to take a
generation or two. Decades of life in diverse societies have cre-
ated two peoples with different attitudes. Easterners are gener-
ally less ambitious and concerned with their careers than their
western counterparts. Their more relaxed work ethic some-
times raises the ire of western Germans. Many easterners also
take offense at what has seemed to them arrogant or patroniz-
ing attitudes of westerners. The "implosion" of East Germany
in 1990 prevented a slower, more nuanced introduction of
Western institutions and habits of thought to the east that
would have resulted in fewer bruised feelings. Polls of recent
years have found a growing convergence of beliefs and opin-
ions between the two peoples, however, a trend almost certain
to continue.
The most serious problem confronting Germany in the long
term is one faced by all advanced, high-wage industrial coun-
tries — how to meet the challenges posed by an increasingly glo-
balized economy in which highly skilled workers of lesser
developed countries are available at one-tenth the wages of
wealthy countries. For Germany these countries are not located
only in Asia, but next door in the former Eastern bloc. By the
1990s, German wages were among the world's highest, some 50
percent higher than those of the United States, for example.
Germany's extensive social safety net is a principal reason for
its high wage cost, yet no political party can expect to signifi-
cantly cut into social programs and retain the favor of voters.
In addition to high wages, the German economy faces struc-
tural problems because the areas in which it has long been
xlviii
strongest — the chemical industry and machine production, for
example — are not areas in which most future economic growth
will occur. Having been so successful in their traditional fields
of expertise, German businessmen are somewhat conservative,
not given to risky entrepreneurship, and have not invested in
new areas such as computers and biotechnology. Economists
see little reason to believe that Germany can overtake the lead-
ers in these fields, most notably the United States and Japan.
Germany also faces serious demographic problems. Popula-
tion growth in recent decades has been slow; in many years, the
number of Germans has actually declined because the birth
rate has been so low. Given this long-standing trend, specialists
wonder how Germans will continue to maintain their generous
pension system, an unfunded system that operates on the pay-
as-you-go principle, according to which retirees are supported
by today's workers. If present trends continue, by 2030 the ratio
of retirees to workers will be one to one.
An obvious solution to this problem is to import workers.
However, because Germans do not regard their country as a
nation of immigrants, importing workers is not currently seen
as a politically acceptable solution. As of the mid-1990s, Ger-
many had about 7 million foreign residents, including 2 mil-
lion Muslims, and more foreign workers are not wanted.
Germany has not yet successfully integrated the foreigners
already on its soil: archaic immigration laws make it difficult to
became a German citizen, and xenophobic attitudes of many
Germans often make foreign residents, even those born and
raised in the country and speaking perfect German, feel
unwanted. In time, demographic realities may cause Germans
to view more favorably the permanent presence of a substantial
non-German population and lead them to adopt more liberal
notions of citizenship.
Unification and the ending of the Cold War have meant that
Germany must adjust itself to a new international environ-
ment. The disastrous failures of German foreign policy in the
first half of the twentieth century have caused Germans to
approach this challenge warily. Until the demise of the Soviet
Union, Germans could enjoy the certainties of the Cold War,
both they and their neighbors secure in the knowledge that the
superpowers would contain any possible German aggression.
Throughout the postwar era, West Germany was a model cit-
izen of the community of nations, content to be the most
devoted participant in the movement toward Europe's eco-
xlix
nomic and social unification. West German politicians shared
the fears of their foreign neighbors of a resurgent, aggressive
Germany and sought to ensure their country's containment by
embedding it in international organizations. In the mid-1950s,
for example, West Germany rearmed, but as a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) .
Since the end of the Cold War, however, united Germany has
occupied an exposed position in Central Europe, with settled,
secure neighbors in the west and unpredictable and insecure
neighbors to the east. Because of this exposure, German policy
makers wish to extend the European Union (EU — see Glos-
sary) and NATO eastward, at a minimum bringing Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary into both organizations. In the
German view, these countries could serve as a buffer between
Germany and uncertain developments in Russia and other
members of the former Soviet Union. At the same time as this
so-called widening of West European institutions is being
undertaken, Germany is working for their deepening by press-
ing for increased European unity. As of mid-1996, Helmut Kohl
remained the continent's most important advocate of realizing
a common European currency through the European Mone-
tary Union (EMU — see Glossary) by the turn of the century.
However unrealistic this timetable may prove to be, in the post-
war era Germany has steadfastly worked to realize German
writer Thomas Mann's ideal of a Europeanized Germany and
rejected his nightmare of a Germanized Europe.
June 19, 1996 Eric Solsten
1
Chapter 1. Historical Setting: Early History
to 1945
Martin Luther, 1483-1346, the main figure of the Protestant Reformation
PEOPLE HAVE DWELLED for thousands of years in the terri-
tory now occupied by the Federal Republic of Germany. The
first significant written account of this area's inhabitants is Ger-
mania, written about A.D. 98 by the Roman historian Tacitus.
The Germanic tribes he describes are believed to have come
from Scandinavia to Germany about 100 B.C., perhaps induced
to migrate by overpopulation. The Germanic tribes living to
the west of the Rhine River and south of the Main River were
soon subdued by the Romans and incorporated into the
Roman Empire. Tribes living to the east and north of these riv-
ers remained free but had more or less friendly relations with
the Romans for several centuries. Beginning in the fourth cen-
tury A.D., new westward migrations of eastern peoples caused
the Germanic tribes to move into the Roman Empire, which by
the late fifth century ceased to exist.
One of the largest Germanic tribes, the Franks, came to con-
trol the territory that was to become France and much of what
is now western Germany and Italy. In A.D. 800 their ruler,
Charlemagne, was crowned in Rome by the pope as emperor of
all of this territory. Because of its vastness, Charlemagne's
empire split into three kingdoms within two generations, the
inhabitants of the West Frankish Kingdom speaking an early
form of French and those in the East Frankish Kingdom speak-
ing an early form of German. The tribes of the eastern king-
dom — Franconians, Saxons, Bavarians, Swabians, and several
others — were ruled by descendants of Charlemagne until 911,
when they elected a Franconian, Conrad I, to be their king.
Some historians regard Conrad's election as the beginning of
what can properly be considered German history.
German kings soon added the Middle Kingdom to their
realm and adjudged themselves rulers of what would later be
called the Holy Roman Empire. In 962 Otto I became the first
of the German kings crowned emperor in Rome. By the middle
of the next century, the German lands ruled by the emperors
were the richest and most politically powerful part of Europe.
German princes stopped the westward advances of the Magyar
tribe, and Germans began moving eastward to begin a long
process of colonization. During the next few centuries, how-
ever, the great expense of the wars to maintain the empire
against its enemies, chiefly other German princes and the
3
Germany: A Country Study
wealthy and powerful papacy and its allies, depleted Germany's
wealth and slowed its development. Unlike France or England,
where a central royal power was slowly established over
regional princes, Germany remained divided into a multitude
of smaller entities often warring with one another or in combi-
nations against the emperors. None of the local princes, or any
of the emperors, were strong enough to control Germany for a
sustained period.
Germany's so-called particularism, that is, the existence
within it of many states of various sizes and kinds, such as prin-
cipalities, electorates, ecclesiastical territories, and free cities,
became characteristic by the early Middle Ages and persisted
until 1871, when the country was finally united. This disunity
was exacerbated by the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth
century, which ended Germany's religious unity by converting
many Germans to Lutheranism and Calvinism. For several cen-
turies, adherents to these two varieties of Protestantism viewed
each other with as much hostility and suspicion as they did
Roman Catholics. For their part, Catholics frequently resorted
to force to defend themselves against Protestants or to convert
them. As a result, Germans were divided not only by territory
but also by religion.
The terrible destruction of the Thirty Years' War of 1618-48,
a war partially religious in nature, reduced German particular-
ism, as did the reforms enacted during the age of enlightened
absolutism (1648-1789) and later the growth of nationalism
and industrialism in the nineteenth century. In 1815 the Con-
gress of Vienna stipulated that the several hundred states exist-
ing in Germany before the French Revolution be replaced with
thirty-eight states, some of them quite small. In subsequent
decades, the two largest of these states, Austria and Prussia,
vied for primacy in a Germany that was gradually unifying
under a variety of social and economic pressures. The politi-
cian responsible for German unification was Otto von Bis-
marck, whose brilliant diplomacy and ruthless practice of
statecraft secured Prussian hegemony in a united Germany in
1871. The new state, proclaimed the German Empire, did not
include Austria and its extensive empire of many non-German
territories and peoples.
Imperial Germany prospered. Its economy grew rapidly, and
by the turn of the century it rivaled Britain's in size. Although
the empire's constitution did not provide for a political system
in which the government was responsible to parliament, politi-
4
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
cal parties were founded that represented the main social
groups. Roman Catholic and socialist parties contended with
conservative and progressive parties and with a conservative
monarchy to determine how Germany should be governed.
After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 by the young emperor Wil-
helm II, Germany stepped up its competition with other Euro-
pean states for colonies and for what it considered its proper
place among the great states. An aggressive program of military
expansion instilled fear of Germany in its neighbors. Several
decades of military and colonial competition and a number of
diplomatic crises made for a tense international atmosphere by
1914. In the early summer of that year, Germany's rulers acted
on the belief that their country's survival depended on a suc-
cessful war against Russia and France. German strategists felt
that a war against these countries had to be waged by 1916 if it
were to be won because after that year Russian and French mil-
itary reforms would be complete, making German victory
doubtful. This logic led Germany to get drawn into a war
between its ally Austria-Hungary and Russia. Within weeks, a
complicated system of alliances escalated that regional conflict
into World War I, which ended with Germany's defeat in
November 1918.
The Weimar Republic, established at war's end, was the first
attempt to institute parliamentary democracy in Germany. The
republic never enjoyed the wholehearted support of many Ger-
mans, however, and from the start it was under savage attack
from elements of the left and, more important, from the right.
Moreover, it was burdened during its fifteen-year existence with
serious economic problems. During the second half of the
1920s, when foreign loans fed German prosperity, parliamen-
tary politics functioned better, yet many of the established
elites remained hostile to it. With the onset of the Great
Depression, parliamentary politics became impossible, and the
government ruled by decree. Economic crisis favored extremist
politicians, and Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Work-
ers' Party became the strongest party after the summer elec-
tions of 1932. In January 1933, the republic's elected president,
Paul von Hindenburg, the World War I army commander,
named a government headed by Hitler.
Within a few months, Hitler accomplished the "legal revolu-
tion" that removed his opponents. By 1935 his regime had
transformed Germany into a totalitarian state. Hitler achieved
notable economic and diplomatic successes during the first five
5
Germany: A Country Study
years of his rule. However, in September 1939 he made a fatal
gamble by invading Poland and starting World War II. The
eventual defeat of Hitler's Third Reich in 1945 occurred only
after the loss of tens of millions of lives, many from military
causes, many from sickness and starvation, and many from
what has come to be called the Holocaust.
Early History
The Germanic tribes, which probably originated from a mix-
ture of peoples along the Baltic Sea coast, inhabited the north-
ern part of the European continent by about 500 B.C. By 100
B.C., they had advanced into the central and southern areas of
present-day Germany. At that time, there were three major
tribal groups: the eastern Germanic peoples lived along the
Oder and Vistula rivers; the northern Germanic peoples inhab-
ited the southern part of present-day Scandinavia; and the
western Germanic peoples inhabited the extreme south of Jut-
land and the area between the North Sea and the Elbe, Rhine,
and Main rivers. The Rhine provided a temporary boundary
between Germanic and Roman territory after the defeat of the
Suevian tribe by Julius Caesar about 70 B.C. The threatening
presence of warlike tribes beyond the Rhine prompted the
Romans to pursue a campaign of expansion into Germanic ter-
ritory. However, the defeat of the provincial governor Varus by
Arminius at the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9 halted
Roman expansion; Arminius had learned the enemy's strate-
gies during his military training in the Roman armies. This bat-
tle brought about the liberation of the greater part of Germany
from Roman domination. The Rhine River was once again the
boundary line until the Romans reoccupied territory on its
eastern bank and built the Limes, a fortification 300 kilometers
long, in the first century A.D.
The second through the sixth centuries was a period of
change and destruction in which eastern and western Ger-
manic tribes left their native lands and settled in newly
acquired territories. This period of Germanic history, which
later supplied material for heroic epics, included the downfall
of the Roman Empire and resulted in a considerable expan-
sion of habitable area for the Germanic peoples. However, with
the exception of those kingdoms established by Franks and
Anglo-Saxons, Germanic kingdoms founded in such other
parts of Europe as Italy and Spain were of relatively short dura-
tion because they were assimilated by the native populations.
6
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
The conquest of Roman Gaul by Frankish tribes in the late fifth
century became a milestone of European history; it was the
Franks who were to become the founders of a civilized German
state.
Medieval Germany
The Merovingian Dynasty, ca. 500-751
In Gaul a fusion of Roman and Germanic societies occurred.
Clovis, a Salian Frank belonging to a family supposedly
descended from a mythical hero named Merovech, became the
absolute ruler of a Germanic kingdom of mixed Roman-Ger-
manic population in 486. He consolidated his rule with victo-
ries over the Gallo-Romans and all the Frankish tribes, and his
successors made other Germanic tribes subjects of the Merov-
ingian Dynasty. The remaining 250 years of the dynasty, how-
ever, were marked by internecine struggles and a gradual
decline. During the period of Merovingian rule, the Franks
reluctantly began to adopt Christianity following the baptism of
Clovis, an event that inaugurated the alliance between the
Frankish kingdom and the Roman Catholic Church. The most
notable of the missionaries responsible for Christianizing the
tribes living in Germany was Saint Boniface (ca. 675-754), an
English missionary who is considered the founder of German
Christianity.
The Carolingian Dynasty, 752-911
Charlemagne inherited the Frankish crown in 768. During
his reign (768-814), he subdued Bavaria, conquered Lom-
bardy and Saxony, and established his authority in central Italy.
By the end of the eighth century, his kingdom, later to become
known as the First Reich (empire in German), included
present-day France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxem-
bourg, as well as a narrow strip of northern Spain, much of
Germany and Austria, and much of the northern half of Italy.
Charlemagne, founder of an empire that was Roman, Chris-
tian, and Germanic, was crowned emperor in Rome by the
pope in 800.
The Carolingian Empire was based on an alliance between
the emperor, who was a temporal ruler supported by a military
retinue, and the pope of the Roman Catholic Church, who
granted spiritual sanction to the imperial mission. Charle-
magne and his son Louis I (r. 814-40) established centralized
7
Germany: A Country Study
authority, appointed imperial counts as administrators, and
developed a hierarchical feudal structure headed by the
emperor. Reliant on personal leadership rather than the
Roman concept of legalistic government, Charlemagne's
empire lasted less than a century.
A period of warfare followed the death of Louis. The Treaty
of Verdun (843) restored peace and divided the empire among
three sons, geographically and politically delineating the
approximate future territories of Germany, France, and the
area between them, known as the Middle Kingdom (see fig. 2).
The eastern Carolingian kings ruled the East Frankish King-
dom, what is now Germany and Austria; the western Caroling-
ian kings ruled the West Frankish Kingdom, what became
France. The imperial title, however, came to depend increas-
ingly on rule over the Middle Kingdom. By this time, in addi-
tion to a geographical and political delineation, a cultural and
linguistic split had occurred. The eastern Frankish tribes still
spoke Germanic dialects; the language of the western Frankish
tribes, under the influence of Gallo-Latin, had developed into
Old French. Because of these linguistic differences, the Treaty
of Verdun had to be written in two languages.
Not only had Charlemagne's empire been divided into three
kingdoms, but the East Frankish Kingdom was being weakened
by the rise of regional duchies, the so-called stem duchies of
Franconia, Saxony, Bavaria, Swabia, and Lorraine, which
acquired the trappings of petty kingdoms. The fragmentation
in the east marked the beginning of German particularism, in
which territorial rulers promoted their own interests and
autonomy without regard to the kingdom as a whole. The
duchies were strengthened when the Carolingian line died out
in 911; subsequent kings would have no direct blood link to the
throne with which to legitimate their claims to power against
the territorial dukes.
The Saxon Dynasty, 919-1024
Because the dukes of the East Frankish Kingdom had wea-
ried of being ruled by a foreign king, they elected a German to
serve as their king once the Carolingian line expired. The elec-
tion of Conrad I (r. 911-18), Duke of Franconia, as the first
German king has been marked by some historians as the begin-
ning of German history. Conrad's successor, Henry I (r. 919-
36), Duke of Saxony, was powerful enough to designate his son
Otto I (r. 936-73) as his successor. Otto was so able a ruler that
8
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
he came to be known as Otto the Great. He overpowered other
territorial dukes who rebelled against his rule and reversed the
particularist trend for a time. But he failed to establish the
principle of hereditary succession, and the German dukes con-
tinued to elect one of their number as king. But through mili-
tary successes and alliances with the church, which had
extensive properties and military forces of its own, Otto
expanded the crown lands, thus laying the foundation of
monarchical power. Henry, Otto, and the later Saxon kings
also encouraged eastward expansion and colonization, thereby
extending German rule to parts of the Slavic territories of
Poland and Bohemia. The Magyars' westward expansion was
halted by Otto in 955 at the Battle of Lechfeld in southern Ger-
many.
In 962 Otto, who had also gained control of the Middle
Kingdom, was formally crowned king of the Romans. The pos-
sessor of this title would, in time, be known as the Holy Roman
Emperor. The coronation came to be seen as the founding of
the Holy Roman Empire, an institution that lasted until 1806
and profoundly influenced the course of German history. The
coronation of Otto was a moment of glory for the German
monarchy, but its long-term consequences were not beneficial
because as German kings sought to exercise the offices of the
empire they became involved in Italian affairs, often to such an
extent that they neglected the governing of Germany. Because
German kings were so often in Italy, the German nobility
became stronger. In addition, the presence of German kings in
Italy as emperors soon caused them to come into conflict with
the papacy, which did not hesitate to seek allies in Italy or Ger-
many to limit imperial power. A last problem was that the suc-
cession to the German throne was often uncertain or was hotly
contested because it was not inheritable, but could only be
attained through election by the German dukes. This circum-
stance made the formation of an orderly or stable central gov-
ernment nearly impossible. In the opinion of some historians,
Otto's triumph in Rome in 962 ultimately was disastrous for
Germany because it delayed German unification by centuries.
The Salian Dynasty, 1024-1125
After the death of the last Saxon king in 1024, the crown
passed to the Salians, a Frankish tribe. The four Salian kings —
Conrad II, Henry III, Henry IV, and Henry V — who ruled Ger-
many as kings from 1024 to 1125, established their monarchy
9
Germany: A Country Study
Source: Based on information from Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Ger-
many, Oxford, 1949, 12.
Figure 2. The Carolingian Empire Divided by the Treaty of Verdun,
A.D. 843
as a major European power. Their main accomplishment was
the development of a permanent administrative system based
on a class of public officials answerable to the crown.
A principal reason for the success of the early Salians was
their alliance with the church, a policy begun by Otto I, which
gave them the material support they needed to subdue rebel-
lious dukes. In time, however, the church came to regret this
close relationship. The relationship broke down in 1075 during
what came to be known as the Investiture Contest, a struggle in
which the reformist pope, Gregory VII, demanded that Henry
IV (r. 1056-1106) renounce his rights over the German
church. The pope also attacked the concept of monarchy by
divine right and gained the support of significant elements of
the German nobility interested in limiting imperial absolutism.
More important, the pope forbade church officials under pain
of excommunication to support Henry as they had so freely
10
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
done in the past. In the end, Henry journeyed to Canossa in
northern Italy in 1077 to do penance and to receive absolution
from the pope. However, he resumed the practice of lay investi-
ture (appointment of religious officials by civil authorities) and
arranged the election of an antipope.
The German monarch's struggle with the papacy resulted in
a war that ravaged German lands from 1077 until the Concor-
dat of Worms in 1122. This agreement stipulated that the pope
was to appoint high church officials but gave the German king
the right to veto the papal choices. Imperial control of Italy was
lost for a time, and the imperial crown became dependent on
the political support of competing aristocratic factions. Feudal-
ism also became more widespread as freemen sought protec-
tion by swearing allegiance to a lord. These powerful local
rulers, having thereby acquired extensive territories and large
military retinues, took over administration within their territo-
ries and organized it around an increasing number of castles.
The most powerful of these local rulers came to be called
princes rather than dukes.
According to the laws of the German feudal system, the king
had no claims on the vassals of the other princes, only on those
living within his family's territory. Lacking the support of the
formerly independent vassals and weakened by the increasing
hostility of the church, the monarchy lost its preeminence.
Thus, the Investiture Contest strengthened local power in Ger-
many in contrast to what was happening in France and
England, where the growth of a centralized royal power was
under way.
The Investiture Contest had an additional effect. The long
struggle between emperor and pope hurt Germany's intellec-
tual life — in this period largely confined to monasteries — and
Germany no longer led or even kept pace with developments
occurring in France and Italy. For instance, no universities
were founded in Germany until the fourteenth century.
The Hohenstaufen Dynasty, 1138-1254
Following the death of Henry V (r. 1106-25), the last of the
Salian kings, the dukes refused to elect his nephew because
they feared that he might restore royal power. Instead, they
elected a noble connected to the Saxon noble family Welf
(often written as Guelf). This choice inflamed the Hohen-
staufen family of Swabia, which also had a claim to the throne.
Although a Hohenstaufen became king in 1138, the dynastic
11
Germany: A Country Study
feud with the Welfs continued. The feud became international
in nature when the Welfs sided with the papacy and its allies,
most notably the cities of northern Italy, against the imperial
ambitions of the Hohenstaufen Dynasty.
The second of the Hohenstaufen rulers, Frederick I (r.
1152-90), also known as Frederick Barbarossa because of his
red beard, struggled throughout his reign to restore the power
and prestige of the German monarchy, but he had little suc-
cess. Because the German dukes had grown stronger both dur-
ing and after the Investiture Contest and because royal access
to the resources of the church in Germany was much reduced,
Frederick was forced to go to Italy to find the finances needed
to restore the king's power in Germany. He was soon crowned
emperor in Italy, but decades of warfare on the peninsula
yielded scant results. The papacy and the prosperous city-states
of northern Italy were traditional enemies, but the fear of
imperial domination caused them to join ranks to fight Freder-
ick. Under the skilled leadership of Pope Alexander III, the
alliance suffered many defeats but ultimately was able to deny
the emperor a complete victory in Italy. Frederick returned to
Germany old and embittered. He had vanquished one notable
opponent and member of the Welf family, Saxony's Henry the
Lion, but his hopes of restoring the power and prestige of his
family and the monarchy seemed unlikely to be met by the end
of his life.
During Frederick's long stays in Italy, the German princes
became stronger and began a successful colonization of Slavic
lands. Offers of reduced taxes and manorial duties enticed
many Germans to settle in the east as the area's original inhab-
itants were killed or driven away. Because of this colonization,
the empire increased in size and came to include Pomerania,
Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia. A quickening economic life in
Germany increased the number of towns and gave them
greater importance. It was also during this period that castles
and courts replaced monasteries as centers of culture. Growing
out of this courtly culture, German medieval literature reached
its peak in lyrical love poetry, the Minnesang, and in narrative
epic poems such as Tristan, Parzival, and the Nibelungenlied.
Frederick died in 1190 while on a crusade and was suc-
ceeded by his son, Henry VI (r. 1190-97). Elected king even
before his father's death, Henry went to Rome to be crowned
emperor. A death in his wife's family gave him possession of Sic-
ily, a source of vast wealth. Henry failed to make royal and
12
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
imperial succession hereditary, but in 1196 he succeeded in
gaining a pledge that his infant son Frederick would receive
the German crown. Faced with difficulties in Italy and confi-
dent that he would realize his wishes in Germany at a later
date, Henry returned to the south, where it appeared he might
unify the peninsula under the Hohenstaufen name. After a
series of military victories, however, he died of natural causes in
Sicily in 1197.
Because the election of the three-year-old Frederick to be
German king appeared likely to make orderly rule difficult, the
boy's uncle, Philip, was chosen to serve in his place. Other fac-
tions elected a Welf candidate, Otto IV, as counterking, and a
long civil war began. Philip was murdered by Otto IV in 1208.
Otto IV in turn was killed by the French at the Battle of Bou-
vines in 1214. Frederick returned to Germany in 1212 from Sic-
ily, where he had grown up, and became king in 1215. As
Frederick II (r. 1215-50), he spent little time in Germany
because his main concerns lay in Italy. Frederick made signifi-
cant concessions to the German nobles, such as those put forth
in an imperial statute of 1232, which made princes virtually
independent rulers within their territories. The clergy also
became more powerful. Although Frederick was one of the
most energetic, imaginative, and capable rulers of the Middle
Ages, he did nothing to draw the disparate forces in Germany
together. His legacy was thus that local rulers had more author-
ity after his reign than before it.
By the time of Frederick's death in 1250, there was little cen-
tralized power in Germany. The Great Interregnum (1256-73),
a period of anarchy in which there was no emperor and Ger-
man princes vied for individual advantage, followed the death
of Frederick's son Conrad IV in 1254. In this short period, the
German nobility managed to strip many powers away from the
already diminished monarchy. Rather than establish sovereign
states, however, many nobles tended to look after their families.
Their many heirs created more and smaller estates. A largely
free class of officials also formed, many of whom eventually
acquired hereditary rights to administrative and legal offices.
These trends compounded political fragmentation within Ger-
many.
Despite the political chaos of the Hohenstaufen period, the
population grew from an estimated 8 million in 1200 to about
14 million in 1300, and the number of towns increased tenfold.
The most heavily urbanized areas of Germany were located in
13
Germany: A Country Study
the south and the west. Towns often developed a degree of
independence, but many were subordinate to local rulers or
the emperor. Colonization of the east also continued in the
thirteenth century, most notably through the efforts of the
Knights of the Teutonic Order, a society of soldier-monks. Ger-
man merchants also began trading extensively on the Baltic.
The Empire under the Early Habsburgs
The Great Interregnum ended in 1273 with the election of
Rudolf of Habsburg as king-emperor. After the interregnum
period, Germany's emperors came from three powerful dynas-
tic houses: Luxemburg (in Bohemia), Wittelsbach (in Bavaria),
and Habsburg (in Austria). These families alternated on the
imperial throne until the crown returned in the mid-fifteenth
century to the Habsburgs, who retained it with only one short
break until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.
The Golden Bull of 1356, an edict promulgated by Emperor
Charles IV (r. 1355-78) of the Luxemburg family, provided the
basic constitution of the empire up to its dissolution. It formal-
ized the practice of having seven electors — the archbishops of
the cities of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz, and the rulers of the
Palatinate, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bohemia — choose the
emperor, and it represented a further political consolidation of
the principalities. The Golden Bull ended the long-standing
attempt of various emperors to unite Germany under a heredi-
tary monarchy. Henceforth, the emperor shared power with
other great nobles like himself and was regarded as merely the
first among equals. Without the cooperation of the other
princes, he could not rule.
The princes were not absolute rulers either. They had made
so many concessions to other secular and ecclesiastical powers
in their struggle against the emperor that many smaller princi-
palities, ecclesiastical states, and towns had retained a degree of
independence. Some of the smaller noble holdings were so
poor that they had to resort to outright extortion of travelers
and merchants to sustain themselves, with the result that jour-
neying through Germany could be perilous in the late Middle
Ages. All of Germany was under the nominal control of the
emperor, but because his power was so weak or uncertain, local
authorities had to maintain order — yet another indication of
Germany's political fragmentation.
Despite the lack of a strong central authority, Germany pros-
pered during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Its popu-
14
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
lation increased from about 14 million in 1300 to about 16
million in 1500, even though the Black Death killed as much as
one-third of the population in the mid-fourteenth century.
Located in the center of Europe, Germany was active in
international trade. Rivers flowing to the north and the east
and the Alpine passes made Germany a natural conduit convey-
ing goods from the Mediterranean to northern Europe. Ger-
many became a noted manufacturing center. Trade and
manufacturing led to the growth of towns, and in 1500 an esti-
mated 10 percent of the population lived in urban areas. Many
towns became wealthy and were governed by a sophisticated
and self-confident merchant oligarchy. Dozens of towns in
northern Germany joined together to form the Hanseatic
League, a trading federation that managed shipping and trade
on the Baltic and in many inland areas, even into Bohemia and
Hungary. The Hanseatic League had commercial offices in
such widely dispersed towns as London, Bergen (in present-day
Norway), and Novgorod (in present-day Russia). The league
was at one time so powerful that it successfully waged war
against the king of Denmark. In southern Germany, towns
banded together on occasion to protect their interests against
encroachments by either imperial or local powers. Although
these urban confederations were not always strong enough to
defeat their opponents, they sometimes succeeded in helping
their members to avoid complete subjugation. In what was
eventually to become Switzerland, one confederation of towns
had sufficient military might to win virtual independence from
the Holy Roman Empire in 1499.
The Knights of the Teutonic Order continued their settle-
ment of the east until their dissolution early in the sixteenth
century, in spite of a serious defeat at the hands of the Poles at
the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. The lands that came under
the control of this monastic military, whose members were
pledged to chastity and to the conquest and conversion of hea-
thens, included territory that one day would become eastern
Prussia and would be inhabited by Germans until 1945. Ger-
man settlement in areas south of the territories controlled by
the Knights of the Teutonic Order also continued, but gener-
ally at the behest of eastern rulers who valued the skills of Ger-
man peasant-farmers. These new settlers were part of a long
process of peaceful German immigration to the east that lasted
for centuries, with Germans moving into all of eastern Europe
and even deep into Russia.
15
Germany: A Country Study
Intellectual growth accompanied German expansion. Sev-
eral universities were founded, and Germany came into
increased contact with the humanists active elsewhere in
Europe. The invention of movable type in the middle of the fif-
teenth century in Germany also contributed to a more lively
intellectual climate. Religious ferment was common, most
notably the heretical movement engendered by the teachings
of Jan Hus (ca. 1372-1415) in Bohemia. Hus eventually was
executed, but the dissatisfaction he felt toward the established
church was shared by many others throughout German-speak-
ing lands, as could be seen in the frequent occurrences of pop-
ular, mystical religious revivalism after his death.
The Protestant Reformation
On the eve of the Protestant Reformation, the institutions of
the Holy Roman Empire were widely thought to be in need of
improvement. The Habsburg emperors Frederick III (r. 1440-
93) and his son Maximilian I (r. 1493-1519) both cooperated
with individual local rulers to enact changes. However, the
imperial and local parties had different aims, the former wish-
ing to strengthen the empire, the latter aiming to secure
greater independence by formalizing their rights and ensuring
regular procedures for the conduct of public business. In 1489
the procedures of the imperial diet, the Reichstag, in which
representatives of all states within the empire met, were reorga-
nized. One of the reforms allowed participation in the diet by
representatives of the towns. In 1495 Maximilian declared an
empirewide peace and made arrangements to reduce the law-
lessness and violence that often marked relations among local
rulers.
Maximilian's reforms were not enough to cure the ills of the
empire, and relations between it and the princes and ecclesias-
tical states often were tense. Disputes frequently involved com-
plicated constellations of powers with occasional interference
from abroad, most notably France. Charles V (r. 1519-56) was
elected emperor in 1519 only after he paid large bribes to the
seven electors and agreed to many restrictions on his powers,
restrictions he often later ignored (see fig. 3).
A changing economy also made for discontent among those
unable to profit from new conditions. Some of the empire's
inhabitants had become quite rich, most notably the Fugger
family of Augsburg, whose members had replaced the bankers
of northern Italy as Europe's leading financiers. The Fuggers
16
RUSSIA /
Holy
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he states of
nan Empire
itories
territories
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8ters
100 Miles
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
had come to manage the financial affairs of the Habsburg
Dynasty, which, in combination with increased trade between
south and north, made Germany Europe's financial center for
a few decades. However, other groups in Germany were experi-
encing hardship. A burgeoning rural population found it diffi-
cult to get enough to eat, and many peasants went to the towns
to seek a living. Municipal officials responded by seeking to bar
rural newcomers. Within towns that were not prospering, rela-
tions between the classes became more tense as social mobility
was reduced by a declining economy.
Martin Luther
On the eve of All Saints' Day in 1517, Martin Luther, a pro-
fessor of theology at Wittenberg University in Saxony, posted
ninety-five theses on a church door. Luther's primary concern
was the sale of indulgences — papal grants of reduced punish-
ment in the afterlife, including releases from purgatory. First
written in Latin, the theses were soon translated into German
and widely distributed. Summoned by church authorities to
explain his writings, Luther became embroiled in further con-
troversy and in 1520 wrote his three most famous tracts, in
which he attacked the papacy and exposed church corruption,
acknowledged the validity of only two of the seven sacraments,
and argued for the supremacy of faith over good works. In
1521 Luther was summoned to appear before Emperor Charles
V at the Diet of Worms. Refusing to recant his writings, he was
banned under the Edict of Worms. Secreted away by the ruler
of Saxony, Frederick the Wise, Luther retreated to the castle of
Wartburg, where he worked on a translation of the New Testa-
ment and wrote numerous religious tracts.
Luther's disagreements with the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church set off a chain of events that within a few
decades destroyed Germany's religious unity. Although one of
the most influential figures in German history, Luther was only
one of many who were critical of the Roman Catholic Church.
However, because of the power of his ideas and the enormous
influence of his writings, it is he who is regarded as the initiator
of the Protestant Reformation. Luther quickly acquired a large
following among those disgusted by rampant church corrup-
tion and unfulfilled by mechanistic religious services. Many
warmed to his contention that religion must be simplified into
a close relationship of human beings with God without the
19
is
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
had come to manage the financial affairs of the Habsburg
Dynasty, which, in combination with increased trade between
south and north, made Germany Europe's financial center for
a few decades. However, other groups in Germany were experi-
encing hardship. A burgeoning rural population found it diffi-
cult to get enough to eat, and many peasants went to the towns
to seek a living. Municipal officials responded by seeking to bar
rural newcomers. Within towns that were not prospering, rela-
tions between the classes became more tense as social mobility
was reduced by a declining economy.
Martin Luther
On the eve of All Saints' Day in 1517, Martin Luther, a pro-
fessor of theology at Wittenberg University in Saxony, posted
ninety-five theses on a church door. Luther's primary concern
was the sale of indulgences — papal grants of reduced punish-
ment in the afterlife, including releases from purgatory. First
written in Latin, the theses were soon translated into German
and widely distributed. Summoned by church authorities to
explain his writings, Luther became embroiled in further con-
troversy and in 1520 wrote his three most famous tracts, in
which he attacked the papacy and exposed church corruption,
acknowledged the validity of only two of the seven sacraments,
and argued for the supremacy of faith over good works. In
1521 Luther was summoned to appear before Emperor Charles
V at the Diet of Worms. Refusing to recant his writings, he was
banned under the Edict of Worms. Secreted away by the ruler
of Saxony, Frederick the Wise, Luther retreated to the castle of
Wartburg, where he worked on a translation of the New Testa-
ment and wrote numerous religious tracts.
Luther's disagreements with the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church set off a chain of events that within a few
decades destroyed Germany's religious unity. Although one of
the most influential figures in German history, Luther was only
one of many who were critical of the Roman Catholic Church.
However, because of the power of his ideas and the enormous
influence of his writings, it is he who is regarded as the initiator
of the Protestant Reformation. Luther quickly acquired a large
following among those disgusted by rampant church corrup-
tion and unfulfilled by mechanistic religious services. Many
warmed to his contention that religion must be simplified into
a close relationship of human beings with God without the
19
Germany: A Country Study
extensive mediation of the Roman Catholic Church and its
accretion of tradition.
Luther magnified the inherent potency of his ideas by articu-
lating them in a language that was without rival in clarity and
force. He strove to make the Scriptures accessible to ordinary
worshipers by translating them into vernacular German. This
he did with such genius that the German dialect he used
became the written language of all of Germany. Without
Luther's translation of the Bible, Germany might have come to
use a number of mutually incomprehensible languages, as was
the case in the northwestern part of the Holy Roman Empire,
where local dialects evolved into what is now modern Dutch.
Luther also wrote hymns that are still sung in Christian reli-
gious services all over the world.
A less exalted reason for the wide distribution of Luther's
doctrines was the development of printing with movable type.
The Reformation created a demand for all kinds of religious
writings. The readership was so great that the number of books
printed in Germany increased from about 150 in 1518 to
nearly 1,000 six years later.
Luther's ideas soon coalesced into a body of doctrines called
Lutheranism. Powerful supporters such as princes and free cit-
ies accepted Lutheranism for many reasons, some because they
sincerely supported reform, others out of narrow self-interest.
In some areas, a jurisdiction would adopt Lutheranism because
a large neighboring state had done so. In other areas, rulers
accepted it because they sought to retain control over their
subjects who had embraced it earlier. Nearly all the imperial
cities became Lutheran, despite the fact that the emperor, to
whom they were subordinate, was hostile to the movement.
Historians have found no single convincing explanation of why
one area became Lutheran and another did not, because so
many social, economic, and religious factors were involved.
Given the revolutionary nature of Lutheranism and the eco-
nomic and political tensions of the period, it is not surprising
that the Reformation soon became marked by violence and
extremism. The Knights' War of 1522-23, in which members of
the lower nobility rebelled against the authorities in southwest-
ern Germany, was quickly crushed. Some of the rampaging
knights were ardent supporters of Luther. The Peasants' War of
1524-25 was more serious, involving as many as 300,000 peas-
ants in southwestern and central Germany. Influenced some-
what by the new religious ideas but responding mostly to
20
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
changing economic conditions, the peasants' rebellion spread
quickly, but without coordination. It also received support
from some dissatisfied city dwellers and from some noblemen
of arms who led its ragged armies. Although the peasants'
rebellion was the largest uprising in German history, it was
quickly suppressed, with about 100,000 casualties. In the 1530s,
the Anabaptists, a radical Christian sect, seized several towns,
their objective being to construct a just society. They were like-
wise brutally suppressed by the authorities.
Luther opposed the peasants' cause and wrote an impas-
sioned tract demanding their quick suppression. However radi-
cal his religious views, Luther was a social and political
conservative. He believed that the end of the world was immi-
nent and regarded practical affairs as having little importance
compared with the effort to win eternal salvation. Therefore,
he counseled obedience to worldly authorities if they allowed
freedom of worship. Lutheranism thus became a means of
upholding the worldly status quo and the leaders who adopted
the new faith. In contrast to England, where Protestantism
retained a significant radical social element, German Protes-
tantism became an integral part of the state. Some historians
maintain that this integration of state and church has deprived
Germany of a deeply rooted tradition of political dissent as
found in Britain and the United States.
Resistance to Lutheranism
Although Lutheranism had powerful supporters, its survival
was by no means certain. Its main opponent was the Habsburg
emperor Charles V, who had inherited Spain, the Netherlands,
southern Italy, Sicily, and the Austrian lands as patrimony and
who hoped to restore the unity of the German Empire by keep-
ing it Roman Catholic. Charles had been out of Germany
between 1521 and 1530, and when he returned he found that
the new religion had won too many adherents to be easily
uprooted. In addition, he could not devote himself single-
mindedly to combating it but also had to struggle with power-
ful external enemies. One was Francis I (r. 1515-47) of France,
who attacked the empire from the west, having resolved to
destroy the power of the Habsburgs. Another threat was posed
by the Turks, who were attacking the empire from the east.
Even the papacy at times conspired against its coreligionist
because it feared Charles was becoming too powerful.
21
Germany: A Country Study
Within Germany, forces were also arrayed against Charles. In
1531 Protestant leaders created the League of Schmalkalden to
oppose him. By 1545 northeastern and northwestern Germany
and large parts of southern Germany had become Protestant.
Despite the significant victory over the Protestants at the Battle
of Muhlberg in 1547, Charles still was not powerful enough to
impose his will on the German princes.
The Peace of Augsburg
By the early 1550s, it was apparent that a negotiated settle-
ment was necessary. In 1555 the Peace of Augsburg was
signed. The settlement, which represented a victory for the
princes, granted recognition to both Lutheranism and Roman
Catholicism in Germany, and each ruler gained the right to
decide the religion to be practiced within his state. Subjects not
of this faith could move to another state with their property,
and disputes between the religions were to be settled in court.
The Protestant Reformation strengthened the long-standing
trend toward particularism in Germany. German leaders,
whether Protestant or Catholic, became yet more powerful at
the expense of the central governing institution, the empire.
Protestant leaders gained by receiving lands that formerly
belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, although not to as
great an extent as, for example, would occur in England. Each
prince also became the head of the established church within
his territory. Catholic leaders benefited because the Roman
Catholic Church, in order to help them withstand Protestant-
ism, gave them greater access to church resources within their
territories. Germany was also less united than before because
Germans were no longer of one faith, a situation officially rec-
ognized by the Peace of Augsburg. The agreement did not
bring sectarian peace, however, because the religious question
in Germany had not yet been settled fully.
The Thirty Years' War, 1 61 8-48
Germany enjoyed a time of relative quiet between the Peace
of Augsburg, signed in 1555, and the outbreak of the Thirty
Years' War in 1618. The empire functioned in a more regular
way than previously, and its federal nature was more evident
than in the past. The Reichstag met frequently to deal with
public matters, and the emperors Ferdinand I (r. 1556-64) and
Maximilian II (r. 1564-76) were cautious rulers concerned
22
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
mostly with strengthening their family's hold on Austria and
adjacent areas. Rudolf II (r. 1576-1612) was an indolent and
capricious ruler who generally followed his advisers' counsel.
As a result, some German states were able to expand their terri-
tories by annexing smaller neighbors in the absence of an
engaged and attentive emperor. Local rivalries engendered
tensions that often were based on religious affiliation.
The Counter-Reformation and Religious Tensions
The Peace of Augsburg brought peace but did not settle the
religious disagreements in Germany. For one thing, its signato-
ries did not recognize Calvinism, a relatively stringent form of
Protestantism that was gaining prominence around the time
the Augsburg treaty was signed, in what has been called the
Second Reformation. Adherents to both Calvinism and Luthe-
ranism worked to spread their influence and gain converts in
the face of the Counter-Reformation, the attempt of the
Roman Catholic Church to regroup and reverse the spread of
Protestantism. Followers of all three religions were at times suc-
cessful, but only at the expense of the others.
Fear of religious subversion caused rulers to monitor the
conduct of their subjects more closely. Attempting to help the
modern reader understand the intensity and pervasiveness of
this fear, Mary Fulbrook, a noted British historian of Germany,
has likened it to the anxiety prevailing in the first years of the
Cold War. An example of the social paranoia engendered by
the religious tensions of the period is Protestant Germany's
refusal until 1700 to accept the Gregorian calendar introduced
by the papacy in 1582 because the reform entailed a one-time
loss of the days between October 5 and 14. Many Protestants
suspected that Roman Catholics were attempting somehow to
steal this time for themselves.
By the first decades of the seventeenth century, religious
controversy had become so obstructive that at times the Reichs-
tag could not conduct business. In 1608, for example, Calvin-
ists walked out of the body, preventing the levying of a tax to
fight a war against the Turks. In the same year, the Evangelical
Union was established by a few states and cities of the empire to
defend the Protestant cause. In 1609 a number of Roman Cath-
olic states countered by forming the Catholic League.
Although both bodies were less concerned with a sectarian war
than with the specific aims of their member states, their forma-
23
Germany: A Country Study
tion was an indication of how easily disputes could acquire a
religious aspect.
Military Campaigns
The Thirty Years' War resulted from a local rebellion, but the
admixture of religion transformed it into a European conflict
that lasted for more than a generation and devastated Ger-
many. In 1618 Bohemian nobles opposed the decision of
Emperor Matthias (r. 1608-19) to designate his Catholic cousin
Ferdinand king of Bohemia. Instead, the nobles elected Fred-
erick of the Palatinate, a German Calvinist, to be their king. In
1620, in an attempt to wrest control from the nobles, imperial
armies and the Catholic League under General Johann von
Tilly defeated the Protestant Bohemians at the Battle of White
Mountain near Prague. The Protestant princes, alarmed by the
strength of the Catholic League and the possibility of Roman
Catholic supremacy in Europe, decided to renew their struggle
against Emperor Matthias. They were aided by France, which,
although Roman Catholic, was opposed to the increasing
power of the Habsburgs, the dynastic family to which Matthias
and Ferdinand belonged. Despite French aid, by the late 1620s
imperial armies of Emperor Ferdinand II (r. 1619-37) and the
Catholic League, under the supreme command of General
Albrecht von Wallenstein, had defeated the Protestants and
secured a foothold in northern Germany.
In his time of triumph, Ferdinand overreached himself by
publishing in 1629 the Edict of Restitution, which required
that all properties of the Roman Catholic Church taken since
1552 be returned to their original owners. The edict renewed
Protestant resistance. Catholic powers also began to oppose
Ferdinand because they feared he was becoming too powerful.
Invading armies from Sweden, secretly supported by Catholic
France, marched deep into Germany, winning numerous victo-
ries. The Catholic general Tilly and Sweden's Protestant king,
Gustavus Adolphus, were killed in separate battles. Wallenstein
was assassinated on Emperor Ferdinand's orders because he
feared his general was becoming too powerful. After the tri-
umph of the Spanish army over Swedish forces at the Battle of
Nordlingen in 1634, a truce was arranged between the
emperor and some of the German princes under the Treaty of
Prague. France then invaded Germany, not for religious rea-
sons but because the House of Bourbon, the dynastic family of
several French and Spanish monarchs, wished to ensure that
24
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
the House of Habsburg did not become too powerful. This
invasion is illustrative of the French axiom that Germany must
always remain divided into small, easily manipulated states.
(Indeed, preventing a united Germany remained an objective
of French foreign policy even late in the twentieth century.)
Because of French participation, the war continued until the
Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648.
The Peace of Westphalia
The Peace of Westphalia largely settled German affairs for
the next century and a half. It ended religious conflicts
between the states and included official recognition of Calvin-
ism. Its signatories altered the boundaries of the empire by rec-
ognizing that Switzerland and the Netherlands had become
sovereign states outside the empire. Portions of Alsace and Lor-
raine went to France. Sweden received some territory in north-
ern Germany, which in the long run it could not retain.
Brandenburg became stronger, as did Saxony and Bavaria. In
addition, states within the empire acquired greater indepen-
dence with the right to have their own foreign policies and
form alliances, even with states outside the empire. As a result
of these changes, the Holy Roman Empire lost much of what
remained of its power and would never again be a significant
actor on the international stage. The Habsburgs would con-
tinue to be crowned emperors, but their strength would derive
from their own holdings, not from leadership of the empire.
Germany was less united in 1648 than in 1618, and German
particularism had been strengthened once again.
The Thirty Years' War had a devastating effect on the Ger-
man people. Historians have usually estimated that between
one-fourth and one-third of the population perished from
direct military causes or from illness and starvation related to
the war. Some regions were affected much more than others.
For example, an estimated three-quarters of Wurttemberg's
population died between 1634 and 1639. Overall losses were
serious enough that historians believe that it took a century
after the Thirty Years' War for Germany's population to reach
the level of 1618.
Germany's economy was also severely disrupted by the rav-
ages of the Thirty Years' War. The war exacerbated the eco-
nomic decline that had begun in the second half of the
sixteenth century as the European economy shifted westward
to the Atlantic states — Spain, France, England, and the Low
25
Germany: A Country Study
Countries. The shift in trade meant that Germany was no
longer located at the center of European commerce but on its
fringes. The thriving economies of many German towns in the
late Middle Ages and first half of the sixteenth century gradu-
ally dried up, and Germany as a whole entered a long period of
economic stagnation that ended only in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
The Age of Enlightened Absolutism, 1648-1 789
Although the Holy Roman Empire no longer had a signifi-
cant role in European politics after the Thirty Years' War, it
remained important in Germany, providing a framework for
the many German states' and cities' conduct of their public
affairs. The Reichstag, which remained in session at Regens-
burg from 1663 until the empire's dissolution in 1806, pro-
vided a forum for the settlement of disputes. On occasion,
votes were taken to remove incompetent or tyrannical rulers of
member states. The empire's most important service was that it
provided a measure of security to Germany's many small states
and free cities, without which some would have been swallowed
up by larger neighbors. Because of its weakened condition, the
empire could no longer dominate Germany, even when
headed by ambitious and capable men such as Charles VI (r.
1711-40). During the 1720s, he attempted unsuccessfully to
breathe new life into the empire. Later emperors returned to
the traditional Habsburg practice of using the imperial throne
to benefit their own dynastic holdings.
For nearly a century after the Peace of Westphalia, the main
danger to German states came from abroad. France was the
chief threat, seizing parts of southwestern Germany in the late
1600s, among them the city of Strasbourg in 1681. French
troops also fought on German soil during the War of the Span-
ish Succession (1701-14). In addition to these military actions,
France formed alliances with some German states, most signifi-
cantly with Bavaria, which sought support against neighboring
Austria. The Ottoman Empire also posed a threat. In 1683 its
forces besieged Vienna. The Germans ultimately were success-
ful against the Ottoman Empire, and after the Treaty of Passa-
rowitz of 1 71 8, the Turks were no longer a danger.
Austria and Prussia
The most important German power after the Peace of West-
26
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
phalia was Austria, followed by a few other states with much
smaller populations, most notably Brandenburg, Saxony, and
Bavaria. Austria retained its preeminence until the second half
of the nineteenth century, but in the eighteenth century Bran-
denburg had become a serious rival, annexing valuable Aus-
trian territory. The rivalry came to form the so-called dualism
of the empire, that is, the presence in it of two powerful states,
neither of which was strong enough to dominate the empire
and for that reason sought the support of smaller states. The
smaller states worked to derive their own advantages from Ger-
man dualism, none being willing to cede sovereignty to either
Austria or Prussia.
In 1648 Brandenburg was a small state in northern Ger-
many. It had been ruled by the Hohenzollern Dynasty since the
late fifteenth century and consisted of the core region and its
capital, Berlin: eastern Pomerania; an area around Magdeburg;
the former holdings of the Knights of the Teutonic Order in
eastern Prussia; and some smaller holdings in western Ger-
many. Brandenburg became known as Prussia in 1701 when its
ruler crowned himself King Frederick I of Prussia. Prussia
acquired the rest of Pomerania after defeating Sweden in the
Great Northern War (1700-21). Prussia's increase in size and
influence may be attributed to a succession of capable leaders,
all of whom enjoyed long reigns. The first was Frederick Will-
iam (r. 1640-88), known as the Great Elector. He increased his
family's power by granting favors to the nobility, weakening the
independence of the towns, and maintaining a professional
standing army. His son Frederick I (r. 1688-1713) established
Prussia as a kingdom. Frederick further strengthened the army,
but not nearly as much as his son Frederick William I (r. 1713-
40), who also modernized the kingdom's bureaucracy. Freder-
ick II (r. 1740-86), known to posterity as Frederick the Great,
continued along the same lines as his father but showed much
greater imagination and ruthlessness, transforming his small
kingdom into one of the great powers of Europe.
In 1740 Frederick seized Silesia, a wealthy province that
belonged to the Habsburgs and had a population of about 1
million inhabitants. Maria Theresa (r. 1740-80), the new Habs-
burg empress, was unable to regain possession of Silesia, which
remained under Prussian control at the end of the War of the
Austrian Succession (1740-48). Frederick retained Silesia even
after facing a coalition of France, Austria, and Russia during
the Seven Years' War (1756-63). Frederick expanded Prussian
27
Germany: A Country Study
territory still further in 1772, when, with his erstwhile enemies
Russia and Austria, he took part in the First Partition of
Poland. This last seizure was highly beneficial to Frederick
because it linked eastern Prussia with much of his kingdom's
western holdings.
Although Prussia and Austria were rivals, they had some
important characteristics in common. Neither state was popu-
lated by a single people, but by numerous peoples speaking dif-
ferent languages and belonging to different religions. Neither
state was located entirely within the empire. Both had sizable
territories to the east of the empire, and it was there that they
hoped mainly to expand. Both states were governed by enlight-
ened monarchs, who, having only to cajole the nobility with
occasional concessions, saw government as for the people but
not by the people. Hence, both states were governed by the
most efficient methods known to the eighteenth century, and
both were fairly tolerant according to the standards of the time.
Prussia accepted many Protestants expelled from other states,
most notably the Huguenots who fled France after the Edict of
Nantes in 1685. Austria became one of the first states to allow
Jews to settle where they liked within its boundaries and to
practice the professions of their choice.
The Smaller States
By the eighteenth century, none of the other states of the
empire were strong enough to have territorial ambitions to
match those of Prussia and Austria. Some of the larger states,
such as Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg, also maintained
standing armies, but their smaller size compelled them to seek
allies, some from outside the empire. With the exception of the
free cities and ecclesiastical states, smaller states, like Austria
and Prussia, were governed by a hereditary monarch who ruled
either with the consent or help of the nobility and with the
help of an increasingly well-trained bureaucracy. Only a few
states, such as Wurttemberg, could boast of an active democ-
racy of the kind evolving in Britain and France. Except in a few
free cities, such as Frankfurt am Main and Hamburg, which
were active in international trade, Germany's commercial class
was neither strong nor self-confident. Farmers in western Ger-
many were largely free; those in the east were often serfs. How-
ever, whether in the east or the west, most who worked the land
lived at the subsistence level.
28
Frederick the Great, king of
Prussia, 1740-86
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
Despite its lack of popular democracy, Germany was gener-
ally well governed. The state bureaucracies gained in power
and expertise, and efficiency and probity were esteemed. Dur-
ing the eighteenth century, the principles of the Enlighten-
ment came to be widely disseminated and applied. Although
there were no political challenges to enlightened absolutism,
as was the case in France, all phenomena, including religion,
were subject to critical, reasoned examination to determine
their rationality. In this more tolerant environment, differing
religious views could still create social friction, but ways were
found for the empire's three main religions — Roman Catholi-
cism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism — to coexist in most states.
The expulsion of about 20,000 Protestants from the ecclesiasti-
cal state of Salzburg during 1731-32 was viewed by the edu-
cated public at the time as a harking back to less enlightened
days.
Several new universities were founded, some soon consid-
ered among Europe's best. An increasingly literate public made
possible a jump in the number of journals and newspapers. At
the end of the seventeenth century, most books printed in Ger-
many were in Latin. By the end of the next century, all but 5
percent were in German. The eighteenth century also saw a
refinement of the German language and a flowering of Ger-
man literature with the appearance of such figures as Gotthold
29
Germany: A Country Study
Lessing, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich Schiller.
German music also reached great heights with the Bach family,
George Frederick Handel, Joseph Haydn, and Wolfgang Ama-
deus Mozart.
The French Revolution and Germany
The French Revolution, which erupted in 1789 with the
storming of the Bastille in Paris, at first gained the enthusiastic
approval of some German intellectuals, who welcomed the
proclamation of a constitution and a bill of rights. Within a few
years, most of this support had dissipated, replaced by fear of a
newly aggressive French nationalism and horror at the execu-
tion of the revolution's opponents. In 1792 French troops
invaded Germany and were at first pushed back by imperial
forces. But at the Battle of Valmy in late 1792, the French army,
a revolutionary citizens' army fighting on its own soil, defeated
the professional imperial army. By 1794 France had secured
control of the Rhineland, which it was to occupy for twenty
years.
During the Rhineland occupation, France followed its tradi-
tional policy of keeping Austria and Prussia apart and manipu-
lating the smaller German states. In observance of the Treaty
of Basel of 1795, Prussian and German forces north of the
Main River ceased efforts against the French. Austria endured
repeated defeats at the hands of the French, most notably at
the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805. At this battle, Russians fought
alongside Austrians against the French, who were aided by
forces from several south German states, including Bavaria,
Baden, and Wurttemberg.
Prussia reentered the war against France in 1806, but its
forces were badly beaten at the Battle of Jena that same year.
Prussia was abandoned by its ally Russia and lost territory as a
result of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. These national humilia-
tions motivated the Prussians to undertake a serious program
of social and military reform. The most noted of the reform-
ers — Karl vom Stein, Karl August von Hardenberg, Wilhelm
von Humboldt, and Gerhard von Scharnhorst, along with
many others — improved the country's laws, education, admin-
istration, and military organization. Scharnhorst, responsible
for military reforms, emphasized the importance to the army
of moral incentives, personal courage, and individual responsi-
bility. He also introduced the principle of competition and
abandoned the privileges accorded to nobility within the offi-
30
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
cer corps. A revitalized Prussia joined with Austria and Russia
to defeat Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in late 1813 and
drove him out of Germany. Prussian forces under General Geb-
hard von Blucher were essential to the final victory over Napo-
leon at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.
Despite Napoleon's defeat, some of the changes he had
brought to Germany during the French occupation were
retained. Public administration was improved, feudalism was
weakened, the power of the trade guilds was reduced, and the
Napoleonic Code replaced traditional legal codes in many
areas. The new legal code was popular and remained in effect
in the Rhineland until 1900. As a result of these reforms, some
areas of Germany were better prepared for the coming of
industrialization in the nineteenth century.
French occupation authorities also allowed many smaller
states, ecclesiastical entities, and free cities to be incorporated
into their larger neighbors. Approximately 300 states had
existed within the Holy Roman Empire in 1789; only about
forty remained by 1814. The empire ceased to exist in 1806
when Francis II of Austria gave up his imperial title. In its place,
Napoleon had created the Confederation of the Rhine, made
up of the states of western and southern Germany, under
French direction. Austria and Prussia were not members. The
confederation was to provide Napoleon with troops for his mil-
itary campaigns. After his defeat, the confederation was dis-
solved.
The German Confederation, 1815-66
The Congress of Vienna (1814-15), convened after Napo-
leon's defeat, sought to restore order to a Europe disrupted by
revolutionary and imperial France. Its members' objective was
a constellation of states and a balance of power that would
ensure peace and stability after a quarter-century of revolution
and war. In addition to the delegates of many small states, the
congress included representatives of five large European states:
Austria, Prussia, Russia, Britain, and France. After months of
deliberations, the congress established an international politi-
cal order that was to endure for nearly 100 years and that
brought Europe a measure of peace.
The congress made no effort to restore the Holy Roman
Empire and its 300-odd states. Instead, it accepted the disap-
pearance of many small states that had occurred since 1789
and created the German Confederation. The confederation
31
Germany: A Country Study
consisted of thirty-eight sovereign states and four free cities
and included the five large kingdoms of Austria, Prussia, Sax-
ony, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg (see fig. 4). The confederation
met at a diet in Frankfurt, with an Austrian always serving as
president.
Prince Clemens von Metternich, who directed Austria's for-
eign policy from 1809 until 1848, was the dominant political
figure within the confederation. He waged a decades-long cam-
paign to prevent the spread of revolution in Europe by seeking
to restore much of the political and social order that had
existed before the French Revolution. Metternich's Carlsbad
Decrees of 1819 established a pervasive system of press censor-
ship and regulation of the universities that dampened German
intellectual life and hindered the publication of writings advo-
cating the principles of liberalism. In the 1820s, he engineered
the formation of the Holy Alliance of the monarchs of Austria,
Prussia, and Russia to quash political, social, and economic
developments within Central and Eastern Europe thought to
threaten political stability.
Economic and Political Trends Toward Unification
It was not possible for Metternich and his allies to suppress
completely the desire for liberal reforms, including the estab-
lishment of constitutional parliamentary government, eco-
nomic freedom, and civil liberties. Some of these reforms had
already been under discussion during the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment, and awareness of their desirability had spread
during the Napoleonic era. In addition, the economic reforms
introduced into the Rhineland by France had taken hold. The
business class that formed after 1815 pressed for abolition of
restrictive trade practices favored by traditional handicraft
guilds. Businessmen also sought a common currency and sys-
tem of measurements for Germany, as well as a reduction of
the numerous tolls that made road and river travel expensive
and slow.
During the 1820s, significant progress was made in reducing
customs duties among German states. At Prussian instigation,
the Zollverein (Customs Union) began to form, and by the
mid-1 830s it included all the most important German states
except Austria. Prussia saw to it that its chief rival within Ger-
many was excluded from the union. Vienna, for its part, did
not realize at this early point the political and economic signifi-
cance of intra-German trade.
32
International boundary
State boundary
Boundary of German
Confederation, 1815
Boundary of North German
Confederation, 1866
Boundary of German
Empire, 1871
Prussia in 1815
\. ■ ■'. ] Territory acquired by
Prussia, 1815-66
I | Imperial territory of
Alsace-Lorraine, 1871
50 100 Kilometers
I 1 — i — 1 1
50 100 Miles
^ London, 1978, 216.
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
Many of Germany's liberal intelligentsia — lower government
officials, men of letters, professors, and lawyers — who pushed
for representative government and greater political freedom
were also interested in some form of German unity. They
argued that liberal political reforms could only be enacted in a
larger political entity. Germany's small, traditional states
offered little scope for political reform.
Among those groups desiring reform, there was, ironically,
little unity. Many businessmen were interested only in reforms
that would facilitate commerce, and they gave little thought to
politics. Political liberals were split into a number of camps.
Some wished for a greater degree of political representation,
but, given a widespread fear of what the masses might do if they
had access to power, these liberals were content to have aristo-
crats as leaders. Others desired a democratic constitution, but
with a hereditary king as ruler. A minority of liberals were
ardent democrats who desired to establish a republic with par-
liamentary democracy and universal suffrage.
The ideal of a united Germany had been awakened within
liberal groups by the writings of scholars and literary figures
such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and by the
achievements of French nationalism after the revolution.
France's easy victories over Germany's small states made the
union of a people with a common language and historical
memory desirable for practical reasons alone. Others were
impressed by the political and commercial accomplishments of
Britain, which made those of the small German states seem
insignificant. Some writers warmed to romantic evocations of
Germany's glory during the Middle Ages.
Many members of Germany's aristocratic ruling class were
opposed to national unity because they feared it would mean
the disappearance of their small states into a large Germany.
Metternich opposed a united Germany because the Habsburg
Empire did not embrace a single people speaking one lan-
guage, but many peoples speaking different languages. The
empire would not easily fit into a united Germany. He desired
instead the continued existence of the loosely organized Ger-
man Confederation with its forty-odd members, none equal to
Austria in strength. Prussia's kings and its conservative elite
sometimes objected to Austria's primacy in the confederation,
but they had little desire for German unification, which they
regarded as a potential threat to Prussia's existence.
35
Source: Based on information from Geoffrey Barraclough. ed., The Times Alias of World History London, 1978, 216.
Figure l. The German Struggle for Unification, 1815-71
Historical Setting: Early History to 1 945
Many of Germany's liberal intelligentsia — lower government
officials, men of letters, professors, and lawyers — who pushed
for representative government and greater political freedom
were also interested in some form of German unity. They
argued that liberal political reforms could only be enacted in a
larger political entity. Germany's small, traditional states
offered little scope for political reform.
Among those groups desiring reform, there was, ironically,
little unity. Many businessmen were interested only in reforms
that would facilitate commerce, and they gave little thought to
politics. Political liberals were split into a number of camps.
Some wished for a greater degree of political representation,
but, given a widespread fear of what the masses might do if they
had access to power, these liberals were content to have aristo-
crats as leaders. Others desired a democratic constitution, but
with a hereditary king as ruler. A minority of liberals were
ardent democrats who desired to establish a republic with par-
liamentary democracy and universal suffrage.
The ideal of a united Germany had been awakened within
liberal groups by the writings of scholars and literary figures
such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and by the
achievements of French nationalism after the revolution.
France's easy victories over Germany's small states made the
union of a people with a common language and historical
memory desirable for practical reasons alone. Others were
impressed by the political and commercial accomplishments of
Britain, which made those of the small German states seem
insignificant. Some writers warmed to romantic evocations of
Germany's glory during the Middle Ages.
Many members of Germany's aristocratic ruling class were
opposed to national unity because they feared it would mean
the disappearance of their small states into a large Germany.
Metternich opposed a united Germany because the Habsburg
Empire did not embrace a single people speaking one lan-
guage, but many peoples speaking different languages. The
empire would not easily fit into a united Germany. He desired
instead the continued existence of the loosely organized Ger-
man Confederation with its forty-odd members, none equal to
Austria in strength. Prussia's kings and its conservative elite
sometimes objected to Austria's primacy in the confederation,
but they had little desire for German unification, which they
regarded as a potential threat to Prussia's existence.
35
Germany: A Country Study
Germany's lower classes — farmers, artisans, and factory
workers — were not included in the discussions about political
and economic reform. Germany's farmers had been freed to
some degree from many obligations and dues owed to the
landowning aristocracy, but they were often desperately poor,
earning barely enough to survive. Farmers west of the Elbe
River usually had properties too small to yield any kind of pros-
perity. Farmers east of the Elbe often were landless laborers
hired to work on large estates. Artisans, that is, skilled workers
in handicrafts and trades belonging to the traditional guilds,
saw their economic position worsen as a result of the industrial-
ization that had begun to appear in Germany after 1815. The
guilds attempted to stop factory construction and unrestricted
commerce, but strong economic trends ran counter to their
wishes. Factory workers, in contrast, were doing well compared
with these other groups and were generally content with their
lot when the economy as a whole prospered.
The Revolutions of 1 848
Europe endured hard times during much of the 1840s. A
series of bad harvests culminating in the potato blight of 1845-
46 brought widespread misery and some starvation. An eco-
nomic depression added to the hardship, spreading discontent
among the poor and the middle class alike. A popular uprising
in Paris in February 1848 turned into a revolution, forcing the
French king Louis Philippe to flee to Britain.
The success of the revolution sparked revolts elsewhere in
Europe. Numerous German cities were shaken by uprisings in
which crowds consisting mainly of the urban poor, but also of
students and members of the liberal middle class, stormed
their rulers' palaces and demanded fundamental reform. Ber-
lin and Vienna were especially hard hit by what came to be
called the revolutions of 1848. The rulers of both cities, like
rulers elsewhere, quickly acceded to the demands of their
rebellious subjects and promised constitutions and representa-
tive government. Conservative governments fell, and Metter-
nich fled to Britain. Liberals called for a national convention to
draft a constitution for all of Germany. The National Assembly,
consisting of about 800 delegates from throughout Germany,
met in a church in Frankfurt, the Paulskirche, from May 1848
to March 1849 for this purpose.
36
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
The Restoration
Within just a few months, liberal hopes for a reformed Ger-
many were disappointed. Conservative forces saw that the lib-
eral movement was divided into a number of camps having
sharply different aims. Furthermore, the liberals had little sup-
port left among the lower classes, who had supported them in
the first weeks of the revolution by constructing barricades and
massing before their rulers' palaces. Few liberals desired popu-
lar democracy or were willing to enact radical economic
reforms that would help farmers and artisans. As a result of this
timidity, the masses deserted the liberals. Thus, conservatives
were able to win sizable elements of these groups to their side
by promising to address their concerns. Factory workers had
largely withheld support from the liberal cause because they
earned relatively good wages compared with farmers and arti-
sans.
Once the conservatives regrouped and launched their suc-
cessful counterattack across Germany, many of the reforms
promised in March 1848 were forgotten. The National Assem-
bly published the constitution it had drafted during months of
hard debate. It proposed the unification of Germany as a feder-
ation with a hereditary emperor and a parliament with dele-
gates elected directly. The constitution resolved the dispute
between supporters of "Little Germany," that is, a united Ger-
many that would exclude Austria and the Habsburg Empire,
and those supporting "Large Germany," which would include
both. The constitution advocated the latter.
The Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV (r. 1840-58), was
elected united Germany's first emperor. He refused the crown,
stating that he could be elected only by other kings. At that
point, the assembly disbanded. A few subsequent rebellions by
democratic liberals drew some popular support in 1849, but
they were easily crushed and their leaders executed or impris-
oned. Some of these ardent democrats fled to the United
States. Among them was Carl Schurz, who later fought at the
Battle of Gettysburg as a Union officer, served one term as a
United States senator from Missouri, and was appointed secre-
tary of the interior by United States president Rutherford B.
Hayes.
The German Confederation was reestablished, and conser-
vatives held the reins of power even more tightly than before.
The failure of the 1848 revolutions also meant that Germany
was not united as many had hoped. However, some of the liber-
37
Germany: A Country Study
als' more practical proposals came to fruition later in the 1850s
and 1860s when it was realized that they were essential to eco-
nomic efficiency. Many commercial restrictions were abolished.
The guilds, with their desire to turn back the clock and restore
preindustrial conditions, were defeated, and impediments to
the free use of capital were reduced. The "hungry forties" gave
way to the prosperity of the 1850s as the German economy
modernized and laid the foundations for spectacular growth
later in the century.
Bismarck and Unification
Liberal hopes for German unification were not met during
the politically turbulent 1848-49 period. A Prussian plan for a
smaller union was dropped in late 1850 after Austria threat-
ened Prussia with war. Despite this setback, desire for some
kind of German unity, either with or without Austria, grew dur-
ing the 1850s and 1860s. It was no longer a notion cherished by
a few, but had proponents in all social classes. An indication of
this wider range of support was the change of mind about Ger-
man nationalism experienced by an obscure Prussian diplo-
mat, Otto von Bismarck. He had been an adamant opponent of
German nationalism in the late 1840s. During the 1850s, how-
ever, Bismarck had concluded that Prussia would have to har-
ness German nationalism for its own purposes if it were to
thrive. He believed too that Prussia's well-being depended on
wresting primacy in Germany from its traditional enemy, Aus-
tria.
In 1862 King Wilhelm I of Prussia (r. 1858-88) chose Bis-
marck to serve as his minister president. Descended from the
Junker, Prussia's aristocratic landowning class, Bismarck hated
parliamentary democracy and championed the dominance of
the monarchy and aristocracy. However, gifted at judging polit-
ical forces and sizing up a situation, Bismarck contended that
conservatives would have to come to terms with other social
groups if they were to continue to direct Prussian affairs. The
king had summoned Bismarck to direct Prussia's government
in the face of the Prussian parliament's refusal to pass a budget
because it disagreed with army reforms desired by the king and
his military advisers. Although he could not secure parlia-
ment's consent to the government's budget, Bismarck was a tac-
tician skilled and ruthless enough to govern without parlia-
ment's consent from 1862 to 1866.
38
Otto von Bismarck, 1815-
98, united Germany under a
Prussian emperor.
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
As an ardent and aggressive Prussian nationalist, Bismarck
had long been an opponent of Austria because both states
sought primacy within the same area — Germany. Austria had
been weakened by reverses abroad, including the loss of terri-
tory in Italy, and by the 1860s, because of clumsy diplomacy,
had no foreign allies outside Germany. Bismarck used a diplo-
matic dispute to provoke Austria to declare war on Prussia in
1866. Against expectations, Prussia quickly won the Seven
Weeks' War (also known as the Austro-Prussian War) against
Austria and its south German allies. Bismarck imposed a
lenient peace on Austria because he recognized that Prussia
might later need the Austrians as allies. But he dealt harshly
with the other German states that had resisted Prussia and
expanded Prussian territory by annexing Hanover, Schleswig-
Holstein, some smaller states, and the city of Frankfurt. The
German Confederation was replaced by the North German
Confederation and was furnished with both a constitution and
a parliament. Austria was excluded from Germany. South Ger-
man states outside the confederation — Baden, Wurttemberg,
and Bavaria — were tied to Prussia by military alliances.
Bismarck's military and political successes were remarkable,
but the first had been achieved at considerable risk, and the
second were by no means complete. Luck had played a part in
the decisive victory at the Battle of Koniggratz (Hradec Kralove
39
Germany: A Country Study
in the present-day Czech Republic); otherwise, the war might
have lasted much longer than it did. None of the larger Ger-
man states had supported either Prussia's war or the formation
of the North German Confederation led by Prussia. The states
that formed what is often called the Third Germany, that is,
Germany exclusive of Austria and Prussia, did not desire to
come under the control of either of those states. None of them
wished to be pulled into a war that showed little likelihood of
benefiting any of them. In the Seven Weeks' War, the support
they gave Austria had been lukewarm.
In 1870 Bismarck engineered another war, this time against
France. The conflict would become known to history as the
Franco-Prussian War. Nationalistic fervor was ignited by the
promised annexation of Lorraine and Alsace, which had
belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and had been seized by
France in the seventeenth century. With this goal in sight, the
south German states eagerly joined in the war against the coun-
try that had come to be seen as Germany's traditional enemy.
Bismarck's major war aim — the voluntary entry of the south
German states into a constitutional German nation-state —
occurred during the patriotic frenzy generated by stunning
military victories against French forces in the fall of 1870.
Months before a peace treaty was signed with France in May
1871, a united Germany was established as the German
Empire, and the Prussian king, Wilhelm I, was crowned its
emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.
Imperial Germany
The German Empire — often called the Second Reich to dis-
tinguish it from the First Reich, established by Charlemagne in
800 — was based on two compromises. The first was between the
king of Prussia and the rulers of the other German states, who
agreed to accept him as the kaiser (emperor) of a united Ger-
many, provided they could continue to rule their states largely
as they had in the past. The second was the agreement among
many segments of German society to accept a unified Germany
based on a constitution that combined a powerful authoritar-
ian monarchy with a weak representative body, the Reichstag,
elected by universal male suffrage. No one was completely satis-
fied with the bargain. The kaiser had to contend with a parlia-
ment elected by the people in a secret vote. The people were
represented in a parliament having limited control over the
kaiser.
40
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
As had been the tradition in Prussia, the kaiser controlled
foreign policy and the army through his handpicked ministers,
who formed the government and prepared legislation. The
government was headed by a chancellor, also selected by the
kaiser, who served in this post at the kaiser's pleasure and could
be dismissed by him at any time. The Bundesrat (Federal
Council) represented Germany's princes. About one-third of
its seats were held by Prussians. Conceived as an upper house
to the Reichstag, the Bundesrat, like the Reichstag, was
required to vote on legislation drawn up by the government
before it became law. The Reichstag had no power to draft leg-
islation. In addition, the government's actions were not subject
to the Reichstag's approval, and the government was not drawn
from the Reichstag, as is ordinarily the case in parliamentary
democracies.
The government needed the approval of the Bundesrat and
the Reichstag to enact legislative proposals, and the kaiser and
his chancellor had many means of securing this approval. Con-
servative in nature, the Bundesrat was usually docile and
needed little wooing. Compliant in the early years of the
empire, the Reichstag, by contrast, became less so with time.
The easiest means of controlling the Reichstag was to threaten
it with new elections in the hope of getting a legislative body
more attuned to the intentions of the government. During
elections the government campaigned for the parties it
favored, sometimes cynically conjuring up fears of national
catastrophe if particular parties won many seats. The govern-
ment also bargained with parties, granting them what they
sought in exchange for votes. A last means of taming the Reich-
stag was to spread rumors of a possible coup d'etat by the army
and the repeal of the constitution and universal suffrage. This
technique was used repeatedly in imperial Germany and could
even frighten the conservative Bundesrat. However little many
of the Reichstag members might like the empire's political
order, the prospect of naked despotism pleased them even less.
Although the Reichstag did not wield real power, elections to
it were hotly contested, and Bismarck and later chancellors and
governments were concerned with their outcome. As more-
democratic parties came to dominate in the Reichstag, govern-
ing became more difficult for the kaiser and his officials. Dur-
ing the later decades of the reign of Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918),
the empire's governing system experienced such difficulties
that some conservatives advocated scrapping it, and democrats
41
Germany: A Country Study
argued for a new, truly parliamentary system. A fear of these
drastic choices and their possible effects caused Germany to
muddle through with the existing system until the disaster of
World War I culminated in that system's abolition.
Political Parties
Six major political parties were active in imperial Germany:
the Conservative Party, the Free Conservative Party, the
National Liberal Party, the Progressive Party, the Center Party,
and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozial-
demokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD). Only the SPD sur-
vived both the empire and the Weimar Republic (1918-33)
and came to play a vital role in the Federal Republic. Even
though the German Empire lacked a genuinely democratic sys-
tem, the six main parties accurately reflected the interests and
hopes of most of its people.
The most right-wing of the six parties was the Conservative
Party, which represented Prussian nationalism, aristocracy, and
landed property. Many of its members remained opposed to
German unification because they feared Prussia's gradual
absorption by the empire. The Conservatives also detested the
Reichstag because it was elected by universal suffrage. The Free
Conservative Party represented industrialists and large com-
mercial interests. The views of this party most closely matched
those of Bismarck. Its members supported unification because
they saw it as unavoidable. The National Liberal Party was com-
posed of liberals who had accepted Germany's lack of full
democracy because they valued national unity more. They con-
tinued to favor a laissez-faire economic policy and seculariza-
tion. In time, National Liberals became some of the strongest
supporters of the acquisition of colonies and a substantial naval
buildup, both key issues in the 1880s and 1890s.
Unlike the members of the National Liberal Party, members
of the Progressive Party remained faithful to all the principles
of European liberalism and championed the extension of par-
liament's powers. This party was in the forefront of those
opposed to the authoritarian rule of Bismarck and his succes-
sors. The Center Party was Germany's Roman Catholic party
and had strong support in southern Germany, the Rhineland,
and in parts of Prussia with significant Polish populations. It
was conservative regarding monarchical authority but progres-
sive in matters of social reform. Bismarck's brutal campaign
against the Roman Catholic Church in the 1870s — the Kul-
42
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
turkampf (cultural struggle), an attempt to reduce the
church's power over education and its role in many other areas
of German society — turned the Center Party against him. By
the late 1870s, Bismarck had to concede victory to the party,
which had become stronger through its resistance to the gov-
ernment's persecution. The party remained important during
the Weimar Republic and was the forerunner of the Federal
Republic's moderate conservative parties, the Christian Demo-
cratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union — CDU) and
the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU).
The Marxist SPD was founded in Gotha in 1875, a fusion of
Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers' Association
(formed in 1863), which advocated state socialism, and the
Social Democratic Labor Party (formed in 1869), headed by
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, which aspired to estab-
lish a classless communist society. The SPD advocated a mix-
ture of revolution and quiet work within the parliamentary
system. The clearest statement of this impossible combination
was the Erfurt Program of 1891. The former method fright-
ened nearly all Germans to the party's right, while the latter
would build the SPD into the largest party in the Reichstag
after the elections of 1912.
Once Bismarck gave up his campaign against Germany's
Roman Catholics, whom he had seen for a time as a Vatican-
controlled threat to the stability of the empire, he attacked the
SPD with a series of antisocialist laws beginning in 1878. A posi-
tive aspect of Bismarck's campaign to contain the SPD was a
number of laws passed in the 1880s establishing national health
insurance and old-age pensions. Bismarck's hope was that if
workers were protected by the government, they would come
to support it and see no need for revolution. Bismarck's antiso-
cialist campaign, which continued until his dismissal in 1890 by
Wilhelm II, severely restricted the activities of the SPD. Ironi-
cally, the laws may have inadvertently benefited the SPD by
forcing it to work within legal channels. As a result of its sus-
tained activity within the political system, the SPD became a
cautious, pragmatic party, which, despite its fiery Marxist rheto-
ric, won increasing numbers of seats in the Reichstag and
achieved some improvements in working and living conditions
for Germany's working class.
The Economy and Population Growth
Germany experienced an economic boom immediately after
43
Germany: A Country Study
unification. For the first time, the country was a single eco-
nomic entity, and old impediments to internal trade were
lifted. The federal chancellery published a new commercial
code and established a uniform currency. The indemnity that
France had to pay Germany after losing the 1870-71 war pro-
vided capital for railroad construction and building projects. A
speculative boom resulted, characterized by large-scale forma-
tion of joint-stock companies and unscrupulous investment
practices. This period of intense financial speculation and con-
struction, called by Germans the Grunderzeit (founders' time),
ended with the stock market crash of 1873.
Despite the crash and several subsequent periods of eco-
nomic depression, Germany's economy grew rapidly. By 1900 it
rivaled the more-established British economy as the world's
largest. German coal production, about one-third of Britain's
in 1880, increased sixfold by 1913, almost equaling British
yields that year. German steel production increased more than
tenfold in the same period, surpassing British production by
far.
Industrialization began later in Germany than in Britain,
and the German economy was not a significant part of the
world economy until late in the nineteenth century Germany's
industrialization started with the building of railroads in the
1840s and 1850s and the subsequent development of coal min-
ing and iron and steel production, activities that made up what
is called the First Industrial Revolution. In Germany, the Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution, that is, the growth of chemical and
electrical industries, followed the enormous expansion of coal
and steel production so closely that the country can be said to
have experienced the two revolutions almost simultaneously.
Germany took an early lead in the chemical and electrical
industries. Its chemists became renowned for their discoveries,
and by 1914 the country was producing half the world's electri-
cal equipment. As a result of these developments, Germany
became the continent's industrial giant.
Germany's population also expanded rapidly, growing from
41.0 million in 1871 to 49.7 million in 1891 and 65.3 million in
1911. The expanding and industrializing economy changed
the way this rapidly expanding population earned its liveli-
hood. In 1871 about 49 percent of the workforce was engaged
in agriculture; by 1907 only 35 percent was. In the same period,
industry's share of the rapidly growing workforce rose from 31
percent to 40 percent. Urban birth rates were often the coun-
44
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
try's highest, but there was much migration from rural areas to
urban areas, where most industry was located. Berlin, by far the
country's largest city and a major industrial center, grew from
almost 1 million inhabitants in 1875 to 2 million in 1910. Many
smaller cities, especially those in areas with much industry —
such as the Ruhr region, the upper Rhine Valley, the Neckar
Valley, and Saxony — tripled or quadrupled in size during this
period.
The Tariff Agreement of 1 879 and Its Social Consequences
The crash of 1873 and the subsequent depression began the
gradual dissolution of Bismarck's alliance with the National
Liberals that had begun after his triumphs of 1866. In the late
1870s, Bismarck began negotiations with the economically pro-
tectionist Conservative Party and Center Party toward the for-
mation of a new government coalition. Conservative electoral
gains and National Liberal losses in 1879 brought a conserva-
tive coalition to power. Bismarck then abandoned his former
allies in the National Liberal Party and put in place a system of
tariffs that benefited the landed gentry of eastern Prussia —
threatened by imports of cheaper grains from Russia and the
United States — and industrialists who were afraid to compete
with cheaper foreign manufactured goods and who believed
they needed more time to establish themselves.
Bismarck's alliance with the Prussian landowning class and
powerful industrialists and the parties representing their inter-
ests had profound social effects. From that point on, conserva-
tive groups had the upper hand in German society. The
German middle class began to imitate its conservative social
superiors rather than attempt to impose its own liberal, middle-
class values on Germany. The prestige of the military became
so great that many middle-class males sought to enhance their
social standing by becoming officers in the reserves. The mid-
dle classes also became more susceptible to the nationalistic
clamor for colonies and "a place in the sun" that was to become
ever more virulent in the next few decades.
Bismarck's Foreign Policy
Bismarck sincerely regarded the new German Empire as
"satiated," that is, having no desire to expand further and
hence posing no threat to its neighbors. The chancellor held
that the country had to adjust to its new circumstances and that
this would take decades. For this reason, he sought to convince
45
Germany: A Country Study
the other European states of Germany's desire to live in peace,
hoping thereby to secure Germany against attack. He aimed to
arrange this security through a system of alliances. Believing
that France would remain Germany's enemy because of the
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, an action he had opposed
because of the enmity it would cause, he turned to other states.
Bismarck arranged an alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879
and one with Italy in 1882. His triumph, however, was a secret
alliance he formed by means of the Reinsurance Treaty with
Russia in 1887, although its terms violated the spirit of the
treaty with Austria-Hungary. However much these agreements
contributed to German security, Bismarck's plunge into the
European scramble for overseas colonies ultimately weakened
it by awakening British fears about Germany's long-term geo-
political aims. Subsequent feelers he put out with a view to
establishing an understanding with Britain were rebuffed. In
1890 Bismarck was dismissed by young Kaiser Wilhelm over a
dispute about antisocialist legislation.
Foreign Policy in the Wilhelmine Era
Foreign policy in the Wilhelmine Era (1890-1914) turned
away from Bismarck's cautious diplomacy of the 1871-90
period. It was also marked by a shrill aggressiveness. Brusque,
clumsy diplomacy was backed by increased armaments produc-
tion, most notably the creation of a large fleet of battleships
capable of challenging the British navy. This new bellicosity
alarmed the rest of Europe, and by about 1907 German policy
makers had succeeded in creating Bismarck's nightmare: a Ger-
many "encircled" by an alliance of hostile neighbors — in this
case Russia, France, and Britain — in an alliance called the Tri-
ple Entente.
The first brick to fall out of Bismarck's carefully crafted edi-
fice was Germany's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Harmed by
Prussian trade policies, Russia did not renew the treaty and
instead turned to France for economic assistance and military
security. The two countries formally allied in early 1893. Britain
joined them in 1907, even though France and Britain had
nearly gone to war over a colonial dispute in 1898. Britain's
main reason for abandoning its usual posture as an aloof
observer of developments on the continent was Germany's
plan to build a fleet of sixty battleships of the formidable
Dreadnought class.
46
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
The German naval expansion program had many domestic
supporters. The kaiser deeply admired the navy of his grand-
mother, Queen Victoria of Britain, and wanted one as large for
himself. Powerful lobbying groups in Germany desired a large
navy to give Germany a worldwide role and to protect a grow-
ing German colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific. Industry
wanted large government contracts. Some political parties pro-
moted naval expansion and an aggressive foreign policy to win
votes from a nervous electorate they kept worked up with jingo-
istic rhetoric.
The chief figure in promoting the naval buildup was Admi-
ral Alfred von Tirpitz, who is considered the founder of the
modern German navy. Tirpitz was an effective spokesman for
the program and had the ear of the kaiser and his advisers. In
1898, after the Reichstag passed the first Naval Bill, Anglo-Ger-
man relations deteriorated. The Supplementary Naval Act of
1900 further strained relations with Britain, as did a proposed
Berlin-Baghdad railroad through the Ottoman Empire, a
project that threatened British as well as Russian interests in
the Balkans. Two crises over Morocco, in 1905 and 1911, drove
France and Britain closer together and made for a tense inter-
national atmosphere. The great powers remained neutral dur-
ing the Balkan Wars (1912-13), a nationalist rebellion against
Ottoman rule, but European tensions were increased still fur-
ther, and the expectation that there would eventually be war on
the continent became more certain.
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo
on June 28, 1914, set off a series of diplomatic and military
decisions that would end peace in Europe. The kaiser gave a so-
called blank check to his ally, Austria-Hungary, saying that Ger-
many would support any Habsburg measure taken against Ser-
bia, which had backed the assassination. Austria-Hungary's
ultimatum to Serbia in late July was so harsh that war became
inevitable. Within days, a set of interlocking alliances had
Europe's great powers embroiled in what would become World
War I.
World War I
Germany's leadership had hoped for a limited war between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. But because Russian forces had
been mobilized in support of Serbia, the German leadership
made the decision to support its ally. The Schlieffen Plan,
based on the assumption that Germany would face a two-front
47
Germany: A Country Study
war because of a French-Russian alliance, required a rapid inva-
sion through neutral Belgium to ensure the quick defeat of
France. Once the western front was secure, the bulk of German
forces could attack and defeat Russia, which would not yet be
completely ready for war because it would mobilize its gigantic
forces slowly.
Despite initial successes, Germany's strategy failed, and its
troops became tied down in trench warfare in France. For the
next four years, there would be little progress in the west,
where advances were usually measured in meters rather than in
kilometers. Under the command of Paul von Hindenburg and
Erich Ludendorff, the army scored a number of significant vic-
tories against Russia. But it was only in early 1918 that Russia
was defeated. Even after this victory in the east, however, Ger-
many remained mired in a long war for which it had not pre-
pared.
Germany's war aims were annexationist in nature and fore-
saw an enlarged Germany, with Belgium and Poland as vassal
states and with colonies in Africa. In its first years, there was
widespread support for the war. Even the SPD supported it,
considering it a defensive effort and voting in favor of war cred-
its. By 1916, however, opposition to the war had mounted
within the general population, which had to endure many
hardships, including food shortages. A growing number of
Reichstag deputies came to demand a peace without annex-
ations. Frustrated in its quest for peace, in April 1917 a seg-
ment of the SPD broke with the party and formed the
Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany. In July the
Reichstag passed a resolution calling for a peace without
annexations. In its wake, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann
Hollweg was forced to resign, and Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff came to exercise a control over Germany until late 1918
that amounted to a virtual military dictatorship.
Military leaders refused a moderate peace because they were
convinced until very late in the war that victory ultimately
would be theirs. Another reason for their insistence on a settle-
ment that fulfilled expansionist aims was that the government
had not financed the war with higher taxes but with bonds.
Taxes had been seen as unnecessary because it was expected
that the government would redeem these bonds after the war
with payments from Germany's vanquished enemies. Thus,
only an expansionist victory would keep the state solvent and
save millions of German bondholders from financial ruin.
48
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
After the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, Russia
and Germany began peace negotiations. In March 1918, the
two countries signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The defeat of
Russia enabled Germany to transfer troops from the eastern to
the western front. Two large offensives in the west were met by
an Allied counteroffensive that began in July. German troops
were pressed back, and it became evident to many officers that
Germany could not win the war. In September Ludendorff rec-
ommended that Germany sue for peace. In October extensive
reforms democratized the Reichstag and gave Germany a con-
stitutional monarchy. A coalition of progressive forces was
formed, headed by SPD politician Friedrich Ebert. The mili-
tary allowed the birth of a democratic parliament because it
did not want to be held responsible for the inevitable armistice
that would end the war on terms highly unfavorable to Ger-
many. Instead, the civilian government that signed the truce
was to take the blame for the nation's defeat.
The political reforms of October were overshadowed by a
popular uprising that began on November 3 when sailors in
Kiel mutinied. They refused to go out on what they considered
a suicide mission against British naval forces. The revolt grew
quickly and within a week appeared to be burgeoning into a
revolution that could well overthrow the established social
order. On November 9, the kaiser was forced to abdicate, and
the SPD proclaimed a republic. A provisional government
headed by Ebert promised elections for a national assembly to
draft a new constitution. In an attempt to control the popular
uprising, Ebert agreed to back the army if it would suppress the
revolt. On November 11, the government signed the armistice
that ended the war. Germany's loses included about 1.6 million
dead and more than 4 million wounded.
Signed in June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles limited Ger-
many to an army of 100,000 soldiers. The treaty also stipulated
that the Rhineland be demilitarized and occupied by the west-
ern Allies for fifteen years and that Germany surrender Alsace-
Lorraine, northern Schleswig-Holstein, a portion of western
Prussia that became known as the Polish Corridor because it
gave Poland access to the Baltic, and all overseas colonies. Also,
an Allied Reparations Commission was established and
charged with setting the amount of war-damage payments that
would be demanded of Germany. The treaty also included the
"war guilt clause," ascribing responsibility for World War I to
Germany and Austria-Hungary.
49
Germany: A Country Study
The Weimar Republic, 1918-33
The Weimar Constitution
The Weimar Republic, proclaimed on November 9, 1918,
was born in the throes of military defeat and social revolution.
In January 1919, a National Assembly was elected to draft a
constitution. The government, composed of members from
the assembly, came to be called the Weimar coalition and
included the SPD; the German Democratic Party (Deutsche
Demokratische Partei — DDP), a descendant of the Progressive
Party of the prewar period; and the Center Party. The percent-
age of the vote gained by this coalition of parties in favor of the
republic (76.2 percent, with 38 percent for the SPD alone) sug-
gested broad popular support for the republic. The antirepub-
lican, conservative German National People's Party
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei — DNVP) and the German Peo-
ple's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei — DVP) received a combined
total of 10.3 percent of the vote. The Independent Social Dem-
ocratic Party of Germany, which had split from the SPD during
the war, won 8 percent of the vote. In February the assembly
elected Friedrich Ebert as the republic's first president.
In mid-1919 the assembly ratified the constitution of the new
Weimar Republic, so named because its constitution was
drafted in the small city where the poets Goethe and Schiller
had lived. The constitution established a federal republic con-
sisting of nineteen states (Lander, sing., Land) (see fig. 5). The
republic's government was a mixed strong president and parlia-
mentary system, with the president seen by many as a sort of
substitute kaiser. The president was elected by popular direct
ballot to a seven-year term and could be reelected. He
appointed the chancellor and, pursuant to the chancellor's
nominations, also appointed the cabinet ministers. However,
the cabinet had to reflect the party composition of the Reichs-
tag and was also responsible to this body. Election to the
Reichstag was by secret ballot and popular vote. Suffrage was
universal. Thus, Germany had a truly democratic parliamen-
tary system. However, the president had the right to dismiss the
cabinet, dissolve the Reichstag, and veto legislation. The legis-
lative powers of the Reichstag were further weakened by the
provision for presidential recourse to popular plebiscite. Arti-
cle 48, the so-called emergency clause, accorded the president
the right to allow the cabinet to govern without the consent of
50
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
parliament whenever it was deemed essential to maintaining
public order.
Problems of Parliamentary Politics
The Weimar Republic was beset with serious problems from
the outset that led many Germans either to withhold support
from the new parliamentary democracy or to seek actively to
destroy it. The extreme left and much of the right provided the
republic's most vitriolic opponents. Its supporters included the
bulk of the left, represented by the SPD, and the moderate
right, made up of the Center Party and the DDP. However, at
key times these supporters failed to behave responsibly because
of political inexperience, narrow self-interest, or unrealistic
party programs.
The most serious obstacle the new republic faced was the
refusal of many Germans to accept its legitimacy. The extreme
left regarded it as an instrument of the propertied to prevent
revolution, recalling Ebert's agreement with the military in
November 1918 that resulted in the army's bloody suppression
of the left-wing revolts of late 1918 and early 1919. In the face
of this SPD-military alliance, elements of the left considered
the SPD as great a barrier to their goals as the conservatives.
Represented by the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunis-
tische Partei Deutschlands — KPD), the extreme left felt such
an enduring hostility to the Weimar Republic that at times it
cooperated with the extreme right in efforts to destroy the
republic.
The right posed a graver threat to the Weimar Republic than
did the extreme left because it enjoyed the support of most of
Germany's establishment: the military, the financial elites, the
state bureaucracy, the educational system, and much of the
press. Unlike political parties in well-established democracies,
the right-wing parties in the Reichstag could not be considered
a loyal opposition because their ultimate aim was to abolish the
new system of government. The right opposed democracy and
desired to establish a conservative authoritarian regime. The
right styled those who were party to the armistice and to the
Treaty of Versailles as "November criminals" because of Ger-
many's loss of territory and sovereignty and the burden of
enormous war reparations. The increasing acceptance by many
of the "stab in the back" legend, which attributed Germany's
defeat in World War I to the treachery of the SPD and others
on the left rather than to the military might of the Allies, inten-
53
>2
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
parliament whenever it was deemed essential to maintaining
public order.
Problems of Parliamentary Politics
The Weimar Republic was beset with serious problems from
the outset that led many Germans either to withhold support
from the new parliamentary democracy or to seek actively to
destroy it. The extreme left and much of the right provided the
republic's most vitriolic opponents. Its supporters included the
bulk of the left, represented by the SPD, and the moderate
right, made up of the Center Party and the DDP. However, at
key times these supporters failed to behave responsibly because
of political inexperience, narrow self-interest, or unrealistic
party programs.
The most serious obstacle the new republic faced was the
refusal of many Germans to accept its legitimacy. The extreme
left regarded it as an instrument of the propertied to prevent
revolution, recalling Ebert's agreement with the military in
November 1918 that resulted in the army's bloody suppression
of the left-wing revolts of late 1918 and early 1919. In the face
of this SPD-military alliance, elements of the left considered
the SPD as great a barrier to their goals as the conservatives.
Represented by the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunis-
tische Partei Deutschlands — KPD), the extreme left felt such
an enduring hostility to the Weimar Republic that at times it
cooperated with the extreme right in efforts to destroy the
republic.
The right posed a graver threat to the Weimar Republic than
did the extreme left because it enjoyed the support of most of
Germany's establishment: the military, the financial elites, the
state bureaucracy, the educational system, and much of the
press. Unlike political parties in well-established democracies,
the right-wing parties in the Reichstag could not be considered
a loyal opposition because their ultimate aim was to abolish the
new system of government. The right opposed democracy and
desired to establish a conservative authoritarian regime. The
right styled those who were party to the armistice and to the
Treaty of Versailles as "November criminals" because of Ger-
many's loss of territory and sovereignty and the burden of
enormous war reparations. The increasing acceptance by many
of the "stab in the back" legend, which attributed Germany's
defeat in World War I to the treachery of the SPD and others
on the left rather than to the military might of the Allies, inten-
53
Germany: A Country Study
sified the hatred many rightists felt toward the republic. Like
some on the extreme left, many on the right used violence,
either petty and random or large-scale and concerted, to attain
their ends. Throughout the short life of the Weimar Republic,
various political groups maintained gangs of youths organized
into paramilitary forces.
In addition to venomous political opposition, the republic
had to contend with a weak economy plagued by high rates of
inflation and unemployment. Inflation was fueled partly by the
enormous wartime debts the imperial government had con-
tracted rather than raise taxes to finance the war. Even more
inflationary were the enormous war reparations demanded by
the Allies, which made economic recovery seem impossible to
many objective expert observers. Inflation ruined many mid-
dle-class Germans, who saw their savings and pensions wiped
out. Unemployment also remained epidemic throughout the
1920s, hurting millions of wage earners and their families.
Their economic misery made these groups susceptible to the
claims of extremist political parties.
The pervasive social and political discontent growing out of
Germans' grievances, justified or not, soon had consequences.
A right-wing coup d'etat in March 1920, the Kapp Putsch —
named for its leader, Wolfgang Kapp — failed only because of a
general strike. The military had refused to intervene, although
it did brutally suppress some Communist-inspired uprisings
shortly thereafter. The establishment's tacit support of unlawful
right-wing actions such as the Kapp Putsch and violent repres-
sion of the left endured to the end of the Weimar Republic.
This support could also be seen in the sentences meted out by
the courts to perpetrators of political violence. Right-wing ter-
rorists usually received mild or negligible sentences, while
those on the left were dealt with severely, even though left-wing
violence was but a fraction of that committed by the right.
Dissatisfaction with the republic was also evident in the June
1920 elections, in which the Weimar coalition lost its majority.
A combined total vote of 28.9 percent for the DNVP, a descen-
dant of the prewar Conservatives, and the DVP, composed
mainly of National Liberals, reflected German middle-class dis-
illusionment with democracy. Both parties wished to abolish
the Weimar constitution. SPD strength fell to 21. V percent, as
some workers defected to the extreme left. The Independent
Social Democratic Party of Germany, formed during the war,
effectively ceased to exist as some members joined the KPD,
54
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
formed in December 1918, and the remainder reunited with
the SPD.
The Weimar coalition never regained its majority. Because
no party ever gained as much as 50 percent of the vote, unsta-
ble coalition governments became the rule in the 1920s, and by
the end of the decade more than a dozen governments had
been formed, none capable of unified action on major prob-
lems. The SPD and the Center Party often could agree on ques-
tions of foreign policy, such as compliance with the provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles, but split on domestic issues. Con-
versely, the Center Party agreed with parties to its right on
domestic issues but split with them on foreign policy. Thus,
minority governments were formed that often showed little
internal coherence during their brief lives.
The year 1923 was one of crisis for the republic. In January
French and Belgian troops occupied the highly industrialized
Ruhr area because of German defaults on reparations pay-
ments. The Weimar government responded by calling upon
the Ruhr population to stop all industrial activity. The govern-
ment also began printing money at such a rate that it soon
became virtually worthless; by the fall of 1923, wheelbarrows
were needed to carry enough currency for simple purchases as
inflation reached rates beyond comprehension. In 1914 US$1
had equaled 4 marks. By mid-1920, US$1 was worth 40 marks,
by early 1922 about 200 marks, a year later 18,000 marks, and
by November 1923 4.2 trillion marks. In addition, the country
was racked by strikes, paramilitary street violence, and rumors
of planned uprisings by both the left and the right. In August,
in the midst of this chaos, President Ebert asked Gustav Strese-
mann, head of the DVP, to form a new government to resolve
the crisis.
The Stresemann Era
Stresemann was a Vernunftrepublikaner, that is, someone who
supported the Weimar Republic because it seemed the best
course of action rather than from a firm commitment to parlia-
mentary democracy. During the war, Stresemann had sup-
ported imperial aims and desired extensive annexation of
foreign territory. After the war, he remained a monarchist and
founded the DVP to oppose the republic. In early 1920, he
wished for the success of the Kapp Putsch. However, shocked
by the assassinations of several prominent politicians, he had
gradually come to believe that the effective functioning of the
55
Germany: A Country Study
Weimar Republic was the best safeguard against violent
regimes of either the left or the right. He also became con-
vinced that Germany's economic problems and differences
with other countries could best be resolved through negotiated
agreements.
Chancellor only from August to November 1923, Strese-
mann headed the "great coalition, 11 an alliance that included
the SPD, the Center Party, the DDP, and the DVP. In this brief
period, he ended passive resistance in the Ruhr area and intro-
duced measures to bring the currency situation under control.
Because of the failure of several coup attempts — including one
by Adolf Hitler in Munich — and a general quieting of the
atmosphere after these problems had been solved, the Weimar
Republic was granted a period of relative tranquillity that lasted
until the end of the decade. Overriding issues were by no
means settled, but, for a few years, the republic functioned
more like an established democracy.
After his resignation from the chancellorship because of
opposition from the right and left, Stresemann served as Ger-
man foreign minister until his death in 1929. A brilliant negoti-
ator and a shrewd diplomat, Stresemann arranged a
rapprochement with the Allies. Reparations payments were
made easier by the Reichstag's acceptance in mid-1924 of the
Dawes Plan, which had been devised by an American banker,
Charles G. Dawes, to effect significant reductions in payments
until 1929. That year, only months before his death, Strese-
mann negotiated a further reduction as part of the Young Plan,
also named for an American banker, Owen D. Young. The
Dawes Plan had also provided for the withdrawal of French and
Belgian troops from the Ruhr district, which was completed in
1925. In addition, beginning in the mid-1920s, loans from the
United States stimulated the German economy, instigating a
period of growth that lasted until 1930.
The Locarno treaties, signed in 1925 by Germany and the
Allies, were the centerpiece of Stresemann's attempt at rap-
prochement with the West. A prerequisite to Germany's admis-
sion to the League of Nations in 1926, the treaties formalized
German acceptance of the demilitarization of the Rhineland
and guaranteed the western frontier as defined by the Treaty of
Versailles. Both Britain and Germany preferred to leave the
question of the eastern frontier open. In 1926 the German and
Soviet governments signed the Treaty of Berlin, which pledged
56
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
Germany and the Soviet Union to neutrality in the event of an
attack on either country by foreign powers.
The Locarno treaties, the Treaty of Berlin, and Germany's
membership in the League of Nations were successes that
earned Stresemann world renown. Within Germany, however,
these achievements were condemned by many on the right
who charged that these agreements implied German recogni-
tion of the validity of the Treaty of Versailles. To them, Strese-
mann's diplomacy, as able as Bismarck's in the opinion of some
historians, was tantamount to treachery because Germany was
honor bound to take by force that which the rightists felt was
owed it. Because of these opinions and continued dissatisfac-
tion on the right with the political system established by the
Weimar Constitution, the Center Party and the parties to its
right became more right-wing during the latter 1920s, as did
even Stresemann's own party, the DVP.
Hitler and the Rise of National Socialism
Adolf Hitler was born in the Austrian border town of
Braunau am Inn in 1889. When he was seventeen, he was
refused admission to the Vienna Art Academy, having been
found insufficiently talented. He remained in Vienna, however,
where he led a bohemian existence, acquiring an ideology
based on belief in a German master race that was threatened by
an international Jewish conspiracy responsible for many of the
world's problems. Hitler remained in Vienna until 1913, when
he moved to Munich. After serving with bravery in the German
army during World War I, he joined the right-wing Bavarian
German Workers' Party in 1919. The following year, the party
changed its name to the National Socialist German Workers'
Party (National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei —
NSDAP). Its members were known as Nazis, a term derived
from the German pronunciation of "National." In 1921 Hitler
assumed leadership of the NSDAP.
As leader of the NSDAP, Hitler reorganized the party and
encouraged the assimilation of other radical right-wing groups.
Gangs of unemployed demobilized soldiers were gathered
under the command of a former army officer, Ernst Rohm, to
form the Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung — SA), Hitler's private
army. Under Hitler's leadership, the NSDAP joined with others
on the right in denouncing the Weimar Republic and the
"November criminals" who had signed the Treaty of Versailles.
The postwar economic slump won the party a following among
57
Germany: A Country Study
unemployed ex-soldiers, the lower middle class, and small
farmers; in 1923 membership totaled about 55,000. General
Ludendorff supported the former corporal in the Beer Hall
Putsch of November 1923 in Munich, an attempt to overthrow
the Bavarian government. The putsch failed, and Hitler
received a light sentence of five years, of which he served less
than one. Incarcerated in relative comfort, he wrote Mein
Kampf (My Struggle), in which he set out his long-term political
aims.
After the failure of the putsch, Hitler turned to "legal revolu-
tion" as the means to power and chose two parallel paths to
take the Nazis to that goal. First, the NSDAP would employ pro-
paganda to create a national mass party capable of coming to
power through electoral successes. Second, the party would
develop a bureaucratic structure and prepare itself to assume
roles in government. Beginning in the mid-1920s, Nazi groups
sprang up in other parts of Germany. In 1927 the NSDAP orga-
nized the first Nuremberg party congress, a mass political rally.
By 1928 party membership exceeded 100,000; the Nazis, how-
ever, polled only 2.6 percent of the vote in the Reichstag elec-
tions in May.
A mere splinter party in 1928, the NSDAP became better
known the following year when it formed an alliance with the
DNVP to launch a plebiscite against the Young Plan on the
issue of reparations. The DNVP's leader, Alfred Hugenberg,
owner of a large newspaper chain, considered Hitler's spell-
binding oratory a useful means of attracting votes. The DNVP-
NSDAP union brought the NSDAP within the framework of a
socially influential coalition of the antirepublican right. As a
result, Hitler's party acquired respectability and access to
wealthy contributors.
Had it not been for the economic collapse that began with
the Wall Street stock market crash of October 1929, Hitler
probably would not have come to power. The Great Depression
hit Germany hard because the German economy's well-being
depended on short-term loans from the United States. Once
these loans were recalled, Germany was devastated. Unemploy-
ment went from 8.5 percent in 1929 to 14 percent in 1930, to
21.9 percent in 1931, and, at its peak, to 29.9 percent in 1932.
Compounding the effects of the Depression were the drastic
economic measures taken by Center Party politician Heinrich
Bruning, who served as chancellor from March 1930 until the
end of May 1932. Bruning's budget cuts were designed to cause
58
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
so much misery that the Allies would excuse Germany from
making any further reparations payments. In this at least, Brun-
ing succeeded. United States president Herbert Hoover
declared a "reparations moratorium" in 1932. In the mean-
time, the Depression deepened, and social discontent intensi-
fied to the point that Germany seemed on the verge of civil
war.
In times of desperation, voters are ready for extreme solu-
tions, and the NSDAP exploited the situation. Skilled Nazi pro-
pagandist Joseph Goebbels launched an intensive media
campaign that ceaselessly expounded a few simple notions
until even the dullest voter knew Hitler's basic program. The
party's program was broad and general enough to appeal to
many unemployed people, farmers, white-collar workers, mem-
bers of the middle class who had been hurt by the Depression
or had lost status since the end of World War I, and young peo-
ple eager to dedicate themselves to nationalist ideals. If voters
were not drawn to some aspects of the party platform, they
might agree with others. Like other right-wing groups, the
party blamed the Treaty of Versailles and reparations for the
developing crisis. Nazi propaganda attacked the Weimar politi-
cal system, the "November criminals," Marxists, international-
ists, and Jews. Besides promising a solution to the economic
crisis, the NSDAP offered the German people a sense of
national pride and the promise of restored order.
Three elections — in September 1930, in July 1932, and in
November 1932 — were held between the onset of the Depres-
sion and Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January 1933.
The vote shares of the SPD and the Center Party fluctuated
somewhat yet remained much as they had been in 1928, when
the SPD held a large plurality of 153 seats in the Reichstag and
the Center Party held sixty-one, third after the DNVP's seventy-
three seats. The shares of the parties of the extreme left and
extreme right, the KPD and the NSDAP, respectively, increased
dramatically in this period, KPD holdings almost doubling
from fifty-four in 1928 to 100 in November 1932. The NSDAP's
success was even greater. Beginning with twelve seats in 1928,
the Nazis increased their delegation seats nearly tenfold, to 107
seats in 1930. They doubled their holdings to 230 in the sum-
mer of 1932. This made the NSDAP the largest party in the
Reichstag, far surpassing the SPD with its 133 seats. The gains
of the NSDAP came at the expense of the other right-wing par-
ties.
59
Germany: A Country Study
Chancellor Bruning was unable to secure parliamentary
majorities for his austerity policy, so he ruled by decree, a right
given him by President Hindenburg. Head of the German
army during World War I, Hindenburg had been elected presi-
dent in 1925. Ruling without parliament was a major step in
moving away from parliamentary democracy and had the
approval of many on the right. Many historians see this devel-
opment as part of a strategic plan formulated at the time by
elements of the conservative establishment to abolish the
republic and replace it with an authoritarian regime.
By late May 1932, Hindenburg had found Bruning insuffi-
ciently pliable and named a more conservative politician, Franz
von Papen, as his successor. After the mid-1932 elections that
made the NSDAP Germany's largest party, Papen sought to har-
ness Hitler for the purposes of traditional conservatives by
offering him the post of vice chancellor in a new cabinet. Hit-
ler refused this offer, demanding the chancellorship instead.
General Kurt von Schleicher, a master intriguer and a leader
of the conservative campaign to abolish the republic, con-
vinced Hindenburg to dismiss Papen. Schleicher formed a new
government in December but lost Hindenburg's support
within a month. On January 30, 1933, Papen again put
together a cabinet, this time with Hitler as chancellor. Papen
and other conservatives thought they could tame Hitler by
tying him down with the responsibilities of government and
transferring to themselves his tremendous popularity with a
large portion of the electorate. But they proved no match for
his ruthlessness and his genius at knowing how — and when — to
seize power. Within two months, Hitler had dictatorial control
over Germany.
The Third Reich, 1933-45
The Consolidation of Power
Hitler rapidly transformed the Weimar Republic into a dicta-
torship. The National Socialists accomplished their "revolu-
tion" within months, using a combination of legal procedure,
persuasion, and terror. Because the parties forming the cabinet
did not have a parliamentary majority, Hindenburg called for
the dissolution of the Reichstag and set March 5, 1933, as the
date for new elections. A week before election day, the Reichs-
tag building was destroyed by fire. The Nazis blamed the fire
on the Communists, and on February 28 the president, invok-
60
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
ing Article 48 of the constitution, signed a decree that granted
the Nazis the right to quash the political opposition. Autho-
rized by the decree, the SA arrested or intimidated Socialists
and Communists.
The election of March 5 was the last held in Germany until
after World War II. Although opposition parties were severely
harassed, the NSDAP won only 43.9 percent of the vote. None-
theless, with the help of political allies, Hitler presented the
Reichstag with the proposal for an Enabling Act that, if passed
by a two-thirds majority, would allow him to govern without
parliament for four years. On March 23, the proposal was
passed with the support of the Center Party and others. All
Communists and some Social Democrats were prevented from
voting.
Hitler used the Enabling Act to implement Gleichschaltung
(synchronization), that is, the policy of subordinating all insti-
tutions and organizations to Nazi control. First, left-wing politi-
cal parties were banned; then, in July 1933, Germany was
declared a one-party state. The civil service and judiciary were
purged of "non-Aryans" (Jews) and leftists. Local and state gov-
ernments were reorganized and staffed with Nazis. Trade
unions were dissolved and replaced with Nazi organizations.
Even the NSDAP was purged of its social-revolutionary wing,
the SA. The enormous and unruly SA was brought under con-
trol by a massacre of its leadership at the end of June 1934 in
the "night of the long knives." Other opponents were also
killed during this purge, among them Schleicher. After Hin-
denburg's death in early August 1934, Hitler combined the
offices of the president and the chancellor. With the SA tamed,
Hitler assured the army that he regarded it as Germany's mili-
tary force, and the soldiers swore an oath of personal alle-
giance to Hitler, pledging unconditional obedience. Heinrich
Himmler's Guard Detachment (Schutz-Staffel — SS) replaced
the SA as Hitler's private army.
Once the regime was established, terror was the principal
means used to maintain its control of Germany. Police arrests,
which had focused originally on Communists and Socialists,
were extended to other groups, most particularly to Jews. This
systematic use of terror was highly effective in silencing resis-
tance. Some enemies of the regime fled abroad. However, all
but a tiny minority of those opposed to Hitler resigned them-
selves to suppressing their opinions in public and hoping for
the regime's eventual demise.
61
Germany: A Country Study
Like its secular institutions, Germany's churches were sub-
jected to Nazi pressure. They resisted incorporation into the
regime and retained a substantial degree of independence.
This situation was tolerated by the regime, provided that the
churches did not interfere with its efforts to control public life.
When the churches were outraged by such Nazi practices as
euthanasia, they protested. The regime responded by more
carefully concealing such medical procedures. Otherwise, with
the exception of a few brave isolated clergymen, the churches
rarely spoke out against the regime. The regime's chief vic-
tims — -Jews, Communists, Socialists, labor leaders, and writ-
ers — generally had not been close to the churches, and their
persecution was witnessed in silence.
Joseph Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, contributed
to the regime's consolidation with the establishment of the
Reich Cultural Chamber, which extended Gleichschaltung to the
educational system, the radio, and the cultural institutions.
However, an elaborate system of censorship was not considered
necessary to control the press. Non-Nazi party newspapers had
already been suppressed. The editors of the remaining newspa-
pers soon were able to figure out what was deemed suitable for
public consumption. Goebbels also took an interest in Ger-
many's substantial film industry, pressuring it to make pleasant,
amusing films that would distract the German public in its lei-
sure hours.
The regime soon achieved its desired consolidation. Many
Germans supported it, some out of opportunism, some
because they liked certain aspects of it such as full employ-
ment, which was quickly achieved. The regime also brought
social order, something many Germans welcomed after fifteen
years of political and economic chaos. Many were won over by
Hitler's diplomatic successes, which began soon after he came
to power and continued through the 1930s and which seemed
to restore Germany to what they saw as its rightful place in the
international community.
Foreign Policy
Once his regime was consolidated, Hitler took little interest
in domestic policy, his sole concern being that Germany
become sufficiently strong to realize his long-term geopolitical
goal of creating a German empire that would dominate west-
ern Europe and extend deep into Russia. In a first step toward
this goal, he made a de facto revision to the Treaty of Versailles
62
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
by ceasing to heed its restrictions on German rearmament.
Soon after becoming chancellor, Hitler ordered that rearma-
ment, secretly under way since the early 1920s, be stepped up.
Later in 1933, he withdrew Germany from the League of
Nations to reduce possible foreign control over Germany. In
1935 he announced that Germany had begun rearmament,
would greatly increase the size of its army, and had established
an air force. Italy, France, and Britain protested these actions
but did nothing further, and Hitler soon signed an agreement
with Britain permitting Germany to maintain a navy one-third
the size of the British fleet. In 1936 Hitler remilitarized the
Rhineland, in violation of various treaties. There was no for-
eign opposition.
In 1936 Germany began closer relations with fascist Italy, a
pariah state because of its invasion of Ethiopia the year before.
The two antidemocratic states joined together to assist General
Francisco Franco in overthrowing Spain's republican govern-
ment during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). In November
1936, Germany and Italy formed the Berlin-Rome Axis. That
same year, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Anti-Comin-
tern Pact, the three signatories pledging to defend each other
against the Soviet Union and international communism.
It was also in 1936 that Hitler informed the regime's top offi-
cials that Germany must be ready for war by 1940. In response,
the Four-Year Plan was established. Developed under the direc-
tion of Hermann Goering, it set forth production quotas and
market guidelines. Efforts to regiment the economy were not
without conflict. Some of the economic elite desired that Ger-
many be integrated into the world's economy. Others advo-
cated autarchy, that is, firmly basing the German economy in
Central Europe and securing its raw materials through barter
agreements.
In the end, no clear decision on the management of the Ger-
man economy was made. Large weapons contracts with indus-
trial firms soon had the economy running at top speed, and
full employment was reached by 1937. Wages did not increase
much for ordinary workers, but job security after years of eco-
nomic depression was much appreciated. The rearmament
program was not placed on a sound financial footing, however.
Taxes were not increased to pay for it because the regime
feared that this would dissatisfy workers. Instead, the regime
tapped the country's foreign reserves, which were largely
exhausted by 1939. The regime also shunned a rigorous orga-
63
Germany: A Country Study
nization of rearmament because it feared the social tensions
this might engender. The production of consumer goods was
not curtailed either, again based on the belief that the morale
of the population had to remain high if Germany were to
become strong. In addition, because Hitler expected that the
wars waged in pursuit of his foreign policy goals would be
short, he judged great supplies of weapons to be unnecessary.
Thus, when war began in September 1939 with the invasion of
Poland, Germany had a broad and impressive range of weap-
ons, but not much in the way of replacements. As in World War
I, the regime expected that the defeated would pay for Ger-
many's expansion.
Through 1937 Hitler's foreign policy had the approval of tra-
ditional conservatives. However, because many of them were
skeptical about his long-range goals, Hitler replaced a number
of high military officers and diplomats with more pliable subor-
dinates. In March 1938, the German army was permitted to
occupy Austria by that country's browbeaten political leader-
ship. The annexation (Anschluss) of Austria was welcomed by
most Austrians, who wished to become part of a greater Ger-
many, something forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. In Sep-
tember 1938, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain
consented to Hitler's desire to take possession of the Sudeten-
land, an area in Czechoslovakia bordering Germany that was
inhabited by about 3 million Germans. In March 1939, Ger-
many occupied the Czech-populated western provinces of
Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia was made a German pup-
pet state.
Immediately after the German occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia, Britain and France finally became convinced of Hit-
ler's expansionist objectives and announced their intention to
defend the sovereignty of Poland. Because Hitler had con-
cluded that he could not hope for British neutrality in the com-
ing war, he formed a formal military alliance with Italy — the
Pact of Steel. In August he signed a nonaggression pact with
the Soviet Union, thus apparently freeing Germany from
repeating the two-front war it had fought in World War I.
The Outbreak of World War II
On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland.
Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later. By
the end of the month, Hitler's armies had overrun western
Poland. Soviet armies occupied eastern Poland, and the two
64
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
countries subsequently formally divided Poland between them.
In April 1940, German forces conquered Denmark and Nor-
way, and in May they struck at the Netherlands, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, and France. French and British troops offered
ineffective resistance against the lightning-like strikes, or blitz-
krieg, of German tanks and airplanes. A large part of the
French army surrendered, and some 300,000 British and
French soldiers were trapped at Dunkirk on the coast of north-
ern France. However, because Hitler, for a combination of
political and military reasons, had halted the advance of his
armored divisions, the British were able to rescue the men at
Dunkirk. France, however, surrendered in June.
For Hitler the war in the west was a sideshow, a prelude to
the building of an empire in eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. Hitler had hoped that Britain would stay out of the war.
In his vision of the near future, he foresaw the two countries
sharing the world between them — Britain would keep its over-
seas empire, and Germany would construct a new one to its
east. When approached with the suggestion of a separate
peace, British prime minister Winston Churchill rejected the
offer and rallied his people to fight on. The Third Reich experi-
enced its first military defeat in the Battle of Britain, in which
the Royal Air Force, during the summer and fall of 1940, pre-
vented the German air force from gaining the air superiority
necessary for an invasion of Britain. Consequently, Hitler post-
poned the invasion.
Hitler concluded by June 1941 that Britain's continuing
resistance was not a serious impediment to his main geopoliti-
cal goal of creating an empire extending east from Germany
deep into the Soviet Union. On June 22, 1941, negating their
1939 nonaggression pact, Germany invaded the Soviet Union.
Eagerness to realize his long-held dream caused Hitler to gam-
ble everything on a quick military campaign. He had antici-
pated victory within three months, but effective Soviet
resistance and the early onset of winter stopped German
advances. A counteroffensive, launched in early 1942, drove
the Germans back from Moscow. In the summer of 1942, Hitler
shifted the attack to the south of the Soviet Union and began a
large offensive to secure the Caucasian oil fields. By September
1942, the Axis controlled an area extending from northern
Norway to North Africa and from France to Stalingrad.
Japan's attack on the United States naval base at Pearl Har-
bor on December 7, 1941, brought the United States into the
65
Germany: A Country Study
war. In support of Germany's fellow Axis power, Hitler immedi-
ately declared war on the United States. But with the United
States involvement, a coalition now existed that, with its vast
human and material resources, was almost certain to defeat the
Third Reich. To ensure that the alliance not break apart as had
happened in 1918 when Russia signed a truce with Germany,
the Allies swore to fight Germany until an unconditional sur-
render was secured. Another reason the Allies wanted the com-
plete military defeat of Germany was that they wished to
preclude any possibility of German politicians claiming that "a
stab in the back" had caused Germany's undoing, as they had
done after World War I.
The military turning point of the war in Europe came with
the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43; some
300,000 of Germany's finest troops were either killed or cap-
tured. By May 1943, Allied armies had driven the Axis forces
out of Africa and had landed in Italy. Also of great importance,
by 1943 the United States and British navies had succeeded in
substantially reducing the German submarine threat to ship-
ping. This cleared the way for the movement of arms and
troops to Britain in preparation for a cross-channel invasion of
France.
Total Mobilization, Resistance, and the Holocaust
Once it became clear that the war would not be a short one,
Germany's industry was reorganized for a total mobilization.
Between February 1942 and July 1944, armaments production
increased threefold despite intense Allied bombing raids.
Much of the labor for this increase came from the employment
of some 7 million foreigners, taken from their homelands and
forced to work under terrible conditions. Also contributing to
the Nazi war effort was the systematic requisitioning of raw
materials and food from occupied territories. As a result, Ger-
mans remained fairly well fed for most of the war, in contrast to
the hunger endured during World War I.
Despite their comparative physical well-being until late in
the war, it gradually became clear to many Germans that the
regime's series of military triumphs had come to an end. Even
the most intense, mendacious propaganda could not conceal
that Germany's forces were being beaten back. Sharing this
growing awareness that defeat was likely, a group of military
officers decided to assassinate Hitler. Although elements of the
military had long opposed him, no one had acted to this point.
66
View of Berlin, 1945
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
During 1943 and 1944, the conspirators, who included many
high-ranking officers and numerous prominent civilians,
worked out elaborate plans for seizing power after the dicta-
tor's death. On June 20, 1944, the conspirators ignited a bomb
that would probably have killed Hitler except for a stroke of
bad luck — the misplacement of the device under a conference
room table. The regime struck back and after months of repris-
als had killed several thousand people, among them one field
marshal and twenty-two generals. Several earlier attempts on
Hitler's life had also failed. Because of these failures, it would
be up to the Allies to remove Hitler and his regime from power.
Anti-Semitism was one of the Third Reich's most faithfully
executed policies. Hitler saw the Jews' existence as inimical to
the well-being of the German race. In his youth in Vienna, he
had come to believe in a social Darwinist, life-or-death struggle
of the races, with that between the German race and the Jews
67
Germany: A Country Study
being the most savage. Because of his adherence to these racist
notions, he dreamed of creating a German empire completely
free of Jews, believing that if the Jewish "bacillus" were permit-
ted to remain within the Teutonic empire, the empire would
become corrupted and fail.
Upon taking power, the Nazis began immediately to rid Ger-
many of its Jewish citizens. In the Aryan Paragraph of 1933, the
regime decreed that Jews could not hold civil service positions.
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 deprived Jews of the right to citi-
zenship and restricted relationships between "Aryans" (racially
pure Germans) and Jews. After the Kristallnacht (Crystal
Night) of November 9, 1938, an organized act of violence per-
petrated by Nazis against Jews in all parts of Germany, the per-
secution of Jews entered a new phase. Random acts of violence,
by then commonplace, were replaced by the systematic isola-
tion of the Jewish population in Germany, which had num-
bered about 600,000 in the early 1930s.
Until 1941 there had been plans to "cleanse" Germany of
Jews by gathering them together and expelling them from the
Reich. One plan had as its goal the transfer of Germany's Jews
to Madagascar. A contingent of Jews had even been moved to
southern France in preparation. However, wartime conditions
and the presence of millions of Jews in Poland, the Soviet
Union, and other occupied areas in Eastern Europe gradually
led to the adoption of another plan: the systematic extermina-
tion of all Jews who came under German control. Techniques
that had been developed for the regime's euthanasia program
came to be used against Jews. Discussions in January 1942 at
the Wannsee Conference on the outskirts of Berlin led to the
improved organization and coordination of the program of
genocide.
Killing came to be done in an efficient, factorylike fashion in
large extermination camps run by Himmler's Special Duty Sec-
tion (Sonderdienst — SD). The tempo of the mass murder of
Jewish men, women, and children was accelerated toward the
end of the war. Hitler's preoccupation with the "final solution"
was so great that the transport of Jews was at times given prefer-
ence over the transport of war materiel. Authorities generally
agree that about 6 million European Jews died in the Holo-
caust. A large number (about 4.5 million) of those killed came
from Poland and the Soviet Union; about 125,000 German
Jews were murdered.
68
Historical Setting: Early History to 1945
Defeat
In June 1944, American, British, and Canadian forces
invaded France, driving the Germans back and liberating Paris
by August. A German counteroffensive in the Ardennes began
in late December was beaten back after heavy fighting in what
became known as the Battle of the Bulge. Soviet troops, mean-
while, advanced from the east. Western forces reached the
Rhine River in March 1945; simultaneously, Soviet armies over-
ran most of Czechoslovakia and pressed on toward Berlin.
Although faced with certain defeat, Hitler insisted that every
German city, every village, and "every square meter" be
defended or left behind as "scorched earth." The Western
Allies and the Soviet forces made their first contact, in Saxony,
on April 27. Three days later, Hitler committed suicide in a
Berlin bunker. Berlin fell to the Soviet forces on May 2; on May
7, the Third Reich surrendered unconditionally. It is estimated
that about 55 million people died in the European theater dur-
ing World War II. About 8 million of these dead were German.
* * *
A good introduction to German history is Mary Fulbrook's A
Concise History of Germany, which not only presents the most
important events but also examines various interpretations of
them. The book closes with a bibliography of recent scholar-
ship. Geoffrey Barraclough's The Origins of Modern Germany is a
classic study of the German Middle Ages. Early Modern Germany,
1477-1806 by Michael Hughes is a good introduction to this
period. C.V. Wedgwood's classic, The Thirty Years' War, is
engrossing reading and is widely available. A more recent treat-
ment of the war is found in The Thirty Years' War, a well-inte-
grated collection of articles about the conflict by noted
specialists edited by Geoffrey Parker.
James J. Sheehan's subtle and learned German History, 1770-
1866 is the standard work in English on the period. Theodore
S. Hamerow's Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, concise and beau-
tifully written, deals with the main political, economic, and
social trends between 1815 and 1871. Gordon A. Craig's Ger-
many, 1866-1945, a survey of these years by the English-speak-
ing world's dean of German studies, can be found in many
libraries. Volker Rolf Berghahn's Imperial Germany, 1871-1914
provides a sophisticated analysis of Germany between unifica-
69
Germany: A Country Study
tion and the outbreak of World War I. James Joll's brief The Ori-
gins of the First World War examines interpretations of why this
war occurred. The German Dictatorship by Karl Dietrich Bracher
is an excellent treatment of the ideological sources of national
socialism and provides an analytical history of Hitler's regime.
Donald Cameron Watt's magisterial How War Came examines
the diplomatic maneuvering leading up to World War II. Ger-
hard L. Weinberg's A World at Arms is an authoritative and com-
prehensive survey of the war. (For further information and
complete citations, see Bibliography.)
70
Chapter 2. Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
Half-timbered houses of the seventeenth century in Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY WAS UNITED ON OCTOBER 3, 1990. This event
came after forty-five years of division that had begun with the
partition of Germany into four occupation zones following its
defeat in 1945 by the Four Powers — the United States, Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union. Once a powerful nation, Ger-
many lay vanquished at the end of World War II. The war's
human cost had been staggering. Millions of Germans had
died or had suffered terribly during the conflict, both in com-
bat and on the home front. Intensive Allied bombing raids,
invasions, and subsequent social upheaval had forced millions
of Germans from their homes. Not since the ravages of the
Thirty Years' War had Germans experienced such misery.
Beyond the physical destruction, Germans had been con-
fronted with the moral devastation of defeat.
Germans refer to the immediate aftermath of the war as the
Stunde Null (Zero Hour), the point in time when Germany
ceased to exist as a state and the rebuilding of the country
would begin. At first, Germany was administered by the Four
Powers, each with its own occupation zone. In time, Germans
themselves began to play a role in the governing of these zones.
Political parties were formed, and, within months of the war's
end, the first elections were held. Although most people were
concerned with mere physical survival, much was accom-
plished in rebuilding cities, fashioning a new economy, and
integrating the millions of refugees from the eastern areas of
Germany that had been lost after the war.
Overshadowing these events within Germany, however, was
the gradual emergence of the Cold War during the second half
of the 1940s. By the decade's end, the two superpowers — the
United States and the Soviet Union — had faced off in an
increasingly ideological confrontation. The Iron Curtain
between them cut Germany in two. Although the Allies' origi-
nal plans envisioned that Germany would remain a single state,
Western and Eastern concepts of political, social, and eco-
nomic organization gradually led the three Western zones to
join together, becoming separate from the Soviet zone and ulti-
mately leading to the formation in 1949 of two German states.
The three Western occupation zones became the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany), and the Soviet
73
Germany: A Country Study
zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East
Germany) .
During the next four decades, the two states led separate
existences. West Germany joined the Western community of
nations, while East Germany became the westernmost part of
the Soviet empire. The two German states, with a common lan-
guage and history, were separated by the mutual suspicion and
hostility of the superpowers. In the mid-1950s, both German
states rearmed. The FRG's armed forces, the Bundeswehr,
became a vital part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The GDR's National People's Army (Nationale Volks-
armee — NVA) became a key component of the Warsaw Pact.
The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 by the GDR fur-
ther divided the two states.
In West Germany, by the early 1950s a system of parliamen-
tary democracy with free and contending political parties was
firmly established. The Christian Democratic Union (Christ-
lich Demokratische Union — CDU), along Avith its sister party,
the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU),
led the coalitions that governed West Germany at the national
level for two decades until late 1969. In that year, the Social
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands — SPD) formed the first of a series of coalition
governments with the Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei — FDP) that governed the country until
1982. Late that year, the SPD was ousted from power when the
CDU/CSU and the FDP formed a new coalition government.
These parties ruled for the rest of the 1980s. As successful, how-
ever, as West Germany's adoption of democratic politics had
been after 1945, the country's economic recovery was so strong
that it was commonly referred to as the "economic miracle "
(Wirtschaftswunder) . By the 1960s, West Germany was among
the world's wealthiest countries, and by the 1990s, Germany's
economy and central bank played the leading role in Europe's
economy.
East Germany was not so fortunate. A socialist dictatorship
was put in place and carefully watched by its Soviet masters. As
in the Soviet Union, political opposition was suppressed, the
press censored, and the economy owned and controlled by the
state. East Germany's economy performed modestly when com-
pared with that of West Germany, but of all the socialist econo-
mies it was the most successful. Unlike West Germany, East
Germany was not freely supported by its citizens. Indeed, force
74
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
was needed to keep East Germans from fleeing to the West.
Although some consolidation of the GDR was assured by the
construction of the Berlin Wall, the GDR remained an artificial
entity maintained by Soviet military power. Once this support
was withdrawn, the GDR collapsed.
During the four decades of division, relations between the
two German states were reserved and sometimes hostile.
Despite their common language and history, the citizens of the
two states had limited direct contact with one another. At
times, during the 1960s, for example, contact was reduced to a
minimum. During the 1970s, however, the two peoples began
to mix more freely as their governments negotiated treaties
that made relations between the two states more open. During
the 1980s, although relations continued to improve and con-
tacts between the two peoples became more frequent, persons
attempting to flee from East Germany still died along its mined
borders, GDR officials continued to harass and arrest dissi-
dents, and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische
Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED) rigidly controlled political
life.
A key reason for the collapse of the GDR was the poor per-
formance of its state-owned and centrally directed economy.
The efforts of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, beginning
in the mid-1980s, to liberalize the Soviet Union and reform its
economy were met with hostility by the GDR's top leadership.
Word of these measures nevertheless reached East German
grassroots opposition groups. Encouraged by the waves of
reform in the Soviet Union and in neighboring socialist states,
opposition in the East German population grew and became
more and more vocal, despite increased state repression. By
the second half of 1989, the East German opposition consisted
of a number of groups with a variety of aims and was strong
enough to stage large demonstrations.
The massive flow of East Germans to the West through
neighboring socialist countries in the summer and fall of 1989,
particularly through Hungary, was telling evidence that the
GDR did not have the support of its citizens. Public opposition
to the regime became ever more open and demanding. In late
1989, confronted with crushing economic problems, unable to
control the borders of neighboring states, and told by the
Soviet leadership not to expect outside help in quelling domes-
tic protest, the GDR leadership resigned in the face of massive
and constantly growing public demonstrations. After elections
75
Germany: A Country Study
in the spring of 1990, the critics of the SED regime took over
the government. On October 3, 1990, the GDR ceased to exist,
and its territory and people were joined to the FRG. The divi-
sion of Germany that had lasted decades was ended.
Postwar Occupation and Division
On May 8, 1945, the unconditional surrender of the German
armed forces (Wehrmacht) was signed by Field Marshal Wil-
helm Keitel in Berlin, ending World War II for Germany. The
German people were suddenly confronted by a situation never
before experienced in their history: the entire German terri-
tory was occupied by foreign armies, cities and infrastructure
were largely reduced to rubble, the country was flooded with
millions of refugees from the east, and large portions of the
population were suffering from hunger and the loss of their
homes. The nation-state founded by Otto von Bismarck in 1871
lay in ruins.
The Establishment of Occupation Zones
The total breakdown of civil administration throughout the
country required immediate measures to ensure the rebuilding
of civil authority. After deposing Admiral Karl Donitz, Hitler's
successor as head of state, and his government, the Allies
issued a unilateral declaration on June 5, 1945, that pro-
claimed their supreme authority over German territory, short
of annexation. The Allies would govern Germany through four
occupation zones, one for each of the Four Powers — the
United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.
The establishment of zones of occupation had been decided
at a series of conferences. At the conference in Casablanca,
held in January 1943, British prime minister Winston
Churchill's proposal to invade the Balkans and East-Central
Europe via Greece was rejected. This decision opened the road
for Soviet occupation of eastern Germany. At the Tehran Con-
ference in late 1943, the western border of postwar Poland and
the division of Germany were among the topics discussed. As a
result of the conference, a commission began to work out
detailed plans for the occupation and administration of Ger-
many after the war. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945,
participants decided that in addition to United States, British,
and Soviet occupation zones in Germany, the French were also
76
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
to have an occupation zone, carved out of the United States
and British zones.
The relative harmony that had prevailed among the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union began to show strains at
the Potsdam Conference, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945.
In most instances, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was successful in
getting the settlements he desired. One of his most far-reach-
ing victories was securing the conference's approval of his deci-
sion to compensate Poland for the loss of territory in the east
to the Soviet Union by awarding it administrative control over
parts of Germany. Pending the negotiation of a peace treaty
with Germany, Poland was to administer the German provinces
of Pomerania, Silesia, and the southern portion of East Prussia.
The forcible "transfer" to the west of Germans living in these
provinces was likewise approved.
The movement westward of Germans living east of a line
formed by the Oder and western Neisse rivers resulted in the
death or disappearance of approximately 2 million Germans,
while an estimated 12 million Germans lost their homes. The
presence of these millions of refugees in what remained Ger-
man territory in the west was a severe hardship for the local
populations and the occupation authorities.
The conferees at Potsdam also decided that each occupying
power was to receive reparations in the form of goods and
industrial equipment in compensation for its losses during the
war. Because most German industry lay outside its zone, it was
agreed that the Soviet Union was to take industrial plants from
the other zones and in exchange supply them with agricultural
products. The Allies, remembering the political costs of finan-
cial reparations after World War I, had decided that repara-
tions consisting of payments in kind were less likely to imperil
the peace after World War II.
The final document of the Potsdam Conference, the Pots-
dam Accord, also included provisions for demilitarizing and
denazifying Germany and for restructuring German political
life on democratic principles. German economic unity was to
be preserved.
The boundaries of the four occupation zones established at
Yalta generally followed the borders of the former German fed-
eral states (Lander, sing., Land). Only Prussia constituted an
exception: it was dissolved altogether, and its territory was
absorbed by the remaining German Lander in northern and
northwestern Germany. Prussia's former capital, Berlin, dif-
77
Germany: A Country Study
fered from the rest of Germany in that it was occupied by all
four Allies — and thus had so-called Four Power status. The
occupation zone of the United States consisted of the Land of
Hesse, the northern half of the present-day Land of
Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and the southern part of Greater
Berlin. The British zone consisted of the Lander of
Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia,
and the western sector of Greater Berlin. The French were
apportioned the Lander of Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saar-
land — which later received a special status — the southern half
of Baden-Wurttemberg, and the northern sector of Greater
Berlin. The Soviet Union controlled the Lander of Mecklen-
burg, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and
the eastern sector of Greater Berlin, which constituted almost
half the total area of the city.
The zones were governed by the Allied Control Council
(ACC), consisting of the four supreme commanders of the
Allied Forces. The ACC's decisions were to be unanimous. If
agreement could not be reached, the commanders would
forego unified actions, and each would confine his attention to
his own zone, where he had supreme authority. Indeed, the
ACC had no executive authority of its own, but rather had to
rely on the cooperation of each military governor to imple-
ment its decisions in his occupation zone. Given the immense
problems involved in establishing a provisional administration,
unanimity was often lacking, and occupation policies soon var-
ied.
The French, for instance, vetoed the establishment of a cen-
tral German administration, a decision that furthered the
country's eventual division. Because they had not participated
in the Potsdam Conference, the French did not feel bound to
the conference's decision that the country would remain an
economic unit. Instead, the French sought to extract as much
as they could from Germany and even annexed the Saar area
for a time.
The Soviet occupiers likewise sought to recover as much as
possible from Germany as compensation for the losses their
country had sustained during the war. Unlike the French, how-
ever, they sought to influence Germany as a whole and hoped
to hold an expanded area of influence. In their own zone, the
Soviet authorities quickly moved toward establishing a socialist
society like their own.
78
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
The United States had the greatest interest in denazification
and in the establishment of a liberal democratic system. Early
plans, such as the Morgenthau Plan to keep Germans poor by
basing their economy on agriculture, were dropped as the
Soviet Union came to be seen as a threat and Germany as a
potential ally.
Britain had the least ambitious plans for its zone. However,
British authorities soon realized that unless Germany became
economically self-sufficient, British taxpayers would bear the
expense of feeding its population. To facilitate German eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, United States and British occupation
policies soon merged, and by the beginning of 1947 their zones
had been joined into one economic area — the Bizone.
The Nuremberg Trials and Denazification
The Allies agreed that Germany should never again have the
opportunity to destroy European peace as it had in the two
world wars. A principal aim of the Allies was to prevent the
resurgence of a powerful and aggressive Germany. As a first
step toward demilitarizing, denazifying, and democratizing
Germany, the Allies established an international military tribu-
nal in August 1945 to jointly try individuals considered respon-
sible for the outbreak of the war and for crimes committed by
the Hitler regime (see The Third Reich, 1933-45, ch. 1).
Nuremberg, the city where the most elaborate political rallies
of the Hitler regime had been staged, was chosen as the loca-
tion for the trials, which began in November 1945.
On trial were twenty-two men seen as principally responsible
for the National Socialist regime, its administration, and the
direction of the German armed forces, the Wehrmacht.
Among the defendants accused of conspiracy, crimes against
peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes were Hermann
Goering, Wilhelm Keitel, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Rudolf
Hess, and Albert Speer. Although many Germans considered
the accusation of conspiracy to be on questionable legal
grounds, the accusers were successful in unveiling the back-
ground of developments that had led to the outbreak of World
War II, as well as the extent of the atrocities committed in the
name of the Hitler regime. Twelve of the accused were sen-
tenced to death, seven received prison sentences, and three
were acquitted.
The trials received wide publicity in Germany and through-
out the world. Although many Germans maintained that it
79
Germany: A Country Study
would have been better if the defendants had faced a German
tribunal rather than one imposed by the war's foreign victors,
they agreed that the trials made public much information
about the mass murders and other crimes that otherwise might
not have come to light. The German people and the rest of the
world reacted with horror and dismay to the revelations. The
trials of these more prominent figures of the Hitler regime
were followed by the trials of thousands of lesser offenders.
The Allies did not seek merely to punish the leadership of
the National Socialist regime, but to purge all elements of
national socialism from public life. One phase of the denazifi-
cation process dealt with lower-level personnel connected with
the Nazi regime. Their pasts were reviewed to determine if the
parts they had played in the regime were sufficiently grievous
to warrant their exclusion from roles in a new Germany's poli-
tics or government. Germans with experience in government
and not involved in the Nazi regime were needed to cooperate
with occupation authorities in the administration of the zones.
The process of denazification was carried out diversely in the
various zones. The most elaborate procedures were instituted
in the United States zone, where investigated individuals were
required to complete highly detailed questionnaires concern-
ing their personal histories and to appear at hearings before
panels of German adjudicators. In the British and French
zones, denazification was pursued with less vigor because the
authorities thought it more important to reestablish a function-
ing bureaucracy in their sectors.
Denazification was most rigorous in the Soviet sector. Civil
servants, teachers, and legal officials with significant Nazi pasts
were thoroughly purged. Denazification was also used as an
instrument for seizing the resources of the so-called "class
enemy": former Nazis who owned factories or estates were
denounced and their property confiscated. After participating
in the social transformation, some former Nazis were par-
doned and even gained high positions within the new commu-
nist ruling class.
The denazification process mandated that simpler cases
involving lesser offenders be tried before more complicated
cases involving officials higher up in the Nazi regime. With
time, however, prosecution became less severe, and the United
States came to be more concerned with the Cold War. When
denazification ended in March 1948, the more serious cases
80
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
had not yet been tried. As a result, numerous former Nazi func-
tionaries escaped justice, much to the regret of many Germans.
Political Parties and Democratization
The reintroduction of democratic political parties in Ger-
many was one of the primary concerns of the Allies during the
final phase of the war. The Soviet authorities were the first to
reestablish political parties in their zone. They ordered the for-
mation of political parties on June 10, 1945, well before such a
directive was issued in the Western zones. In addition to seek-
ing to control their own zone, they hoped to influence the
emerging political constellations in the Western zones by the
early mobilization of a strong leftist movement.
On June 11, the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunis-
tische Partei Deutschlands — KPD) was reestablished in the
Soviet zone under a German leadership that, for the most part,
had lived for years in Moscow. Wilhelm Pieck was its chairman.
Shortly thereafter, the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD) was also
reconstituted, under the leadership of Otto Grotewohl. When
it became obvious that the SPD would emerge as the most pop-
ular leftist party in the Soviet zone, the Soviet authorities
forced the merger of the KPD and the SPD in April 1946 and
subsequently, from this merger, the formation of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands — SED). The Communists clearly had the upper hand in
SED leadership. Vigorous resistance to the merger of the two
leftist parties came from Social Democrats in the Western
zones, led by Kurt Schumacher, a veteran Social Democratic
politician and member of the Reichstag during the Weimar
Republic and a political prisoner during the Third Reich. As a
result of this principled opposition to Communist control, the
rebuilding of the SPD in the Western zones took a separate
course.
The SED sought to retain the image of a political force open
to the masses, and it governed through the active participation
of its members. It also competed with other parties in regional
elections. After the Land elections of October 1946 in which
the SED failed to obtain an absolute majority, the party
resorted to different tactics in order to secure its grip on the
electorate. SED leaders created an Anti-Fascist Bloc consisting
of all political parties that was to guarantee the introduction of
an antifascist and democratic order in the Soviet zone. From
81
Germany: A Country Study
the very beginning, the SED could veto any proposal from any
other bloc party not in accordance with its ideals for a socialist
society. As a result, the two other political parties authorized in
the Soviet zone were purged of their leadership, and their
party programs were realigned in support of SEE) goals. The
two other parties were the Christian Democratic Union (Christ-
lich Demokratische Union — CDU), which represented middle-
class interests, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany
(Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — LDPD), which
represented the liberal political tradition that dated back to
the late 1840s.
Two additional bloc parties were established in 1948 in the
Soviet zone to represent groups still without a specific political
party. The Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany
(Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands — DBD) was
formed to prepare farmers for the planned land reform, which
would involve extensive nationalizations. The second party, the
National Democratic Party of Germany (National-
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands — NDPD), was to work at
reintegrating into a socialist society approximately 2 million
people of right-wing views. The group included veterans and a
relatively large number of former members of the National
Socialist German Workers' Party (National-Sozialistiche
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei — NSDAP), Adolf Hitler's party.
The Social Democratic Party that operated in the Western
zones was, in contrast to the Eastern SPD, markedly anticom-
munist (see Social Democratic Party of Germany, ch. 7). This
attitude reflected a continuation of its bitter hostility to the
Communists during the Weimar Republic. The reestablished
party, headed by Kurt Schumacher and, after his death, by
Erich Ollenhauer, could look back on a distinguished history
of creating better living conditions for the working class within
the context of parliamentary democracy. Although anticom-
munist, the SPD's leadership still regarded the party as Marxist
and remained committed to working for a socialist economy.
As such, the SPD envisioned a neutral socialist Germany
located between the capitalist economies of the West and the
Soviet dictatorship of the East. The SPD was able to build on its
extensive working-class membership, which predated Hitler's
seizure of power in 1933.
For the conservative forces, the political beginning after
1945 appeared more difficult because of past fragmentation on
regional and denominational lines. The persecution and sup-
82
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
pression suffered during the Third Reich by conservative Cath-
olics and Protestants alike gave rise to a unified Christian
conservative party, which would represent all who opposed
communism and socialism and who held traditional Christian
middle-class values. At first, several regional political organiza-
tions formed in Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt am Main. On
December 16, 1945, it was agreed that their collective designa-
tion should be called the Christian Democratic Union (Christ-
lich Demokratische Union — CDU) (see Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union, ch. 7).
During the initial phase of development, members of the
Christian labor unions strongly influenced the program of the
conservative movement. Although they did not dispute the
concept of private ownership of property, they advocated state
control for many principal industries. During the 1950s, a
market-oriented policy that was combined with a strong social
component came to dominate the party.
The Bavarian Christian conservative organization, the Chris-
tian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU), founded
in October 1946, remained a separate party organization and
kept its name even after the foundation of the FRG. It followed
a more pronounced conservative ideological party line than
the CDU.
Even more difficult than the political unification of Chris-
tian conservatives was the consolidation of the liberal move-
ment in postwar Germany. Traditionally, the liberals had been
divided into a conservative national liberal wing and a more
leftist-oriented liberal movement. There was also a reservoir of
voters who understood themselves to be truly liberal in that
they did not commit themselves to any ideology. Common to
all of the party groupings, however, was the rejection of a
planned economy. A number of independent liberal party
groups existed for a time in southwestern Germany and in
Hesse, Hamburg, and Berlin. In November 1948, most of them
united in the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische
Partei — FDP), whose main figure, Theodor Heuss, became the
first federal president of the FRG (see table 2, Appendix; Free
Democratic Party, ch. 7).
The Creation of the Bizone
By early 1946, the Western Allies — the United States and
Britain in particular — had become convinced that Soviet
expansionism had to be contained. The Soviet Union's seizure
83
Germany: A Country Study
of Polish territory and the drawing of the Oder-Neisse border
(which gave formerly German territory to Poland), its antidem-
ocratic actions in other countries occupied by Soviet forces,
and its policies toward areas such as Greece and Turkey per-
suaded Western leaders that the Soviet Union was aiming for
communist domination of Europe. Churchill's use of the
expression "Iron Curtain" to describe the Soviet cordoning off
of a sphere of influence in Europe illustrated a basic change in
attitude toward Soviet intentions on the part of Western lead-
ers. As a result of this change, Germany came to be seen more
as a potential ally than as a defeated enemy.
The change in attitude led United States officials to take a
more active role in Germany. A notable early example of this
policy change was a speech given in Stuttgart in September
1946 by the United States secretary of state, James F. Byrnes,
proposing the transfer of administrative functions from the
existing military governments to a single civilian German
administration. Byrnes stated that the United States had not
defeated the Nazi dictatorship to keep Germans suppressed
but instead wanted them to become a free, self-governing, and
prosperous people. The speech was the first significant indica-
tion that Germany was not to remain an outcast but was,
according to Byrnes, to have "an honorable place among the
free and peace-loving nations of the world."
Neither the Soviet Union nor France desired a revitalized
Germany, but after intensive negotiations, a unified economic
zone, the Bizone, consisting of the United States and British
zones, was proclaimed on January 1, 1947. After a difficult
beginning, the Bizone proved itself a success, and its popula-
tion of 40 million began to benefit from an improving econ-
omy. Only in the spring of 1949, after a period of sustained
economic growth, did the French occupation zone join the
Bizone, creating the Trizone.
In mid-1947 the European Recovery Program, or Marshall
Plan as it is more widely known, was announced. The plan's
aim was to stimulate the economies on the continent through
the infusion of large-scale credits for the promotion of trade
between Europe and the United States. The United States stip-
ulated only that Europe's economy was to be united and that
Europeans were to participate actively in the administration of
the program. The Soviet Union suspected that the proposal
was a means to prevent it from harvesting the fruits of the vic-
tory over fascism. Deeming the proposal a direct affront to its
84
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
communist ideology by "American economic imperialism," the
Soviet Union promptly rejected participation in the program,
as did the East European states, obviously acting on Soviet
orders.
To fulfill the precondition of economic cooperation in
Europe, sixteen Western countries joined the Organisation for
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC — see Glossary) in
early 1948. In April 1948, the United States Congress approved
the Foreign Assistance Act, which arranged the provision of
aid. Shortly thereafter, industrial products, consumer goods,
credits, and outright monetary gifts started to flow into the
impoverished economies of Western Europe. Cities, industries,
and infrastructure destroyed during the war were rapidly
rebuilt, and the economies of the war-torn countries began to
recover. In the Western zones, aid from the Marshall Plan laid
the foundations for the West German "economic miracle" of
the 1950s.
A functioning currency system was also needed for a growing
economy. The war economy of the National Socialist govern-
ment had created an oversupply of currency not matched by a
supply of goods. To combat the resulting black-market econ-
omy, especially noticeable in large cities, and to aid economic
recovery in western Germany, a central bank was founded and
a currency reform was proclaimed on June 19, 1948. The
reform introduced the deutsche mark. In exchange for sixty
reichsmarks, each citizen received DM40 (for value of the
deutsche mark — see Glossary). Additionally, controls over
prices and basic supplies were lifted by authorities, thus
abruptly wiping out the black market.
The swift action of the Western powers took the Soviet
authorities by surprise, and they quickly implemented a sepa-
rate currency reform for their zone and all of Berlin. The West-
ern powers, however, had already ordered the distribution of
deutsche marks in their sectors of the city. This measure, which
for the Soviet Union represented the culmination of the West-
ern policy to undermine Soviet efforts to build a socialist soci-
ety in its zone, produced a sudden dramatic reaction, the
Soviet blockade of Berlin.
On June 24, 1948, Soviet troops blocked all road and rail
connections to West Berlin. Within a few days, shipping on the
Spree and Havel rivers was halted; electric power, which had
been supplied to West Berlin by plants in the Soviet zone, was
cut off; and supplies of fresh food from the surrounding coun-
85
Germany: A Country Study
tryside were suddenly unavailable. The Four Power status of
Berlin, agreed upon by the Allied victors, had not included any
provisions regarding traffic by land to and from Berlin through
the Soviet zone. It had, however, established three air corridors
from the Western zones to the city.
The three Western powers acted swiftly: an airlift of unprece-
dented dimensions was organized to supply the 2.5 million
inhabitants of the Western sectors of Berlin with what they
needed to survive. The United States military governor in Ger-
many, General Lucius D. Clay, successfully coordinated the air-
lift, which deployed 230 United States and 150 British
airplanes. Up to 10,000 tons of supplies were flown in daily,
including coal and other heating fuels for the winter. Alto-
gether, about 275,000 flights succeeded in keeping West Berlin-
ers alive for nearly a year.
The Soviet Union had not expected such Western resolve.
Failing in its attempt to starve the Western Allies out of Berlin,
it lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949. The Western Allies, led
by the United States, had stood their ground without provok-
ing armed conflict. Although the blockade had ended, its
effects on Berlin were lasting. By June 16, 1948, realizing that it
would not achieve its goal of a socialist Germany, the Soviet
Union withdrew from the ACC, prompting the Western Allies
to create a separate administration for their sectors. At the end
of 1948, two municipal administrations existed, and Berlin had
become a divided city. A more significant effect was perhaps
that, in Western eyes, Berlin was no longer seen as the capital
of Hitler's Germany but rather as a symbol of freedom and the
struggle to preserve Western civic values.
The Birth of the Federal Republic of Germany
Participants at the Potsdam Conference had agreed that the
foreign ministers of the four victorious powers should meet to
implement and monitor the conference's decisions about post-
war Europe. During their fifth meeting, held in London in late
1947, prospects for concluding a peace treaty with Germany
were examined. Following lengthy discussions on the question
of reparations, the conference ended without any concrete
decisions.
The tense atmosphere during the talks and the uncoopera-
tive attitude of the Soviet participants convinced the Western
Allies of the necessity of a common political order for the three
Western zones. At the request of France, the Western Allies
86
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
were joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg at
the subsequent Six Power Conference in London, which met in
two sessions in the spring of 1948.
The recommendations of this conference were contained in
the so-called Frankfurt Documents, which the military gover-
nors of the Western zones issued to German political leaders,
the minister presidents of the Western Lander on July 1, 1948.
The documents called for convening a national convention to
draft a constitution for a German state formed from the West-
ern occupation zones. The documents also contained the
announcement of an Occupation Statute, which was to define
the position of the occupation powers vis-a-vis the new state.
The minister presidents initially objected to the creation of a
separate political entity in the west because they feared such an
entity would cement the division of Germany. Gradually, how-
ever, it became apparent that the division of the country was
already a fact. To emphasize the provisional nature of the docu-
ment they were to draft, the minister presidents rejected the
designation "constitution" and agreed on the term "Basic Law"
(Grundgesetz). Final approval of the Basic Law, whose articles
were to be worked out by a parliamentary council, was to be
given by a vote of the Land diets, and not by referendum, as
suggested in the Frankfurt Documents. Once the Allies had
accepted these and other modifications, a constitutional con-
vention was called to draft the Basic Law.
The convention met in August 1948 in Bavaria at Herrenchi-
emsee. After completing its work, the Parliamentary Council,
consisting of sixty-five delegates from the respective Land diets
and chaired by leading CDU politician Konrad Adenauer, met
in Bonn in the fall of 1948 to work out the final details of the
document. After months of debate, the final text of the Basic
Law was approved by a vote of fifty-three to twelve on May 8,
1949. The new law was ratified by all Land diets, with the excep-
tion of the Bavarian parliament, which objected to the empha-
sis on a strong central authority for the new state. After
approval by the Western military governors, the Basic Law was
promulgated on May 23, 1949. A new state, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany), had come into exist-
ence (see fig. 6).
The members of the Parliamentary Council that fashioned
the articles of the Basic Law were fully aware of the constitu-
tional deficiencies that had brought down the Weimar Repub-
lic. They sought, therefore, to approve a law that would make it
87
Germany: A Country Study
Figure 6. Germany, 1949-90
impossible to circumvent democratic procedures, as had
occurred in the past. The powers of the lower house, the
Bundestag, and the federal chancellor were enhanced consid-
erably at the expense of the federal president, who was reduced
to a figurehead (see Government Institutions, ch. 7). Prime
consideration was given to the basic rights and the dignity of
the individual. The significance of the Lander was enhanced by
their direct influence on legislation through representation in
88
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
the upper house, the Bundesrat. The Basic Law also safe-
guarded parliamentary government by protecting the federal
chancellor from being forced from power through a simple
vote of no-confidence. Instead, a constructive vote of no-confi-
dence was required, that is, the vote's sponsors were required
to name a replacement able to win the necessary parliamentary
support. The Basic Law also supported the principle of a free
market, as well as a strong social security system. In summary,
the new Basic Law showed striking similarities to the constitu-
tion of the United States. To underscore its provisional charac-
ter, Article 146 of the Basic Law stated that the document was
to be replaced as soon as all German people were free to deter-
mine their own future.
According to the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional
Court could ban a political party that aimed at obstructing or
abolishing the system of democracy. The activities of a number
of openly antidemocratic parties during the Weimar Republic
had inspired the authors of the Basic Law to include this strong
provision. In 1952 the Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische
Reichspartei — SRP), a successor to the NSDAP, became the
first party to be banned. The SRP had maintained that the
Third Reich still existed legally, and it had denied the legiti-
macy of the FRG as a state. A few years later, the KPD was also
suspended. Although the KPD was at first represented in all
Land parliaments, it gradually lost support. After 1951 the lead-
ership of the KPD began to pursue an openly revolutionary
course and advocated the overthrow of the government. After
five years of deliberations, the Federal Constitutional Court
declared the KPD unconstitutional.
The Birth of the German Democratic Republic
As with the birth of the FRG, the formation of a separate
nation-state in the Soviet zone also took only a few years. In late
1947, the SED convened the "German People's Congress for
Unity and a Just Peace" in Berlin. To demonstrate the SED's
claim of responsibility for the political future of all Germans,
representatives from the Western zones were invited. The con-
gress demanded the negotiation of a peace treaty for the whole
of Germany and the establishment of a German central gov-
ernment. An SED-controlled organization was founded to win
support for the realization of these demands in all occupation
zones.
89
Germany: A Country Study
The Second People's Congress, held in March 1948, pro-
posed a referendum on German unity, rejected the Marshall
Plan, and recognized the Oder-Neisse border, which separated
the Soviet zone from territory that was administered by Poland
but that had once been part of Germany Thereafter, few West-
ern politicians had any doubts about the goals of the
SED-sponsored congress. The congress elected a People's
Council and created a constitutional committee to draft a con-
stitution for a "German Democratic Republic," which was to
apply to all of postwar Germany. The constitutional committee
submitted the new constitution to the People's Council, and it
was approved on March 19, 1949.
The Third People's Congress, its membership chosen by the
SED, met in May 1949, just after the ending of the Berlin block-
ade. Apparently reacting to current events in the Western
zones, where the Basic Law establishing the West German gov-
ernment in Bonn had just been approved, the congress
approved the draft constitution of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR, or East Germany).
A new People's Council, elected during the Third People's
Congress, was convened for the first time on October 7, 1949,
and the constitution of the GDR went into effect the same day.
The Soviet military administration was dissolved, and its admin-
istrative functions were transferred to East German authorities.
The People's Council was renamed and began its work as the
Volkskammer (People's Chamber), the parliament of the GDR.
A second parliamentary chamber, the Landerkammer (Provin-
cial Chamber), consisting of thirty-four deputies, was consti-
tuted by the five Land diets on October 11, 1949. Wilhelm
Pieck became the first president of the GDR on the same day,
and the newly formed cabinet, under the leadership of Otto
Grotewohl, was installed on October 12, 1949.
According to the first constitution of the GDR, its citizens
enjoyed certain basic rights, even the right to strike. In reality,
however, there was little freedom. According to the constitu-
tion, both the Council of State (Staatsrat) and the Council of
Ministers (Ministerrat) were elected by and responsible to the
Volkskammer. All parties and mass organizations represented
in this body were united in the National Front, under the ideo-
logical leadership of the SED. The Volkskammer was a mere
forum for speeches and mock debates. In reality, all policy mat-
ters were decided by the Politburo of the SED, on which most
90
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
important functionaries of the Council of State and the Coun-
cil of Ministers had a seat.
The party structure of the SED had been reorganized in the
image of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union even before
the foundation of the GDR, and the system of nomenklatura
(see Glossary), with its strict system of ideological education
and selection of candidates for all functions in party and state,
was introduced. Within a few months, East Germany became a
model for all other satellites of the Soviet Union.
West Germany and the Community of Nations
At the end of World War II, Germany was a defeated nation
occupied by foreign powers. It had lost its national sovereignty,
and the world saw it as a pariah, guilty of crimes without paral-
lel in history. In addition to rebuilding their shattered country
in a physical sense, most leading German politicians saw their
main goals in the coming decades as restoring their country's
reputation, regaining its sovereignty, and becoming once again
a member in good standing in the community of nations.
The figure who dominated West Germany's politics in its
first two decades was Konrad Adenauer, a politician totally
committed to restoring his country to an honored place
among nations. He saw little likelihood that the Soviet occupa-
tion of East Germany would soon end; hence, he sought to
build a strong West Germany firmly attached to the Western
community of parliamentary democracies. As president of the
Parliamentary Council, Adenauer had played a leading role in
the process of finalizing and passing the Basic Law in 1949.
Even before he participated in fashioning the country's con-
stitution, Adenauer had had a long and eventful political
career. Born in 1876 in Cologne, he studied law and economics
and became active in local politics. As a member of the Catho-
lic-based Center Party, he became the mayor of his home town
in 1917. The National Socialists deposed him in 1933, and,
after the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, he was
arrested and imprisoned for four months. After the war, the
United States reinstalled him as mayor of Cologne. The British
military authorities, however, fired him from this position
because of alleged incompetence. In March 1946, Adenauer
became chairman of the CDU in the British occupation zone
and, after having shown extraordinary leadership in the delib-
erations on the Basic Law, became the first chancellor of the
newly formed state (see table 3, Appendix).
91
Germany: A Country Study
One of Adenauer's main goals was regaining his country's
sovereignty. Although the Basic Law gave full legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers to the new FRG and its Lander, certain
powers were reserved for the occupying authorities. The Occu-
pation Statute, drawn up in April 1949 by the foreign ministers
of the Four Powers, gave the occupation authorities the right to
supervise the new state's foreign policy, trade, and civil avia-
tion, as well as the right, under special circumstances, to
assume complete control over their own occupation zones.
By means of another statute, the Ruhr Statute, likewise con-
cluded in April 1949, the administration of the resources and
industrial potential of the Ruhr area was also kept under for-
eign control. In the past, the area had been a key element in
the building of Germany's military machine. France, in particu-
lar, sought safeguards against future threats to its national secu-
rity by arranging the creation of the International Authority for
the Ruhr, which, under the direction of France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, controlled the distribution of
the area's resources.
Although the Ruhr Statute was designed to prevent Ger-
many from ever again becoming a threat to its neighbors, it
later served as the first instrument of economic cooperation
for the region. In conformity with the Petersberg Agreement of
November 1949 with the Western Allies, the FRG became a
member of the International Authority for the Ruhr and was
granted the right to establish consular relations with foreign
countries. Furthermore, the dismantling of German industrial
plants in the Ruhr area was largely stopped, and Germany was
allowed to again build merchant ships. The winning of these
important concessions was Adenauer's first major success as
chancellor.
In the spring of 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schu-
man recommended the creation of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) to revive European economic coop-
eration and prevent future conflict between France and Ger-
many. According to Schuman's plan, countries willing to place
their coal and steel industries under an independent authority
could join.
Once again, Adenauer seized the opportunity to further
integrate West Germany into Western Europe. Against the
SPD's strong opposition, the FRG entered into negotiations
with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy
on the formation of the ECSC. Negotiations were successfully
92
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
concluded in June 1952. The ECSC superseded the Interna-
tional Authority for the Ruhr and laid the foundations of the
future European Community (EC — see Glossary; see European
Union, ch. 8). Adenauer's conciliatory but resolute foreign pol-
icy also secured the admission in 1951 of the FRG into the
Council of Europe, a body established in May 1949 to promote
European ideals and principles.
Another important step for the FRG on its path toward reen-
try into the community of nations was Adenauer's unwavering
position on restitution to the victims of Nazi crimes. Of particu-
lar significance was the normalization of relations with Israel
and with the Jewish people in general. Although the terrible
atrocities that had occurred during the war could not be
undone, material restitution could at least improve the lot of
the survivors. In 1952 a reparations agreement with Israel was
arranged that called for the payment of DM3 billion to the Jew-
ish state over the next twelve years. Additional agreements with
Jewish organizations provided for restitution to Jewish victims
throughout the world. Through such actions, the FRG sought
to meet its obligations as the legal successor to the German
Reich, a position it had accepted since the FRG's founding.
Rearmament and the European Defense Community
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 convinced Western
leaders of the growing threat of international communism.
The United States began to encourage the Europeans — the
FRG in particular — to contribute to their own defense. For
Germany, five years after having lost the most devastating of all
wars, this meant forming an army, a step unthinkable for many
Germans. Germany's rearmament was also anathema to some
of its neighbors, especially France. As the Korean War contin-
ued, however, opposition to rearmament lessened within the
FRG, and China's entry in the war caused France to revise its
negative position toward German rearmament.
To contain a newly armed Germany, French officials pro-
posed the creation of the European Defense Community
(EDC) under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO). Adenauer quickly agreed to join the EDC
because he saw membership as likely to increase his country's
sovereignty. The treaties establishing the EDC were signed in
May 1952 in Bonn by the Western Allies and the FRG.
Although the Bundestag ratified the treaties, the EDC was ulti-
mately blocked by France's parliament, the National Assembly,
93
Germany: A Country Study
because it opposed putting French troops under foreign com-
mand. The French veto meant that a new formula was needed
to allay French fears of a strong Germany.
The negotiations surrounding the planned rearmament of
the FRG and the creation of the EDC provoked a Soviet coun-
termeasure. After a second East German proposal for talks on a
possible unification of the two Germanys failed because of the
FRG's demands for free elections in the GDR, the Soviet Union
put forth a new proposal to the Western Allies in March 1952.
The Soviet Union would agree to German unification if the
Oder-Neisse border were recognized as final and if a unified
Germany were to remain neutral. If the proposal were
accepted, Allied troops would leave Germany within one year,
and the country would obtain its full sovereignty.
Although the offer was directed to the Western Allies, its
content was aimed directly at the West German public and
aroused lively discussion about the country's future. Adenauer
was convinced, however, that even if the Soviet proposal were
serious, an acceptance of the plan would mean Germany's
exclusion from the community of Western democracies and an
uncertain future. Together with the Western Allies, which did
not wish to act without his consent, Adenauer continued to
demand free elections supervised by the United Nations (UN)
in all of Germany as a precondition for negotiations. The
Soviet Union declined and abandoned its proposal. Adenauer
was harshly criticized by the opposition for not having seized
this opportunity for unification. As his impressive victory in the
Bundestag elections of 1953 clearly demonstrated, however,
Adenauer had acted according to the wishes of the overwhelm-
ing majority of West Germans (see table 4, Appendix).
Adenauer's decision to turn down the Soviet proposal was
convincing evidence that the FRG intended to remain firmly
anchored in the Western defense community. After plans for
the EDC had failed because of the French veto, negotiations
were successfully concluded on the Treaties of Paris in May
1954, which ended the Occupation Statute and made the FRG
a member of the Western European Union (WEU — see Glos-
sary) and of NATO (see The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion; Western European Union, ch. 8). On May 5, 1955, the
FRG declared its sovereignty as a country and, as a new mem-
ber of NATO, undertook to contribute to the organization's
defense effort by building up its own armed forces, the
Bundeswehr (see Creation of the Bundeswehr, ch. 9).
94
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
The FRG contributed to NATO's defense effort by building
up the Bundeswehr, an undertaking that met with considerable
opposition within the population. For many, the memories of
the war were still too vivid. To avoid separating the army from
the country's civilian and political life, as was the case during
the Weimar Republic, laws were passed that guaranteed civilian
control over the armed forces and gave the individual soldier a
new status. Members of the conscription army were to be "citi-
zens in uniform" and were encouraged to take an active part in
democratic politics. Although West Germans generally
remained less than enthusiastic about their new army, the
majority accepted the responsibility of sharing the burden of
defense with the United States and the other members of
NATO.
By 1955 the Soviet Union had abandoned efforts to secure a
neutralized Germany, having become convinced of the FRG's
firm position within the Western Alliance. Following the Four
Power Conference in Geneva in July 1955, Chancellor Ade-
nauer accepted an invitation to visit Moscow, seeking to open
new lines of communication with the East without compromis-
ing the FRG's firm commitment to the West. In Moscow in Sep-
tember, he arranged for the release of 10,000 German war
prisoners. In addition, without having recognized the division
of Germany or the Oder-Neisse line as permanent, West Ger-
man negotiators also established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union had recognized the GDR as a state in
1954, and the two countries maintained diplomatic relations
with one another. The FRG had not, however, recognized the
GDR. And to dissuade other countries from recognizing East
Germany, Adenauer's foreign policy adviser, Walter Hallstein,
proposed that the FRG break diplomatic relations with any
country that recognized the GDR. The proposal was based on
the FRG's claim, as a democratic state, to be the only legitimate
representative of the German people. The Hallstein Doctrine
was adopted as a principle of West German foreign policy in
September 1955 and remained in effect until the late 1960s.
Another important development in the FRG's relations with
its neighbors was that the Saarland rejoined the FRG in 1957.
After World War II, France had attempted to separate this
region economically and politically from the rest of Germany.
In 1947 the Saarland received its own constitution and was vir-
tually autonomous. During negotiations leading to the Treaties
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Germany: A Country Study
of Paris, the FRG and France agreed, in the Saar Statute, that
the Saarland should become a territory under the control of
the Council of Europe. However, in the referendum of Octo-
ber 1955, which was supposed to confirm the Saar Statute,
Saarland voters rejected the statute by a two-thirds majority, an
indication that they wished their region to become part of the
FRG. On January 1, 1957, the Saarland became a West German
Land.
In addition to his success in building a close and firm rela-
tionship with the United States, another of Adenauer's great
foreign policy achievements was reconciliation with France,
with which Germany had been locked in rivalry and conflict for
centuries. In spite of remaining disagreements on the areas of
European integration and NATO, a basis for the development
of more normal relations between their two countries was
forged upon a good personal understanding between Ade-
nauer and French president Charles de Gaulle, who had
assumed the French presidency in 1958.
The German-French Friendship Treaty (Elysee Treaty),
which went into effect in January 1963, called for regular con-
sultations between the two governments, semiannual meetings
of the chiefs of state, and a youth exchange program. The
treaty was seen by many as a positive step in the history of a dif-
ficult relationship between the two countries. Of greater
importance to the majority of West Germans, however, was the
country's relationship with the United States and its secure
place within the Western defense community.
Social Market Economy
Germany's economic growth during the first decades after
the war at times overshadowed its marked success at joining the
international community. In 1945 the country's economy was
shattered. A good part of what survived was later dismantled
and carried off by the victorious Allies. Within Germany there
was much argument about how to rebuild the economy and
what its nature should be. Socialist politicians argued for a cen-
tral distribution system, extensive state controls, and the
nationalization of banks and industry. Their main opponent
was Ludwig Erhard, a liberal economist appointed to head the
office of economic affairs in the Bizone, who later became min-
ister for economics and ultimately FRG chancellor (1963-66),
succeeding Adenauer.
96
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
Erhard's concept of a socially responsive market economy
based on free trade and private enterprise, aided by the infu-
sion of capital through the Marshall Plan, proved to be the
ideal basis for the strong recovery of the West German econ-
omy, culminating in the economic miracle ( Wirtschaftswunder)
of the 1950s (see The Social Market Economy, ch. 5). In some
areas, for instance in housing and in agriculture, prevailing cir-
cumstances required the introduction of price controls and
subsidies. Controls to prevent the formation of cartels and to
foster monetary stability also remained the state's responsibil-
ity. The state likewise furthered the accumulation of private
capital and protected ordinary citizens by establishing a gener-
ous system of social services that included statutory health,
unemployment, and pension insurance programs.
West Germany's economy functioned very well for several
decades, and the country became one of the world's wealthiest
(see The Economic Miracle and Beyond, ch. 5). Thanks to the
strong social welfare component and the system of codetermi-
nation, which gave workers in factories some say about their
management, West German industry enjoyed a long period of
labor peace. The export-oriented economy received another
boost with the creation of the European Economic Community
(EEC — see Glossary) by the Treaty of Rome in March 1957.
West Germany was one of the EEC's founding members.
Ludwig Erhard and the Grand Coalition
Konrad Adenauer assumed the chancellorship of the newly
founded FRG in 1949, at the age of seventy-three. From the
beginning, his primary foreign policy goals had been the
achievement of German reunification through a policy of
strength, the building of strong relations with the United
States, and reconciliation with France.
Until the elections of 1961, Adenauer had enjoyed the sup-
port of a healthy CDU/CSU majority in the Bundestag. Various
domestic issues and very likely also the Berlin crisis, however,
reduced the CDU/CSU's strength in the Bundestag and forced
the formation of a coalition government with the FDP. The
work of this government was impeded by differences of opin-
ion from the outset. Following the resignation of FDP cabinet
members in protest over a controversy surrounding the arrest
of Rudolf Augstein, editor of the newsmagazine Der Spiegel, for
allegedly having reported classified material concerning NATO
exercises, the working climate of the coalition deteriorated.
97
Germany: A Country Study
Forced to accept the resignation of his powerful minister of
defense, Franz Josef Strauss, who had had Augstein arrested,
and facing an erosion of support within the CDU, Adenauer
resigned on October 15, 1963.
Ludwig Erhard succeeded Adenauer as chancellor. Under
Erhard's leadership, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition remained in
power until 1966. Erhard's more liberal economic policy
toward the East European states that maintained diplomatic
relations with East Germany made maintaining the Hallstein
Doctrine difficult. In addition, his position of favoring close
coordination of German foreign policy with the United States
was resisted by the "Gaullists," even those in his own party, who
favored a continuation of Adenauer's close relations with
France.
The CDU/CSU did well in the elections of 1965, but rela-
tions with the FDP had deteriorated. A recession and a budget
crisis caused the FDP to drop out of the coalition. Erhard ruled
with a minority government for a short time, but after the
opposition's significant gains in several Land elections, his
party formed a new coalition government with the SPD. Erhard
resigned as chancellor in November 1966, less successful in
that position than he had been as the "father of the economic
miracle."
When the CDU/CSU entered into a coalition with the SPD
in December 1966, West Germany was experiencing unprece-
dented economic troubles. High unemployment, a relatively
high budget deficit, and an unexpected rise in support for
right-wing groups, such as the National Democratic Party of
Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands —
NPD), brought West Germany's largest parties together to
form what was called the Grand Coalition. Kurt Georg
Kiesinger (CDU), who had served as minister president of
Baden-Wurttemberg, was appointed chancellor; Willy Brandt
(SPD), the governing mayor of Berlin, became vice chancellor
and minister of foreign affairs; and Karl Schiller (SPD) was
appointed minister for economics. Considered by many as
"unnatural" because the coalition partners came from opposite
ends of the political spectrum, the coalition was seen as a tem-
porary solution needed to gain the cooperation of the trade
unions and stabilize the economy.
The Ulbricht Era, 1949-71
Soviet dictator Stalin died in March 1953. In large portions
98
Konrad Adenauer, federal
chancellor, 1949-63
Ludwig Erhard, federal
chancellor, 1963-66
Kurt Georg Kiesinger, federal
chancellor, 1966-69
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
Germany: A Country Study
of the East German population, particularly among workers
suffering under the high production quotas set by the SED, Sta-
lin's death gave rise to hopes for an improvement in living con-
ditions and for an easing of political terror. In an attempt to
stave off increasing unrest among the population as living stan-
dards were worsening and production quotas were being
raised, the East German leadership, headed by General Secre-
tary Walter Ulbricht, announced new economic policies that
would end price hikes and increase the availability of consumer
goods. Ulbricht refused, however, to lower production goals for
industry and construction, which had been increased by 10
percent on May 28, 1953.
On the new parade grounds at East Berlin's Stalin Allee, a
symbol of communist pride, enraged workers assembled in pro-
test on June 16. The following day, demonstrations were held
in most industrial cities of the GDR. Demands were made for
comprehensive economic reforms and political changes,
including Ulbricht's resignation and free elections. Over-
whelmed by such widespread opposition to their policies, the
East German authorities were unable to quell the protests.
Soviet military units stationed in East Germany were called in
and, with the help of East German police units, suppressed the
unrest within two days. Order was restored at a cost of an esti-
mated several dozen deaths and 1,000 arrests. Ulbricht, the fig-
ure largely responsible for the causes of the demonstrations,
had triumphed, but the uprising demonstrated the frailty of
the East German regime and signaled the East German popula-
tion's "will to freedom."
Born in Leipzig in 1893, Ulbricht had served on the Western
Front in World War I and had joined the KPD in 1919. He
advanced quickly in the party hierarchy, becoming Reichstag
deputy in 1928. After Hitler's seizure of power, Ulbricht went
into exile. From 1937 to 1945, he worked for the party in Mos-
cow. After the war, he returned to Berlin to build up the KPD
under the protection of the Soviet Union. By 1950 he was
chairman of the SED and through a variety of positions ruled
the East German state with an iron fist for the next two decades
by successfully eliminating every potential competitor within
the SED leadership.
Consolidation of the New State
The most important instrument employed by East German
authorities to guarantee their absolute rule was the State Secu-
100
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
rity Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, commonly referred to as
the Stasi). Founded in early 1950 as the secret service branch
of the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fur Staatssicher-
heit — MfS), the Stasi came to exercise almost complete control
over the population of the GDR. During the first five years of its
existence, Stasi personnel were trained by Soviet instructors. In
addition to its surveillance of the East German population —
which was carried out with sinister thoroughness up until the
final days of the GDR — the Stasi conducted extensive espio-
nage activities in the West, particularly in the FRG.
Aside from its approximately 100,000 full-time employees,
the Stasi could also rely on the assistance of nearly 2 million
civilian spies, or so-called informal employees (Informelle Mitar-
beiter — IM), who reported regularly from domestic listening
posts or from abroad. Experts agree that before its dissolution
in 1990, the Stasi had developed the most perfect spying system
ever devised to watch over its own citizens. It had truly realized
the idea of the "glass-citizen," whose every activity was known to
and controlled by the state. In Stasi headquarters in East Ber-
lin, detailed information on individual citizens was collected in
huge archives, which survived, largely intact, the downfall of
the East German state.
An equally important role in building a permanent power
base for the SED was played by mass organizations. One of the
most important was the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche
Jugend — FDJ), founded in March 1946, in which young people
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five were to be indoc-
trinated as members of a new socialist society. Together with its
suborganization for youngsters from six to fourteen years of
age, the Young Pioneers — later called the Pioneer Organiza-
tion "Ernst Thalmann," in memory of the chief of the KPD dur-
ing the Weimar Republic, who was killed in a concentration
camp — the FDJ soon became an effective instrument for influ-
encing the coming generations. An important part of its influ-
ence was that membership in the FDJ soon determined access
to institutions of higher learning, recreation and sports facili-
ties, and ultimately career opportunities.
Another important mass organization was the Free German
Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund — FDGB), which attempted to motivate the workforce to
achieve production goals and also provided members with
opportunities for inexpensive vacations at FDGB-owned sea-
101
Germany: A Country Study
shore resorts. Similarly, the interests of women were served by
the Democratic Women's Federation of Germany.
By the end of 1947, all facets of society were organized in
associations and groupings under the control of the SED. The
GDR authorities also sought to deprive potential enemies
within the state of the traditions and institutions upon which
the state and society had been founded. A primary target for
complete transformation was the court system. Judges and
attorneys soon came to be used as mere instruments to carry
out Marxist-Leninist goals. The legality of actions was deter-
mined by the political leadership.
The SED also declared the traditional administrative division
of East Germany into five Lander an obstacle to "efficient" gov-
ernance. The five Lander, all grown out of long historical tradi-
tions, were abolished and fourteen administrative districts
established. This measure gave the central government in East
Berlin much greater control over the activities in these dis-
tricts, which were now much smaller, and, equally important,
allowed it to break with another aspect of Germany's despised
bourgeois history.
Planned Economy
In the GDR, as in the other new "people's republics," the
authorities' goal of abolishing private property and every trace
of capitalism was to be implemented in several steps. By taking
possession of all resources, as well as of the means of produc-
tion and distribution, the socialist state hoped to be able to
compete successfully with the capitalist West and finally dem-
onstrate the superiority of the socialist system.
Patterned on the Soviet model, the East German economy
was transformed into a state-controlled, centrally planned pro-
duction and distribution system by 1948. Beginning in 1945,
large tracts of real estate and factories were taken over by the
state under reform programs for agriculture and industry.
After the foundation of the GDR, these reforms were pursued
with vigor. In 1949 the new state became a member of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which
included all other Soviet satellite states and had been created
in order to coordinate economic planning in socialist states
worldwide.
The concept of multiyear plans was introduced with the First
Five-Year Plan of 1951. It was intended to make up war losses
and also make possible reparations payments to the Soviet
102
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
Union. For this purpose, heavy industry was built up on a large
scale. Production goals could not be reached, however, because
of a chronic shortage of raw materials. The manufacture of
consumer products was neglected completely.
The Second Five-Year Plan, started in 1956, aimed to com-
plete the nationalization of all industrial concerns and the col-
lectivization of agricultural enterprises. By the early 1960s,
Kombinate (collective farms) accounted for about 90 percent of
all farm production. Private farmers who resisted collectiviza-
tion were arrested.
When production began to decline in the early 1960s, the
SED introduced the so-called New Economic System of decen-
tralized planning, which delegated some production decisions
previously the prerogative of the central planning authorities
to the Association of Publicly Owned Enterprises (Vereinigung
Volkseigener Betriebe — WB). The WB was to foster special-
ized production within individual branches of industry, includ-
ing the previously neglected production of consumer goods.
Production declined even further, however, and it became
increasingly evident to many East Germans that their "planned
economy" had lost the economic battle with the capitalist West.
The Warsaw Pact and the National People's Army
The Warsaw Pact, which included the Soviet Union and all
its satellite states in Eastern Europe, was created on May 14,
1955, just days after the FRG joined NATO. Like NATO, its
Western counterpart, the Warsaw Pact guaranteed mutual mili-
tary assistance to its members in the event of an attack and
coordination of all member forces in a unified command. The
existence of this command, which was situated in Moscow,
allowed the Soviet Union to station troops on its allies' territo-
ries. Each member state was also obligated to establish its own
armed forces. In the GDR, the People's Police (Volkspolizei, or
Vopo) had created paramilitary units in 1952. The Soviet
Union had unofficially helped form East German naval and air
force units beginning in 1950.
On March 1, 1956, the National People's Army (Nationale
Volksarmee — NVA) was officially created by transferring the
existing paramilitary units of the People's Police to the NVA.
The new army was officially under the leadership of the SED
and under the direction of the newly created Ministry for
National Defense. Initially, the NVA was to be staffed by volun-
teers only, but in 1962, when recruitment presented increasing
103
Germany: A Country Study
difficulties for the SED and its support organizations, conscrip-
tion was introduced. Before the construction of the Berlin
Wall, conscription had been seen as impossible to enforce.
As early as the 1950s, the NVA became the most effective and
best-equipped fighting force in the Warsaw Pact aside from the
Soviet army. By the early 1980s, the NVA had an active strength
of 167,000, of which approximately 60,000 were professional
soldiers; there were approximately 3 million reservists. Most
weapons were of Soviet origin.
The Berlin Wall
Besides its increasing economic difficulties, by the end of the
1950s the GDR encountered another problem that began to
threaten its existence: large numbers of people were leaving
East Germany for the West. Nearly half of those who fled the
GDR were under twenty-five years of age. Although crossing
the border between the two German states had become dan-
gerous after new security measures were introduced in the
early 1950s and severe penalties for the crime of "flight from
the republic" (Republikflucht) were introduced by GDR authori-
ties in 1957, a relatively safe escape route remained via West
Berlin, which could be reached from East Berlin using the city's
public transportation network. Once in West Berlin, refugees
were registered and then transported to the FRG by air.
Alarmed by the continuous population drain, the East Ger-
man Politburo ordered the erection of a wall along the border
between West Berlin and East Berlin. On Sunday morning,
August 13, 1961, workers began building a three-meter-high
concrete wall along the border of the Soviet sector of the city.
Within a few hours, public transportation lines were cut, and
West Berlin was sealed off from East Germany. Chancellor Ade-
nauer and West Berlin's governing mayor, Willy Brandt, sought
to calm the outraged West Berliners. The Western Allies did
not react with force because they were unwilling to endanger
world peace. Up to that date, nearly 3.5 million had left the
GDR for West Germany. After the building of the wall, the
stream of refugees decreased to a mere trickle.
Despite the construction of the Berlin Wall, many East Ger-
mans still tried to escape. Several hundred of those attempting
to leave the GDR were killed; others were captured, perhaps
after being wounded by automatic guns or mines along the
border, and sentenced to long prison terms. With the sealing
104
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
off of East Berlin, the East German regime had solved the refu-
gee situation.
The "Socialist State of the German Nation"
The building of the Wall effectively halted large-scale emi-
gration from the GDR. Although the SED failed to gain the
active support of the majority of the population, young people,
especially, began to tolerate the regime, at least passively. In the
absence of any alternatives, they fulfilled their routine duties in
youth organizations, schools, and workplaces. By the
mid-1960s, the regime could afford to lessen internal pressures
on its citizens, who, encouraged by increased production of
consumer goods, had largely given up their open resentment
against the SED and had turned their attention to improving
their standard of living.
Ulbricht's state visit to Egypt in 1965 ended the GDR's politi-
cal isolation. A previously unknown pride in East German
achievements and a feeling of distinct GDR identity began to
develop, first among ruling party functionaries and then gradu-
ally among segments of the population. In 1967 the GDR lead-
ership, encouraged by these developments, attempted to gain
official recognition of its autonomy from the FRG. When the
FRG refused to grant recognition, the GDR government pro-
claimed a separate GDR citizenship and introduced a visa
requirement for West Germans traveling to West Berlin and to
the GDR. With these measures, the GDR began to practice a
policy of new assertiveness and ideological delimitation
(Abgrenzung) in response to the FRG's policy of recognizing
only one German citizenship.
Membership in the UN was a primary foreign policy goal of
the GDR in the late 1960s. A veto by the Western powers in the
UN Security Council blocked the GDR's bid, however. The
GDR did gain admission to the International Olympic Commit-
tee, which permitted East German athletes to participate in the
Olympic games as a separate team. For the GDR, however, the
ultimate breakthrough in the area of foreign policy — a treaty
with the FRG — came only after international political tensions
began to ease under the new spirit of detente.
Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow between
the FRG and the Soviet Union in January 1970, a new era of
communication began between the two German states that cul-
minated in the signing of the Basic Treaty in December 1972.
The next year, both states became members of the UN, and
105
Germany: A Country Study
most countries came to recognize the GDR. Permanent diplo-
matic representations, in lieu of embassies, were established,
respectively, by the FRG in East Berlin and by the GDR in
Bonn, demonstrating the new climate of mutual respect and
cooperation between the two German states.
In this new setting, there was no longer room for Walter
Ulbricht, who had maintained a policy of confrontation with
the West for many years. The Soviet Union, which had demon-
strated considerably more flexibility than the GDR leadership
during its negotiations with the FRG, was also irritated by the
failure of Ulbricht's economic program and by his attempts to
demonstrate ideological independence by adhering to conser-
vative Marxist principles. In 1971 the Soviet authorities
ordered that Ulbricht be relieved of power. His replacement
was Erich Honecker, who, as secretary of the Central Commit-
tee of the SED for security matters, had been directly responsi-
ble for the building of the Berlin Wall.
The Social Democratic-Free Democratic Coalition,
1969-82
In the West German Bundestag elections of September 1969,
the CDU/CSU remained the largest political group, holding
eighteen more seats than the SPD. With the help of the FDP,
which had earlier supported the candidacy of the SPD minister
of justice Gustav Heinemann for the federal presidency, Willy
Brandt was able to form an SPD-FDP coalition government,
with himself as federal chancellor. The SPD-FDP coalition
lasted until late 1982 and was noted for its accomplishments in
the area of foreign policy. The formation of this new coalition
forced the CDU/CSU into opposition for the first time in the
history of West Germany.
Willy Brandt
Willy Brandt became the first democratically elected Social
Democrat to hold the chancellorship. Born in Lubeck in 1913,
Brandt first joined the SPD in 1930 and later joined a smaller
leftist grouping, the Socialist Workers Party (Sozialistiche
Arbeiterpartei — SAP). After Hitler came to power, Brandt emi-
grated to Norway, where he became a citizen and worked as a
journalist. After Germany occupied Norway in 1940, he fled to
Sweden. Brandt returned to Germany after the war as a news
correspondent and later as a Norwegian diplomat in Berlin.
106
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
After he had again assumed German citizenship, Brandt
rejoined the SPD in 1947. He became mayor of Berlin in 1957
and was the SPD candidate for the chancellorship in 1961. In
the late 1950s, Brandt was a principal architect of the SPD's
rejection of its Marxist past and adoption of the Bad Godes-
burg Program, in which the party accepted the free-market
principle. The triumph of the CDU/CSU in the 1957 national
elections and widespread and increasing prosperity made such
a step necessary if the SPD were to win the electorate's favor. In
1964 Brandt became the chairman of the SPD. From 1966 to
1969, he served as minister for foreign affairs and vice chancel-
lor in the Grand Coalition.
When Brandt became chancellor in 1969, he proposed a
new policy toward the communist states of Eastern Europe; this
policy later became known as Ostpolitik (policy toward the
East). In recognition of his efforts toward detente in Europe,
he received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1971. In the early
1970s, Brandt also engineered a package of treaties that nor-
malized the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union and with
Poland, the GDR, and other Soviet-bloc nations. He success-
fully withstood a vote of no-confidence in the Bundestag in
April 1972 and won the Bundestag elections in November 1972
with an impressive relative majority of nearly 45 percent.
Brandt resigned in May 1974, shocked by the discovery that
one of his personal assistants, Gunter Guillaume, was a spy for
the GDR.
In domestic policy, Brandt and his FDP coalition partners
initiated legal reforms, including the passage of more liberal
laws regarding divorce and abortion, the latter reform generat-
ing intense public discussion. Education reforms calling for
new types of schools and for overhauling administration of the
universities were only partially carried out. Brandt and his coa-
lition partners were more successful in realizing their foreign
policy goals than in achieving their domestic aims.
Ostpolitik
West Germany's relations with the East European states had
virtually stagnated since the establishment of the Hallstein Doc-
trine in the mid-1950s. In 1970, in an attempt to lessen tensions
in Europe, Brandt and his FDP minister for foreign affairs,
Walter Scheel, agreed to negotiate with the communist bloc.
For the first time since 1948, the top politicians of the FRG and
the GDR held talks, with Brandt and the East German prime
107
Germany: A Country Study
minister, Willi Stoph, meeting in Erfurt in East Germany and
Kassel in West Germany. Although the talks produced no con-
crete results because Brandt refused to recognize the GDR as a
sovereign state, communication lines were reopened.
After coordinating policy goals with the United States, the
FRG also entered negotiations with the Soviet Union on a
treaty normalizing relations, in which both countries
renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no terri-
torial claims, and it recognized de facto the Oder-Neisse bor-
der and the border between the FRG and the GDR. FRG
negotiators, however, insisted that such agreements did not
alter the West German position on future reunification of the
country and that the responsibilities of the Four Powers in Ger-
many remained unchanged by the treaty. They also linked the
signing of the treaty to a Soviet promise to open talks on nor-
malizing the Berlin situation. After the Soviet Union had
agreed to these conditions, the Treaty of Moscow was signed in
August 1970. The agreement opened the road to negotiations
with other countries of the Soviet bloc.
In December 1970, after ten months of complicated negotia-
tions, the FRG and Poland signed the Treaty of Warsaw. The
treaty contained essentially the same points as the Treaty of
Moscow on the question of Poland's western border, the renun-
ciation of territorial claims by the FRG, and the ongoing
responsibilities of the Four Powers. In return, Poland agreed to
allow ethnic Germans still in Poland to emigrate to the FRG.
During the subsequent debates on the ratification of the two
treaties, the CDU/CSU and part of the FDP made their con-
sent contingent on the formulation of a strong statement by
the Bundestag underscoring Germany's right to reunification
in self-determination and of the Allies' responsibilities for Ger-
many and Berlin.
Concurrent with the negotiations on the treaties of Moscow
and Warsaw, the Four Powers undertook to end disagreement
about the status of Berlin in talks that ultimately led to the Four
Power Agreement (also known as the Quadripartite Agree-
ment) of September 1971. The talks, which began in March
1970, got off to a difficult stari because the Western Allies and
the Soviet Union were deeply divided over their basic interpre-
tation of the "status of Berlin." After they "agreed to disagree"
on this point, progress was finally made, and all sides con-
curred that the status quo of Berlin should not be changed uni-
laterally.
108
Willy Brandt, federal
chancellor, 1969-74
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
Helmut Schmidt, federal
chancellor, 1974-82
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
The Soviet Union made two very important concessions:
traffic to and from West Berlin would be unimpeded in the
future, and the existing ties of West Berlin to the FRG were
given de facto recognition. Soviet officials, however, insisted
that West Berlin was not to be considered a territory belonging
to the FRG and therefore was not to be governed by it. Further-
more, the Soviet Union made the conclusion of the agreement
among the Four Powers contingent on the signing of the
Treaty of Moscow between the FRG and the Soviet Union,
which was still under negotiation. They thereby established the
same linkage that the FRG had demanded, but in reverse.
The Four Power Agreement charged the governments of
West Berlin and the GDR with negotiating an accord that
would regulate access to and from West Berlin from the FRG
and secure the right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin and
the GDR. The Transit Agreement of May 1972 arranged these
matters and also secured the rights of GDR citizens to visit the
FRG, but only in cases of family emergency.
109
Germany: A Country Study
Following the negotiations on traffic between the FRG and
the GDR, both sides recognized the feasibility of arriving at a
more comprehensive treaty between the two German states.
Talks began in August 1972 and culminated in December 1972
with the signing of the Basic Treaty. In the treaty, both states
committed themselves to developing normal relations on the
basis of equality, guaranteeing their mutual territorial integrity
as well as the border between them, and recognizing each
other's independence and sovereignty. They also agreed to the
exchange of "permanent missions" in Bonn and East Berlin to
further relations.
After the bitterly contested approval of the Basic Treaty by
the SPD-FDP-controlled Bundestag in May 1973, a political
decision that the CDU/CSU had warned against for decades
became a reality: West Germany's de facto recognition of East
Germany as a separate state. To many conservatives, the Basic
Treaty represented the failure of the Hallstein Doctrine and a
final blow to the possibility of Germany's reunification. Bavaria
filed a suit in the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to
prevent the treaty's implementation, but the court held the
treaty to be compatible with the provisions of the Basic Law. As
a result of the treaty, the FRG and the GDR became members
of the UN in June 1973.
Among the states to the east, Czechoslovakia remained the
only neighbor with which West Germany had not yet normal-
ized diplomatic relations. Negotiations with this country
proved to be considerably more difficult than those with the
Soviet Union or Poland. The main obstacle was a difference in
interpreting the Munich Agreement of September 1938. On
the one hand, the FRG maintained that the accord itself had to
be considered legally valid but that the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia in March 1939 had voided its provisions. Czechoslova-
kia, on the other hand, insisted that the accord be considered
void from the very beginning. Both sides finally agreed that the
accord was to be considered void, but that all legal proceedings
in the occupied territory between 1938 and 1945 were to be
upheld. Once this basic understanding had been reached, the
treaty with Czechoslovakia, known as the Treaty of Prague, sim-
ilar in content to the Treaty of Warsaw, was signed in December
1973, and diplomatic relations were established. Shortly there-
after, West Germany exchanged ambassadors with Hungary
and Bulgaria.
110
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
Helmut Schmidt
Following Brandt's resignation in May 1974, the SPD-FDP
coalition partners unanimously agreed that Minister of Finance
Helmut Schmidt should head the new government. At fifty-five,
Schmidt became the youngest chancellor of the FRG. Born in
Hamburg in 1918, he served as an officer in World War II.
After the war, he joined the SPD and served in Hamburg's
municipal government, where he acquired a national reputa-
tion as a top-notch manager because of his competence in deal-
ing with a severe flood in 1962. He was the SPD faction leader
in the Bundestag and minister of defense in the first SPD-FDP
cabinet. Schmidt gradually became recognized at home and
abroad as a pragmatic politician and an expert in economic
and defense matters. His first cabinet included the FDP's
Hans-Dietrich Genscher as minister of foreign affairs.
Genscher replaced Walter Scheel, who had been elected fed-
eral president in 1974.
Schmidt was confronted with a number of serious problems.
The economic turbulence caused by the oil crisis of 1973 had
affected the FRG, and a ban on the use of automobiles on Sun-
days had been introduced to preserve scarce fuel reserves. Per-
haps as a result of the crisis, Germans began to recognize
limitations to economic growth and simultaneously to become
aware of ecological dangers to the environment inherent in
their lifestyle. As a result, environmental movements sprang up
throughout the FRG.
Worries about the environment and about long-term eco-
nomic growth became widespread in the next few years, and
the almost limitless optimism of the postwar period began to
give way to a mood of uncertainty about the future. Unemploy-
ment was also on the rise, and labor unions, traditionally reli-
able allies of the SPD, began to depart from their position of
solidarity with the SPD-FDP government. In this increasingly
difficult economic and political environment, Schmidt tried to
steer a steady course, one often too conservative for his party
and from which necessary support was at times lacking.
The Student Movement and Terrorism
In addition to troubling economic and environmental prob-
lems for which no easy solutions were available, West Germany
and its politicians had to contend with two new sources of
social unrest: the student movement of the late 1960s and early
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Germany: A Country Study
1970s, and left-wing terrorism, which originated in the late
1960s, but which had its greatest impact in the 1970s.
Inspired by the student movement in the United States and
by the international movement opposing the war in Vietnam,
as well as by rising opposition to the traditional administration
of German universities, students organized protest movements
at a number of German universities in the late 1960s. Sit-ins,
disruption of lectures, and attacks against buildings housing
major publishing companies, such as the Axel Springer Group,
were staged by a minority of student groups, primarily those
with Marxist ties. Protesters claimed that an "extra-parliamen-
tary opposition" was needed to ensure representation of the
people in a state that was governed largely by two major parties.
The student protest movement had little support among the
population, however, and was finally absorbed by the estab-
lished parties.
Terrorism was also a concern during this period (see Dissi-
dence and Terrorist Activity, ch. 9). A few radical student ele-
ments sought to realize their aims through political terrorism.
Small groups launched violent attacks against "symbols of capi-
talism." They fire-bombed department stores in several cities,
broke into police stations, robbed banks, and attacked United
States military installations.
One terrorist group, notorious for its brutality, became
known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, named after its leaders,
Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. Calling themselves the
Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion — RAF), their aim was
to assassinate the "levers of the imperialist power structure,"
thereby provoking the state to abandon lawful methods of
fighting terrorism. The arrest and imprisonment in 1972 of the
main RAF leaders led to an intensification of terrorist acts by
the group, which culminated in 1977 in the kidnapping of
Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the president of the Federation of Ger-
man Employers' Associations (Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande — BDA) and in the hijacking
six weeks later of a Lufthansa passenger airplane to Mogadishu,
Somalia.
The aim of both these terrorist actions was the release of
Baader and the other RAF prisoners. In a spectacular rescue
action, the Lufthansa airplane was stormed by a special unit of
the West German Federal Border Force, ending a five-day odys-
sey through the Middle East. Failing in their coup, Baader and
three other RAF leaders committed suicide in their prison
112
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
cells, and Schleyer was subsequently murdered by his kidnap-
pers. The police had been successful in discovering hideouts,
strategy papers, and caches of weapons, however, which led to
the severe weakening of the organization of the RAF.
Nevertheless, supported by various international terrorist
groups, including the GDR's Stasi, the RAF maintained a small
network committed to assassinating prominent public figures.
In 1989 they were responsible for the murder of Alfred Herr-
hausen, a top executive of the Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, and
in 1991 for the murder of Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, president
of the Treuhandanstalt, the agency that managed the privatiza-
tion of property in the former GDR (see Unification and Its
Aftermath, ch. 5).
The Greens
In the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973, regional political
groups concerned with environmental issues began to put up
candidates in communal and regional elections. In 1980 a
number of ecological groups, alternative action movements,
and various women's rights organizations banded together on
the national level to form the political party that came to be
called the Greens (Die Grunen).
Although the political views of the various groups in the new
party were widely diverse, all agreed that the continuous expan-
sion of the economy was detrimental to the environment and
that disarmament was imperative if mankind were to survive.
The Greens' support for radical peace movements and their
demand that the FRG withdraw from NATO prevented many
West Germans from taking the Greens seriously as a political
force. In the Bundestag elections of 1980, they could muster
only 1.5 percent of the vote, not enough to win any parliamen-
tary seats. In the 1983 elections, however, they broke the 5 per-
cent barrier and won twenty-seven seats in the Bundestag.
Differing ideological orientations within the Greens soon
began to undermine the party's effectiveness in the political
process. Two different factions emerged: the dogmatic funda-
mentalists (Fundis), who were unwilling to make any compro-
mises on policy in order to win political allies; and the realists
(Realos), who were ready to enter into a coalition with the SPD
on the communal and Land level in order to put environmen-
talist ideas into practice.
Another cause of disagreement within the party organiza-
tion of the Greens was the principle of rotation of seats in the
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Germany: A Country Study
Bundestag and in Land diets. This policy required deputies to
give up their seats after only half a term so that other Green
candidates would have an opportunity to participate in the
political process. As a result, experienced representatives who
understood the workings of parliament were forced to relin-
quish their seats and were relegated to subordinate work in the
party. Such unrealistic policies persuaded numerous talented
Green politicians to withdraw from active politics, or to leave
the party altogether. In 1984 a party leadership consisting only
of women was elected, giving the Greens an image of practicing
reverse discrimination.
Although the Realos among the Greens subsequently partici-
pated in Land governments as cabinet members, the party
remained on the periphery of politics during the remainder of
the 1980s (see The Greens, ch. 7). Nevertheless, the Greens
positively influenced the views of the traditional political par-
ties concerning the ecology and the preservation of natural
resources.
The Christian Democratic/Christian Socialist-Free
Democratic Coalition, 1983-
The SPD-FDP coalition formed in 1969 became increasingly
strained in the early 1980s, leading to concerns among the FDP
leadership about its stability. The SPD had become deeply
divided because many of its members found Chancellor
Schmidt's policies too conservative. Particularly troublesome
was his position on NATO's Dual-Track Decision, which
required the stationing of new missiles in West Germany if
Soviet missiles were not withdrawn. FDP chairman Genscher
feared that Schmidt would lose the backing of the SPD as its
left wing became more influential. As a result of these fears,
Genscher began to urge a change in the political constellation
governing West Germany and the formation of a coalition with
the CDU/CSU.
The SPD-FDP coalition broke apart in September 1982 when
the FDP minister of economics, Otto Lambsdorff, advocated
cutting social welfare expenditures. Schmidt countered by
threatening to fire Lambsdorff. The threat prompted the resig-
nation of all FDP cabinet members. Schmidt presided over a
minority government for a few days until the FDP, together
with the CDU/CSU, raised a constructive vote of no-confi-
dence against the government. Schmidt lost the vote, and Hel-
114
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
mut Kohl, head of the CDU, formed a new coalition
government composed of the CDU, its sister party the CSU,
and the FDR Kohl himself became chancellor on October 1,
1982.
Born in 1930 in Ludwigshafen in the heavily Roman Catho-
lic and conservative Rhineland-Palatinate, Kohl was a founding
member and leader of the CDU youth organization in his
hometown. He served as minister president of the
Rhineland-Palatinate from 1969 to 1976, and in the 1976
national elections he ran unsuccessfully against SPD candidate
Chancellor Schmidt for the office of chancellor.
In the 1980 national elections, Franz Josef Strauss was the
CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor. Strauss, Bavaria's minister
president and head of the CSU, was one of Germany's most
influential and colorful politicians. He believed the CDU/CSU
could come to power in Bonn without the help of the FDP.
After Strauss lost the elections and Schmidt remained chancel-
lor, however, Kohl began to steer toward an eventual coalition
with the FDP because he did not think that conservatives could
win an absolute majority at the national level.
New elections for the Bundestag were held in 1983, several
months after Kohl had assumed the chancellorship. The results
gave Kohl's government a clear majority and confirmed him as
chancellor. Throughout his career, Kohl demonstrated a strong
determination, extraordinary political skills, and a keen sense
for the political will of the German people. His key role in the
German reunification process has deservedly earned him a
position of distinction in German history.
In the first half of the 1980s, West German politics were
dominated by the heated discussion of NATO's Dual-Track
Decision. The peace movement mounted numerous demon-
strations to protest the possible stationing of United States mis-
siles in West Germany should the Soviet Union not remove its
newly stationed SS-20 missiles from Eastern Europe.
In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had decided to modern-
ize its intermediate-range missile arsenal by the introduction
and stationing of the advanced ground-based SS-20 systems.
With a range of approximately 5,000 kilometers, the SS-20 was
capable of delivering a 150-kiloton nuclear warhead within a
target radius of 400 meters — a capability that could not be
matched by any NATO weapon. It was clear that the missile's
target area was Central Europe. Chancellor Schmidt had been
among the first to warn of the danger posed by this new Soviet
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Germany: A Country Study
weapon system. The United States reacted quickly by develop-
ing two new weapon systems — the Pershing II inter-
mediate-range rocket and the cruise missile. Although the Per-
shing II possessed a considerably shorter range and a much
smaller warhead than the SS-20, it was capable of hitting its
potential target with almost absolute accuracy.
At the NATO conference of foreign and defense ministers
held in December 1979, officials decided to deploy 108 Persh-
ing II rockets and 464 cruise missiles in Europe by the end of
1983. They also agreed to enter negotiations as soon as possible
with the Soviet Union on the stationing of medium-range mis-
siles in Europe. If Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Central
Europe, United States missiles would not be positioned in West
Germany. The United States-Soviet Union talks began in
Geneva in November 1981 and continued for two years, but
without achieving results.
NATO's Dual-Track Decision met with mounting opposition
from the West German and European peace movement, and
numerous rallies were held in the early 1980s. In the fall of
1983, protest demonstrations throughout the FRG were aimed
at influencing the imminent decision of the Bundestag on
deployment. Demonstrators feared that if missiles were sta-
tioned on German soil, the German population would be
wiped out in the event of a possible nuclear exchange, while
the Soviet Union would remain unaffected. With time, how-
ever, the peace movement became increasingly divided, and
after 1983 it began to have less influence on public opinion.
Most West Germans saw the Soviet Union as responsible for the
escalation of the arms race by their deployment of the SS-20
and, in addition, mistrusted the Soviet Union's apparently
keen interest in the peace movement in Western Europe.
Chancellor Kohl and his new government were determined
to stand by West Germany's commitment to its NATO partners.
After a lengthy debate in the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU-FDP
majority coalition voted for deployment, with the SPD and the
Greens opposing. Stationing of the missiles began immediately,
and the Soviet Union withdrew from the Geneva negotiations.
By the mid-1980s, as international tensions began to ease, pub-
lic attention turned to new prospects for detente between West
and East.
The Honecker Era, 1971-89
Ulbricht's successor in East Germany was Erich Honecker.
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Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
Born in 1913 in the Saarland, Honecker joined the Communist
Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands —
KPD) in 1929. As a full-time functionary of the party, he contin-
ued his work in the underground movement after Hitler came
to power in 1933 and until arrested by the Nazis in 1935.
Imprisoned until the end of World War II, Honecker resumed
his career in 1945 as a leading KPD functionary, becoming
Ulbricht's assistant on the latter's return to Germany from the
Soviet Union in 1945. From 1946 to 1955, Honecker served as
chairman of the youth organization, the Free German Youth
(Freie Deutsche Jugend — FDJ). He became a member of the
SED Politburo in 1958. As secretary for security matters of the
SED Central Committee, Honecker was directly responsible for
the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. When Ulbricht was
removed from power in 1971, Honecker succeeded him in his
party functions and became chief of the SED. Honecker was
head of state of the GDR from 1976 until his resignation in
1989. After his fall from power, Honecker found refuge in the
Embassy of Chile in Moscow until his extradition to Berlin in
1992, where he was brought to trial. He was released from cus-
tody in 1993 for health reasons and went to Chile, where he
died in 1994. Although less rigid than Ulbricht, as evidenced by
his willingness to sign agreements with the West that opened
the GDR somewhat and made the lives of its citizens easier,
Honecker remained a convinced communist until his death.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Keen to gain international recognition of its sphere of inter-
est and believing that such recognition would solidify its grip
on its East European satellite states, the Soviet Union, begin-
ning in the early 1970s, sponsored an initiative calling for the
convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE — see Glossary). For the West, such meetings
meant the possibility of tying the Soviet Union and its satellites
to an international security system, thereby lessening tensions,
furthering economic cooperation, and obtaining humanitarian
improvements for the people of Eastern Europe. The first of
the series of conferences opened in July 1973 in Helsinki and
was attended by the foreign ministers of the thirty-five member
states. At the conference's final meeting in 1975, the heads of
state of all member countries were in attendance for the sign-
ing of the Final Act, or the Helsinki Accords.
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Germany: A Country Study
As subsequent CSCE conferences showed, Soviet officials
had totally underestimated the effect of the provisions for the
exchange of information, which allowed for the unscrambled
reception of Western media broadcasts within the geographic
area of the Warsaw Pact countries. East Germans benefited
especially from access to West German radio and television pro-
grams, which furnished previously unobtainable news about
world events. Television viewers in the East also became aware
of an obviously far superior standard of living in the West and
developed a new awareness of the deficiencies of the commu-
nist regime, an awareness that fifteen years later led to the
events that brought down that regime.
The New East German Constitution and the Question of
Identity
Although the GDR had finally achieved its goal of interna-
tional recognition with the signing of the Basic Treaty in
December 1972, renewed concerns about the stability and
identity of the GDR as a second German state drove the SED
Politburo toward a policy of reaffirming the socialist nature of
the state. As early as 1971, Honecker had launched a campaign
to foster a socialist identity among East Germans and to
counter West German emphasis on the historical unity of the
German nation. In 1974 the GDR constitution was even
amended to increase a sense of separate development. All ref-
erences in the document to the "German nation" and to Ger-
man national heritage were deleted.
The SED had long revised German history to make it con-
form to socialist purposes. Symbols of Prussian heritage in Ber-
lin, such as the equestrian statue of Prussian king Frederick the
Great, had been removed. And in 1950, Ulbricht had ordered
the 500-year-old palace of the Hohenzollern Dynasty demol-
ished because it was a symbol of "feudal repression."
Just as the SED was striving to develop a separate GDR con-
sciousness and loyalty, however, the new access to Western
media, arranged by the CSCE process and formalized in the
Helsinki Accords of 1975, was engendering a growing enthusi-
asm among East Germans for West Germany's Ostpolitik.
Honecker sought to counter this development by devising a
new formula: "citizenship, GDR; nationality, German." After
the SED's Ninth Party Congress in May 1976, Honecker went
one step further: figures of Prussian history, such as the
reformers Karl vom Stein, Karl August von Hardenberg, Ger-
118
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
hard von Scharnhorst, and the founder of Berlin Univer-
sity, Wilhelm von Humboldt, were rehabilitated and claimed as
historical ancestors of the GDR. Frederick the Great and Otto
von Bismarck were also restored to prominence. Even Martin
Luther was judged a worthy historical figure who needed to be
understood within the context of his times.
These concessions did not alter the regime's harsh policy
toward dissidents, however. Primary targets were artists and
writers who advocated reforms and democratization, including
Wolf Biermann, a poet-singer popular among East German
youth who was expelled from the GDR in 1976. A wave of per-
secution of other dissident intellectuals followed. Some were
imprisoned; others were deported to West Germany. Nonethe-
less, political statements by East German intellectuals, some
going so far as to advocate reunification, continued to appear
anonymously in the West German press.
Relations Between the Two Germanys
Although Honecker pursued a tough policy against internal
dissidents and carefully guarded the GDR's unique identity as
the state in which the old Marxist dream of socialism had
become a reality, he was keenly aware of the necessity for com-
munication and reasonable working relations with the FRG.
His dream of being received at the White House as a guest of
state by United States president Ronald Reagan was never real-
ized, but Honecker opened more lines of communication to
Western politicians than had his predecessors.
As a consequence of the Helsinki Accords, the reception of
Western news media broadcasts was tacitly allowed in the GDR.
In the early 1980s, it also became possible for citizens of the
GDR who were not yet pensioners to visit relatives in the West
in cases involving urgent family matters. Under a new regula-
tion, refugees who had gone to the West before 1981 and had
therefore automatically lost their GDR citizenship could now
enter the GDR with their West German passport. These mea-
sures benefited East Germans and, together with access to
Western television, helped to create a new relaxed atmosphere
in the GDR.
On the economic side, the GDR fully utilized the advantages
of the Interzone Trading Agreement, which allowed special
consideration for the export of goods from the GDR to the
FRG and other EC member states, as well as the import of vital
industrial products from the West. Diplomatic relations with
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Germany: A Country Study
the EC were established in 1988, a reversal of the former policy
that saw the organization as a threat to the GDR's sovereignty.
The annual Leipzig Industrial Fair also provided a convenient
forum for meeting Western politicians and industrialists.
The severe shortage of Western currency in the GDR, one of
the key concerns of the SED leadership, was alleviated by
agreements with the FRG that tripled the bulk contributions to
the East German postal administration by the FRG. Similar
agreements, financially advantageous to the GDR, improved
the highway links to West Berlin. More significant, however, was
the granting of bank credits amounting to DM2 billion to the
GDR during 1983 and 1984. The CSU leader and minister pres-
ident of Bavaria, Franz Josef Strauss, was the principal negotia-
tor of these credit agreements.
At first, the credits appeared to yield positive results along
the inner-German border, where mines and automatic guns,
which had so long posed a deadly threat to East Germans
attempting to flee to the FRG, were dismantled. Later, however,
it became clear that these devices had been replaced by nearly
impenetrable electronic warning systems and with trained dogs
at certain sectors along the border. The order to shoot at refu-
gees was not rescinded but remained in effect almost until the
end of the GDR regime. Also remaining in effect were strict
controls for West German citizens at GDR border crossings and
on transit routes to and from West Berlin, although there were
no further reports of people being abused at border check-
points.
However much relations improved between the two states in
some areas, the stance of the SED leadership toward the FRG's
NATO membership remained hostile. Harsh attacks in the East
German press labeling the FRG as an "American missile
launcher" became more frequent during the debates on the
stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles. On occasion, high-
level official visits were canceled to signal the GDR's opposition
to Western military policies. The FRG responded in kind. For
example, Federal President Karl Carstens (1979-84) did not
attend as planned the East German celebrations on the occa-
sion of the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in
1983.
In October 1987, when the two superpowers were striving for
detente and disarmament and the relations between the two
Germanys were cordial, Honecker visited Bonn as the GDR
head of state. The visit, postponed several times, was in
120
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl ( 1982- ), right, at a meeting
in Bonn in 1987 with Erich Honecker, leader of East Germany,
1971-89
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
response to Chancellor Schmidt's visit to East Germany in
1981. Honecker was in the West German capital for an "official
working meeting." He signed agreements for cooperation in
the areas of science and technology, as well as environmental
protection. Honecker's statement that the border dividing the
two Germanys would one day be seen as a line "connecting" the
two states, similar to the border between the GDR and Poland,
attracted thoughtful public attention in the West. Honecker
was cordially received by members of the government, in the
words of Federal President Richard von Weizsacker (1984-94),
as a "German among Germans." However, at various stages of
the visit — which subsequently took him to several federal states,
including his native Saarland — large numbers of demonstra-
tors chanted, "The wall must go."
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Germany: A Country Study
The East German media coverage of the visit provided the
opportunity for Chancellor Kohl to speak to "all the people in
Germany" and to call for the breaking down of barriers "in
accordance with the wishes of the German people." Although
the visit yielded no immediate concrete results and Honecker's
hopes of increased political recognition for the GDR were not
realized, a dialogue had begun that could make the division of
Germany more bearable for the people involved. As of late
1987, however, there was still little hope of overcoming the divi-
sion itself.
The Peace Movement and Internal Resistance
The GDR leadership welcomed protests against weapons
and war as long as they occurred in the FRG. However, when a
small group of East German pacifists advocating the conversion
of "swords into plowshares" demonstrated in 1981 against the
presence of Soviet missiles on GDR soil, as well as against the
destruction of the environment by the dumping of industrial
waste and the use of nuclear power generally, they were
arrested, prosecuted, and in some cases expelled from the
GDR. Church organizations in the GDR — considered subver-
sive by their mere existence — and individual pastors who pro-
tected and defended demonstrators at risk to their own safety
became targets of increased surveillance by the Stasi, as did
individual churchgoers, who by 1988 were frequently arrested
and interrogated.
The mounting nervousness of the GDR leadership became
evident in June 1987 when large crowds of East Berlin youth
gathered on their side of the Wall, along with young people
from all over the GDR, to hear two rock concerts being held in
West Berlin near the Reichstag building. When the crowd
broke into frenzied cries for freedom and unification, police
cleared the area, arresting and forcibly removing Western news
reporters filming the incident.
In the local elections of May 17, 1989, the "united list" led by
the SED received 98.9 percent of the vote, obviously the result
of massive manipulation, which enraged large segments of the
population who had previously remained silent. In the next
months, persistent public complaints against the prevailing liv-
ing conditions and lack of basic freedoms, voiced by church
groups and by opposition groups, inspired the population to
take to the streets in large numbers. The largest of the new
122
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
opposition groups was the New Forum, founded in September
1989 by Barbel Bohley, Jens Reich, and others.
During the fall of 1989, mass demonstrations of several hun-
dred thousand people were taking place, first in what soon
became traditional Monday demonstrations in Leipzig and
later in Berlin and other large cities. For the first time, GDR
rulers realized that they were losing control: the demonstra-
tions were too massive to be quelled by intimidation or even
mass arrests; and shooting at the demonstrators was out of the
question because of the sheer size of the crowds and the
absence of Soviet support for draconian measures.
Beginning in the summer of 1989, the regime was threat-
ened by another development. Among the thousands of GDR
citizens that traveled by car on "vacation" to the socialist
"brother country" Hungary, some 600 were successful in cross-
ing illegally into Austria, where they were enthusiastically wel-
comed before traveling on to the FRG. Others wanting to
escape the GDR took refuge in the embassies of the FRG in
Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. On September 11, Hungary
legalized travel over the border to Austria for GDR citizens
heading for the FRG, enabling 15,000 to take this route within
a few days. Eventually, the GDR leadership was forced to allow
special trains to carry thousands of GDR refugees who had
received permission to emigrate to the West after taking sanc-
tuary in the FRG's embassies in Prague and Warsaw. As the
trains traveled through the GDR, many more refugees tried to
climb aboard, so the government refused to further allow such
transports.
The Last Days of East Germany
In January 1988, Honecker paid a state visit to France. By all
indications, the long stretch of international isolation
appeared to have been successfully overcome. The GDR finally
seemed to be taking its long-sought place among the interna-
tional community of nations. In the minds of the GDR's
old-guard communists, the long-awaited international political
recognition was seen as a favorable omen that seemed to coin-
cide symbolically with the fortieth anniversary of the East Ger-
man state.
In spite of Honecker's declaration as late as January 1989
that "The Wall will still stand in fifty and also in a hundred
years," the effects of glasnost and perestroika had begun to be evi-
dent in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe.
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Germany: A Country Study
Although the GDR leadership tried to deny the reality of these
developments, for most East Germans the reforms of Soviet
leader Gorbachev were symbols of a new era that would inevita-
bly also reach the GDR. The GDR leadership's frantic attempts
to block the news coming out of the Soviet Union by prevent-
ing the distribution of Russian newsmagazines only strength-
ened growing protest within the population.
In Berlin, on October 7, the GDR leadership celebrated the
fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the East German
state. In his address, Honecker sharply condemned the FRG
for interfering in the GDR's internal affairs and for encourag-
ing protesters. Still convinced of his mission to secure the sur-
vival of the GDR as a state, he proclaimed: "Socialism will be
halted in its course neither by ox, nor ass." The prophetic
retort by Gorbachev, honored guest at the celebrations, as
quoted to the international press, more accurately reflected
imminent realities: "He who comes too late will suffer the con-
sequences of history."
The consequences of not having held in check the earlier
large demonstrations against the regime's inflexibility came
two days later when 70,000 protesters shouting "We are the
people" demonstrated in Leipzig. When the police took no
action during these historic hours of October 9, 1989, it
became clear to everyone that the days of the GDR were num-
bered. After the crowds in Leipzig reached over 100,000 pro-
testers on October 16, the Central Committee of the SED —
previously kept in the background by Honecker and his com-
rades in the party leadership — took control. Honecker
resigned from his offices as head of state and party leader on
October 18.
Egon Krenz, longtime member of the Politburo and FDJ
chairman, became Honecker's successor as general secretary of
the SED. On October 24, Krenz also assumed the chairman-
ship of the Council of State. On his orders, all police actions
against demonstrators were discontinued. On November 4, the
largest demonstration in GDR history took place, with over 1
million people in East Berlin demanding democracy and free
elections. Confronted with this wave of popular opposition, the
GDR government, under Prime Minister Willi Stoph, resigned
on November 7. The Politburo followed suit on November 8.
Finally, on the evening of November 9, Politburo member
Gunter Schabowski announced the opening of the border
crossings into the FRG.
124
East Germans fleeing to West Germany in 1989
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
Opening of the Berlin Wall and Unification
November 9, 1989, will be remembered as one of the great
moments of German history. On that day, the dreadful Berlin
Wall, which for twenty-eight years had been the symbol of Ger-
man division, cutting through the heart of the old capital city,
was unexpectedly opened by GDR border police. In joyful dis-
belief, Germans from both sides climbed up on the Wall, which
had been called "the ugliest edifice in the world." They
embraced each other and sang and danced in the streets. Some
began chiseling away chips of the Wall as if to have a personal
hand in tearing it down, or at least to carry away a piece of Ger-
man history. East Germans immediately began pouring into
West Germany. Within a few days, over 1 million persons per
day had seized the chance to see their western neighbor first-
hand.
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Germany: A Country Study
On November 13, Hans Modrow was elected minister presi-
dent of the GDR. After Chancellor Kohl had presented his
Ten-Point Plan for the step-by-step unification of Germany to
the Bundestag on November 28, the Volkskammer struck the
leadership role of the SED from the constitution of the GDR
on December 1 (see Unification, ch. 8). The SED Politburo
resigned on December 3, and Krenz stepped down as chairman
of the Council of State on December 6. One day later, the
Round Table talks started among the SED, the GDR's other
political parties, and the opposition. On December 22, the
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin was opened for pedestrian traffic.
During January 1990, negotiations at the Round Table con-
tinued. Free elections to the Volkskammer were scheduled for
March 18. The conservative opposition, under CDU leader-
ship, waged a joint campaign under the banner of the Alliance
for Germany, consisting of the CDU, the German Social Union
(Deutsche Soziale Union — DSU), a sister party of the CSU, and
the Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch — DA).
The elections on March 18 produced a clear majority for the
Alliance for Germany. On April 12, a CDU politician, Lothar
de Maiziere, was elected the new minister president.
The unusually poor showing of the SPD in these final East
German elections may be explained by the party's reluctance to
support German unification and also by the fact that the public
was aware of the close contacts that the SPD leadership had
maintained with the SED over the years. The success of the
conservative parties was repeated in the communal elections
on May 6, which were seen as a correction to the manipulated
vote of the previous year.
As a precondition for German unity, the Two-Plus-Four Talks
among the two German governments and the four victorious
powers of World War II began on May 5. Held in four sessions,
the last of which was on September 12, the talks culminated in
the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany (the Two-Plus-Four Treaty). These talks settled
questions relating to the eastern border of Germany, the
strength of Germany's military forces, and the schedule of
Allied troop withdrawal from German soil.
During a visit to Moscow in early February, Chancellor Kohl
had received assurances from Gorbachev that the Soviet Union
would respect the wishes of both Germanys to unite. Kohl real-
ized that in order to seize this historic opportunity for Ger-
many, swift action and final determination were crucial. In a
126
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
cordial meeting between Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl on
July 16, unified Germany's membership in NATO and its full
sovereignty were conceded by the Soviet president.
The first concrete step toward unification was the monetary,
economic, and social union of West Germany and East Ger-
many on July 1, as had been agreed in May in a treaty between
the two German states. The monetary union introduced the
deutsche mark into East Germany. Although there had been
concern about the GDR's precarious financial situation, the
full extent of the disastrous consequences of forty years of com-
munist rule only came to light in the summer of 1990. It was
soon clear that the first massive aid package for the East Ger-
man economy, comprising DM115 billion, was just the begin-
ning of a long and expensive rebuilding of a country reduced
to shambles by the SEE).
Divided by futile discussions about the speed of unification,
the new government coalition in East Berlin had begun to fall
apart duringjuly 1990, when its SPD members resigned. Per-
suaded by the mounting economic and social problems that
unification was necessary, the Volkskammer finally agreed on
October 3, 1990, as the date of German unification.
On the occasion of the first free elections in the GDR, Chan-
cellor Kohl took the opportunity to publicly express his grati-
tude to the United States, which had been Germany's most
reliable ally during the process of unification. Once the first
prerequisite for future unification had been established,
namely, the willingness of Gorbachev to consider negotiations
on unification in light of the dramatic events of the fall of 1989,
the consent of the other victorious powers had to be secured.
Statements voicing concerns and even fears of a reemer-
gence of an aggressive unified Germany suddenly appeared in
the international press and media, as well as in unofficial
remarks made by political figures throughout Europe. Even the
FRG's major NATO partners in Europe — Britain and France —
had become rather comfortable with the prevailing situation,
that is, being allied with an economically potent, but politically
weak, semisovereign West Germany.
Although lip service in support of future unification of Ger-
many was common in the postwar era, no one dreamed of its
eventual realization. When the historic constellation allowing
unification appeared, swift and decisive action on the part of
Chancellor Kohl and the unwavering, strong support given by
the United States government for the early completion of the
127
Germany: A Country Study
unification process were key elements in surmounting the last
hurdles during the final phase of the Two-Plus-Four Talks.
The unification treaty, consisting of more than 1,000 pages,
was approved by a large majority in the Bundestag and the
Volkskammer on September 20, 1990. After this last procedural
step, nothing stood in the way of formal unification. At mid-
night on October 3, the German Democratic Republic joined
the Federal Republic of Germany. Unification celebrations
were held all over Germany, especially in Berlin, where leading
political figures from West and East joined the joyful crowds
who filled the streets between the Reichstag building and Alex-
anderplatz to watch a fireworks display. Germans celebrated
unity without a hint of nationalistic pathos, but with dignity
and in an atmosphere reminiscent of a country fair. Yet the
world realized that an historic epoch had come to a peaceful
end.
* * *
A good starting point for readers seeking to learn more
about the founding, consolidation, and final reunification of
the two German states is Germany from Partition to Reunification
by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. Another concise and expert
account is Peter Pulzer's German Politics, 1945-1995. Longer
accounts by noted historians are Volker Rolf Berghahn's Mod-
ern Germany, which starts with events at the turn of the century
and ends in the mid-1980s, and Mary Fulbrook's The Divided
Nation, which begins with the aftermath of World War I and
ends with unification. Fulbrook's The Two Germanies, 1945-1990
is a concise survey of the many ways historians have interpreted
recent German history.
Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress's detailed two-volume A
History of West Germany is widely available. David Childs's The
GDR: Moscow's German Ally is a highly readable history of the
German Democratic Republic. Mary Fulbrook's Anatomy of a
Dictatorship examines the nature of the East German state and
how it failed.
A useful documentation of the postwar years and the ques-
tion of reunification can be found in The German Question,
edited by Walther Hubatsch, with Wolfgang Heidelmeyer et al.
Timothy Garton Ash's In Europe's Name is a searching analysis of
Ostpolitik, from Adenauer to Kohl. Konrad H. Jarausch pro-
vides a concise account of the events of 1989 and 1990 in his
128
Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990
scholarly The Rush to German Unity. Stephen F. Szabo's The Diplo-
macy of German Unification is a good brief account of the inter-
national aspects of unification. A more detailed treatment of
this subject is Germany Unified and Europe Transformed by Philip
Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. (For further information and
complete citations, see Bibliography.)
129
Chapter 3. The Society and Its Environment
Cologne Cathedral, begun in 1248, was completed only in 1880.
THE OPENING OF THE BERLIN WALL on November 9,
1989, was one of the most dramatic events of the post-World
War II period. In the ensuing months, much more than just the
graffiti-covered concrete panels of that infamous structure
came crashing down during carnival-like celebrations. After
four decades, the division of an entire continent, a nation, and
a society came to an abrupt end.
A powerful force setting the revolutionary change in motion
was a substantial movement of people from the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) westward. Through-
out its forty-year history, the GDR had resorted to extreme
measures to control its borders and halt the exodus of produc-
tive workers. The most extreme of these measures was the erec-
tion in 1961 of the Berlin Wall to check the sustained
movement of East Germans to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG, or West Germany), whose booming economy had
created millions of new jobs. Nearly three decades later, for a
period of several years beginning in the summer of 1989, the
appeal of West Germany, even with its economy mired in reces-
sion, prompted another wave of migration of more than
700,000 East Germans, most between the ages of eighteen and
thirty.
The FRG's absorption of the GDR in 1990 enlarged its area
by about 30 percent and increased its population about 20 per-
cent. Integrating this new territory has proven to be a Her-
culean task. Prior to unification, West Germans enjoyed one of
the highest standards of living in the world and a per capita
income exceeding that of the United States. East Germans
were prosperous by the standards of the communist world but
had a living standard considerably below that of Western
Europe. As the costs of unification have accumulated, the time
when easterners will attain the standard of living of westerners
has receded further into the future.
In the early 1990s, the five new eastern states (Lander, sing.,
Land) experienced substantial depopulation as a result of a
plummeting birth rate and the internal migration of eastern
Germans to the west. All social groups in the east were affected
by the hasty merger, but the position of women was even more
negatively affected. In particular, the rapid privatization of the
socialist command economy led to much unemployment
133
Germany: A Country Study
among women and the dismantling of an extensive child-care
system. The east's elderly, who generally had incomes and sav-
ings much below their counterparts in the western Lander, also
suffered hardship.
Unification inevitably revealed a series of unpleasant sur-
prises about the closed economy and society of what had been
East Germany. One of the most distressing was the deplorable
state of the environment. Among the world's most environmen-
tally conscious peoples, West Germans were shocked by the lev-
els of ecological damage in the east. Environmental
degradation, most noticeably badly polluted air and water, was
perhaps a more important cause of the inequalities in living
standards between east and west than smaller living quarters
and lower wages. Surveying the dilapidated infrastructure and
housing stock, observers dubbed the newly incorporated terri-
tory "Germany's Appalachia."
By mid-1995 it appeared that the physical and administrative
mergers of the two German states would be far easier to accom-
plish than the social aspect of the union. In the postwar period,
the two Germanys had assiduously developed two mutually
exclusive models of society. Thus, the major challenge lay in
harmonizing and integrating these societies, which were only
gradually emerging from the long shadows cast by four decades
of separate development in antagonistic systems.
Physical Setting
Roughly the size of Montana and situated even farther
north, unified Germany has an area of 356,959 square kilome-
ters. Extending 853 kilometers from its northern border with
Denmark to the Alps in the south, it is the sixth largest country
in Europe. At its widest, Germany measures approximately 650
kilometers from the Belgian-German border in the west to the
Polish frontier in the east.
The territory of the former East Germany (divided into five
new Lander in 1990) accounts for almost one-third of united
Germany's territory and one-fifth of its population. After a
close vote, in 1993 the Bundestag, the lower house of Ger-
many's parliament, voted to transfer the capital from Bonn in
the west to Berlin, a city-state in the east surrounded by the
Land of Brandenburg. The relocation process is expected to be
concluded by about the year 2000, following the transfer of the
Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Chancellory, and ten of the
eighteen federal ministries.
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The Society and Its Environment
Topography
With its irregular, elongated shape, Germany provides an
excellent example of a recurring sequence of landforms found
the world over. A plain dotted with lakes, moors, marshes, and
heaths retreats from the sea and reaches inland, where it
becomes a landscape of hills crisscrossed by streams, rivers, and
valleys. These hills lead upward, gradually forming high pla-
teaus and woodlands and eventually climaxing in spectacular
mountain ranges.
As of the mid-1990s, about 37 percent of the country's area
was arable; 17 percent consisted of meadows and pastures; 30
percent was forests and woodlands; and 16 percent was devoted
to other uses. Geographers often divide Germany into four dis-
tinct topographic regions: the North German Lowland; the
Central German Uplands; Southern Germany; and the Alpine
Foreland and the Alps (see fig. 7).
North German Lowland
The North German Lowland is a part of the Great European
Plain that sweeps across Europe from the Pyrenees in France to
the Ural Mountains in Russia. All of the Lander of Schleswig-
Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomera-
nia, Brandenburg, Berlin, most of Lower Saxony and Saxony-
Anhalt, and parts of Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia are
located in this region.
Hills in the lowland only rarely reach 200 meters in height,
and most of the region is well under 100 meters above sea level.
The lowlands slope almost imperceptibly toward the sea. The
North Sea portion of the coastline is devoid of cliffs and has
wide expanses of sand, marsh, and mud flats (Watten) . The
mud flats between the Elbe estuary and the Netherlands bor-
der are believed to have been above sea level during Roman
history and to have been inundated when the shoreline sank
during the thirteenth century. In the western area, the former
line of inshore sand dunes became the East Frisian Islands. The
mud flats between the islands and the shore are exposed at
very low tides and are crossed by innumerable channels vary-
ing in size from those cut by small creeks to those serving as the
estuaries of the Elbe and Weser rivers. The mud and sand are
constantly shifting, and all harbor and shipping channels
require continuing maintenance.
The offshore islands have maximum elevations of fewer than
thirty-five meters and have been subject to eroding forces that
135
Germany: A Country Study
have washed away whole sections during severe storms. Shore-
lines most subject to eroding tides were stabilized during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Although the East Frisian Islands are strung along the coast
in a nearly straight line, the North Frisian Islands are irregu-
larly shaped and are haphazardly positioned. They were also
once a part of the mainland, and a large portion of the mud
flats between the islands and the coast is exposed during low
tides.
The Baltic Sea coast of Schleswig-Holstein differs markedly
from its North Sea coast. It is indented by a number of small,
deep fjords with steep banks, which were carved by rivers when
the land was covered with glacial ice. Farther to the east, the
Baltic shore is flat and sandy. Rvigen, Germany's largest island,
lies just offshore of Stralsund.
Wherever the region's terrain is rolling and drainage is satis-
factory, the land is highly productive. This is especially true of
the areas that contain a very fertile siltlike loess soil, better than
most German soils. Such areas, called Borden (sing., Borde), are
located along the southern edge of the North German Low-
land beginning west of the Rhine near the Ruhr Valley and
extending eastward and into the Leipzig Basin. The Magde-
burg Borde is the best known of these areas. Other Borden are
located near Frankfurt am Main, northern Baden-Wurttem-
berg, and in an area to the north of Ulm and Munich. Because
the areas with loess soil also have a moderate continental cli-
mate with a long growing season, they are considered Ger-
many's breadbasket.
Central German Uplands
The Central German Uplands are Germany's portion of the
Central European Uplands; they extend from the Massif Cen-
tral in France to Poland and the Czech Republic. Germany's
uplands are generally moderate in height and seldom reach
elevations above 1,100 meters. The region encompasses all of
the Saarland, Hesse, and Thuringia; the north of Rhineland-
Palatinate; substantial southern portions of North Rhine-West-
phalia, Lower Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt; and western parts of
Saxony.
In the west, the Central German Uplands begin with the
Rheinish Uplands, a massive rectangular block of slate and
shale with a gently rolling plateau of about 400 meters in eleva-
tion and peaks of about 800 to 900 meters. The Rheinish
136
The Society and Its Environment
Uplands are divided by two deep and dramatic river valleys —
the Moselle and the Rhine. The high hilly area to the south of
the Moselle is the Hunsruck; the one to its north is the Eifel.
The Rhine separates these areas from their extensions to the
east, the Taunus, and, to the north, the Westerwald. To the
north and east of the Westerwald are further distinct areas of
the Rheinish Uplands, most notably the small range of hills
known as the Siebengebirge, across the Rhine from Bonn, and
the larger hilly regions — the Siegerland, Bergishes Land,
Sauerland, and the Rothaargebirge. The higher elevations of
the Rheinish Uplands are heavily forested; lower-lying areas are
well suited for the growing of grain, fruit, and early potatoes.
Because of the low elevations of its valleys (200 to 350
meters), the Uplands of Hesse provide an easily traveled pas-
sageway through the Central German Uplands. Although not
as dramatic as the Rhine Valley, for hundreds of years this pas-
sageway — the so-called Hessian Corridor — has been an impor-
tant route between the south and the north, with Frankfurt am
Main at one end and Hanover at the other, and Kassel on the
Weser River in its center. The headwaters of the Weser have cre-
ated a number of narrow but fertile valleys. The highlands of
the Uplands of Hesse are volcanic in origin. The most notable
of these volcanic highlands are the Rhon (950 meters) and the
Vogelsburg (774 meters).
To the north of the Uplands of Hesse lie two low ranges, the
Teutoburger Wald and the Wiehengebirge, which are the
northernmost fringes of the Central German Uplands. It is at
the Porta Westfalica near Minden that the Weser River breaks
through the latter range to reach the North German Lowland.
One of the highest points in the Central German Uplands is
atBrocken (1,142 meters) in the Harz Mountains. This range is
situated about forty kilometers to the northeast of Gottingen
and forms the northwestern boundary of the Leipzig Basin, an
extension of the North German Lowland. The Harz are still
largely forested at lower levels; barren moors cover higher ele-
vations. An important center for tourism in the 1990s, the
range was once an important source for many minerals.
The Thuringer Wald, located in southwestern Thuringia, is a
narrow range about 100 kilometers long, with its highest point
just under 1,000 meters. Running in a northwesterly direction,
it links the Central German Uplands with the Bohemian Massif
of the Czech Republic and forms the southwestern boundary
of the Leipzig Basin. The basin's southeastern boundary is
139
The Society and Its Environment
Uplands are divided by two deep and dramatic river valleys —
the Moselle and the Rhine. The high hilly area to the south of
the Moselle is the Hunsrvick; the one to its north is the Eifel.
The Rhine separates these areas from their extensions to the
east, the Taunus, and, to the north, the Westerwald. To the
north and east of the Westerwald are further distinct areas of
the Rheinish Uplands, most notably the small range of hills
known as the Siebengebirge, across the Rhine from Bonn, and
the larger hilly regions — the Siegerland, Bergishes Land,
Sauerland, and the Rothaargebirge. The higher elevations of
the Rheinish Uplands are heavily forested; lower-lying areas are
well suited for the growing of grain, fruit, and early potatoes.
Because of the low elevations of its valleys (200 to 350
meters), the Uplands of Hesse provide an easily traveled pas-
sageway through the Central German Uplands. Although not
as dramatic as the Rhine Valley, for hundreds of years this pas-
sageway — the so-called Hessian Corridor — has been an impor-
tant route between the south and the north, with Frankfurt am
Main at one end and Hanover at the other, and Kassel on the
Weser River in its center. The headwaters of the Weser have cre-
ated a number of narrow but fertile valleys. The highlands of
the Uplands of Hesse are volcanic in origin. The most notable
of these volcanic highlands are the Rhon (950 meters) and the
Vogelsburg (774 meters).
To the north of the Uplands of Hesse lie two low ranges, the
Teutoburger Wald and the Wiehengebirge, which are the
northernmost fringes of the Central German Uplands. It is at
the Porta Westfalica near Minden that the Weser River breaks
through the latter range to reach the North German Lowland.
One of the highest points in the Central German Uplands is
at Brocken (1,142 meters) in the Harz Mountains. This range is
situated about forty kilometers to the northeast of Gottingen
and forms the northwestern boundary of the Leipzig Basin, an
extension of the North German Lowland. The Harz are still
largely forested at lower levels; barren moors cover higher ele-
vations. An important center for tourism in the 1990s, the
range was once an important source for many minerals.
The Thuringer Wald, located in southwestern Thuringia, is a
narrow range about 100 kilometers long, with its highest point
just under 1,000 meters. Running in a northwesterly direction,
it links the Central German Uplands with the Bohemian Massif
of the Czech Republic and forms the southwestern boundary
of the Leipzig Basin. The basin's southeastern boundary is
139
Germany: A Country Study
formed by the Erzgebirge range, which extends to the north-
east at a right angle to the Thuringer Wald. Part of the Bohe-
mian Massif, the Erzgebirge range reaches 1,214 meters at its
highest point.
The southeasternmost portion of the Central German
Uplands consists of the Bohemian Forest and the much smaller
Bavarian Forest. Both ranges belong to the Bohemian Massif.
The Bohemian Forest, with heights up to 1,450 meters, forms a
natural boundary between Germany and the Czech Republic.
Southern Germany
Between the Central German Uplands and the Alpine Fore-
land and the Alps lies the geographical region of Southern
Germany, which includes most of Baden-Wurttemberg, much
of northern Bavaria, and portions of Hesse and Rhineland-
Palatinate. The Main River runs through the northern portion
of this region. The Upper Rhine River Valley, nearly 300 kilo-
meters long and about fifty kilometers wide, serves as its west-
ern boundary. The Rhine's wide river valley here is in sharp
contrast to its high narrow valley in the Rheinish Uplands. The
southern boundaries of the region of Southern Germany are
formed by extensions of the Jura Mountains of France and
Switzerland. These ranges are separate from those of the Cen-
tral German Uplands. One of these Jura ranges forms the
Black Forest, whose highest peak is the Feldberg at 1,493
meters, and, continuing north, the less elevated Odenwald and
Spessart hills. Another Jura range forms the Swabian Alb (see
Glossary) and its continuation, the Franconian Alb. Up to
1,000 meters in height and approximately forty kilometers
wide, the two albs form a long arc — 400 kilometers long — from
the southern end of the Black Forest to near Bayreuth and the
hills of the Frankenwald region, which is part of the Central
German Uplands. The Hardt Mountains in Rhineland-Palati-
nate, located to the west of the Rhine, are also an offshoot of
the Jura Mountains.
The landscape of the Southern Germany region is often that
of scarp and vale, with the eroded sandstone and limestone
scarps facing to the northwest. The lowland terraces of the
Rhine, Main, and Neckar river valleys, with their dry and warm
climate, are suitable for agriculture and are highly productive.
The loess and loam soils of the Rhine-Main Plain are cultivated
extensively, and orchards and vineyards flourish. The
Rhine-Main Plain is densely populated, and Frankfurt am
140
The Society and Its Environment
Main, at its center, serves both as Germany's financial capital
and as a major European transportation hub.
Alpine Foreland and the Alps
The Alpine Foreland makes up most of Bavaria and a good
part of Baden-Wurttemberg. The foreland is roughly triangular
in shape, about 400 kilometers long from west to east with a
maximum width of about 150 kilometers north to south, and is
bounded by Lake Constance and the Alps to the south, the
Swabian and Franconian albs to the north, and the Bavarian
Forest to the east. Elevation within the foreland rises gently
from about 400 meters near the Danube, which flows along its
north, to about 750 meters at the beginning of the Alpine foot-
hills. With the exception of Munich and the small cities of
Augsburg, Ingolstadt, and Ulm, the foreland is primarily rural.
Soils are generally poor, with the exception of some areas with
loess soil, and much of the region is pasture or is sown to hardy
crops.
Germany's portion of the Alps accounts for a very small part
of the country's area and consists only of a narrow fringe of
mountains that runs along the country's border with Switzer-
land and Austria from Lake Constance in the west to Salzburg,
Austria, in the east. The western section of the German Alps
are the Algauer Alps, located between Lake Constance and the
Lech River. The Bavarian Alps, the central section, lie between
the Lech and Inn rivers and contain Germany's highest peak,
the Zugspitze (2,963 meters). The Salzburg Alps, which begin
at the Inn River and encircle Berchtesgaden, make up the east-
ernmost section of Germany's Alps.
Drainage
The greater part of the country drains into the North Sea via
the Rhine, Ems, Weser, and Elbe rivers, which flow in a north-
northwest direction. In the east, the Oder River and its tribu-
tary, the Neisse River, flow northward into the Baltic Sea and
mark the border with Poland. With the exception of the Lahn
River, which flows southward before joining the Rhine, most of
the tributaries of these rivers flow in a west-to-east or east-to-
west direction. In an exception to the south-north pattern of
major rivers, the Danube River rises in the Black Forest and
flows in a southeasterly direction, traversing Bavaria before
crossing into Austria at Passau on the long journey to the Black
141
Germany: A Country Study
Sea. The Iller, Lech, Isar, and Inn rivers flow from the south
into the Danube and drain the Alpine Foreland.
The Rhine, Germany's longest and most important river,
originates in Switzerland, from where it flows into Lake Con-
stance (actually a river basin). At the lake's west end, it begins a
long course (800 kilometers) to the Netherlands, at first mark-
ing the boundary between Germany and Switzerland and later
that between Germany and France. Of the Rhine's three most
important tributaries, the Moselle River drains parts of the
Rheinish Uplands, the Main drains areas between the Central
German Uplands and the Franconian Alb, and the Neckar
River drains the area between the Black Forest and the Swabian
Alb. Because these rivers keep the Rhine high during the win-
ter and because melting snow in the Alps keeps it high during
the spring and summer, the river generally has a high steady
flow, which accounts for its being the busiest waterway in
Europe.
Climate
Although located mostly at latitudes north of the United
States-Canadian border and thus closer to the Arctic Circle
than to the equator, Germany's climate is moderate and is gen-
erally without sustained periods of cold or heat. Northwestern
and coastal Germany have a maritime climate caused by warm
westerly winds from the North Sea; the climate is characterized
by warm summers and mild cloudy winters. Farther inland, the
climate is continental, marked by greater diurnal and seasonal
variations in temperature, with warmer summers and colder
winters.
In addition to the maritime and continental climates that
predominate over most of the country, the Alpine regions in
the extreme south and, to a lesser degree, some areas of the
Central German Uplands have a so-called mountain climate.
This climate is characterized by lower temperatures because of
higher altitudes and greater precipitation caused by air becom-
ing moisture-laden as it lifts over higher terrain.
The major air masses contributing to the maritime weather
are the Icelandic low-pressure system and the Azores high-pres-
sure system. The Icelandic lows rotate in a counterclockwise
direction and tend to move to the east and southeast as they
approach Europe. The Azores highs move eastward and rotate
in a clockwise direction. Both of these air masses furnish West-
142
Bamberg in northern Bavaria
One of Heidelberg's town gates
Courtesy Germany Information Center, New York
143
Germany: A Country Study
ern Europe with moisture-laden clouds propelled by westerly
winds.
The northern lowlands frequently experience a situation
(more often during the winter months) when they are between
these air masses and are simultaneously influenced by both. At
such times, winds come from the west and are usually strong.
When only one of the systems is dominant, it is more often the
Icelandic low. In spite of their nearly polar origin, Icelandic
lows are warmed by the Gulf Stream, and areas on the coun-
try's North Sea coast have midwinter temperatures averaging
more than 1.6° C. This temperature is more than three degrees
above the average for the latitude, which is shared by central
Labrador and some bitterly cold regions in Siberia.
When continental weather systems originating to the east are
responsible for the weather, conditions are markedly different.
In the winter months, these systems have high-pressure air
masses that bring bright, clear, cold weather. The local people
describe these air masses as Siberian highs and usually expect
them to last for about two weeks. An occasional condition
called John, or warm wind, arises when the center of a low-pres-
sure system deviates to the south of its usual path and crosses
the central part of the country. In this atmospheric condition,
warm tropical air is drawn across the Alps and loses moisture
on the southern slopes of the mountains. The air warms signif-
icantly as it compresses during its descent from the northern
slopes. In the springtime, these winds dissipate the cloud cover
and melt the snows. Many people respond to the rapid weather
changes caused by the John with headaches, irritability, and cir-
culatory problems.
The yearly mean temperature for the country is about 9° C.
Other than for variations caused by shelter and elevation, the
annual mean temperature is fairly constant throughout the
country. Temperature extremes between night and day and
summer and winter are considerably less in the north than in
the south.
Duringjanuary, the coldest month, the average temperature
is approximately 1.6°C in the north and about -2°C in the
south. In July, the warmest month, the situation reverses, and it
is cooler in the north than in the south. The northern coastal
region has July temperatures averaging between 16°C and
18°C; at some locations in the south, the average is 19.4°C or
slightly higher.
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The Society and Its Environment
Annual precipitation varies from 2,000 millimeters a year in
the southern mountains to a low of 400 millimeters in the vicin-
ity of Mainz. Over most of the country, it averages between 600
millimeters and 800 millimeters per annum.
The Environment
Unification abruptly transformed the Federal Republic
from a country with a solid, even excellent, environmental
record to one facing a whole range of ecological disasters — the
result of the GDR's decades-long abuse of its natural habitat.
The estimated costs of restoring the environment in the new
Lander grew as information became available about how much
damage it had sustained. Expert estimates of from DM130 bil-
lion to DM220 billion (for value of the deutsche mark — see
Glossary) in the spring of 1990 had increased to a possible
DM400 billion two years later.
The two Germanys differed greatly in their approaches
toward protecting the environment. Beginning in the late
1960s, ecological concerns had become increasingly common
in West Germany, as was repeatedly demonstrated in opinion
polls. A 1990 poll, for example, found that more than 70 per-
cent of those West Germans questioned held that environmen-
tal protection should be the highest priority for the
government and the economy.
In East Germany, environmental activism was minimal. For
decades the GDR had followed standard Soviet practices in
regard to industrial and urban development, scrimping on or
avoiding entirely key infrastructure investments such as
water-treatment facilities and air-pollution abatement. The
comprehensive and intelligent Socialist Environmental Man-
agement Act of 1968 was poorly implemented and, more
important, largely ignored after the late 1970s when East Ger-
man authorities decided that Western economic growth could
only be matched by sacrificing the environment. This policy
was followed throughout the 1980s.
West German environmental legislation initially lagged
behind that of East Germany. For the first decades after World
War II, West Germans were concerned with reconstructing
their country and its economy. Early efforts to deal with the
environment met with little interest. The attainment of wide-
spread prosperity and the coming to maturity of a new genera-
tion with so-called postmaterialist values led to an interest in
protecting the environment. The late 1960s and the early 1970s
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Germany: A Country Study
saw the passage of several dozen laws relating to the environ-
ment, the most important of which were the Waste Disposal
Law and the Emission Protection Law, both passed in 1972. In
1974 the Federal Environmental Agency was established. The
new legislation established the principles of Germany's envi-
ronmental policies, still in effect in the mid-1990s: preventing
pollution by monitoring new products and projects; requiring
the polluter, rather than society at large, to pay damages; and
relying on cooperation among government, industry, and soci-
ety to protect the environment.
The oil crisis of 1973-74 and the ensuing worldwide reces-
sion led to a tapering off of environmental activism on the part
of the West German government and the political parties.
However, numerous citizens' groups formed and pressed for
increased environmental protection (see Citizens' Initiative
Associations, ch. 7). The accident at the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant in the United States in 1979 also spurred
the growth of such groups. Elements of the environmental
movement formed a political party, the Greens (Die Grunen)
in 1980, which in 1983 won seats in the Bundestag (see The
Greens, ch. 7). Of greatest importance were domestic ecologi-
cal problems such as pollution in the Baltic Sea and the Rhine
and Main rivers and damage to the country's forests from acid
rain.
During the early 1980s, concerns about the environment
became widespread in the general population, and all political
parties were forced to address them. These concerns were
raised still higher by a series of ecological disasters in 1986: the
accident at the nuclear plant at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union
and serious spills of dangerous chemicals into the Rhine at
Basel in Switzerland. Immediately after the Chernobyl disaster,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl created the Ministry of the Environ-
ment, Nature Conservation, and Reactor Safety.
Stricter environmental controls led to marked improve-
ments in air quality. Between 1966 and 1988, sulfur dioxide
emissions in West Germany fell by one-third. Dust levels, which
stood at 3.2 million tons in 1980, fell to 550,000 tons by the late
1980s. The quality of river water also improved. The Rhine and
Main rivers, nearly "biologically dead" in the 1960s, supported
several species of fish by the early 1990s. The Ruhr River,
located in the heart of the country's largest manufacturing
region, became the cleanest "industrial" river in West Germany
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The Society and Its Environment
after the construction of a series of dams and the reforestation
of slag heaps and wastelands.
At unification, the ecological situation in the new Ldnderwas
quite different. Because 95 percent of industrial wastewater
had been discharged without treatment and 32 percent of
households were not connected to sewerage systems, more
than 40 percent of the rivers of the new Lander and 24 percent
of their lakes were totally unfit as sources of drinking water;
only 3 percent of their rivers and 1 percent of their lakes were
considered ecologically healthy. Some rivers had pollution lev-
els 200 times higher than that permitted by European Commu-
nity (EC — see Glossary) environmental standards. The
widespread use of brown coal had resulted in record emissions
of sulfur dioxide, which rose by one-fifth between 1980 and
1988. Moreover, decades of brown coal strip mining had left
some eastern areas resembling a lunar landscape. Other areas
had been contaminated by the mining and processing of ura-
nium, primarily to service the Soviet nuclear sector.
Although East German per capita waste production had
been much lower than that of West Germany, the East German
government had negotiated away this advantage and jeopar-
dized ecological security in the bargain. In the 1980s, the GDR
had earned hard currency by importing and carelessly dispos-
ing of millions of tons of West Germany's trash, exacerbating
soil degradation and groundwater contamination. Some 60
percent of industrial waste had been deposited without con-
trols. Of about 11,000 landfill sites, more than 10,000 were
uncontrolled. With more than 28,000 potentially hazardous
sites, the cleanup effort required in the east appears compara-
ble in scope to the Superfund campaign in the United States.
The Cold War had also damaged East Germany's environ-
ment and to a lesser extent that of West Germany. For nearly
five decades, millions of troops from the East and the West had
made intensive use of the territory of the two Germanys as mil-
itary bases and training sites. Cleanup costs were estimated in
the hundreds of millions of dollars. In recognition of this situa-
tion, the United States Department of Defense allocated funds
to repair environmental damage in the Federal Republic. In
contrast, Soviet and later Russian forces, although they report-
edly occupied as much as 2.5 percent of East German territory,
were paid to leave the country and did so without compensat-
ing Germany for the extreme environmental damage they had
caused.
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Germany: A Country Study
With unification in 1990, the new Lander became subject to
the environmental laws of the Federal Republic and the EC,
although both sets of laws were to be applied gradually. Stan-
dards in some areas, such as emissions control, would not come
into effect until after 2000. The ecological situation in the new
Lander soon changed for the better, although much of the
improvement stemmed less from the imposition of new stan-
dards than from the closing, for economic reasons, of out-
moded plants that had caused much pollution. Projects such as
constructing new air, water, and soil treatment plants and mod-
ernizing old ones, reducing the amounts of brown coal con-
sumed, and cleaning up dump sites will gradually undo
decades of ecological damage. Some environmental policies in
the new Lander, like those in the old Lander, are preventive in
nature. Because of the irresponsible practices of the former
GDR, however, a great number are also restorative.
Serious environmental problems continue to confront Ger-
many. Despite the efforts begun in the early 1970s, the "death
of the forest" (Waldsterben) caused by acid rain continues. In
1992 about 68 percent of the country's trees had suffered sig-
nificant ecological damage. Forests in northwestern Germany
had suffered the least damage from acid rain, those in the
south and east the most. Chemical emissions from automobiles
are a serious cause of this problem. Only since 1993, however,
have new vehicles been required to have catalytic converters.
Germany's farmers also cause much pollution through inten-
sive use of fertilizers. Because they are a powerful interest
group, it has been difficult to pass legislation to regulate their
farming methods.
Nuclear power presents a special dilemma for Germany. In
western Germany, support for that power source, which in the
mid-1990s supplied about 35 percent of the country's energy
requirement, has fluctuated depending upon international
events and crises. As of the mid-1990s, however, there appeared
little chance that any more nuclear plants would be con-
structed in the near future.
Upon unification, the Federal Republic inherited East Ger-
many's two nuclear power plants, which had been built to
Soviet specifications. Decommissioning these plants would
increase reliance on polluting coal-fired power plants. Despite
this prospect, the likelihood of a Chernobyl-like disaster
prompted the shutdown of these unsafe nuclear power plants.
As of 1995, new, more ecologically friendly power plants are
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The Society and Its Environment
being built in the new Lander to replace nuclear power and
brown coal-fired plants.
Population
The population of Germany manifests trends characteristic
of most advanced industrial countries: lower marriage rates,
delayed marriage and child-bearing, low fertility rates, small
household size, high divorce rates, and extended life expect-
ancy. The population of indigenous Germans has been in
decline since 1972 in the west and since 1969 in the east
because the number of births has not kept pace with the num-
ber of deaths. In 1990 only five of the sixteen Lander registered
growth in population because of natural increase.
Household size decreased from 3.0 persons in 1950 to 2.3 in
1990. Marriage rates have slackened, while divorce rates have
risen or remained stable at high rates. In the late 1980s, almost
one-third of all marriages ended in divorce. Infant mortality
has steadily declined, and life expectancy has risen, albeit more
slowly in eastern Germany. As in the United States, a greater
proportion of the population is moving into advanced age. In
1871 only 4.6 percent of the population was sixty-five years of
age or older. By 1939 that proportion had risen to 7.8 percent,
and by 1992 it had risen to about 15 percent. By 2000 it is esti-
mated that one-quarter of the population will be sixty or older.
Since the 1950s, the population of Germany has become
more diverse. Millions of foreigners have migrated to Germany,
seeking employment, citizenship, or asylum. In contrast to the
native population, foreigners in Germany tend to have more
children and larger households. In 1988 their average house-
hold size was 3.5 persons. Depending upon their origins and
social status, foreigners in Germany have been integrated into
society in widely varying degrees.
Historical Background
Since the first unification of Germany in 1871 to form the
German Empire, the population and territorial expanse of
Germany have fluctuated considerably, chiefly as a result of
gains and losses in war. At the time of its founding, the empire
was home to some 41 million people, most of whom lived in vil-
lages or small towns (see table 5, Appendix). As industrializa-
tion and urbanization accelerated over the next forty years, the
population increased significantly to 64.6 million, according to
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Germany: A Country Study
the 1910 census. About two-thirds of this population lived in
towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants, and the number of
large cities had grown from eight in 1871 to eighty-four in
1910. Stimulating population growth were improvements in
sanitary and working conditions and in medicine. Another sig-
nificant source of growth was an influx of immigrants from
Eastern Europe, who came to Germany to work on farms and
in mines and factories. This wave of immigrants, the first of sev-
eral groups that would swell Germany's population in the suc-
ceeding decades, helped compensate for the millions of
Germans who left their country in search of a better life, many
of whom went to the United States.
At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the population of
Germany had reached about 68 million. A major demographic
catastrophe, the war claimed 2.8 million lives and caused a
steep decline in the birth rate. In addition, the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles awarded territories containing approximately 7 mil-
lion German inhabitants to the victors and to newly indepen-
dent or reconstituted countries in Eastern Europe.
In the 1930s, during the regime of Adolf Hitler, a period of
expansion added both territory and population to the Third
Reich. Following the annexation of Austria in 1938 and the
Sudetenland (part of Czechoslovakia) in 1939, German terri-
tory and population encompassed 586,126 square kilometers
and 79.7 million people, according to the 1939 census. The
census found that women still outnumbered men (40.4 million
to 38.7 million), despite a leveling trend in the interwar
period.
The carnage of World War II surpassed that of World War I.
German war losses alone were estimated at 7 million, about
half of whom died in battle. Ruined, defeated, and divided into
zones of occupation, a much smaller Germany emerged in
1945 with a population about the same as in 1910. In the imme-
diate postwar period, however, more than 12 million persons —
expelled Germans and displaced persons — immigrated to Ger-
many or used the country as a transit point en route to other
destinations, adding to the population.
By 1950 the newly established Federal Republic of Germany
had a population of about 50 million, more than 9 million of
whom were "expellees." The German Democratic Republic had
about 4 million newcomers and 14 million natives (see table 6,
Appendix). Most of the expellees came from East Prussia,
Pomerania, Silesia, and the Sudetenland, all one-time German
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The Society and Its Environment
territories held by other countries at the end of World War II.
The majority of the settlers in West Germany remained, found
work in the rapidly recovering economy, and in time were suc-
cessfully integrated into the society. Between 1950 and 1989,
West Germany's population grew from 50 million to 62.1 mil-
lion. Resettled Germans and refugees from former eastern ter-
ritories and their families constituted approximately 20
percent of the country's population. From its earliest years,
West Germany had become either a temporary or a final desti-
nation for millions of migrants. Yet despite this influx, the
country did not develop an identity as a country of immigra-
tion as did, for example, the United States or Canada.
The situation in East Germany was much different. From its
founding in 1949, the GDR struggled to stabilize its population
and thwart emigration. In the course of its forty-year history,
almost one-quarter of East Germany's population fled the state
to settle in West Germany. In the 1950s alone, more than 2 mil-
lion people moved west, a migration that triggered the
regime's radical solution in August 1961 — the construction of
the Berlin Wall (see The Berlin Wall, ch. 2). During most of its
existence, the only segment of East Germany's population per-
mitted to leave for West Germany were retirees, whose resettle-
ment there was unofficially encouraged to reduce the GDR's
pension payments. As a result, the number of persons sixty
years of age and older in the GDR fell from 22.1 percent in
1970 to 18.3 percent in 1985 and made the East German popu-
lation younger than that of West Germany.
Deprived of a regular supply of workers by the construction
of the Berlin Wall, the Federal Republic in the 1960s absorbed
yet another wave of migrants. Laborers were recruited through
agreements with seven countries: Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Portugal, Tunisia, and Morocco. Between 1955 and 1973, the
number of foreign workers, called guest workers ( Gastarbeiter)
to emphasize the intended temporary nature of their con-
tracts, grew from about 100,000 to about 2.5 million. Originally
brought in for three-year shifts, most workers — mainly single
men — remained and made a valuable contribution to the
booming West German economy. In the early 1970s, however, a
recession brought on by the international energy crisis slowed
the West German economy; the importing of workers officially
came to an end in 1973 (see Immigration, this ch.).
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the fourth and most controver-
sial wave of immigrants to West Germany were asylum-seekers
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Germany: A Country Study
and political refugees — ethnic Germans from Poland, Yugosla-
via, Czechoslovakia, and territories belonging to the former
Soviet Union and also East Germans who moved west as the
GDR collapsed. Many Germans were angered by the financial
and social costs these immigrants required because they
believed many asylum-seekers were drawn to Germany more by
the desire for a better standard of living than by the need to
escape political oppression. Many ethnic Germans hardly
seemed German: some did not even speak German.
Fertility
Despite the Berlin Wall and the fortified boundary that
divided them, the two Germanys had many similar demo-
graphic developments in the postwar period. In the late 1950s
and especially in the 1960s, both Germanys experienced a
"baby boom," stimulated by increased economic prosperity and
a heightened sense of security. During the second half of the
1960s, East Germany's population grew slightly, an unusual
occurrence. In West Germany, the absolute peak in births, 1.3
million, was reached in 1965. In that year, births outnumbered
deaths by 417,504.
After the baby boom, both countries experienced periods of
zero population growth when the annual number of births
failed to compensate for the annual number of deaths. As of
1993, with the exclusion of foreigners' births, deaths have out-
numbered births every year since 1976 in the old Lander. Since
1986 the same has been true for the new Lander. When the
West German total fertility rate reached its historic peacetime
low of fewer than 1.3 children per woman of child-bearing age
in 1985, popular newsmagazines caused a sensation with cover
stories that warned of the eventual disappearance of the Ger-
mans. In the former GDR, a pronatalist policy temporarily had
modest success in boosting the birth rate in the mid-1970s, but
the population declined there for two reasons: emigration and
low fertility. This was especially noticeable after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989 when emigration soared. Low
fertility also continued to be a problem. Between 1989 and
1991, eastern Germany's total fertility rate fell by 38 percent. In
1991 the rate was 0.98, well below West Germany's lowest level.
Although its population was just one-fifth that of West Ger-
many, until 1986 East Germany officially topped in absolute
terms West Germany in both the number of births outside mar-
riage and the number of abortions. This situation was
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The Society and Its Environment
accounted for in part by a chronic lack of birth control choices
in the former Soviet bloc and the practice of using abortion as
a regular means of curbing unwanted pregnancies. In 1988
one-third of all births in the GDR were to unwed mothers,
whereas in the FRG only one-tenth were. The trend of
out-of-wedlock births in the east continued to increase after
unification. By 1992 nearly 42 percent of the babies born in the
new Lander were to single mothers, compared with 12 percent
in the old Lander.
Until mid-1993, when a more restrictive West German law
came into effect, the eastern section of Germany recognized
the right of abortion on demand. The highest rate was reached
in 1972, when one-third of pregnancies were aborted. By 1989
the rate had declined, but the probability of an abortion was
still one in every four pregnancies. In the old Lander, legal
abortions were restricted to special circumstances based on
such factors as the physical or mental health of the mother or
fetus. In 1989 West Germany officially registered 75,297 abor-
tions, compared with about 74,000 for East Germany. Social,
cultural, and economic factors accounted for the differences in
frequency of abortion and extramarital birth rates.
Following unification, a trend termed demographic paralysis
was observed in the former East Germany when the number of
births fell by 50 percent between 1990 and 1993. From 1988 to
mid-1993, the crude birth rate fell from 12.9 per 1,000 to 5.3
per 1,000, an abrupt and precipitous decline unmatched in an
industrial society in peacetime. Especially hard hit by skyrocket-
ing unemployment and adrift in an alien market economy,
record numbers of women in the new Lander stopped having
children. Some reports indicated that by the summer of 1993
as many as two-thirds of working women in the east had lost
their jobs since unification. In that same year, the marriage rate
fell by half.
Age-Gender Distribution
In the early 1990s, an age-gender distribution pyramid of
unified Germany's population displayed at its apex the legacy
of heavy war casualties: a preponderance of elderly women too
great to be explained by women's greater longevity. Official sta-
tistics show that in 1990 there were approximately 2.7 million
more females than males (41.2 million versus 38.5 million) in
Germany. In the same year, so many wives had outlived their
husbands, either because of war deaths or because of the lower
153
Germany: A Country Study
life expectancy of males, that the 4.9 million elderly widows in
the country accounted for approximately 6 percent of the total
population. Population specialists have forecast the transfor-
mation of the pyramid into a mushroom, as the effect of slack-
ening birth rates pushes the population bulge higher up the
age categories. In 1990 about 50 percent of the population was
under thirty-seven years of age (see fig. 8).
The progressive aging of Germany's population has been
rapid. In 1970 those aged seventeen or younger made up 27.2
percent of the population, those aged eighteen to sixty-five
accounted for 59.1 percent, and those aged sixty-five and older
were 13.7 percent. By 1990 these shares had changed to 19.2
percent, 65.8 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. The impli-
cations of this trend for social welfare and security are a cause
of concern. In the early 1990s, one pensioner was financed by
three employees. If present trends continue, forecasts indicate
that by 2030 as much as 28 percent of Germany's population
will be elderly, and there will be a 1:1 ratio between pensioners
and workers.
Mortality
In the postwar period, the former GDR developed a compre-
hensive health care system that made steady advances in reduc-
ing infant mortality and extending life expectancy for both
men and women. Early in the postwar period, life expectancy
in some categories was actually longer for East Germans than
for West Germans, and infant mortality was lower until 1980.
However, starting in the mid-1970s, West Germany began to
register longer life expectancies in every age-group, and after
1980 the infant mortality rate dropped below that of East Ger-
many. In 1988 infant mortality in West Germany was 7.6 per
1,000 live births and 8.1 per 1,000 in East Germany.
The better health and longevity of West Germans probably
stemmed from an increased interest in quality of life issues,
personal health, and the environment. East Germans, in con-
trast, suffered the ill effects of the Soviet model of a traditional
rust-belt industrial economy, with minimal concern for work-
ers' safety and health and wanton disregard of the need to pro-
tect the environment. Improving environmental conditions
and a more health-conscious way of living should gradually
reduce remaining health differences among Germans. In mid-
1995 unified Germany had an estimated mortality rate of about
eleven per 1,000, and life expectancy was estimated at 76.6
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The Society and Its Environment
years (73.5 years for males and 79.9 years for females). The
major causes of death were the same as those of other
advanced countries (see Current Health Care Issues and Out-
look for the Future, ch. 4).
Population Distribution and Urbanization
Following unification, the Federal Republic encompassed
356,958 square kilometers and was one of the largest countries
in Europe. With about 81.3 million people in mid-1995, it
ranked second behind Russia in population among the coun-
tries of Europe. Unification actually reduced the Federal
Republic's population density, however, because East Germany,
which had a large rural area, was more sparsely populated.
With an average of 228 persons per square kilometer in late
1993, unified Germany ranked third in population density
among European countries. It ranked behind the Netherlands
and Belgium, which had 363 and 329 persons per square kilo-
meter, respectively.
Germany's population density varies greatly. The most
densely populated Lander axe Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen,
with densities of 3,898, 2,236, and 1,697 persons per square
kilometer, respectively, at the end of 1992 (see table 7, Appen-
dix) . The least densely populated are two new Lander, Mecklen-
burg-Western Pomerania and Brandenburg, both mostly rural
in character. They had population densities of eighty and
eighty-six persons per square kilometer, respectively, at the end
of 1992. Other Lander axe closer to the national average: the
largest Land, Bavaria, with 167 persons per square kilometer, is
mostly rural, but its capital is the large city of Munich; Rhine-
land-Palatinate, with 196 persons per square kilometer, is also
mostly rural but has numerous heavily populated areas along
the Rhine; and Saxony, with 252 persons per square kilometer,
also has a number of heavily populated areas.
The Land with the most population, one-fifth of the nation's
total, is North Rhine-Westphalia. With a population density of
519 persons per square kilometer at the end of 1992, it is the
most heavily settled of all Lander, with the exception of the
three city Lander of Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin. North
Rhine-Westphalia's density is caused by its many cities; several
dozen of these cities have populations above 100,000, includ-
ing five with populations above 500,000. Many of these cities
are located so close together that they form one of Europe's
155
Germany: A Country Study
AGE-GROUP
85 and over
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches
Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Wiesbaden, 1994, 66.
Figure 8. Population by Age and Gender, 1992
largest urban agglomerations, the Ruhrstadt (Ruhr City), with
a population of about 5 million.
The Federal Republic has few very large cities and many
medium-sized ones, a reflection of the centuries when the
name Germany designated a geographical area consisting of
many small and medium-sized states, each with its own capital
(see table 8, Appendix). Berlin, by far the largest city, with a
population of 3.5 million at the end of 1993, is certain to grow
in population as more of the government moves there in the
second half of the 1990s and as businesses relocate their head-
quarters to the new capital. Some estimates predict that
Greater Berlin will have a population of 8 million by early in
the twenty-first century.
Berlin already dwarfs the only other cities having more than
1 million inhabitants: Hamburg with 1.7 million and Munich
with 1.3 million. Ten cities have populations between 500,000
and 1 million, seventeen between 250,000 and 500,000, and
156
The Society and Its Environment
fifty-four between 100,000 and 250,000. In the early 1990s,
about one-third of the population lived in cities with 100,000
residents or more, one-third in cities and towns with popula-
tions between 50,000 and 100,000, and one-third in villages
and small towns.
Other densely populated areas are located in the southwest.
They are Greater Stuttgart; the Rhine-Main area with its center
of Frankfurt am Main; and the Rhine-Neckar region with its
center in Mannheim. The greater Nuremberg and Hanover
regions are also significant population centers. The new Lander
are thinly settled except for Berlin and the regions of Dresden-
Leipzig and Chemnitz-Zwickau.
Urban areas in the east are more densely populated than
those in the west because the GDR saw little of the suburbaniza-
tion seen in West Germany. As a result, there is a greater con-
trast between urban and rural areas in the new Lander than in
the west. West Germany's suburbanization, however, is not
nearly as extensive as that experienced by the United States
after the end of World War II. Compared with cities in the
United States, German cities are fairly compact, and their
inhabitants can quickly reach small villages and farmlands.
Germany's population growth has been slow since the late
1960s. Many regions have shown little or no growth, or have
even declined in population. The greatest growth has been in
the south, where the populations of Baden-Wurttemberg and
Bavaria each increased by well over 1 million between 1970 and
1993. (Each had also grown by over 1 million in the 1960s.)
North Rhine-Westphalia, which had grown by 1 million in the
1960s, added another 750,000 to its population between 1970
and 1993, a small increase, given a total population of nearly 18
million at the end of 1993. Bremen, Hamburg, and the Saar-
land experienced some population loss between 1970 and
1993. With the exception of united Berlin, all the new Lander
lost population between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end
of 1993. In general, this development reflected long-term
trends in East Germany, although the rate of decline has been
higher since unification.
Immigration
Immigration has been a primary force shaping demographic
developments in the two Germanys in the postwar period (see
Historical Background, this ch.). After the erection of the Ber-
lin Wall in 1961, the immigration flow, first into West Germany
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Germany: A Country Study
and later into united Germany, consisted mainly of workers
from southern Europe. In addition, the immigrants included
several other groups: a small but steady stream of East German
immigrants (Ubersiedler) during the 1980s that exploded in size
in 1990 (389,000) but by 1993 had fallen by more than half
(172,000) and was somewhat offset by movement from west to
east (119,000); several million ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
from East European countries, especially the former Soviet
Union; and several million persons seeking asylum from politi-
cal oppression, most of whom were from East European coun-
tries.
Foreign Residents
As of early 1994, approximately 6.8 million registered for-
eigners resided in Germany. Turks made up the largest group
(1.9 million), followed by immigrants from the former Yugosla-
via (930,000), Italians (565,000), Greeks (350,000), Poles
(260,000), and Austrians (185,000). About 25 percent of these
foreign residents, most of whom were born in Germany, are
under the age of eighteen. Because of the higher birth rate of
foreigners, one of every ten births in Germany is to a foreigner.
However, because recruiting of Gastarbeiter stopped in 1973 at
the onset of a worldwide recession, most foreign workers are
middle-aged and have lived in Germany for several decades.
The foreign population is not distributed evenly. More than
two-thirds live in the Lander of North Rhine-Westphalia,
Baden-Wurttemberg, and Bavaria, where in 1990 they made up
9, 10, and 7 percent of the population, respectively. Foreigners
live mainly in urban areas; in 1989 approximately 23 percent of
foreign residents lived in Hamburg and Berlin. Foreigners
often live in particular areas of large cities. (For example,
Kreuzberg in Berlin and Kalk in Cologne both have large Turk-
ish communities.) There are few foreigners in the new Lander.
Of the roughly 190,000 foreigners living in the former GDR in
1989 because of work contracts, many have since been repatri-
ated to Vietnam, Mozambique, Cuba, and other developing
countries that were friendly to the GDR regime.
Foreigners began arriving in West Germany in large num-
bers in the 1960s after the construction of the Berlin Wall
ended migration from East Germany. Recruited mainly from a
number of countries in southern Europe, Gastarbeiter were not
expected to stay beyond the terms of their work permits. How-
ever, many opted to remain in West Germany and subsequently
158
Residential area in Cologne
Courtesy Eric Solsten
brought their families there to live. As a result, and owing to
higher birth rates, the foreign population in Germany has
increased substantially (see table 9, Appendix). By offering
financial incentives, West German authorities hoped to encour-
age some Gastarbeiter to return to their native countries, but rel-
atively few took advantage of these provisions. A tightening of
entry restrictions also caused many to remain in Germany
rather than risk not being readmitted after spending time in
their home country.
Although no longer recruited abroad, Germany's foreign
residents remain vital to the economy, parts of which would
shut down if they were to depart. They also contribute to the
country's welfare and social insurance programs by paying
twice as much in taxes and insurance premiums as they receive
in benefits. In the long term, their presence may be seen as
vital because they have a positive birth rate. The birth rate
159
Germany: A Country Study
among native Germans is so low that some studies have esti-
mated that Germany will require approximately 200,000 immi-
grants a year to maintain its population into the next century
and support its array of social welfare benefits.
Most Germans do not see their country as a land of immigra-
tion like the United States or Canada, and no demographic or
social issue has generated greater controversy than the pres-
ence of foreigners in the Federal Republic. In an opinion poll
taken in 1982, two-thirds of West Germans said that there were
too many foreigners in Germany, and one-half thought that
foreigners should be sent back to their countries of origin. In
1992 another poll found that the "foreigner problem" ranked
as the most serious issue for western Germans and was third in
importance for eastern Germans.
According to the foreigners law that went into effect in mid-
1993, foreigners living in Germany for fifteen years may
become German citizens if they have no criminal record and
renounce their original citizenship. Young foreigners who have
resided eight years in Germany may become citizens if they
have attended German schools for six years and apply for citi-
zenship between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three. Usually,
however, German citizenship depends not on where one is
born (ius solis) but on the nationality of the father or, since
1974, on the mother (ius sanguinis). Thus, to many, German
citizenship depends on being born German and cannot right-
fully be acquired through a legal process. This notion makes it
practically impossible for naturalized citizens or their children
to be considered German. Some reformers advocate eliminat-
ing the concept of German blood in the 1913 law regulating
citizenship, but the issue is an emotional one, and such a
change has little popular support.
Ethnic Germans
Ethnic Germans have immigrated to Germany since the end
of World War II. At first, these immigrants were Germans who
had resided in areas that had formerly been German territory.
Later, the offspring of German settlers who in previous centu-
ries had settled in areas of Eastern Europe and Russia came to
be regarded as ethnic Germans and as such had the right to
German citizenship according to Article 116 of the Basic Law.
Because they became citizens immediately upon arrival in Ger-
many, ethnic Germans received much financial and social assis-
tance to ease their integration into society. Housing, vocational
160
The Society and Its Environment
training, and many other types of assistance, even language
training — because many did not know the language of their
forebears — were liberally provided.
With the gradual opening of the Soviet empire in the 1980s,
the numbers of ethnic Germans coming to West Germany
swelled. In the mid-1980s, about 40,000 came each year. In
1987 the number doubled and in 1988 doubled again. In 1990
nearly 400,000 ethnic Germans came to the Federal Republic.
In the 1991-93 period, about 400,000 ethnic Germans settled
in Germany. Since January 1993, immigration of ethnic Ger-
mans has been limited to 220,000 per year.
Because this influx could no longer be managed, especially
because of the vast expense of unification, restrictions on the
right of ethnic Germans to return to Germany became effec-
tive in January 1991. Under the new restrictions, once in Ger-
many ethnic Germans are assigned to certain areas. If they
leave these areas, they lose many of their benefits and are
treated as if they were foreigners. The government has also
established programs to encourage the estimated several mil-
lion ethnic Germans who still live in the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe to remain there. Although ethnic Ger-
mans are entitled to German citizenship by virtue of their
bloodlines, to many Germans they do not seem German, and
their social integration has frequently been difficult.
Asylum-Seekers
To atone for the crimes of the Third Reich, Article 16/2 of
West Germany's Basic Law offers liberal asylum rights to those
suffering political persecution. Until the 1980s, relatively few
refugees took advantage of this provision. But in the second
half of the decade, a new class of "jet-age refugees" began to
make its way to Europe and especially to West Germany, which
accepted more than any other West European country. In the
mid-1980s, many refugees came from Iran and Lebanon. By
1991 most refugees originated in regions of war-torn former
Yugoslavia, Romania, or Turkey. From 1986 to 1989, about
380,000 refugees sought asylum inWest Germany. By compari-
son, in the 1990-92 period, nearly 900,000 people sought ref-
uge in a united Germany.
Although only about 5 percent of requests for asylum are
approved, slow processing and appeals mean that many refu-
gees remain in Germany for years. Because financial aid is also
provided for the refugees' living expenses, their presence has
161
Germany: A Country Study
become a burden on federal and local government. The result-
ing social tensions made imperative an amendment to the con-
stitutional provision regarding asylum. After heated debate, in
1993 the Bundestag passed legislation that amended the Basic
Law and tightened restrictions on granting asylum. One impor-
tant change is that asylum-seekers are no longer to be admitted
into Germany if they have applied from a third country. In
addition, more funds are to be allotted to processing applica-
tions, so that asylum-seekers remain in Germany for shorter
periods.
Ethnic Minorities
In the early 1990s, there were between 50,000 and 60,000
Gypsies in Germany. They were divided into two groups: the
Sinti, who have lived for hundreds of years in Germany and
who have largely adopted conventional modes of living and
employment; and the Roma, many of whom fled Romania fol-
lowing the 1989 revolution that toppled the Nicolae Ceausescu
regime. The lifestyle and work habits of the mobile Roma clash
with those of most Germans. As a result, in 1992 the German
government signed an agreement with Romania providing for
the repatriation of thousands of Roma in exchange for cash
payments to be used for housing and job training.
Several other minority groups, officially recognized and
their languages protected, also live in Germany. For more than
1,000 years, the Sorbs, a Slavic nationality, have lived as an eth-
nic minority in Brandenburg and Saxony. As of 1993, there
were about 120,000 Sorbs in Germany. In addition, about
60,000 Danish speakers live in Schleswig-Holstein, a reminder
of the area's Danish past; and about 12,000 speakers of the Fri-
sian language live on the Frisian Islands and on the northwest-
ern coast.
Germany once had a prosperous and largely assimilated Jew-
ish population of about 600,000. In the 1930s and 1940s, most
German Jews were exiled, were imprisoned, or perished in
Nazi death camps (see Total Mobilization, Resistance, and the
Holocaust, ch. 1). By the early 1990s, Germany's Jewish com-
munity was only about 40,000. Its numbers were growing, how-
ever, as the result of the immigration of some Israelis and
Russian Jews. One of the most eloquent spokespersons for the
rights of minorities and a tireless advocate for greater tolerance
is the community's leader, Ignaz Bubnis.
162
Turkish restaurant in Berlin
Courtesy German Information
Center, New York
Italian grocery store in Cologne
Courtesy Eric Solsten
163
Germany: A Country Study
Women in Society
For centuries, a woman's role in German society was
summed up and circumscribed by the three "K" words: Kinder
(children), Kirche (church), and Kuche (kitchen). Throughout
the twentieth century, however, women have gradually won vic-
tories in their quest for equal rights. In 1919 they received the
right to vote. Profound changes also were wrought by World
War II. During the war, women assumed positions traditionally
held by men. After the war, the so-called Trummerfrauen
(women of the rubble) tended the wounded, buried the dead,
salvaged belongings, and began the arduous task of rebuilding
war-torn Germany by simply clearing away the rubble.
In West Germany, the Basic Law of 1949 declared that men
and women were equal, but it was not until 1957 that the civil
code was amended to conform with this statement. Even in the
early 1950s, women could be dismissed from the civil service
when they married. After World War II, despite the severe
shortage of young men that made marriage impossible for
many women, traditional marriage once again became society's
ideal. Employment and social welfare programs remained
predicated on the male breadwinner model. West Germany
turned to millions of migrants or immigrants — including large
numbers of GDR refugees — to satisfy its booming economy's
labor requirements. Women became homemakers and moth-
ers again and largely withdrew from employment outside the
home.
In the east, however, women remained in the workforce. The
Soviet-style system mandated women's participation in the
economy, and the government implemented this key objective
by opening up educational and vocational opportunities to
women. As early as 1950, marriage and family laws also had
been rewritten to accommodate working mothers. Abortion
was legalized and funded by the state in the first trimester of
pregnancy. An extensive system of social supports, such as a
highly developed day-care network for children, was also put in
place to permit women to be both mothers and workers. Eman-
cipated "from above" for economic and ideological reasons,
women in the east entered institutes of higher learning and the
labor force in record numbers while still maintaining the
household. East Germany had to rely on women because of its
declining population; the situation was made more critical by
the fact that most of those fleeing to West Germany were men.
164
The Society and Its Environment
Because of these developments, about 90 percent of East
German women worked outside the home. They made up
about half the membership in the two most important mass
organizations of the former GDR — the Free German Trade
Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund —
FDGB) and the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend —
FDJ). In 1988 slightly more than one-third of the membership
of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische
Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED) consisted of women. In
contrast, only about 4.4 percent of West German women were
members of a political party.
After several decades of conforming to traditional social pat-
terns, West German women began to demand changes. Follow-
ing patterns in Europe and the United States, emancipation in
the Federal Republic originated "from below," with women
themselves. In the 1970s, the women's movement gathered
momentum, having emerged as an outgrowth of student pro-
tests in the late 1960s (see Citizens' Initiative Associations, ch.
7). Rallying around the causes of equal rights (including the
right to abortion, which was somewhat restricted in West Ger-
many), the movement succeeded in having legislation passed
in 1977 that granted a woman equal rights in marriage. A
woman could work outside the home and file for divorce with-
out her husband's permission. Divorce was permitted when the
marriage partners could no longer be reconciled.
Women also made gains in education in both Germanys. By
the mid-1960s, East German women accounted for about half
of all secondary school graduates who had prepared to study at
institutes of higher learning in the GDR; by the 1975-76 aca-
demic year, they were in the majority (53 percent). To assist
women in completing their studies, an extensive support sys-
tem, including supplementary payments and child care, was
provided. Expanded educational opportunities for West Ger-
man women were slower in coming and never equaled the lev-
els reached in the east. Only in the early 1980s did West
German women qualify for admission to universities in the
same numbers as men. Although fewer than that number pur-
sued college and university studies, between 1970 and 1989 the
percentage of female students increased from 31 percent to 41
percent. Two factors were believed to be responsible for the
discrepancy between eastern and western rates of attendance
at institutes of higher learning: West German women had a
stronger orientation toward traditional familial relations; and
165
Germany: A Country Study
they had dimmer prospects for admission to particular aca-
demic departments and for professional employment after
graduation.
Despite significant gains, discrimination remains in united
Germany. Income inequalities persist: a woman's wages and sal-
aries range between 65 percent and 78 percent of a man's for
many positions. In most fields, women do not hold key posi-
tions. Generally, the higher the position, the more powerful is
male dominance. For example, women are heavily represented
in the traditional care-giving fields of health and education,
but even in such fields there is a wide disparity between the
number of females working in hospitals (75 percent of total
staff) and schools (more than 50 percent) and the number of
female physicians (4 percent) and principals (20 percent in the
west and 32 percent in the east). In the late 1980s, only 5 per-
cent of university professors in West Germany were women.
Although substantial barriers to equality of the sexes in Ger-
many remain as a result of a persistently patriarchal family
structure and work environment, women have managed to
gain isolated high-profile victories. A separate national office
for women's affairs was created in West Germany in 1980, and
similar agencies have been established in most Lander in united
Germany. Since the mid-1980s, offices responsible for working
toward women's equality have been active, first in West Ger-
many and after unification in the new Lander. The Equality
Offices ( Gleichstellungstellen) have as one of their tasks ensuring
that women occupy a more equitable share of positions in the
public sector.
Some women have succeeded in reaching positions of
power. One of the most successful women in politics in the
1990s is Rita Sussmuth, president of the Bundestag. In the field
of industry, Birgit Breuel assumed the leadership, following the
assassination of Detlev Rohwedder in April 1991, of the Treu-
handanstalt (Trust Agency), the powerful agency charged with
privatizing the former East German economy. Other influen-
tial and prominent German women in the mid-1990s are Mar-
ion von Donhoff, coeditor of Die Zeit, and Elizabeth
Noelle-Neumann, director of the Allensbach Public Opinion
Institute. Yet despite this progress, a 1991 article in an influen-
tial weekly magazine made it clear how far women must go to
achieve equality. The magazine's list of the 100 most powerful
people in Germany included only four women.
166
The Society and Its Environment
Almost all segments of eastern German society encountered
tremendous difficulty in the unification process, but women
suffered the most. Some reports indicated that two-thirds of
working women in the new Lander were unemployed, and
many more were turned into part-time workers as a result of
privatization, downsizing of firms, and elimination of support
services such as day-care and after-school centers. To improve
their prospects for employment, some women in eastern Ger-
many reportedly were resorting to sterilization, one of the fac-
tors contributing to the steep decline in births from twelve per
1,000 in 1989 to 5.3 per 1,000 in 1993.
Among the issues that demonstrated differences between
women of the old and new Lander, one of the most contentious
was abortion. In 1991 there were about 125,000 registered
abortions performed in Germany, about 50,000 of which were
in the east. Although the number of registered abortions in
both parts of Germany had been declining in recent years, the
actual number of abortions was estimated at about 250,000. For
a time following unification, the restrictive western and permis-
sive eastern legislation on abortion continued in force. In June
1992, however, the Bundestag voted to ease abortion restric-
tions and to permit the procedure during the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy with compulsory counseling. Resorting to what
had been a successful policy in the early 1970s, those opposed
to the new law, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl, appealed to
the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to nullify the
new law. Just before it was scheduled to take effect, the law was
blocked when the court issued an injunction. Subsequently, a
new restrictive law came to apply in all of Germany (see Politi-
cal Developments since Unification, ch. 7).
Marriage and Family
Like most other advanced countries in the postwar era, Ger-
many recorded fewer marriages, more divorces, and smaller
families. In 1960 there were 690,000 marriages, compared with
516,000 in 1990. The total for 1993 amounted to only 442,000,
but most of this decline was caused by a drop of than more 50
percent in the number of marriages in the new Lander between
1990 and 1993. Until 1990 the decline in marriages in East Ger-
many had been appreciably greater than in West Germany
(from 215,000 in 1950 to 137,000 in 1989, compared with
536,000 and 399,000 in the same years in West Germany), but
not nearly as steep in the 1990-93 period. Just as the dramatic
167
Germany: A Country Study
social changes brought to the new Lander by unification
affected birth rates there, so they also affected marriages rates.
Another difference in marriage practices between the two
Germanys had been that easterners marrying for the first time
did so at an earlier age than westerners. Easterners did so, it is
believed, because of their desire to have children and hence
qualify for low-cost child care and housing benefits. Following
unification this difference remained. In 1992 the average age
at first marriage was 29.0 for men and 26.5 for women in the
old Lander, compared with 2V. 1 for men and 25.1 for women in
the new Lander. Since the mid-1970s, the average age at which
people marry has slowly risen for both genders in both parts of
Germany.
As the number of marriages declined, the frequency of
divorce increased in both states. Between 1960 and 1990, the
number of divorces in West Germany more than doubled,
increasing from 49,000 to 123,000 and yielding a divorce rate
of about 30 percent. Divorce was always more common in East
Germany than it was in West Germany. The number of divorces
roughly doubled between 1960 and 1988, going from 25,000 to
49,000. In 1986 there was a record divorce rate of 46 percent.
Although home to only 20 percent of the total population, the
new Lander accounted for 29 percent of all divorces in 1990.
After unification, however, the incidence of divorce decreased
greatly in the east, perhaps in response to the overall uncer-
tainty and insecurity of future prospects for single mothers in
unified Germany. In 1992 the number of divorces in the new
Lander amounted to only 10,000. In 1993, however, this num-
ber rose to 18,000, an increase of 78 percent.
Despite the increasing likelihood of divorce, in 1990 about
89 percent of all families consisted of married couples, and
about 70 percent of those of marriage age were married. In
both east and west, however, the failure of these families to pro-
duce the necessary number of children for population replace-
ment was striking. Of the 15 million married couples in the
former West Germany, about 57 percent had children. Forty-
seven percent of couples with children had one child, 38 per-
cent had two children, and 13 percent had three or more chil-
dren. In 1950 the average number of persons in German
households was 3.0. By 1990 this figure had declined to 2.3. In
1991 four-person households accounted for 13 percent of the
total number of households, three-person households for 16
percent, two-person households for 31 percent, and
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The Society and Its Environment
single-person households for 35 percent. In the early 1990s,
only foreign families were regularly having two or more chil-
dren, with the Turkish subgroup being the largest in terms of
family size.
Like West Germany, East Germany had provided legislative
protection for the family and married couples, together with
generous maternity leave and pay provisions. In the east, how-
ever, it was assumed that the mother would rejoin the work-
force soon after maternity leave, and an elaborate child-care
system was put in place. Virtually all women could obtain excel-
lent care for their children if they wished. In the west, many
mothers gave up their careers or interrupted them for long
periods following the birth of a child because child care was
generally unavailable. As a result, in 1990 women of
child-bearing age in the east had more children (1.67) than
women in the west (1.42). Supported by the state, eastern
women had long been accustomed to balancing child-rearing
and a profession. After unification, however, the new Lander
experienced a precipitous decline in births because of high
unemployment, especially among women (see Fertility, this
ch.).
By the mid-1990s, the newest trend in household formation
was what became known as nonmarital living partnerships.
Between 1972 and 1990, the number of such households
increased sevenfold, to 963,000, or 2-7 percent of all house-
holds. Almost 90 percent of these were childless households.
Most young people were opting to live together before decid-
ing to marry. This factor pushed the average age at marriage
higher.
Another sign of the movement away from the traditional
concept of family and of the manifestation of sexual freedom
was the rising number of out-of-wedlock births. In the late
1980s, about one in ten West German and three in ten East
German births were to unmarried women.
In the postwar period, it became clear that marriage had lost
its former position as the only legitimate locus for sexual activ-
ity. In the early 1990s, polls indicated that 60 percent of Ger-
man sixteen-year-olds were sexually active, compared with 15
percent in the 1950s.
In the past, when regional differences were acute, conven-
tion held that marriages between a Prussian and a Bavarian,
between a Catholic and a Protestant, and definitely between a
Christian and a Jew were "mixed" marriages. In modern Ger-
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Germany: A Country Study
many, only unions between Germans and foreigners are con-
sidered mixed. Of 516,000 marriages in 1990, about 6 percent
were between Germans and foreigners. Most often German
women married Americans, Italians, Turks, and Yugoslavs, and
German men married Yugoslavs, Poles, Filipinos, and Austri-
ans. In 1974 legislation was passed conferring automatic citi-
zenship on children born of these unions.
Housing
There is a wide range of housing stock in Germany, from
mansions and country estates for the wealthy, to tents and wel-
fare hotels for the needy and homeless. Most Germans live in
self-contained apartments or in single-family houses.
Single-story and two-story townhouse-like dwellings character-
ize the tidy neighborhoods of small towns and medium-sized
cities, and high-rise apartment buildings are common in larger
cities. In many communities, merchants, tradespeople, and
shopkeepers continue to live above their stores, and clustered
farmhouses still form the nucleus of many villages.
After World War II, West Germany faced a severe housing
shortage. Not only had the war destroyed much of the housing,
but the millions of refugees from the east had to find new
accommodations. According to one estimate, there were 10
million dwellings for 17 million households. The housing
shortage often forced several families to share a single dwell-
ing. In the 1950s and 1960s, a tremendous surge in construc-
tion, supported heavily by the government, resulted in the
construction of as many as 700,000 dwellings in a single year.
Gradually, the housing crisis eased. The problems that per-
sisted generally involved a shortage of affordable housing in
urban areas. Housing conditions in East Germany also
improved greatly. However, much of the housing was badly
designed and poorly constructed, and even at the state's
demise in 1990, the overall housing supply was inadequate.
Unification revealed significant differences in the quality,
variety, and size of dwellings in the two Germanys. In West Ger-
many, about 70 percent of the housing stock had been built
after 1948, with 95 percent of the dwellings having their own
bathrooms and 75 percent having central heating. In East Ger-
many, 55 percent of the housing stock had been built before
1948, with only 75 percent of the dwellings having bathrooms
and only 47 percent having central heating. In addition, much
of the housing in East Germany was in poor condition because
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The Society and Its Environment
the authorities had maintained rents at such low levels that
funds were not available for essential repairs.
In 1992 united Germany had approximately 34.5 million
dwellings with 149 million rooms, for a total of 2.8 billion
square meters of living space. Dwellings in the west were larger
than those in the east. In 1992 dwellings in the old Lander had
an average floor space of 82. 7 square meters for an average of
35.1 square meters per person, compared with 64.5 square
meters and an average of 29.0 square meters per person in the
new Lander.
The federal government has responded with special mea-
sures to rectify housing problems in the new Lander, launching
an ambitious program to upgrade and expand housing. By
1993 about 1.1 million units had been modernized. Specialists
have estimated that bringing housing in the east up to western
standards will require the construction of 140,000 new dwell-
ings a year until 2005.
Unification also revealed significant differences with respect
to home ownership. In the early 1990s, approximately 40 per-
cent of residents owned their dwellings in the old Lander, com-
pared with 25 percent in the new Lander.
Prior to unification, a housing shortage had developed in
West Germany because of increased immigration and the rising
number of single householders. The arrival of several million
refugees, ethnic Germans, and eastern Germans coincided
with a steep drop in the availability of inexpensive housing.
Despite the construction of as many as 400,000 new dwellings
each year, as of 1993 the need for housing outpaced the supply.
A housing shortage exists because the country's 35 million
households exceed the number of dwellings by about 500,000.
The housing shortage and a lack of available land for build-
ing in densely populated areas have driven up real estate
prices. In 1992 a single-family free-standing house with 125
square meters of floor space cost DM300,000 in Dresden,
DM450,000 in Hamburg, DM590,000 in Frankfurt am Main,
DM800,000 in Berlin, and DM910,000 in Munich. In western
Germany, the average price of building land was DM129 per
square meter, compared with DM32 per square meter in the
east.
Because decent housing is seen as a basic right in Germany,
the government provides financial aid to households devoting
too great a share of their income to housing costs. The aid can
subsidize their rents or help pay mortgages. In the early 1990s,
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Germany: A Country Study
some 3 million households received this type of aid. Despite
these programs, however, homelessness remains a problem. In
the early 1990s, some specialists estimated the number of
homeless at between 800,000 and 1 million, while others
believed it to be as low as 150,000. The homeless receive aid
from government and charitable organizations, which provide
an array of social services and shelters (see Provisions of the
Social Welfare System, ch. 4).
Religion
Roman Catholicism, one of Germany's two principal reli-
gions, traces its origins there to the eighth-century missionary
work of Saint Boniface (see Medieval Germany, ch. 1). In the
next centuries, Roman Catholicism made more converts and
spread eastward. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the
Knights of the Teutonic Order spread German and Roman
Catholic influence by force of arms along the southern Baltic
Coast and into Russia. In 1517, however, Martin Luther chal-
lenged papal authority and what he saw as the commercializa-
tion of his faith. In the process, Luther changed the course of
European and world history and established the second major
faith in Germany — Protestantism (see The Protestant Reforma-
tion, ch. 1).
Religious differences played a decisive role in the Thirty
Years' War (see The Thirty Years* War, 1618-48, ch. 1). An
enduring legacy of the Protestant Reformation and this con-
flict was the division of Germany into fairly distinct regions of
religious practice. Roman Catholicism remained the preemi-
nent faith in the southern and western German states, while
Protestantism became firmly established in the northeastern
and central regions. Pockets of Roman Catholicism existed in
Oldenburg in the north and in areas of Hesse. Protestant con-
gregations could be found in north Baden and northeastern
Bavaria.
The unification of Germany in 1871 under Prussian leader-
ship led to the strengthening of Protestantism (see Bismarck
and Unification, ch. 1). Otto von Bismarck sought to weaken
Roman Catholic influence through an anti-Roman Catholic
campaign, the Kulturkampf, in the early 1870s. The Jesuit
order was prohibited in Germany, and its members were
expelled from the country. In Prussia the "Falk laws," named
for Adalbert Falk, Bismarck's minister of culture, mandated
German citizenship and attendance at German universities for
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The Society and Its Environment
clergymen, state inspection of schools, and state confirmation
of parish and episcopal appointments. Although relations
between the Roman Catholic Church and the state were subse-
quently improved through negotiations with the Vatican, the
Kulturkampf engendered in Roman Catholics a deep distrust
of the empire and enmity toward Prussia.
Prior to World War II, about two-thirds of the German popu-
lation was Protestant and the remainder Roman Catholic.
Bavaria was a Roman Catholic stronghold. Roman Catholics
were also well represented in the populations of
Baden-Wurttemberg, the Saarland, and in much of the Rhine-
land. Elsewhere in Germany, especially in the north and north-
east, Protestants were in the majority
During the Hitler regime, except for individual acts of resis-
tance, the established churches were unable or unwilling to
mount a serious challenge to the supremacy of the state (see
The Third Reich, 1933-45, ch. 1). A Nazi, Ludwig Muller, was
installed as the Lutheran bishop in Berlin. Although raised a
Roman Catholic, Hitler respected only the power and organiza-
tion of the Roman Catholic Church, not its tenets. In July 1933,
shortly after coming to power, the Nazis scored their first diplo-
matic success by concluding a concordat with the Vatican, regu-
lating church-state relations. In return for keeping the right to
maintain denominational schools nationwide, the Vatican
assured the Nazis that Roman Catholic clergy would refrain
from political activity, that the government would have a say in
the choice of bishops, and that changes in diocesan boundaries
would be subject to government approval. However, the Nazis
soon violated the concordat's terms, and by the late 1930s
almost all denominational schools had been abolished.
Toward the end of 1933, an opposition group under the
leadership of Lutheran pastors Martin Niemoller and Dietrich
Bonhoeffer formed the "Confessing Church." The members of
this church opposed the takeover of the Lutheran Church by
the Nazis. Many of its members were eventually arrested, and
some were executed — among them, Bonhoeffer — by the end
of World War II.
Postwar Christianity
The postwar division of Germany left roughly equal numbers
of Roman Catholics and Protestants in West Germany. East
Germany had five times as many Protestants as Roman Catho-
lics. There the authorities waged a persistent and largely suc-
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Germany: A Country Study
cessful campaign to minimize the influence and authority of
the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches.
In the Federal Republic, freedom of religion is guaranteed
by Article 4 of the Basic Law, and the churches enjoy a special
legal status as corporate bodies. In theory, there is constitu-
tional separation of church and state, but church financing
complicates this separation. To support churches and their
work, most Germans in the old Lander pay a voluntary church
tax, amounting to an 8 or 9 percent surcharge on income tax
paid. Living in a society known for consensus and conformity,
few West Germans formally withdrew from the established
churches before the 1980s and hence continued to pay the tax.
Beginning in the 1980s, negative attitudes toward the tax
and the churches become more common, and people began
leaving the churches in significant numbers. Between 1980 and
1992, about 1.0 million Roman Catholics and 1.2 million Prot-
estants gave up their church memberships. A faltering econ-
omy and increased taxes caused many to withdraw for financial
reasons. In a 1992 poll, approximately 42 percent of those que-
ried stated that the church tax was "much too high"; 64 percent
favored abolishing the tax and supporting the churches
through voluntary contributions. Fourteen percent of those
Roman Catholics and Protestants polled stated that they were
likely to withdraw or definitely would withdraw from their
church.
In a society increasingly materialist and secular, the spiritual
and moral positions of the churches became irrelevant to
many. Among the younger generation seeking autonomy and
self-fulfillment, allegiance was no longer simply surrendered
without question to institutions of authority. Attendance at ser-
vices dropped off significantly, and the institution of the
church quietly disappeared from the lives of many Germans.
In East Germany, although the constitution theoretically
provided for freedom of religion, the Marxist-Leninist state
placed formidable obstacles before those seeking to exercise
that basic right. Enormous pressure was exerted on citizens to
renounce religion. East Germans who practiced their religion
were denied educational and professional opportunities, for
example. Consequently, at unification the majority of East Ger-
mans were either not baptized or had left their church.
In the 1990s, polls in the new Lander revealed that more
than 70 percent of East Germans did not believe in God. Young
people were even less religious. Some polls found that only 16
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The Society and Its Environment
percent of East German schoolchildren believed in God. An
entire generation had been raised without the religious rituals
that traditionally had marked life's milestones. Secular rituals
had been substituted. For example, the Jugendweihe (youth ded-
ication) gradually supplanted the Christian practice of confir-
mation.
After unification in 1990, there were nominally 30.2 million
Protestants and 26.7 million Roman Catholics in united Ger-
many. Roman Catholics and Protestants combined amounted
to about 76 percent of the German population and 71 percent
of the country's total population.
Although less extreme than in the past, attitudes toward reli-
gion continue to polarize German society. In the 1990s, espe-
cially in the western Lander, attitudinal differences separate
many younger Germans with humanistic values (concern for
the environment, the rights of women and minorities, and
peace and disarmament issues) from an older generation who
hold traditional religious values. Many others of the postwar
generations have accepted the values of popular culture and
consumerism and have left the churches because they no
longer seem significant. Millions of Germans of all ages, how-
ever, continue to profess a religion for a variety of reasons,
among them strong religious beliefs, social pressure to con-
form, preservation of educational and employment opportuni-
ties, support for essential church social-welfare activities, and
(in the western Lander) the enduring appeal of Christian ritu-
als surrounding baptism, marriage, and burial.
As of 1995, it was difficult to determine to what extent Ger-
mans in the new Lander would return to religion. In the early
1990s, popular magazines featured stories about the "heatheni-
zation" of Germany. Although such a provocative characteriza-
tion of trends seems exaggerated, the incorporation of the
former East Germany did dilute religious influence in united
Germany. Conversely, however, the opening of eastern Ger-
many gave missionaries from the old Lander and from around
the world the chance to rekindle religious fervor. In the old
Lander, the churches have continued their vitally important
work of operating an extensive network of hospitals, nursing
homes, and other social institutions. The need for such ser-
vices and facilities is greatest in the five new Lander, and the
churches quickly stepped in to help.
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Germany: A Country Study
Roman Catholicism
With about 28.2 million members, the Roman Catholic
Church in unified Germany is organized into five archdioceses,
eighteen dioceses, three diocesan offices, and one apostolic
administration. Two of the archdioceses are based in Bavaria
(Munich/Freising and Bamberg) and two in North Rhine-
Westphalia (Cologne and Paderborn). More than 57 percent
of all German Roman Catholics live in these two Lander.
Another 28 percent live in the three Lander of Baden-Wurttem-
berg, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate. Only about 900 of the
church's 13,000 parishes and other pastoral centers are located
in the new Lander. The number of Roman Catholics in East
Germany declined from 2 million shortly after the war to
800,000 by 1992. Serving these Roman Catholics are two dio-
ceses, one in Brandenburg (Berlin) and the other in Saxony
(Dresden).
Between 1970 and 1989, the number of Roman Catholics
attending Sunday mass in West Germany declined from 37 per-
cent to 23 percent. Between 1970 and 1990, the number of
annual baptisms fell from about 370,000 to around 300,000.
Approximately 470,000 Roman Catholics officially left the
church between 1985 and 1990. In the same period, about
25,000 returned to the church, and another 25,000 converted
to other religions.
Despite the diminishing numbers of Roman Catholics, the
church tax enables the Roman Catholic Church to remain
strong financially. In 1992 the church's share of tax revenues
amounted to approximately DM8.5 billion. An additional DM8
billion was received in the form of government subsidies, ser-
vice payments, property, and contributions. Much of this sup-
port is returned to society through an extensive network of
church-operated kindergartens, senior citizen centers, and hos-
pitals. The main Roman Catholic charitable organization is the
Deutscher Caritasverband, which had about 400,000 employees
in 1992.
As the FRG has become an increasingly secular society, the
centuries-old traditional authority of the Roman Catholic
Church in matters of morality has declined, especially among
German youth. Many German Roman Catholics routinely
ignore the church and in particular the pope's positions on
such key issues as birth control, premarital sex, divorce, and
abortion. For years the number of ordinations in Germany has
declined. To address this issue, most German Catholics favor
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The Society and Its Environment
permitting priests to marry, and many support the ordination
of women.
Periodically, independent reformist clergymen challenge
the church hierarchy and doctrine. Often they do so with the
support of many German Catholics. In the 1970s, Hans Kiing, a
theologian at Tubingen University, used his position and cha-
risma to criticize the idea of papal infallibility and other dog-
mas. In the early 1990s, major differences of opinion between
the laity and church authorities were revealed by a clash
between a reform-minded priest and the archbishop in Pader-
born, the most conservative German diocese. For beliefs
deemed contrary to Vatican policies and dogma, Father Eugen
Drewermann was defrocked by Archbishop Johannes Degen-
hardt. In the tradition of Luther, Drewermann continued to
express his unorthodox views outside the church — at universi-
ties and in the media, including talk shows. A 1992 survey indi-
cated that among all Germans, Drewermann was more popular
than Pope John Paul II.
Protestantism
In the mid-1990s, most of the country's roughly 30 million
Protestants were organized into twenty-four member churches
of the Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in
Deutschland — EKD), headquartered in Hanover. Later in the
decade, the church's headquarters is scheduled to relocate to
Berlin. The mainline Protestant churches belong to one of
three groups: Lutheran (ten); Reformed, or Calvinist (two);
and United, or Lutheran-Calvinist (twelve). The largest num-
ber of congregations is in Saxony, Berlin, Brandenburg, Lower
Saxony, Bavaria, Thuringia, and Baden-Wurttemberg. Protes-
tant clergy are permitted to marry, and women are actively
engaged in the ministry. One of the most prominent women in
the EKD and in Germany in the mid-1990s was Maria Jepsen,
bishop of Hamburg.
In the early 1990s, about 5 percent of German Protestants
attended weekly services. Annual baptisms declined from
about 346,000 in 1970 to around 257,000 in 1990. Of the
257,000 baptisms in 1990, only about 12 percent took place in
the former East Germany. Out of 219,000 confirmations in
1990, about 10 percent involved East German youth. Like their
Roman Catholic counterparts, Protestant churches are well
supported by taxes and contributions. The EKD also runs
numerous hospitals and other social institutions and is a vitally
177
Germany: A Country Study
important member of the country's system of social welfare.
The main Protestant charitable organization is the Diakon-
isches Werk; it has about 350,000 employees.
In East Germany, Protestant churches became a focal point
of opposition during the 1980s. This was possible because of an
agreement with the authorities in 1978 that granted the
churches a degree of independence. Opposition groups, com-
posed of believers and nonbelievers alike, subsequently were
able to meet at the churches, where they discussed peace issues
and how East Germany could be reformed. In 1989 these
churches, in particular those in Leipzig, became staging points
for the massive demonstrations that led to the collapse of the
communist regime (see The Peace Movement and Internal
Resistance, ch. 2).
Free Churches
The free churches in Germany include about a dozen affili-
ated but independent churches and congregations that
emerged from Protestant renewal movements, primarily in the
nineteenth century. Some free churches practice baptism, and
others accept a simple public declaration of faith. Prominent
among the former are Baptists and Methodists, who set up reli-
gious communities in Germany in 1834 and 1849, respectively.
Methodism was brought to Germany by immigrants returning
from the United States. Since 1854 a third group, the Free
Evangelical Congregations, has practiced baptism of believers,
without making it a precondition for membership in the con-
gregation.
Although the various free churches follow different prac-
tices, they differ from the two main religions in Germany in
that they are independent of the state. The free churches, see-
ing themselves as "free churches in a free country," seek no spe-
cial treatment from the state and are funded almost exclusively
by members' voluntary contributions.
The emergence of these independent churches was accom-
panied by their persecution and denunciation as sects. For this
reason, overcoming prejudice has been a long and arduous
process. After World War II, the free churches were cofounders
of the Study Group of Christian Churches in West Germany
and West Berlin. They used this organization as a forum for fra-
ternal interaction with other churches.
The tenets of the free churches stress the importance of the
New Testament, freely expressed belief in Jesus Christ and a life
178
The Society and Its Environment
of service devoted to him, personal piety, and the sanctity of
human life. Conscientious objection to military service is a part
of the teachings of some free churches. Many free churches
emphasize the autonomy of the local parish and prefer to be
called a community rather than a church.
Since 1926 the original members of the Free Churches in
Germany have cooperated with one another through the Meet-
ing of Evangelical Free Churches. These churches are the Asso-
ciation of Evangelical Free Church Congregations, the
Association of Free Evangelical Congregations, and the Evan-
gelical Methodist Church. Five additional churches have guest
membership status: the Christian Study Group Mulheim/Ruhr,
the Sacred Army in Germany, the European-Festland Fraternal
Uniate, the Church of the Nazarene, and the Association of
German Mennonite Communities. These eight free churches
have a combined membership of approximately 195,000, orga-
nized in about 1,500 parishes or communities. Almost all these
churches are legal corporate bodies.
In recent years, the free churches' interaction and coopera-
tion with the established Protestant churches have intensified.
A few such activities include missionary work, Bible groups,
and humanitarian efforts such as "Bread for the World."
Orthodox Churches
Eastern Orthodox Christianity in Germany derives mainly
from the hundreds of thousands of Serbs who came to the
country in the 1960s and 1970s as Gastarbeiter. The breakup of
the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s caused thousands
more Serbs to come to Germany. Many of the Slavs from other
East European countries also belong to the Eastern Orthodox
Church. Germany's large Greek population belongs mostly to
the Greek Orthodox Church.
Judaism
When Hitler came to power in 1933, approximately 600,000
Jews lived in Germany, some of whom were among the most
prominent members of society. Over the next twelve years,
most fled or were murdered, along with millions of East Euro-
pean Jews, Slavs, and other nationalities. As of January 1992,
seventy-six Jewish congregations and Land associations had
about 34,000 members, with the largest communities located in
Berlin and Frankfurt am Main. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, several thousand Soviet Jews of German ancestry took
179
Germany: A Country Study
advantage of liberalized Soviet emigration policies and Ger-
man naturalization laws and resettled in the Federal Republic.
However, since unification in 1990 and the outbreak of radical
right-wing violence, some in the Jewish community, remember-
ing similar events in the 1930s, have left. Although most hate-
crimes and violence have been aimed at foreign workers and
asylum-seekers, there have been scattered incidents of attacks
on Jewish synagogues and memorials.
Islam
Following the influx of foreign laborers in the 1960s and
early 1970s, Islam established a religious presence in Germany,
making it the religion with the country's third largest member-
ship. As of 1994, approximately 2 million Muslims resided in
Germany. Most of the Muslims are either Turkish, Kurdish, Ira-
nian, or Palestinian. Additional Muslims have entered the
country as refugees, fleeing the ethnic and religious conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.
Social Structure and Social Mobility
Despite continuing although lessening differences in living
standards between the old and new Lander, in the mid-1990s
German social structure consists mainly of a large, prosperous
central stratum containing about 60 percent of the population.
This stratum includes mid-level civil servants, most salaried
employees, skilled blue-collar workers, and a shrinking pool of
farmers. A smaller wealthier group consisting of an upper-mid-
dle class and an upper class offsets the poverty experienced by
a poor lower class. Hence in terms of social indicators such as
education, average income, and property ownership, Germany
ranks among the world's leading countries. In terms of income,
for example, in 1991 the average German family had a net
monthly income of DM4,905, second highest among members
of the EC.
Social Structure
Most of the workforce is employed in the services sector.
West Germany completed the transition from an industrial
economy to one dominated by the services sector in the 1970s,
and by the late 1980s this sector employed two-thirds of the
workforce. In contrast, when the Berlin Wall fell, East Germany
still had not made this transition. Because more of the work-
180
Turks praying at a mosque in Berlin
A hospital operated by the Evangelical Church
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
181
Germany: A Country Study
force was engaged in industry and agriculture than in the ser-
vices sector, its socioeconomic structure resembled that of West
Germany in 1965.
Rainer Geissler, a German sociologist, has examined his
country's social structure in light of the economic changes that
have taken place in the postwar era. Because of the growth of
the services sector and the doubling of state employees since
1950, he has discarded earlier divisions of German society into
an elite class, middle class, and worker class, with a small ser-
vices class consisting of employees of all levels. He has replaced
this division with a more nuanced model that better reflects
these postwar changes. As the economy of the new Lander is
incorporated into the western economy, its much simpler
social structure (elite, self-employed, salaried employees, and
workers) will come to resemble that of the old Lander.
According to Geissler, at the end of the 1980s West Ger-
many's largest group (28 percent of the population) was an
educated salaried middle class, employed either in the services
sector or in the manufacturing sector as educated, white-collar
employees. Some members of this group earned very high sala-
ries; others earned skilled blue-collar wages. This professional
class has expanded at the expense of the old middle class,
which amounted to only 7 percent of the population at the end
of the 1980s. A less educated segment of the services sector, or
white-collar employee sector, amounted to 9 percent of the
population. Geissler divided the working class into three
groups: an elite of the best-trained and best-paid workers (12
percent); skilled workers (18 percent), about 5 percent of
whom are foreigners; and unskilled workers (15 percent),
about 25 percent of whom are foreigners. A portion of this last
group live below the poverty line. Farmers and their families
make up 6 percent of the population. At the top of his model
of the social structure, Geissler posits an elite of less than 1 per-
cent.
The Elite
During the centuries when Germany was a collection of
medium-and small-sized states, wealth and power were concen-
trated in the hands of the nobility, landed gentry, and wealthy
merchants in the cities. With the collapse of the German
Empire in 1918, the nobility and landed gentry suffered a
major setback, but they still retained much power and influ-
ence. During the interwar years, however, much political power
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The Society and Its Environment
devolved to representatives of other classes. A vivid illustration
of the transfer of power was former army corporal Adolf Hit-
ler's assumption of the German presidency following the death
of General Paul von Hindenburg in 1934.
The old propertied and monied elites suffered an additional
loss of power after World War II. In the new worker-dominated
GDR, they saw their property confiscated and their power evap-
orate. West German society was transformed by the rapidly
expanding social market economy and the migration of mil-
lions of displaced persons from the east, many of whom were
well educated and capable. Some of the old elite and their off-
spring retained positions of influence (most notably in the mil-
itary and the diplomatic corps), but to an extent greater than
ever before, the elite class became open to society as a whole.
According to Geissler, Germany's elite numbers just a few
thousand, less than 1 percent of the population, but its influ-
ence far outweighs its numbers. The elite consists of persons
occupying key positions in such social sectors as business, poli-
tics, labor unions, the civil service, the media, and the
churches. Membership in the elite is based on performance
and is rarely inherited. For this reason, Germany's elite is plu-
ralist in nature because members of lower social strata can
enter it by rising to the top of a social sector. The openness of
elite positions varies. Sons of workers routinely come to hold
high positions in labor unions or in the SPD, but rarely in
banking or the diplomatic corps. A vital criterion for advance-
ment is a university degree, most notably a law degree, because
about one-third of Germany's elite consists of lawyers.
Entry into East Germany's elite was determined almost
exclusively by ideological considerations. Small and
entrenched, the East German elite has been characterized as
monopolistic, in contrast to that of the West German elite,
where numerous groups shared or competed for power. Most
of the GDR elite has lost power since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
As a result, a new elite similar to the pluralistic elite of the old
Lander \s forming in the new Lander.
The Self-Employed
The self-employed provide a service on their own or are the
owners of firms that provide a service or a product. In West
Germany in 1989, the self-employed constituted 8.8 percent of
the workforce, compared with 16.0 percent in 1950; their
decline was even steeper in East Germany, from 20.4 to 2.2 per-
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Germany: A Country Study
cent over the same period. The self-employed are a heteroge-
neous group, encompassing shipping magnates and
seamstresses and artists and gas station owners. As a result, the
earnings of the group's members vary considerably — some
members are wealthy, most rank in the upper middle or middle
class in terms of income and social prestige, and some (about 7
percent of this group) are poor. Excluding farmers, annual
household income of the self-employed in the old Lander in
1991 amounted to about DM150,000, almost triple the average
household income.
As property owners and food producers, farmers are a small
but significant part of the self-employed. In both Germanys,
the number of farmers fell dramatically in the postwar era: in
the west, from 5 million (or 10 percent of the population) in
1950 to 864,000 (or 1.4 percent) in 1989; in the east, from
740,000 in 1951 to only 3,000 in the early 1990s.
A typical agricultural enterprise in the old Lander is a small-
or medium-sized farm worked by the owner, assisted by one or
two family members. Some farmers are wealthy, while others
only earn a bare subsistence. Farmers' average household
income is lower than that of most other self-employed but is
about 25 percent higher than the national average.
Salaried Employees
The number of salaried employees grew greatly in the post-
war era in West Germany, from 16 percent of the workforce in
1950, to 33 percent in 1974, and to 42 percent in 1989. Salaried
employees work in three main areas: commercial, technical,
and administrative. In 1989, 68 percent of salaried employees
worked in the services sector and 32 percent in industry.
Geissler divides salaried employees (including civil servants)
into two groups: a lower group that performs simple routine
tasks (hairdressers, salesclerks, bus drivers, and low-level civil
servants such as letter carriers) and that in 1989 accounted for
9 percent of West Germany's population; and an upper group
with advanced education and responsibility, often unsuper-
vised, that performs complex tasks (accountants, teachers, law-
yers, and engineers) and that accounted for 28 percent of the
population. The jobs of the upper group often involve much
stress, and half its members have complained of it, compared
with less than one-fourth of skilled workers.
In 1988 the households of salaried employees in West Ger-
many earned on the whole 36 percent more than workers'
184
The Society and Its Environment
households. Studies have found that despite their modest
social prestige and income, only 13 percent of the lower group
of salaried employees regard themselves as workers. Salaried
employees as a whole see themselves as belonging to the mid-
dle class. According to various studies cited by Geissler, the
social animosity that prevailed between salaried employees and
workers in the first half of the twentieth century has evolved
into a more subtle sense of belonging to different groups. This
feeling of distinctness is most strongly felt by salaried employ-
ees far removed from the workbench, for example, those in
banking.
Generally speaking, salaried employees tend to believe that
they must look out for themselves on an individual basis, rather
than collectively, as is more common among workers. The
higher salaried employees rise in their profession, the more
likely this is to be the case. In consequence, a smaller portion
of salaried employees are members of labor unions than are
workers.
Civil Servants
Civil servants (Beamteri) have a long tradition in Germany.
Their number more than doubled between 1950 and 1989,
from 790,000 to 1.8 million in West Germany, where they
accounted for 6.6 percent of the workforce. Because teachers
and professors are civil servants in Germany, much of this
increase came from the expansion of education in the postwar
era. Only about one-third of those working for the state are
regarded as civil servants. The remainder are either hourly or
salaried employees without the special status and rights of civil
servants. In 1989 civil servants and government employees
accounted for 16.6 percent of the workforce.
Civil servants have complete job security, generous pensions,
and higher net incomes than salaried employees. In return for
these advantages, civil servants are to serve the state loyally and
carry out their duties in a nonpartisan way. This does not, how-
ever, prevent civil servants from being active in politics and
even being elected to public office.
Workers
Although West Germany became primarily a services-sector
economy in the 1970s, blue-collar workers remain a vitally
important segment of the workforce, even though they are out-
numbered by salaried employees. At the end of the 1980s,
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Germany: A Country Study
workers accounted for two-fifths of the workforce in West Ger-
many, a drop from three-fifths in 1900 and slightly more than
one-half in 1960. The social market economy and powerful
trade unions greatly improved workers' working conditions, job
security, and living standards in the postwar era. Between 1970
and 1989, for example, their average net earnings increased 41
percent in real terms, more than any other group except for
the self-employed (not including farmers) and pensioners. In
the 1980s, about 43 percent of skilled workers and 29 percent
of unskilled or partially trained workers lived in their own
houses or apartments; automobile ownership and lengthy vaca-
tions (often abroad) had become the rule.
As a result of these changes, German workers no longer live
separately from the rest of society as was the case in the nine-
teenth century and for much of the twentieth century. The
gradual, so-called deproletarianization has caused some sociol-
ogists to maintain that it is no longer accurate to speak of Ger-
man workers as a separate social group. Geissler is aware of the
much-improved living standards of the workers and the grad-
ual disappearance of a proletarian lifestyle, but he maintains
that workers still constitute a distinct group because their earn-
ings are lower than average, their work is physically demanding
and closely supervised, and their children's opportunities for
social advancement are not as good as those of most other
groups. In addition, most workers still regard themselves as
members of the working class, although a growing percentage
see themselves as middle class.
According to Geissler, the working class is composed of three
distinct subgroups: elite, skilled, and unskilled or partially
trained workers. In the mid-1980s, about 12 percent of the pop-
ulation lived in the households of the worker elite, 19 percent
in those of skilled workers, and 16 percent in those of the
unskilled.
The worker elite, which is composed of supervisors and
highly trained personnel, enjoys better pay than the other
groups. Its work is less physically demanding and resembles
that of salaried employees. Only one-third of the sons of the
worker elite remain workers, and about one-half of the group
see themselves as members of the middle class.
Skilled workers have completed a set course of vocational
training. This group has expanded in recent decades and in
the early 1990s outnumbered the unskilled, which even as late
as 1970 accounted for 57 percent of workers.
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The Society and Its Environment
Unskilled workers perform the poorest paid and dirtiest
tasks. Foreigners account for about 25 percent of this group
and German women for about 38 percent. A portion of this
group lives below the poverty line. In addition to their other
burdens, the unskilled are most likely to become unemployed
and involved in criminal activity.
The Poor
As a large, urbanized, industrial country with a diverse popu-
lation, Germany has a portion of its population living in pov-
erty. The European Union (EU — see Glossary) classifies as
poor those households that have less than half the average net
income. According to this definition, in 1992 approximately
7.5 percent of the population in the old Lander and 14.8 per-
cent in the new Lander were poor. The number of poor has
been growing since 1970, when the number of those receiving
social assistance reached its lowest point of 750,000. In the
early 1990s, one study estimated that in 1992 there were 4.6
million recipients of various kinds of social assistance, nearly
700,000 of whom lived in the new Lander. Households with
three or more children and single parents were the most likely
recipients of social assistance.
Social Mobility
Upward social mobility, or the ability or chance of offspring
to improve their social position relative to that of their parents,
expanded in both Germanys during the postwar era. The
growth of the services sector was the primary cause of this
expansion. The large, well-trained workforce required by this
sector was supplied by a greatly expanded education system. As
a result, many Germans received a better education than had
their parents.
The postwar era saw the formation of a large, newly edu-
cated middle class, which grew at the expense of the small tra-
ditional middle class, many of whose members were merchants
and the owners of small firms. Joining this older middle class
was difficult because membership required capital, property,
and other kinds of assets. For this reason, it was a relatively
closed class, and its members were usually the offspring of
existing members. By contrast, joining the new professional
middle class depended on academic training, something
readily available in postwar West Germany, where education
was inexpensive and financial aid was easily obtainable.
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Germany: A Country Study
One study measuring social mobility in the postwar decades
used a six-level model to track Germans born between 1930
and 1949. It found that 20 percent had moved up to the next
higher level, 10 percent had moved up two levels, and 2 per-
cent had moved up three levels. Some downward mobility was
recorded as well. For example, 1 percent had dropped three
levels.
Opportunities for upward social mobility varied, however,
according to one's place in society. Blue-collar workers, for
example, did not show as much social mobility as other classes,
although their mobility increased somewhat in the late postwar
decades. A commonly used index to measure social mobility is
the percentage of sons remaining within the social stratum or
milieu of their fathers. West German studies have shown that in
1970 only 5 percent of blue-collar workers' sons managed to
move up into better paying, higher status professions in the ser-
vices sector. By 1979 the percentage had more than doubled to
11 percent. The percentage of sons of lower-level salaried and
public-sector employees moving into elevated professional
positions had increased from 12 to 22 percent in the same
period.
Another study examined the likelihood of different groups
securing a position in the two top levels of the services sector.
The first and upper level accounts for about 10 percent of total
employment and consists of positions in medicine, law, higher
education, upper levels of administration, and the like. The
second and lower level accounts for about 15 percent of
employment and consists of positions in teaching, mid-level
management, retailing, computers, and the like. The study
found that about two-thirds of those employed in the top level
and nearly three-fifths of those in the second level are the off-
spring of persons employed in these levels. Only about 20 per-
cent of the sons of workers are employed in these levels. Access
to the top level is very restricted, with 4 percent of the sons of
skilled workers and 2 percent of the sons of unskilled workers
employed there. Almost no farmers' sons move into the top lev-
els.
Geissler has found three occupational categories particularly
conducive to upward mobility: the self-employed, the nonman-
ual service providers, and the worker elite. Self-recruitment in
the three categories is relatively low. Geissler holds that this
indicates that the offspring of those so employed are finding
higher status positions. In contrast to these groups, 93 percent
188
The Society and Its Environment
of farmers are the sons of farmers; farmers' offspring who leave
the farm usually become either skilled or unskilled workers.
As of the first half of the 1990s, social mobility trends in the
new Lander had not yet stabilized. Both upward and downward
mobility are greater than in the old Lander. The widespread dis-
qualification of the GDR elite meant downward mobility for
many. The rapid transformation of the social structure through
the replacement of a command socialist economy with a social
market economy is also causing much social mobility, especially
between generations. Children often do not work in the same
sector as their parents. A new social class of entrepreneurs is
being formed as the new Lander become integrated into the
western economy.
The Search for a New National Identity
In the aftermath of unification, Germans are searching for a
new identity. There appear to be at least two distinct German
identities, and obstacles to their speedy fusion seem formida-
ble.
In the postwar period, West Germany became an upwardly
mobile, success-oriented society. By 1990 a broad and prosper-
ous middle-class and upper-middle-class society had developed.
Although they still worked hard to earn the vacation and work-
ing conditions among the best in the world, West Germans
sought to create a "leisure society." There was a movement, for
example, advocating the adoption of a four-day workweek.
Work was intrinsically less important to West Germans than to
East Germans; instead, they prized personal fulfillment, recre-
ation, health, and the natural environment.
Through a remarkable transformation, West Germans had
rehabilitated themselves, had become internationally oriented,
and had assumed a leading role within the larger European
community. Members of the older generation, especially those
"blessed by a late birth" (too young to be Nazis), were
self-assured and proud of the Federal Republic's political, eco-
nomic, and social achievements. Starting in the 1960s, the
younger generation discovered new freedoms and exercised
them. In the 1970s and 1980s, youth- and student-led protests
were mounted against nuclear weapons and nuclear power
plants and in favor of peace, disarmament, and environmental
protection.
By the early 1990s, most of the 1960s generation had been
assimilated into the German establishment, but its experiences
189
Germany: A Country Study
in challenging authority and winning concessions produced
evolutionary changes in German society economy, and cul-
ture. This generation's influence could be seen in the huge
candlelight vigils staged by people of all ages to protest
right-wing violence and xenophobia.
On the other side of the fortified border, East German soci-
ety was decidedly working class, with comparatively minor class
distinctions. Where there were significant income differentials,
the extra money was of little consequence in an economy
marked by shortages of most consumer goods. The state appa-
ratus provided security in the form of guaranteed employment,
free education and health care, and subsidized low rent.
Homelessness was unknown in the GDR. Other social ills such
as violent crime, drug abuse, and prostitution also were much
less prevalent than in the west.
In terms of their attitude toward state authority and the fam-
ily, easterners manifested values characteristic of westerners in
the late 1950s and 1960s. On the factory floor or the collective
farm, conditions were often primitive and the workweek long
(forty-three or more hours). The workforce, too, was reminis-
cent of an earlier Germany, with greater numbers employed in
smokestack industries or in fields and mines, and far fewer in
the services or information sector. One of many revelations
after unification was the information illiteracy of easterners.
With few external options or diversions, East Germans iden-
tified with home and family more than their counterparts in
the west. Deprived of the means and liberty to travel outside
communist Eastern Europe, they formed what some sociolo-
gists called a "niche society," retreating into an inner circle to
find a degree of privacy.
For three generations, East Germans had been indoctri-
nated in the thought processes of two forms of totalitarianism
in succession: nazism and communism. With the collapse of
communism, Germans living in the new Lander had few values
and beliefs, aside from personal ones, with which to identify.
Embittered by the seemingly imperialistic imposition of all
things West German, some easterners developed "an identity of
defiance" ( Trotzidentitat) .
In the initial stage of union, Germans focused on the pro-
found differences that had evolved in the two states since the
end of World War II. In the Federal Republic, one of the
world's wealthiest countries, quality-of-life issues played key
roles in defining one's place and identity in society. Home own-
190
The Society and Its Environment
ership, travel experiences, and leisure activities of all kinds
were translated into powerful status symbols.
In stark contrast, the state owned practically all property in
East Germany. Expectations of improving individual or family
lifestyles were modest. Overall, the eastern Ldnderwere decades
behind the west in most categories measuring standard of liv-
ing. Coming from a society grown accustomed to measuring
itself and others by the yardstick of material prosperity, it was
not surprising that West Germans felt more in common with
their neighbors to the west, in whose countries they frequently
traveled.
In some respects, the former GDR stood in relation to the
FRG as a colony to an imperial power, and it was not long
before westerners and easterners began acting out the roles of
"know-it-alls" (westerners) and "whimpering easterners."
Within several years of the opening of the Berlin Wall, the
former East Germany was transformed from a full-employment
society to one having more than 1 million unemployed and
hundreds of thousands of part-time workers.
Forced resocialization has weighed heavily on eastern Ger-
mans' self-esteem. The cleft between east and west is suffi-
ciently deep and wide to make easterners appear to be
foreigners in their own land, or at best second-class citizens. By
August 1992, the situation had deteriorated to the point where
a headline on the cover of Der Spiegel, the influential weekly
magazine, summed it up in three words: "Germans Against
Germans."
In modern European history, the merging of two fundamen-
tally different social, political, and economic systems such as
those that evolved in the two Germanys has no precedent. For-
tunately for the newly united country, most Germans still rely
on the traditional traits of diligence, orderliness, discipline,
and thrift, and these shared values ultimately should resolve
the problems associated with the merger of two states and soci-
eties at vastly different levels of development and achievement.
* * *
As of mid-1995, no postunification survey of German geogra-
phy in English had been published. The standard text remains
Roy E.H. Mellor's The Two Germanies. Alun Jones's The New Ger-
many, published in 1994, deals with key social and economic
developments since unification. Developments in German Politics,
191
Germany: A Country Study
edited by Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl,
and Stephen Padgett, includes chapters dealing with aspects of
German society, including ones on women, the environment,
and immigration policies. Each chapter has been written by a
noted specialist and includes suggestions for further reading.
German Politics and Society, a quarterly journal published by the
Center for German and European Studies of the University of
California at Berkeley, contains a variety of scholarly articles
dealing with German society. A more journalistic approach is
John Ardagh's widely available and highly informative Germany
and the Germans.
Three articles especially illuminating on demographic devel-
opments are "Germany's Population: Turbulent Past, Uncer-
tain Future" by Gerhard Heilig, Thomas Buttner, and Wolfgang
Lutz; "Bericht 1990 zur demographischen Lage: Trends in
beiden Teilen Deutschlands und Auslander in der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland" by Charlotte Hohn, Ulrich Mammey, and
Hartmut Wendt; and "Demographic Shocks after Communism:
Eastern Germany, 1989-93" by Nicholas Eberstadt.
A comprehensive survey of German social structure is
Rainer Geissler's Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. The German
government's annual statistical survey, Statistisches Jahrbuch fur
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, provides much statistical infor-
mation about many aspects of German society. Facts about Ger-
many, edited by Arno Kappler and Adriane Grevel, periodically
updated and available from German embassies, contains brief
surveys of several areas covered in this chapter. (For further
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
192
Chapter 4. Social Welfare, Health Care, and
Education
Ludwig van Beethoven, 1 770-1827, received his early music training in Bonn.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY in Germany has
followed a unique historical path. During a long process of
growth and social experimentation, Germany combined a vig-
orous and highly competitive capitalist economy with a social
welfare system that, with some exceptions, has provided its citi-
zens cradle-to-grave security. The system's benefits are so exten-
sive that by the 1990s annual total spending by the state,
employers, and private households on health care, pensions,
and other aspects of what Germans call the social safety net
amounted to roughly DM1 trillion (for value of the deutsche
mark — see Glossary) and accounted for about one-third of the
country's gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). Unlike
many of the world's advanced countries, however, Germany
does not provide its citizens with health care, pensions, and
other social welfare benefits through a centralized state-run sys-
tem. Rather, it provides these benefits via a complex network of
national agencies and a large number of independent regional
and local entities — some public, some quasi-public, and many
private and voluntary. Many of these structures date from the
nineteenth century, and some from much earlier.
The legislation that established the basis of this system dates
from the 1880s and was passed by imperial Germany's parlia-
ment, the Reichstag, with the dual purpose of helping German
workers meet life's vicissitudes and thereby making them less
susceptible to socialism. This legislation set the main principles
that have guided the development of social policy in Germany
to the present day: membership in insurance programs is man-
dated by law; the administration of these programs is delegated
to nonstate bodies with representatives of the insured and
employers; entitlement to benefits is linked to past contribu-
tions rather than need; benefits and contributions are related
to earnings; and financing is secured through wage taxes levied
on the employer and the employee and, depending on the pro-
gram, sometimes through additional state financing.
These insurance programs were developed from the bottom
up. They first covered elements of the working class and then
extended coverage to ever broader segments of the population
and incorporated additional risks. Over time, these programs
came to provide a wide net of entitlements to those individuals
having a steady work history.
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Germany: A Country Study
By international standards, the German welfare system is
comprehensive and generous. However, not everyone benefits
equally. In the mid-1990s, the so-called safety net was deficient
for the lower-income strata and the unemployed. It was also
inadequate for persons needing what Germans term "social
aid," that is, assistance in times of hardship. In 1994, for exam-
ple, 4.6 million persons needed social aid, a 100 percent
increase since the 1980s. Germans who had been citizens of the
former German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Ger-
many), which became part of the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG, or West Germany) in 1990, tend to be overrepresented
in each of these groups.
Women are more at a disadvantage than any other social
group. This fact stems from the bias of German social insur-
ance programs in favor of a male breadwinner model; most
women receive social and health protection by virtue of their
dependent status as spouse. Hence, despite the existence of a
comprehensive interlocking social net, women face inequali-
ties in accruing benefits in their own right because of periods
spent rearing children or caring for an elderly parent.
Divorced women also fare poorly because of the welfare sys-
tem's provisions, as do widows, whose pensions are low.
In addition to these problems or shortcomings, Germany's
social welfare and health programs have had to contend with
the unification of the former West Germany and East Germany
in 1990. West Germany's approach to social insurance, health
insurance, unemployment insurance (which did not exist in
the former GDR), accident insurance, and social aid and assis-
tance has been applied to East Germany. This fact has meant
that the complex and heterogeneous organizational and finan-
cial arrangements present in the former West Germany to
deliver health and social services have had to be built up in the
former East Germany, in many cases entirely from scratch.
The need for this extension of social welfare programs fol-
lows logically from the former East Germany's transition to a
free-market economy in which employment, health care, and
social insurance benefits have always been highly contingent
upon each other. In the absence of an East German democratic
tradition and attitudes supportive of the new institutions and,
as well, of adequate private organizational resources and skilled
manpower, Germany's attempt to integrate two entirely differ-
ent systems of social protection, education, and health care
196
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
purely by means of law, administrative provisions, and financial
resources is bound to produce problems for years to come.
In the mid-1990s, representatives of Germany's political par-
ties, businesses, unions, and voluntary social services agencies
continued to wage a vigorous debate over social policy. At issue
is the role to be played by state and/or nongovernmental vol-
untary charitable agencies, churches, and other social service
providers and how to find a politically acceptable mix of public
and private institutions. Ever since the nineteenth century,
especially during periods of economic and social crisis, there
has been a recurrent demand to shift from insurance-based
programs to a universal flat-rate and tax-financed program in
order to secure a minimum income for all. However, there has
never been sufficient political support for eliminating insur-
ance-based programs. In the postwar period, business groups
and the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demo-
kratische Union — CDU), with the exception of the left wing
within the CDU, tended to support the continued segmenta-
tion of the labor force into separate insurance-based programs
for various occupational groups. In contrast, the labor unions
and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD) tended to support uni-
tary programs for the entire labor force.
The great costs of unification have raised the possibility of
ending the steady expansion of social welfare programs that
had been going on for more than a century. The current con-
servative governing coalition has proposed reductions in bene-
fits to finance unification. Other factors such as the
increasingly competitive global economy and structural
changes in the labor market have also raised questions about
the continued affordability of German social policy. As a result,
the government is increasingly listening to employers who
insist that their share of employee benefit payments be
reduced in order that German business remain competitive in
a global economy.
The integration of the two entirely different education sys-
tems that emerged after the 1945 division of the country has
also raised many controversial issues. No consensus has
emerged on whether Germany should adopt the unified school
system found in the former East Germany or the heteroge-
neous three-tiered system of the former West Germany. Nor is
there consensus on whether to increase the number of school
years by one year for students in eastern Germany or to reduce
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Germany: A Country Study
the thirteen years of schooling in western Germany to twelve
years. A greater uniformity within the country's education sys-
tem is also needed because the plethora of school tracks and
the diversity of curricula and qualifying examinations might
indeed endanger the mobility of students and teachers within
Germany and within Europe in general.
Social Insurance and Welfare Programs
Historical Development
After Germany was united in 1871 under the direction of
Otto von Bismarck, the nation developed a common govern-
ment structure and social policy. But the fact that united Ger-
many had been formed out of four kingdoms, five grand
duchies, twelve duchies, twelve principalities, and three free cit-
ies was a crucial factor in the way social welfare was adminis-
trated. Although after unification social welfare policy was
increasingly formulated on the national level, the social insur-
ance programs implementing national policy were aimed at
different social strata and were administered in highly decen-
tralized ways.
The new social welfare system that developed after unifica-
tion in 1871 used existing decentralized structures to provide
an ever increasing range of benefits. Because of this, most
social welfare programs in Germany are not administered by
state bureaucracies. Instead, except for the period when Ger-
many was ruled by the regime of Adolf Hitler (1933-45) and
when the former East Germany (1949-90) established a state-
run social welfare program, the organizations implementing
social policy have been private voluntary entities, some of
which date from the Middle Ages. Thus, Germany has imple-
mented a national social policy through an extensive decentral-
ized and pluralistic network of voluntary agencies.
Germans see their economy as a social market economy, that
is, one that combines a capitalist mode of production with the
belief that society should protect all its members from eco-
nomic and social need. Such protection is provided by a system
of social insurance to which people contribute according to
their incomes with the understanding that they may someday
need its assistance. The belief that society is responsible for the
well-being of its members is called solidarity, or Solidaritat, and
is a key concept of German social policy.
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
Germans have combined the notion of solidarity with fed-
eral and decentralized arrangements of power sharing, or Sub-
sidaritdt, another concept that lies at the heart of German
political culture and is characteristic of all German-speaking
countries. Fundamentally, Subsidaritdt means building social
organizations and society from the bottom up rather than from
the top down. As a result of this concept, Germans rely on
grassroots social entities whenever possible to provide social
services and make use of higher-level institutions only when
lower-level ones are found to be inadequate.
Solidaritdt and Subsidaritdt have affected the development of
a national social policy, but most of all they have shaped its
implementation. For example, Germany's social insurance pro-
grams are quasi-public self-governing bodies subject in most
cases to labor and management control, but they are largely
independent of the public sector, which retains only supervi-
sory powers. The primary providers of most social assistance
services are private-sector voluntary organizations, most of
which are church related. Government offices at the regional
and local levels generally determine and handle cash benefits
and allowances established at the national level.
Some of the most important voluntary social service agen-
cies and church-related groups predate the unification of Ger-
many in 1871; others date from the last decades of the
nineteenth century. The first German chapter of the Interna-
tional Red Cross was founded in 1863. Out of it grew the Ger-
man Red Cross, one of the country's key voluntary agencies.
The Innere Mission, which later became the Diakonisches
Werk of the Evangelical Church in Germany, was founded in
1848. The Roman Catholic charity Deutscher Caritasverband,
the largest of the voluntary welfare associations, dates from
1897. The German Non-Denominational Welfare Association,
as it became known after 1932, was founded in 1920 to repre-
sent all nonchurch-related hospitals. The Workers' Welfare
Organization was founded in 1919 from numerous Social Dem-
ocratic women's groups working for the well-being of children.
Despite the radically different political regimes in power in
Germany since 1871, German social policy has shown a remark-
able degree of continuity in organizational arrangements and
financing. Change has been largely of an incremental nature,
and new programs have conformed to previously existing prin-
ciples and patterns.
199
Germany: A Country Study
The beginning of the national German social welfare system
occurred in the 1880s while Bismarck was in power. A primary
motivation for social legislation was the government's desire to
erode support for socialism among workers and to establish the
superiority of the Prussian state over the churches. The govern-
ment hoped that provision of economic security in case of
major risks and loss of income would promote political integra-
tion and political stability. Three laws laid the foundations of
the German social welfare system: the Health Insurance of
Workers Law of 1883, which provided protection against the
temporary loss of income as a result of illness; the Accident
Insurance Law of 1884, which aided workers injured on the
job; and the Old Age and Invalidity Insurance Law of 1889. Ini-
tially, these three laws covered only the top segments of the
blue-collar working class.
The second phase of the German social welfare system
spanned the period from 1890, the year of Bismarck's resigna-
tion, to 1918. During this period, improvements were made in
the initial programs.The National Insurance Code of 1911 inte-
grated the three separate insurance programs into a unified
social security system, and compulsory coverage and benefits
were extended to white-collar workers. Survivors' pensions for
widows were also introduced in 1911. (The many amendments
to the National Insurance Code of 1911 were later integrated
into the Social Insurance Code of 1988.) In 1916 survivors'
benefits were increased, and the retirement age for workers
was reduced from seventy to sixty-five. Because its cooperation
was needed to maintain production during World War I, the
working class acquired more political influence and won
greater social protection and representation during this
period. Efforts were also made to develop mechanisms for set-
tling labor disputes and organizing voluntary employee com-
mittees, issues taken up by new labor legislation and decrees.
Most efforts were completed by the mid-1920s.
The Weimar Republic (1918-33) saw a further expansion of
social welfare programs. In 1920 war victims' benefits were
added to the social welfare system. In 1922 the Youth Welfare
Act was passed, which today continues to serve as the basic
vehicle for all youth-related programs. Unemployment relief
was consolidated in 1923 into a regular assistance program,
financed by employees and employers. The same year, the 1913
agreement between doctors and sickness funds about who
could treat sickness-funds patients was integrated into the
200
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
National Insurance Code. Also in 1923, a national law on min-
ers created a single agency for the administration of social
insurance programs for miners; before the law went into effect,
110 separate associations had administered the program. In
1924 a modern public assistance program replaced the poor
relief legislation of 1870, and in 1925 the accident insurance
program was reformed, allowing occupational diseases to
become insurable risks. In 1927 a national unemployment
insurance program was also established. These gains in social
insurance and assistance programs were threatened by the
Great Depression of the early 1930s, however. Reduced wages
meant smaller contributions to social insurance and assistance
programs, all of which were soon on the brink of bankruptcy.
The Hitler regime introduced major changes in individual
programs and program administration. In 1934 the regime dis-
mantled the self-governance structure of all social insurance
programs and appointed directors who reported to the central
authorities. The regime made many improvements in social
insurance programs and benefits, but these changes were con-
ceived to serve the regime rather than the population. In 1938
artisans came to be covered under compulsory social insur-
ance, and in 1941 public health insurance coverage was
extended to pensioners. In 1942 all wage-earners regardless of
occupation were covered by accident insurance, health care
became unlimited, and maternity leave was extended to twelve
fully paid weeks with job protection.
Two separate German states evolved after World War II, each
with its own social welfare programs. In the GDR, the state
became even stronger than it had been under Hitler. The com-
munist-directed Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialis-
tische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED) had a near
monopoly of control over all social and political institutions,
including those that administered social welfare programs.
Initially, the GDR retained separate social insurance plans,
but by 1956 the plans had been unified into two compulsory,
centrally controlled, and hierarchically organized systems that
provided universal flat-rate benefits. Special programs also
served the so-called technical and scientific intelligentsia, civil
servants, police, and members of the National People's Army
(Nationale Volksarmee — NVA) and other security organiza-
tions. All programs were heavily state subsidized, unlike those
in West Germany. Because the right to work was guaranteed,
unemployment insurance did not exist.
201
Germany: A Country Study
West Germany moved away from Hitler's central state direc-
tion and returned to decentralized administration and control.
Social insurance and social protection programs under labor
and management control, which were characteristic of the
Weimar period, were restored. The return to separate earn-
ings-related and means-tested benefits for different groups
meant that social insurance, social compensation, and public
assistance (or social aid) were not integrated into one overall
administration, as some Germans wished and as the Allied
Control Council had intended in 1946 when it drafted a uni-
fied national insurance system. In the mid-1970s, legislators
attempted to consolidate the goals, the protection, and the
entitlements as much as possible. But they failed to develop a
coherently organized and uniform system that would have
eliminated disparities in individual entitlements. Indeed, by
the mid-1990s the disparities in welfare benefits entitlements in
unified Germany had become more significant than ever
before.
Provisions of the Social Welfare System
The German social welfare tradition divides entitlement pro-
grams into three types. The first and most common type con-
sists of contributory social insurance programs that protect
those who pay into them from loss of income and unplanned
expenditures because of illness, accident, old age or disability,
and unemployment. The second type consists of noncontribu-
tory social compensation programs that provide tax-financed
social welfare (such as health care, pensions, and other bene-
fits) to those — civil servants, for example — who perform a pub-
lic service to society. Tax-financed social compensation is also
provided to those who have suffered from income loss or dis-
ability as a result of military or other public service, and allow-
ances are provided to their dependents in the case of death.
Since 1976 victims of violent crimes have also been eligible for
social compensation. In addition, social compensation can con-
sist of payments to all members of society and includes tax-
funded child, housing, and educational allowances. The third
type of social welfare programs provides social aid, or assis-
tance, to persons in need who are not eligible for assistance
from the other two kinds of social entitlement programs or
who need additional aid because they are still in need — for
example, if their pensions are too small to provide them with
decent housing. Aid can consist of general income mainte-
202
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
nance payments (including payments for food, housing, cloth-
ing, and furniture) and assistance for those with special needs,
such as the disabled, and individuals without health insurance
(0.3 percent of the total German population).
In order to better measure the extent of social welfare
expenditures, since 1960 the Germans have used the concept
of a social budget to lump together all forms of social spend-
ing, whether by the government, by the country's large social
insurance programs, or by other sources. The steady expansion
of social welfare programs and the increased costs of such
items as pensions and medical care caused West Germany's
social budget to increase tenfold between 1960 and 1990, from
DM68.9 billion in 1960 to DM703.1 billion in 1990. The West
German economy expanded greatly in this period so that the
social budget's share of GNP increased from about one-fifth in
1960 to about one-third by 1990. Roughly two-fifths of the 1990
social budget went to pension payments and one-third to
health care. By 1992 the social budget had grown to about
DM900 billion, a sharp increase caused by the unification of
the two Germanys. Unification meant an increased population
and many special needs of the five new states (Lander, sing.,
Land) in eastern Germany.
In 1990 the public sector (federal, Land, and local govern-
ments) paid for about 38 percent of the social budget, employ-
ers for 32 percent, and private households for about 29
percent. The remainder was financed by social insurance and
private organizations.
The cost of the social budget for an average wage earner is
difficult to assess. By the mid-1990s, however, a typical wage
earner was estimated to pay about one-fifth of his or her
income in direct taxes (only part of which went to the social
budget) and another one-fifth for the compulsory social insur-
ance programs. In addition, there were many indirect taxes,
which accounted for about two-fifths of all tax revenue. The
most important of the indirect taxes is the value-added tax
(VAT — see Glossary), set in 1993 at 15 percent for most goods
and at 7 percent for basic commodities each time it is assessed.
Given Germany's demographic trends, the cost of the social
budget is certain to increase in the coming decades.
Social Insurance
The social insurance program was established in 1889 and
provides retirement pay. Although the central government has
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Germany: A Country Study
always formulated social insurance policy, the implementation
of the program is decentralized. In unified Germany, control
over the blue-collar insurance programs remains in the hands
of twenty-three Land-based insurance agencies and four federal
insurance agencies. In the old Lander in western Germany,
eighteen Land-based insurance agencies serve people in geo-
graphical districts that conform to those established in the
nineteenth century, not to the geographical entities created
after 1945. With the assistance of staff from the West German
insurance agencies, five Land-based and self-governing insur-
ance agencies were established in the new Lander.
Four federal insurance agencies serve four groups in unified
Germany: federal railroad workers, merchant marine seamen,
miners, and white-collar workers. Civil servants and their
dependents are covered by a separate retirement program
financed by outlays from federal, Land, and local governments.
Other retirement programs provide retirement income for reg-
istered craftsmen, agricultural workers, and self-employed pro-
fessionals.
Because of population trends that indicate a worsening
worker/retiree ratio and the likelihood of solvency problems
in the next century, the pension reform of 1992 increased the
usual retirement age from sixty-three to sixty-five, beginning in
2001. Whatever the legal retirement age, many Germans retire
early for health reasons on disability pensions.
The amount of retirement pay is determined by the length
and level of the insured person's contributions. Contributions
in 1995 were scheduled to amount to 18.6 percent of an
employee's annual gross income up to a maximum of
DM93,600 in the old Lander and DM76,800 in the new Lander,
with the employee and employer each paying half. In the early
1990s, the average retirement pension amounted to about
DM1,600 per month for retired persons over the age of sixty.
This meant that Germany had the fourth-highest pensions in
Europe, surpassed only by Luxemburg, France, and Denmark.
In 1957 legislation was passed that required pensions to be
indexed, that is, raised according to average wage increases.
Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance was introduced in 1927, relatively
late in comparison with the pioneering programs of the nine-
teenth century. It replaced the welfare program for the unem-
ployed that had been created in 1919. With the exception of
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exterior and a living room of an apartment house for pensioners
in Reutlingen, Baden-Wiirttemberg
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
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Germany: A Country Study
civil servants, all employed individuals and trainees, irrespec-
tive of salary or wage levels, are covered by the program. Con-
tributions in 1995 to unemployment insurance were scheduled
to amount to 6.5 percent of an employee's gross pay up to
DM96,600 in the old Lander and DM76,800 in the new Lander,
with the employee and employer each paying half. In return,
the employee receives unemployment pay of 68 percent of net
earnings for a married worker and 63 percent for a nonmar-
ried worker, provided that the unemployed person has worked
for 360 insurable days in the last three years before being laid
off. Unemployment pay can be paid from the first day of unem-
ployment for seventy-eight to 832 weekdays, depending on the
length of insured employment and the age of the unemployed.
In the early 1990s, unemployment pay averaged DM1,300 per
month. Once unemployment pay runs out, the employee is eli-
gible for unemployment aid, which averaged DM975 a month
in the early 1990s. Because the unemployed frequently do not
receive enough benefits to maintain their basic living standard,
local social welfare entities often provide additional assistance.
During unemployment, entitlements to benefits of other social
insurance and health insurance programs remain in place.
The unemployment insurance program is administered
through a three-tiered administration: a federal labor agency,
regional labor agencies in the Lander, and local labor offices.
Unlike the labor-management partnership in the administra-
tion of the other insurance programs, this program is con-
trolled by tripartite boards composed of representatives of
labor, management, and governments at the federal, Land, and
local level. Because East Germany did not have an unemploy-
ment insurance program, the adoption of such a program in
the new Lander has entailed numerous administrative prob-
lems. In addition, unemployment there is higher than in the
old Lander (in 1994 about 15 percent, compared with 10 per-
cent in the old Lander) .
Accident Insurance
Enacted in 1884, the accident insurance program initially
covered only accidents in the workplace. In 1925 occupational
diseases also came to be covered. In the post-1945 era, cash and
in-kind benefits such as rehabilitation and vocational training
were expanded and improved. Travel to and from work is also
now covered. If an accident leads to total disability, the injured
person receives a pension amounting to 66 percent of the latest
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
year's earnings. Survivor pensions can amount to a maximum
of 80 percent of earnings. Disability pensions and survivors'
benefits were indexed in 1957, that is, adjusted according to
wage increases. In addition to covering members of the labor
force, the plan also covers students and children; their cover-
age is paid for out of general tax revenues. Employers pay pre-
miums for their employees; premiums amount to 1.44 percent
of an employee's gross earnings. The self-employed are also
able to enroll in the program.
Social Assistance
Social assistance is provided to persons who, for any of a
number of reasons, are unable to provide themselves with a
decent standard of living. In 1991 some 4.2 million persons
received various forms of social assistance. In the same year, the
most important reasons that people needed social assistance
were unemployment (34 percent; social assistance is paid once
unemployment pay runs out), pensions or incomes too small to
allow their recipients a decent standard of living (11 and 7 per-
cent, respectively), refusal of divorced fathers to pay child sup-
port (11 percent), and sickness (6 percent). Half of all
recipients of social assistance are single elderly women. For-
eigners residing in Germany also receive social assistance at a
higher than average rate because they are more likely to be
unemployed or earn low incomes.
Unlike the benefits provided by social insurance programs,
social assistance is funded by taxes and is not determined by
previous contributions. Social assistance is means tested, and
recipients generally must have exhausted their savings. The
incomes of a recipient's close relatives (parents and children)
may also be considered when assessing the provision of social
assistance. In the mid-1990s, social assistance for the head of
household amounted to about DM500 a month in the old
Lander, 80 percent of this amount was allocated for the spouse,
and 50 to 90 percent of this amount was allocated for the chil-
dren, depending on their ages. In addition to these benefits,
social assistance can cover housing costs, medical care, cloth-
ing, winter heating, and many other expenses.
Other Social Benefits
In addition to social assistance, Germany's social welfare sys-
tem provides many other tax-funded benefits. The most widely
paid benefit is that of the child allowance. It is paid to parents
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Germany: A Country Study
of all income levels to lessen the burden of raising children.
Benefits are generally paid until the child reaches the age of
sixteen and thereafter up to the age of twenty-seven if the child
is receiving an education. In the mid-1990s, DM70 a month was
paid for the first child, DM130 for the second, DM220 for the
third, and DM240 for the fourth and subsequent children.
Upper-income parents receive smaller amounts. Child benefits
are tax exempt. Taxpayers also have an annual income tax
exemption of DM4,104 for each dependent child.
Since 1986 payments for child rearing have also been made
to parents who are either unemployed or working only up to
nineteen hours per week. In 1994 these payments amounted to
DM600 a month per child for the first six months of the child's
life; after this age, household income was considered. Pay-
ments continue until the child's second birthday. Beginning in
1994, a single parent with a net annual income of more than
DM75,000 and a couple with a net annual income of more than
DM100,000 were no longer eligible to receive this benefit.
A single parent raising a child and receiving inadequate
financial support from the other parent is eligible to receive
maintenance payments up to a child's twelfth birthday for a
maximum period of seventy-two months. In 1994 in the old
Lander, these payments could amount to as much as DM291 a
month for children up to age six and DM353 a month for chil-
dren between the ages of six and twelve.
Families and single individuals can also receive payments to
help them with housing expenses if their incomes are insuffi-
cient to afford decent shelter. Unlike housing aid provided
through social assistance, aid of this nature does not require
that recipients exhaust their savings or lack close relatives to
assist them.
The disabled are also served by a broad range of medical
and vocational programs designed to provide them with
humane living conditions. Statutory social insurance programs
are responsible for meeting the various needs of their mem-
bers who become disabled. In addition, government agencies
at the federal, Land, and local levels seek to provide employ-
ment and help with special housing and transportation provi-
sions. Employment of the disabled is furthered by federal
legislation that requires firms employing more than fifteen per-
sons to reserve 6 percent of positions for the disabled or to
make annual compensatory payments. In 1994 Germany had
nearly 600 sheltered workplaces able to provide special employ-
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
ment for about 140,000 disabled persons unable to find
employment in the general economy.
Since 1995 German residents have been obliged to join a
new social insurance program that arranges for its members'
future need for long-term nursing care. Those with public
health insurance will continue with that insurance; those with
private health insurance are obliged to secure a new insurance
policy to arrange long-term nursing care. The new insurance
program will initially cover the expenses of long-term nursing
provided at home; monthly benefits, in some special cases, will
go up to DM3,750 but usually will be set at much lower levels
depending on the kind of nursing care provided and the con-
dition of the insured person's health. Some benefits will be pro-
vided in kind, such as visits by health care professionals to the
home. Some benefits will be cash payments to friends or rela-
tives who provide nonprofessional nursing care. Beginning in
mid-1996, long-term institutional care will also be covered.
Until this program was instituted, the lack of long-term nurs-
ing care was seen as the single most important shortcoming in
the country's system of social welfare. One effect of this short-
coming was that patients who should have been receiving nurs-
ing care at home or in a nursing institution remained instead
in hospitals, a more expensive form of treatment. As of late
1994, officials had set an initial contribution of 1 percent of
incomes up to DM68,400 a year in the old Lander and
DM53,100 in the new Lander, with the employee and the
employer each paying half. Part of the costs of long-term nurs-
ing care may in the future be covered by abolishing a public
holiday that always falls on a workday. To cover the cost of long-
term institutional nursing care, the contribution rate will
increase to 1.7 percent in mid-1996. The great expense of this
benefit may require the abolition of a second public holiday.
The administration of the nursing care insurance program is
unique. It overlaps somewhat that of the sickness funds but will
also include many federal, Land, and local agencies. In fact, the
program will involve more implementors than all other social
insurance programs combined. Implementation problems
arise primarily from different entitlements and services pro-
vided through social assistance, or social aid, and by nursing
care insurance. Problems also stem from differing evaluations
by sickness-funds medical experts about who needs care and
how much and what kind of nursing care is needed throughout
Germany.
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Germany: A Country Study
Current Social Welfare Issues and Outlook for the Future
As of mid-1995, the policy and institutional features that
characterized the development of German social policy over
the last century continued to provide the overall umbrella of
social policy in Germany. This has meant the continuation of
separate programs for different groups in the labor force;
decentralized and mostly nongovernment, self-administering
bodies and private grassroots voluntary social welfare agencies;
an emphasis on earnings-related individualized cash benefits
determined by past contributions rather than by need; and a
continued reliance on social insurance programs. For most
people living in Germany, these programs have worked well
and in the postwar period have provided a continuous expan-
sion of coverage and improved benefits.
Behind these achievements, however, are hidden inequities
and inequalities. During the last forty years, the system favored
the improvement of benefits for those with a continuous work
record. For the most part, these were male workers and women
who had never left the workforce. They received earnings-
related insurance benefits while other population groups
tended to receive means-tested benefits or a combination of
the two.
The number of individuals receiving means-tested social
assistance, however, was increasing in the former FRG even
prior to unification. And in 1995, in a united Germany, the
recipients of social assistance included a growing number of
impoverished elderly women, female-headed single house-
holds, and families with several children. For example, a 1992
study found that households with a sick or disabled person
needing constant home care, households with a newborn
child, and non-German households had an increased likeli-
hood of receiving social assistance benefits.
Women are more heavily represented among the disadvan-
taged than men. Their lower wages on average mean smaller
benefits because of smaller contributions into insurance pro-
grams. In addition, the time women spend caring for children
and other relatives generally means that women have shorter
work histories, which affects their pension levels. German wel-
fare regulations also place divorced and separated women at a
disadvantage.
The new Lander present a challenge to Germany's social wel-
fare system. From the perspective of individuals, unification
brought a number of social and institutional innovations and
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
improvements in living conditions, along with a few new enti-
tlements — for example, disability pay, retirement for men
under the age of sixty-five, and pensions for widows and widow-
ers. However, the abolition of familiar social service centers,
child-care facilities, and nursing homes, coupled with inexperi-
enced staff in administrative agencies, has increased social and
psychological stress for many in the east. Women of child-bear-
ing age living in the new Lander have been particularly affected
because before unification they had better prenatal and post-
natal care, the right to abortion, and a fairly widespread net-
work of day-care centers at work or in their communities.
The lack of private voluntary organizations in the new
Lander has made the administration of social programs there
difficult. Western German voluntary and church-related agen-
cies have provided and still do provide much assistance. They
have also assisted in setting up local and district government
offices and have trained new manpower to decide on entitle-
ments, calculate benefits, and interpret new laws. But a serious
shortage of social workers and facilities to train or retrain them
remains.
The difference between the two Germanys in terms of bene-
fits received and resources available for different social strata
will continue for some time. The resulting dissatisfaction and
social decline can be considered time bombs that might bring
future political, social, and psychological instability.
National Health Insurance and Medical Care
Germany's health care system provides its residents with
nearly universal access to comprehensive high-quality medical
care and a choice of physicians. Over 90 percent of the popula-
tion receives health care through the country's statutory health
care insurance program. Membership in this program is com-
pulsory for all those earning less than a periodically revised
income ceiling. Nearly all of the remainder of the population
receives health care via private for-profit insurance companies.
Everyone uses the same health care facilities.
Although the federal government has an important role in
specifying national health care policies and although the
Lander control the hospital sector, the country's health care sys-
tem is not government run. Instead, it is administered by
national and regional self-governing associations of payers and
providers. These associations play key roles in specifying the
details of national health policy and negotiate with one
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Germany: A Country Study
another about financing and providing health care. In addi-
tion, instead of being paid for by taxes, the system is financed
mostly by health care insurance premiums, both compulsory
and voluntary.
In early 1993, the Health Care Structural Reform Act
(Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz — GSG) came into effect, marking
the end of a more than a century-long period in which benefits
and services under statutory public health insurance had been
extended to ever larger segments of the population. Rising
health expenditures may prompt policy makers to impose fur-
ther restrictions on providers and consumers of health care.
These high expenditures have been caused by a rapidly aging
population (retirees' costs rose by 962 percent between 1972
and 1992), the intensive and costly use of advanced-technology
medical procedures, and other economic and budgetary pres-
sures. As of mid-1995, the drafting of new reform proposals was
under way.
For residents of the former GDR, the era of free care ended
in 1991. The political decision to adopt the FRG's health care
system required the reorganization of nearly all components of
health care in the new Lander. As of mid-1995, the reorganiza-
tion of the health care system in the former GDR still was far
from completion.
Development of the Health Care System
Nearly everyone residing in Germany is guaranteed access to
high-quality comprehensive health care. Statutory health insur-
ance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung — GKV) has provided
an organizational framework for the delivery of public health
care and has shaped the roles of payers, insurance or sickness
funds, and providers, physicians, and hospitals since the Health
Insurance Act was adopted in 1883. In 1885 the GKV provided
medical protection for 26 percent of the lower-paid segments
of the labor force, or 10 percent of the population. As with
social insurance, health insurance coverage was gradually
extended by including ever more occupational groups in the
plan and by steadily raising the income ceiling. Those earning
less than the ceiling were required to participate in the insur-
ance program. In 1995 the income ceiling was an annual
income of about DM70, 00 in the old Lander and DM57,600 in
the new Lander.
In 1901 transport and office workers came to be covered by
public health insurance, followed in 1911 by agricultural and
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
forestry workers and domestic servants, and in 1914 by civil ser-
vants. Coverage was extended to the unemployed in 1918, to
seamen in 1927, and to all dependents in 1930. In 1941 legisla-
tion was passed that allowed workers whose incomes had risen
above the income ceiling for compulsory membership to con-
tinue their insurance on a voluntary basis. The same year, cov-
erage was extended to all retired Germans. Salespeople came
under the plan in 1966, self-employed agricultural workers in
1972, and students and the disabled in 1975.
The 1883 health insurance law did not address the relation-
ship between sickness funds and doctors. The funds had full
authority to determine which doctors became participating
doctors and to set the rules and conditions under which they
did so. These rules and conditions were laid down in individual
contracts. Doctors, who had grown increasingly dissatisfied
with these contracts and their limited access to the practice of
medicine with the sickness funds, mobilized and founded a
professional association (Hartmannbund) in 1900 and even
went on strike several times. In 1913 doctors and sickness funds
established a system of collective bargaining to determine the
distribution of licenses and doctors' remuneration. This
approach is still practiced, although the system has undergone
many modifications since 1913.
The formation of two German states in the second half of
the 1940s resulted in two different German health systems. In
East Germany, a centralized state-run system was put in place,
and physicians became state employees. In West Germany, the
prewar system was reestablished. It was supervised by the gov-
ernment but was not government run. According to the Basic
Law of 1949, Germany's constitution, the federal government
has exclusive authority in public health insurance matters and
sets broad policy in relation to the GKV. The government's
authority applies in particular to benefits, eligibility, compul-
sory membership, covered risks (physical, emotional, mental,
curative, and preventive), income maintenance during tempo-
rary illness, employer-employee contributions to the GKV, and
other central issues. However, except for the funding of some
benefits and the planning and financing of hospitals, the
responsibility for administering and providing health care has
been delegated to nonstate entities, including national and
regional associations of health care providers, Land hospital
associations, nonprofit insurance funds, private insurance com-
panies, and voluntary organizations.
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Germany: A Country Study
Portability of coverage, eligibility, and benefits are indepen-
dent of any regional and/ or local reinterpretations by either
insurers, politicians, administrators, or health care providers.
Universal coverage is honored by any medical office or hospi-
tal. Check-ins at doctors' offices, hospitals, and specialized facil-
ities are simple, and individuals receive immediate medical
attention. No one in need of care can be turned away without
running a risk of violating the code of medical ethics or Land
hospital laws.
The health care system has achieved a high degree of equity
and justice, despite its fragmented federal organization: no sin-
gle group is in a position to dictate the terms of service deliv-
ery, reimbursement, remuneration, quality of care, or any
other important concerns. The right to health care is regarded
as sacrosanct. Universality of coverage, comprehensive bene-
fits, the principle of the healthy paying for the sick, and a ^dis-
tributive element in the financing of health care have been
endorsed by all political parties and are secured in the Basic
Law.
By the mid-1990s, health care benefits provided through the
GKV were extensive and included ambulatory care (care pro-
vided by office-based physicians), choice of office-based physi-
cians, hospital care, full pay to mothers (from six weeks before
to eight weeks after childbirth), extensive home help, health
checkups, sick leave to care for relatives, rehabilitation and
physical therapy, medical appliances (such as artificial limbs),
drugs, and stays of up to one month in health spas every few
years. Persons who are unable to work because of illness receive
full pay for six weeks, then 80 percent of their income for up to
seventy-eight weeks. In an attempt to contain costs, beginning
in the 1980s some of these benefits required copayments by the
insured. Although these fees were generally very low, some
copayments were substantial. For example, insured patients
paid half the cost of dentures, although most other dental care
was paid by health insurance.
The system has managed these achievements relatively eco-
nomically. In 1992 about 8.1 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP — see Glossary) went into medical care, or
US$1,232 per capita, compared with 12.1 percent of GDP and
US$2,354 per capita in the United States. Even so, Germany
devoted about one-third of its overall social budget to health
care, an amount surpassed only by retirement payments.
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
The German health care community has made a serious and
sustained effort to control the growth of health costs since the
mid-1970s. The steep rise in health expenditures in the first
half of the 1970s prompted the passage of the Health Insur-
ance Cost Containment Act of 1977. The law established an
advisory board, the Concerted Action in Health Care, to sug-
gest nonbinding guidelines for health care costs. Chaired by
the federal minister for health, its sixty members represent the
most important interest groups having a stake in health care.
The board has contributed to slowing the growth of health care
costs, but further legislation has been necessary.
Modest copayments for medications, dental treatment, hos-
pitalization, and other items were introduced in 1982 for mem-
bers of sickness funds. These payments were further increased
by the Health Care Reform Act of 1989 (Gesundheitsre-
formgesetz — GRG) and again by the Health Care Structural
Reform Act (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz — GSG) of 1993. The
GSG also introduced new regulatory instruments to monitor
more closely access to medical practice, to reorganize sickness-
funds governance, and to control medication costs and pro-
spective hospital payments. In addition, it proposed measures
to overcome the separation between ambulatory medical care
and hospital care that prevailed in the former FRG.
Health Insurance
Some 92 percent of Germany's residents receive health care
through statutory health insurance, that is, the GKV. As of late
1992, the GKV relied on about 1,200 nonprofit sickness funds
that collect premiums from their members and pay health care
providers according to negotiated agreements. Those not
insured through these funds, mostly civil servants and the self-
employed, have private for-profit insurance. An estimated 0.3
percent of the population has no health insurance of any kind.
They are generally the rich who do not need it and the very
poor, who receive health care through social assistance.
Sickness funds are divided into two categories: primary
funds and substitute funds. Workers earning less than the peri-
odically revised income ceiling are required to belong to the
primary funds; those earning more than this ceiling may be
members on a voluntary basis. Some primary-fund members
have a choice of funds. Others do not and become members of
a particular fund because of their occupation or place of resi-
dence. According to figures from the Ministry of Labor and
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Germany: A Country Study
Social Affairs for late 1992, of the six types of primary funds,
local sickness funds, then about 270 in number, are the most
important. Organized geographically, they supply about 46 per-
cent of the insured workforce with health insurance. About 800
company-based funds, located in firms with more than 450
employees, cover about 11 percent of workers. Some 180 occu-
pational funds organized by craft cover another 2.5 percent.
There are three other kinds of primary funds (about two dozen
in all); they supply insurance for self-employed farmers, sailors,
and miners and cover about 4 percent of the workforce. There
are also two kinds of substitute funds; they provide health
insurance to white-collar and blue-collar workers earning more
than the income ceiling. Substitute funds are organized on a
national basis, and membership is voluntary. Such funds cover
about 34 percent of insured workers.
Employers and employees each pay half of a member's pre-
miums, which in the first half of the 1990s averaged between 12
and 13 percent of a worker's gross earnings up to the income
ceiling. Premiums are set according to earnings rather than
risk and are not affected by a member's marital status, family
size, or health; they are the same for all members of a particu-
lar fund with the same earnings. In a household with two wage
earners, each pays the full premium assessed by his or her sick-
ness fund. The unemployed remain members of their sickness
fund. Their contributions are paid by federal and local govern-
ment offices, with one-third coming from local social assistance
offices. The contributions of retirees are paid by the pension-
ers themselves and by their pension funds. Thus, the public
health insurance program redistributes from higher to lower
income groups, from the healthy to the sick, from the young to
the old, from the employed to the unemployed, and from
those without children to those with children.
Because some funds have poorer overall health profiles than
others as a result of the occupations of their members, the
number of dependents and pensioners among its members, or
other factors, premiums can range from as low as about 6.5
percent to as much as 16.0 percent of a member's gross earn-
ings. To counter this inequity, a national reserve fund makes
payments to funds with high numbers of pensioners. The GSG
of 1993 mandates an equalization of contribution rates across
all sickness funds by authorizing payments to funds burdened
with health risks associated with age and gender.
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Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
About 11 percent of Germans pay for private health insur-
ance provided by about forty for-profit insurance carriers. A
good portion of those choosing private insurance are civil ser-
vants who want insurance to cover the roughly 50 percent of
their medical bills not covered by the government. Some sick-
ness-fund members buy additional private insurance to secure
such extras as a private room or a choice of physicians while in
a hospital. Otherwise, the medical care provided to the pub-
licly and privately insured is identical, and the same medical
facilities are used. Self-employed persons earning above the
income ceiling must have private insurance. Members of a sick-
ness fund who leave it for a private insurance carrier will gener-
ally not be allowed to return to public insurance.
Although private insurance companies pay health care pro-
viders about twice the amount paid by the primary sickness
funds, private insurance is often cheaper than statutory health
insurance, especially for policyholders without dependents. As
is the case for members of sickness funds, employees who have
private insurance have half their premiums paid by their
employers. German private health insurance is unusual in that
whatever the insured person's age, his or her premium will
remain that set for his or her age cohort when the policy ini-
tially was taken. Premiums rise only according to increases in
overall health care costs. Policyholders generally stay with their
original policy because if they change companies, they will pay
the higher rates of an older age cohort.
Health Care Providers
Germany's principal health care providers are its physicians,
dentists, and three types of hospitals (public, private nonprofit,
and private for-profit). The health industry also includes large
pharmaceutical companies and the manufacturers of various
kinds of medical supplies. Public health departments, which
are operated by the Lander, are not an important part of Ger-
man health care. The public health clinics in the new Lander
are being phased out during the integration of the two medical
systems.
Germany's supply of physicians is high. Students who meet
academic requirements have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to study medicine. This fact, plus an excellent and inex-
pensive university system, has resulted in the country's educat-
ing physicians at a much higher per capita rate than the United
States. Between 1970 and 1990, the number of physicians in
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Germany: A Country Study
the former West Germany more than doubled, and in 1991 the
country had 3.2 physicians per 1,000 population, a higher ratio
than most other members of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD — see Glossary). (In
1990 the United States rate was 2.3 per 1,000.) With 11.5 physi-
cian visits per person per year in 1988, West Germans and Ital-
ians went to a doctor more frequently than other Europeans.
(In 1989 the United States rate was 5.3 visits per person per
year.) Even so, expenditures to physicians per capita amounted
to less than half (US$193) of those in the United States
(US$414).
German physicians have good incomes (dentists earn even
more), although their average earnings have declined from six
to three times the average wage since efforts at cost contain-
ment began in the 1970s. The high number of physicians could
reduce physicians' earnings still further. In addition, many
young physicians face unemployment. The GSG of 1993, for
example, mandates a reduction in the number of office-based
physicians who treat GKV patients (generally about 90 percent
of physicians join the association that allows them this prac-
tice). The law also has the long-term goal of limiting the num-
ber of specialists in geographic areas where they are
overrepresented.
German health care makes a sharp distinction between phy-
sicians who provide office-based or ambulatory care and physi-
cians who work in hospitals. Office-based physicians are fee-for-
service entrepreneurs whose incomes depend on the amount
and kinds of medical care they provide. In contrast, hospital
physicians are salaried employees of the hospitals in which they
work. Very few hospital physicians are permitted to bill their
patients. Until recent health reform legislation, the two types
of physicians did not work together. Once an ambulatory-care
physician decided that a patient should enter a hospital (only
in emergencies could a patient go directly to a hospital), the
patient's care was entirely taken over by a hospital-based physi-
cian. When a patient left the hospital, by law he or she again
came under the care of an office-based physician. Since the
late 1970s, hospital-based physicians have outnumbered ambu-
latory-care physicians. In 1990 there were about 96,000 of the
former and 75,000 of the latter in the old Lander.
The GRG aimed at encouraging a better integration of
office and hospital care, but little progress was made. The GSG
of 1993 intended to lessen the traditional division by, among
218
University clinic in Miinster,
North Rhine-Westphalia
Courtesy German Information
Center, New York
other reforms, making it possible for hospital-based physicians
to see their patients after their release from the hospital. It is
expected that lessening the separation of the types of medical
care will reduce overall health care costs, but as of mid-1995 no
marked successes in achieving this goal had been noticed.
Additionally, new budgeting rules that go into effect in 1996
may cause outpatient surgery, still unusual in Germany, to
become more common by making it more profitable for hospi-
tals.
The ownership of hospitals (there were a total of about 3,100
hospitals in the early 1990s) is the outcome of historical devel-
opment and regional traditions rather than conscious policy
and has resulted in three types of hospitals: public, nonprofit,
and private for-profit. Each type accounts for about one-third
of the hospitals. Public-sector hospitals are mostly owned by the
Lander, municipalities, and counties and provide about 50 per-
cent of all hospital beds. Nonprofit hospitals, typically run by
Catholic or Protestant organizations, provide about 35 percent
of the beds, and for-profit hospitals account for 15 percent.
Germany has too many hospital resources. In 1988 the ratio
of 10.9 patient beds per 1,000 population in the former West
Germany was higher than the OECD average. The number of
admissions as a percentage of the total German population was
219
Germany: A Country Study
21.5 percent, significantly above the OECD average of 16.1 per-
cent. The average length of stay of 16.6 days was below the
OECD average but quite high by United States standards. Ger-
many's inpatient occupancy rate was 86.5 percent, also fairly
high by international standards.
Between 1972 and 1986, the federal government and the
Lander were jointly responsible for hospital policy making, but
in 1986 the Land governments once again assumed sole
responsibility. Lander own and partially finance medical school
hospitals and accredited teaching hospitals. They enforce
accreditation and licensing of health facilities and of health
professionals working in social services. The Lander are respon-
sible for policy development and implementation of social and
nursing services, social assistance, youth services, and social
work. Most important, the Lander remain responsible for the
effective and efficient allocation and distribution of hospital
resources.
Remuneration of Health Care Providers
Each year the national associations of sickness funds negoti-
ate agreements with the national associations of sickness-funds
physicians. The same bargaining procedures apply to dental
care. The associations work with guidelines suggested by the
Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care and
establish umbrella agreements on guidelines for the delivery of
medical care and fee schedules tied to the relative value scales
of about 2,000 medical procedures. At the national level, the
Federal Committee of Sickness Funds Physicians and Sickness
Funds is a key player, although it is little known outside the cir-
cle of health care practitioners and experts. It sets spending
limits on the practice of medicine in physicians' offices, deter-
mines the inclusion of new medical procedures and preventive
services, adjusts the remuneration of physicians, and formu-
lates guidelines on the distribution and joint use of sophisti-
cated medical technology and equipment by ambulatory-care
or office-based physicians and hospital physicians.
At the regional level, regional associations of sickness funds
and regional associations of sickness-funds physicians negotiate
specific contracts, including overall health budgets, reimburse-
ment contracts for all physicians in a region, procedures for
monitoring physicians, and reference standards for prescrip-
tion drugs.
220
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
A key instrument for containing GKV health care costs is the
global budget, introduced in the mid-1980s, which sets limits
on total health care expenditures. The GSG of 1993 retained
cost containment methods until 1996, when it is hoped that
structural reforms will no longer make it necessary. By means
of the global budget, regional increases in total medical expen-
ditures are linked to overall wage increases of sickness-funds
members. The sickness funds transfer monies amounting to
the negotiated budget to the regional associations of sickness-
funds physicians; the associations pay their members on the
basis of points earned from services performed in a billing
period. The value of the services is determined by the negoti-
ated fee-for-service schedule, which assigns points to each ser-
vice according to the relative value scale. No exchange of
money occurs between sickness-fund patient and physician. Pri-
vately insured patients pay their physicians themselves and are
reimbursed by their insurance companies.
The monetary value of a point is determined by dividing the
total value of points billed by all sickness-funds physicians into
the region's total negotiated health budget. A greater than
expected number of services billed will mean that a point has
less value, and a physician will earn less for a particular service
than in a previous year. To prevent physicians from attempting
to earn more by billing more services, committees of doctors
and sickness funds closely scrutinize physician practices. Excess
billing practices are easily detected by means of statistical pro-
files of diagnostic and therapeutic practices that identify depar-
tures of individual doctors from the group average (a form of
community rating). Physicians found guilty of improper con-
duct are penalized. The same procedures apply to dentists.
Land hospital associations and Land associations of sickness
funds negotiate the general standards for hospital care and
procedures and criteria by which to monitor the appropriate
and efficient delivery of medical care. Each hospital negotiates
a contract on hospital care and the prices for hospital services
with the regional sickness-funds association. Until 1993 hospi-
tals' operating costs (of which salaries made up as much as 75
percent) were covered by per diem rates paid by public and pri-
vate insurance. Hospital investments and equipment are
financed by Land general revenues.
The GSG of 1993 developed a more sophisticated reimburse-
ment method for hospitals than the simple per diem rate in an
attempt to achieve greater hospital efficiency and thereby
221
Germany: A Country Study
reduce costs. The law requires that four sets of costs be negoti-
ated for each hospital: payments to diagnosis-related groups
for the full treatment of a case, with the possibility of an extra
payment if a patient is hospitalized for an unusual length of
time; special payments for surgery and treatments before and
after surgery; departmental allowances that reimburse the hos-
pital for all nursing and medical procedures per patient per
day; and finally a basic allowance for all nonmedical proce-
dures and covered accommodations, food, television, and simi-
lar expenses. The law also introduced new aggregate spending
targets and spending caps on hospitals for the period 1993 to
1995. Moreover, the law imposes more stringent capital spend-
ing controls on hospital construction and expensive medical
equipment.
Current Health Care Issues and Outlook for the Future
German health care has long overemphasized curative medi-
cine and neglected preventive medicine and health promo-
tion. In 1994 the Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in
Health Care recognized this imbalance and recommended
improving prenatal and postnatal care, providing more vacci-
nations for young children, and better educating the public
about the dangers of alcohol consumption and smoking both
during pregnancy and at other times. The council also found
that schoolchildren need more sports, dental care, and sex
education, and that they should be taught better dietary habits.
Adolescents require better information about the dangers of
drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, and obesity. All
adults should exercise more and make better use of available
cancer and dental screening. The council further recom-
mended that fewer prescription drugs be taken (the cost for
prescription drugs for the elderly is almost one-third higher
than the cost of physician visits). Improving the control of
blood pressure, counseling diabetics, eliminating occupational
hazards, and promoting self-help groups are other goals.
The council also found that many older Germans have bad
dietary habits. Although eating habits have improved in recent
decades, the German diet is rich in fats, carbohydrates, and
sugar and is deficient in fruits and vegetables. In addition, the
consumption of tobacco and alcohol is high, although it
decreased between 1980 and 1990 among both men and
women. Because of these factors, specialists estimate that 30 to
222
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
40 percent of the population has health problems related to
diet.
Cardiovascular diseases are the cause of about half of all
deaths, followed by cancer, which accounts for about one-quar-
ter of deaths (see table 10, Appendix). Modern medicine has
largely eradicated traditional threats to health such as tubercu-
losis, diphtheria, and pneumonia. Marked improvements are
also seen in other areas, such as infant and maternal mortality
rates. In 1970 infant mortality rates (defined as deaths under
one year of age per 1,000 live births) were 18.5 in the former
East Germany and 23.4 in the former West Germany, com-
pared with an estimated 6.3 in united Germany by 1995. Mater-
nal deaths fell from 140 per 100,000 live births in the mid-
1950s to fewer than ten per 100,000 by 1989 in the former West
Germany. A similar improvement was measured in the former
East Germany.
A new health problem is acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome (AIDS). By late 1994, a total of 11,854 AIDS cases had
been reported in Germany.
Another institutional challenge is extending the old Lander
health care system based on statutory health insurance to the
new Lander. Achieving this goal has meant a complete overhaul
of the GDR's state-run and highly centralized system; the intro-
duction of insurance funds, private insurance, and voluntary
organizations; and the training of physicians to become fee-for-
service entrepreneurs, rather than salaried state employees as
they were under the old system. The Treaty on Monetary, Eco-
nomic, and Social Union of May 18, 1990, also set the goal of
bringing hospitals in the former GDR up to the standards of
those in the West. An ambitious program to invest about US$1
billion per year beginning in 1995 will be aimed at this last
goal, with about 40 percent of funds coming from the federal
government, another 40 percent from the new Lander, and 20
percent from public and private insurance carriers. It is
expected that realization of the full integration of the two
health systems will take many years, however.
Education
Germany has one of the world's best and most extensive
school and university systems. Although shortcomings exist, on
the whole the country's varied and multifaceted education sys-
tem addresses well the needs of a population with widely differ-
ing characteristics and abilities. Some young people are best
223
Germany: A Country Study
served by a traditional classroom-based education that pre-
pares them for study at a wide choice of institutions of higher
learning. Others profit more from vocational training and edu-
cation consisting of on-the-job training combined with class-
room instruction. At the end of this kind of education,
graduates enter the workforce with a useful skill or profession.
Other students may choose one of many combinations of ele-
ments of these two paths, or decide later in life to embark on
one of them by means of adult education and night school.
Because education in Germany costs little compared with that
in the United States, for example, and because educational
support of various kinds is widely available, Germans are likely
to receive education and training suited to their abilities and
desires.
But however well Germans have arranged their system of
education, problems remain. The integration of two entirely
different education systems within the country's highly federal-
ized system had not been completed as of mid-1995. In addi-
tion, the country's vaunted system of higher education is beset
by severe overcrowding despite its great expansion since the
1960s. Moreover, many who begin study at the university level
are not adequately prepared to meet its demands. Many others
who successfully complete their courses of study can find no
suitable employment once they graduate. Solving these prob-
lems will engage the country's educators and public into the
next century.
Historical Background
The origins of the German education system date back to
church schools in the Middle Ages. The first university was
founded in 1386 in Heidelberg; others were subsequently
established in Cologne, Leipzig, Freiburg, and a number of
other cities. These universities, which trained only a small intel-
lectual elite of a few thousand, focused on the classics and reli-
gion. In the sixteenth century, the Reformation led to the
founding of universities along sectarian lines. It was also in this
century that cities promulgated the first regulations regarding
elementary schools. By the eighteenth century, elementary
schools had increasingly been separated from churches and
had come under the direction of state authorities. Prussia, for
example, made school attendance for all children between the
ages of five and fourteen compulsory in 1763. A number of uni-
224
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
versities dedicated to science also came into being in the eigh-
teenth century.
The defeat of Prussia by France led to a reform of education
by the Berlin scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). His
reforms in secondary schools have shaped the German educa-
tion system to the present day. He required university-level
training for high school teachers and modernized the struc-
ture and curriculum of the Gymnasium, the preparatory school.
He also proposed an orientation phase after the Gymnasium
and a qualifying examination known as the Abitur for university
admission. In 1810 Humboldt founded the university in Berlin
that now bears his name. Humboldt also introduced the three
principles that guided German universities until the 1960s: aca-
demic freedom, the unity of teaching and research, and self-
government by the professors. Also of much influence in edu-
cation, both within Germany and abroad, was Friedrich
Froebel's development of the kindergarten in 1837.
For much of the nineteenth century, Germany had two dis-
tinctive educational tracks: the Gymnasium, which provided a
classical education for elites; and the Volksschule, which was
attended for eight years by about 90 percent of children. The
two schools were administered and supervised separately. Later
in the century, two additional types of school emerged: the
Realgymnasium, which substituted modern languages for the
classics, and the Oberrealschule, which emphasized mathematics
and science. Most children, however, could not attend the
schools that prepared students for the professions or university
entrance because of the schools' high standards and long dura-
tion. Hence, around the turn of the century, the Mittelschule, or
middle school, was introduced to meet parental demand for
expanded educational and economic opportunities. Children
entered the Mittelschule after three years of elementary school,
and they attended that school for six years.
In the nineteenth century, new universities were established
in a number of major German cities, including Munich, Ham-
burg, and Frankfurt am Main. The older universities had been
located mainly in smaller cities, such as Heidelberg. Many of
the new universities were technical universities, and Germany
soon attained a leadership in science that it lost only with
World War II. Universities were state supported but largely
independent in matters of curriculum and administration. A
university degree brought much social status and was the pre-
225
Germany: A Country Study
requisite for entering the professions and the higher levels of
the civil service.
A serious problem of German education before World War I
was the rigid differentiation between primary education,
received by all, and secondary education, received mainly by
the children of the more prosperous classes. This division
meant that most children of the poor had no access to second-
ary schooling and subsequent study at the university level. After
the war, the Weimar constitution outlined a democratic vision
of education that would address the problem: supervision by
the state, with broad legislative powers over education; uniform
teacher training; a minimum of eight years of primary school
attendance; continuing education until the age of eighteen
years; and free education and teaching materials. Many of
these reform proposals never came to fruition, however.
During the Hitler era (1933-45), the national government
reversed the tradition of provincial and local control of educa-
tion and sought centralized control as part of the regime's aim
to impose its political and racist ideology on society Despite an
agreement with the Vatican that theoretically guaranteed the
independence of Roman Catholic schools, during the 1930s
the regime considerably reduced church control of the paro-
chial school system. Universities also lost their independence.
By 1936 approximately 14 percent of all professors had been
dismissed because of their political views or ethnic back-
ground. The introduction of two years of military service and
six months of required labor led to a rapid decline in university
enrollment. By 1939 all but six universities had closed.
After the defeat of the Hitler regime in 1945, the rebuilding
of the education system in the occupied zones was influenced
by the political interests and educational philosophy of the
occupying powers: the United States, Britain, and France in
what became West Germany; and the Soviet Union in East Ger-
many. As a result, two different education systems developed.
Their political, ideological, and cultural objectives and their
core curricula reflected the socioeconomic and political-ideo-
logical environments that prevailed in the two parts of Ger-
many from 1945 to 1989.
The Western Allies had differing views on education, but the
insistence of the United States on the "reeducation" of German
youth, meaning an education in and for democracy, proved the
most persuasive. Thus, the West German education system was
shaped by the democratic values of federalism, individualism,
226
Lunchtime in a Grundschule in North Rhine-Westphalia
Playground at a Grundschule in Berlin
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
227
Germany: A Country Study
and the provision of a range of educational choices and oppor-
tunities by a variety of public and private institutions. Students
began to express themselves more freely than before and to
exercise a greater degree of influence on education. In West
Germany, religious institutions regained their footing and rep-
utation. By contrast, the East German education system was
centralized. The communist-controlled Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands — SED)
retained a monopoly over education and subjected it to rigid
control.
Both Germanys faced the task of "denazifying" teachers and
reeducating students, but they moved in different directions.
The authorities in the East sought teachers who had opposed
fascism and who were committed to a Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy. In the West, authorities dismissed several thousand teach-
ers and replaced them with educators holding democratic
values. The ensuing Western reform program included recon-
structing facilities and reinvigorating the system. In 1953
reforms were introduced that aimed at standardizing educa-
tion throughout the Lander. In the 1960s, reforms were under-
taken that introduced apprentice shops and new instruction
techniques for vocational training.
The 1970s saw further major educational reform, detailed in
the document Structural Plans for the Educational System. The
plan was approved in 1970 by the Council of Education, which
was established in 1957 to serve as an advisory committee for
the entire education system, and by each Land minister of edu-
cation and cultural affairs. The main components of the
reform program were the reorganization of the upper level of
the Gymnasium, the recruitment of more students into colleges
and universities, and the establishment of the comprehensive
school (Gesamtschule). The Gesamtschule brings together the
three kinds of secondary schools — the Hauptschule, the Real-
schule, and the Gymnasium — in an attempt to diminish what
some perceived as the elitist bias of the traditional secondary
education system. The program also proposed expanding adult
education and vocational training programs.
The reform program achieved some but not all of its goals.
The university entrance examination was made easier, and the
number of students attending institutions of higher education
rose from just over 200,000 in 1960 to about 1.9 million in the
1992-93 academic year (see table 11, Appendix). Between
1959 and 1979, twenty new universities were built, and univer-
228
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
sity academic staff increased from 19,000 to 78,000. However,
some Germans opposed the lowering of university entrance
standards, and some also resisted the introduction of the Ge-
samtschule. In addition, the worldwide recession brought on by
the oil crisis of 1973 caused serious financial problems for the
government at all levels and made reforms difficult to realize.
Despite the different educational policies implemented by
the two Germanys between 1945 and 1990, both systems
regarded education as a constitutional right and a public
responsibility, emphasized the importance of a broad general
education (Allgemeinbildung) , taught vocational education
through the so-called dual system that combined classroom
instruction with on-the-job training, required students to pass
the Abitur examination before beginning university studies,
and were committed to Humboldt's concept of university stu-
dents' becoming educated by doing research. Despite these
similarities, the systems differed in many important details, and
the structural divergence was considerable.
Educational Policy Making and Administration
The Basic Law of 1949 reaffirmed the nineteenth-century
tradition under which the Lander were responsible for educa-
tion. Article 30 clearly established the autonomy of the Lander
in most educational and cultural matters, including the financ-
ing of education, the maintenance of schools, teacher training,
the setting of teachers' qualifications and educational stan-
dards, and the development of standardized curricula. In
higher, or tertiary, education, the Lander share responsibility
with the federal government. The federal government, for
example, oversees vocational education and training, a very
important component of Germany's system of education. The
federal government also controls the financing of stipends and
educational allowances and the promotion of research and
support of young scientists through fellowships. In addition,
the federal government also has passed framework laws on gen-
eral principles of higher education. However, the federal gov-
ernment has no power to reform higher education institutions;
this power remains a prerogative of the Lander.
Most teachers and university-level professors are civil ser-
vants with life tenure and high standing in society. They receive
generous fringe benefits and relatively lucrative compensation,
while making no contributions to social security programs. In
Bavaria, for example, the average starting salary for an elemen-
229
Germany: A Country Study
tary or secondary school teacher in the early 1990s was about
US$40,000. A senior teacher in a Gymnasium earned about
US$53,000.
Postsecondary education is a shared responsibility imple-
mented through "cooperative federalism" and joint policy
areas. The federal government and the sixteen old Lander
cooperate extensively with regard to the establishment, expan-
sion, and modernization of institutions of higher education,
including their financing.
To counterbalance decentralized authority and provide lead-
ership in education, the development of educational policy
and implementation is influenced by a number of nationwide
joint permanent advisory bodies. These include the Planning
Committee for the Construction of Institutions of Higher
Learning and the Scientific Council. Planning for education
and the promotion of research by the federal government and
the Lander have become more important since unification and
are implemented by the Federal and Land Commission on
Educational Planning and the Promotion of Research.
Educational Finances
Education is the second largest item of public spending after
social security and welfare and in the 1990-91 academic year
amounted to 4 percent of GNP. Education is not paid for by
local property taxes but rather out of general revenues. Since
1949 the federal government, the Lander, and the local govern-
ments, including in some cases intercommunal single or multi-
purpose districts (Zweckverbande) , have shared in financing
education. For elementary, primary, and secondary education,
the Lander and the local governments are the major funding
sources. The Lander are responsible for teachers' salaries, cur-
riculum development, and the setting of standards and qualifi-
cations. Local governments are responsible for the
maintenance and operation of school facilities. The Lander
remain the main source of funding for higher education, but
the federal government also plays a role. In 1991 the Lander
paid about 74 percent of total education costs (68 percent in
1970); local governments contributed 16 percent (24 percent
in 1970); and the federal government contributed 10 percent
(8 percent in 1970).
The Education System
The Basic Law of 1949 grants every German citizen the right
230
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
to self-fulfillment. In theory, citizens are able to choose the
type of education they want and are given access to their pre-
ferred occupation or profession. The goal of educational pol-
icy is therefore to provide each citizen with opportunities to
grow personally, professionally, and as a citizen in accordance
with his or her abilities and preferences. The Lander axe to pro-
vide equal educational opportunities and quality education for
all through a variety of educational institutions.
Education is free and in most types of school is coeduca-
tional. Almost all elementary and secondary schools and about
95 percent of higher education institutions are public. College,
graduate, and postgraduate students pay a nominal fee ranging
from DM35 to DM60 a semester, which includes extensive
rights to health care and other social benefits. When churches
or private organizations run kindergartens, they do so inde-
pendently, and the public sector is not involved.
According to the terms of the Dusseldorf Treaty of 1955, the
first major attempt to unify or coordinate the school systems of
the Lander, school attendance is mandatory for a minimum of
nine years (or in some Lander lew years), beginning at age six.
A student who starts vocational training as an apprentice must
attend a part-time vocational school until the age of eighteen.
Elementary and Primary Education
The first level of education is called elementary education
and consists of kindergarten for children ages three to five (see
fig. 9). Attendance is voluntary. In the first half of the 1990s,
about 80 percent of children were in kindergarten. Beginning
in 1996, all children will be guaranteed a place in kindergar-
ten. Because the former GDR had maintained an extensive kin-
dergarten system, the new Lander had enough kindergarten
places to meet this requirement. In contrast, in the early 1990s
the old Lander had only enough places to accommodate about
75 percent of children in the relevant age-group.
The second level of education is called primary education
and consists of the Grundschule (basic school). Children
between the ages of six and ten attend the Grundschule from
grades one through four. Children are evaluated in the fourth
grade and tracked according to their academic records,
teacher evaluations, and parent-teacher discussions. The three
tracks lead to different secondary schools and play a significant
role in determining a child's subsequent educational options.
231
Germany: A Country Study
SCHOOL
AGE YEAR
18
17
16
15
13
12
11
10
15 10
14 9
13 8
12 7
11 6
10 5
TECHNICAL
COLLEGE
(FACHSCHULE)
UNIVERSITY'
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL 6
(GYMNASIALE OBERSTUFE)
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL
(BERUFSSCHULE)
AVS 3
ITS 4
HTS 5
BASIC VOCATIONAL TRAINING YEAR
TENTH SCHOOL YEAR
SHORT-COURSE
SECONDARY SCHOOL
(HAUPTSCHULE)
INTERMEDIATE
SCHOOL
(REALSCHULE)
HIGH SCHOOL
(GYMNASIUM)
COMPRE-
HENSIVE
SCHOOL
(GESAMT-
SCHULE)
PRIMARY SCHOOL
(GRUNDSCHULE)
KINDERGARTEN
EHS— Evening High School/College (Abendgymnasium/Kolleg).
Includes technical universities, teacher training colleges,
academies of art, music conservatories, and other institutions
of higher learning.
AVS — Advanced Vocational School (Berufsaufbauschule).
ITS — Intermediate Technical School (Berufsfachschule).
HTS — Higher Technical School (Fachoberschule).
Includes specialized high schools and comprehensive schools.
Source: Based on information from Arno Kappler and Adriane Grevel, eds., Facts about
Germany, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 407.
Figure 9. Structure of the Education System, 1994
232
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
Junior Secondary Education
Secondary education, the third level of education, is divided
into two levels: junior secondary education (also called inter-
mediate secondary education) and senior secondary educa-
tion. Upon completion of the Grundschule, students between
the ages of ten and sixteen attend one of the following types of
secondary schools: the Hauptschule, the Realschule, the Gymna-
sium, the Gesamtschule, or the Sonderschule (for children with
special educational needs). Students who complete this level of
education receive an intermediate school certificate. Adults
who attend two years of classes in evening schools can also earn
these intermediate school certificates, which permit further
study.
Junior secondary education starts with two years (grades five
and six) of orientation courses during which students explore a
variety of educational career paths open to them. The courses
are designed to provide more time for the student and parents
to decide upon appropriate subsequent education.
The Hauptschule, often called a short-course secondary
school in English, lasts five or six years and consists of grades
five to nine or five to ten depending on the Land. Some Lander
require a compulsory tenth year or offer a two-year orientation
program. About one-third of students completing primary
school continue in the Hauptschule. The curriculum stresses
preparation for a vocation as well as mathematics, history,
geography, German, and one foreign language. After receiving
their diploma, graduates either become apprentices in shops
or factories while taking compulsory part-time courses or
attend some form of full-time vocational school until the age of
eighteen.
Another one-third of primary school graduates attend the
Realschule, sometimes called the intermediate school. These
schools include grades five through ten. Students seeking
access to middle levels of government, industry, and business
attend the Realschule. The curriculum is the same as that of the
Hauptschule, but students take an additional foreign language,
shorthand, wordprocessing, and bookkeeping, and they learn
some computer skills. Graduation from the Realschule enables
students to enter a Fachoberschule (a higher technical school) or
a Fachgymnasium (a specialized high school or grammar school)
for the next stage of secondary education. A special program
makes it possible for a few students to transfer into the Gymna-
sium, but this is exceptional.
233
Germany: A Country Study
The Gymnasium, sometimes called high school or grammar
school in English, begins upon completion of the Grundschule
or the orientation grades and includes grades five through thir-
teen. The number of students attending the Gymnasium has
increased dramatically in recent decades; by the mid-1990s,
about one-third of all primary school graduates completed a
course of study at the Gymnasium, which gives them the right to
study at the university level. In the 1990s, the Gymnasium con-
tinued to be the primary educational route into the universi-
ties, although other routes have been created.
The Gesamtschule originated in the late 1960s to provide a
broader range of educational opportunities for students than
the traditional Gymnasium. The Gesamtschule has an all-inclusive
curriculum for students ages ten to eighteen and a good deal
of freedom to choose coursework. Some schools of this type
have been established as all-day schools, unlike the Gymnasium,
which is a part-day school with extensive homework assign-
ments. The popularity of the Gesamtschule has been mixed. It
has been resisted in more conservative areas, especially in
Bavaria, where only one such school had been established by
the beginning of the 1990s. A few more were established in
Bavaria in the next few years; their presence is marginal when
compared with the Gymnasium, of which there were 395 in
1994. Even North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous
Land and an outspoken supporter of the Gesamtschule, had only
181, compared with 623 of the traditional Gymasium.
Senior Secondary Education
The variety of educational programs, tracks, and opportuni-
ties available to students increases at the senior secondary level.
The largest single student group attends the senior level of the
Gymnasium, the Gymnasiale Oberstufe. This level includes the tra-
ditional academically oriented Gymnasium, the vocational Gym-
nasium, the occupation-specific Fachgymnasium, and the
Gesamtschule. Graduation from these schools requires passing
the Abitur, the qualifying examination for studying at the uni-
versity level. Until the late 1970s, nearly everyone who passed
the Abitur had access to an institution of higher education.
However, in the 1980s the numerus clausus, a restrictive quota
system that had been introduced for the study of medicine in
the late 1960s, began to be used for other popular fields of
study Strict selection criteria limiting access to higher educa-
234
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
tion had become necessary because the demand for places at
universities had become much greater than the supply.
Vocational Education and Training
The German education system has been praised for its abil-
ity to provide quality general education combined with excel-
lent specific training for a profession or a skilled occupation. In
1992 about 65 percent of the country's workforce had been
trained through vocational education. In the same year, 2.3
million young people were enrolled in vocational or trade
schools.
Building upon the junior secondary program, the Berufs-
schulen are two- and three-year vocational schools that prepare
young people for a profession. In the 1992-93 academic year,
there were 1.8 million enrolled in these schools. About 264,000
individuals attended Berufsfachschulen, also called intermediate
technical schools (ITS). These schools usually offer full-time
vocation-specific programs. They are attended by students who
want to train for a specialty or those already in the workforce
who want to earn the equivalent of an intermediate school cer-
tificate from a Realschule. Full-time programs take between
twelve and eighteen months, and part-time programs take
between three and three-and-one-half years. Other types of
schools designed to prepare students for different kinds of
vocational careers are the higher technical school (HTS), the
Fachoberschule, attended by about 75,000 persons in 1992-93,
and the advanced vocational school (AVS), the Berufsaufbau-
schule, attended by about 6,500 persons in the same year. Stu-
dents can choose to attend one of these three kinds of schools
after graduating with an intermediate school certificate from a
Realschule or an equivalent school.
The method of teaching used in vocational schools is called
the dual system because it combines classroom study with a
work-related apprenticeship system. The length of schooling/
training depends on prior vocational experience and may
entail one year of full-time instruction or up to three years of
part-time training.
Students can earn the Fachhochschulreife after successfully
completing vocational education and passing a qualifying
entrance examination. The Fachhochschulreife entitles a student
to enter a Fachhochschule, or a training college, and to continue
postsecondary occupational or professional training in engi-
neering or technical fields. Such programs last from six
235
Germany: A Country Study
months to three years (full-time instruction) or six to eight
years (part-time instruction). Some students with many years of
practical experience or those with special skills may also attend
a Fachhochschule.
Vocational education and training is a joint government-
industry program. The federal government and the Lander
share in the financing of vocational education in public voca-
tional schools, with the federal government bearing a slightly
higher share (58 percent in 1991) than the Lander. On-the-job
vocational training, whose cost is entirely borne by companies
and businesses, is more costly to provide than vocational educa-
tion. In the early 1990s, companies and businesses annually
spent 2 percent of their payrolls on training.
Tertiary or Higher Education
In the 1992-93 academic year, higher education was avail-
able at 314 institutions of higher learning, with about 1.9 mil-
lion students enrolled. Institutions of higher learning included
eighty-one universities and technical universities, seven com-
prehensive universities (Gesamthochschuleri) , eight teacher-train-
ing colleges, seventeen theological seminaries, 126 profession-
specific technical colleges, thirty training facilities in public
administration (Verwaltungsfachhochschulen) , and forty-five acad-
emies for art, music, and literature. Nearly 80 percent, or 250,
of these institutions were located in the old Lander, and sixty-
four were in the new Lander. Baden-Wurttemberg and North
Rhine-Westphalia had the largest share of these institutions,
sixty-one and forty-nine, respectively. In 1990 about 69.7 per-
cent of students at tertiary-level institutions went to universities
and engineering schools, and another 21. V percent attended
vocational training colleges (Fachhochschulen) .
German university students can complete their first degree
in about five years, but on average university studies last seven
years. Advanced degrees require further study. Because tuition
at institutions of higher education amounts to no more than a
nominal fee except at the handful of private universities, study
at the university level means only meeting living expenses. An
extensive federal and Land program provides interest-free
loans to students coming from lower-income households. Half
of the loan must be paid within five years of graduation. Stu-
dents graduating in the top third of their class or within a
shorter time than usual have portions of their loans forgiven.
Loans are also available to students receiving technical and
236
A sixth-grade class at the Geschwister Scholl Gymnasium in Pulheim,
North Rhine-Westphalia
Courtesy William Collins
vocational training. In the early 1990s, about half of all stu-
dents were obliged to work while attending university.
Unlike the United States, Germany does not have a group of
elite universities; none enjoys a reputation for greater overall
excellence than is enjoyed by the others. Instead, particular
departments of some universities are commonly seen as very
good in their field. For example, the University of Cologne has
a noted economics faculty. Also in contrast to the United
States, German universities do not offer much in the way of
campus life, and collegiate athletics are nearly nonexistent.
Universities generally consist of small clusters of buildings dis-
persed throughout the city in which they are located. Students
do not live on university property, although some are housed in
student dormitories operated by churches or other nonprofit
organizations.
237
Germany: A Country Study
Education in the New Lander
The Soviet-supported SED centralized and politicized educa-
tion far more than had been the case during the Hitler era.
About 70 percent of teachers and all school counselors, super-
intendents, members of the teachers' union, and school admin-
istrators were SED members, often performing both
professional and party functions. In theory, parents were part
of the educational process, but in practice they were expected
to support party educational policy. Teacher-student ratios
were low — 1:5 compared with 1:18 in West Germany.
Under the new system, public education was expanded by
establishing preschools and kindergartens. Because most
women returned to work after six months of maternity leave,
these new schools were widely attended. Lowered standards of
admission and scholarships expanded access to higher educa-
tion for working-class children and diminished its elitist bias.
The state emphasized education in "socialist values" and Marx-
ism-Leninism at all levels of the system, following the Soviet
model. Students were required to spend one day per week
working in a factory, in an office, or on a farm in order to rein-
force the importance of labor.
In terms of organization, all types of schools were replaced
by a uniform ten-grade polytechnical school, which empha-
sized technical education. Upon graduation from this school,
about 85 percent of students entered a two-year vocational edu-
cation school. The remaining students attended special classes
to prepare for university studies, some going to an extension of
secondary school for two years, others attending vocational
school for three years. The GDR had six universities, nine tech-
nical universities, and several dozen specialized institutions of
higher education. In the 1950s and 1960s, the children of
workers were favored for university study. In later decades, the
children of the intelligentsia (state officials, professionals, and
academicians) again formed a greater part of the student pop-
ulation. However, in addition to passing the qualifying exami-
nation, students had to demonstrate political loyalty and
commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Throughout their
schooling, children were constantly exposed to party ideology
and values.
The system had a strong vocational element that focused on
providing a bridge to adult work. The system was particularly
successful in some respects; literacy was practically universal by
1989, and the proportion of unskilled workers and trainees in
238
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
the workforce fell from 70 percent in 1955 to 13 percent in
1989. The system was best suited to the teaching of mathemat-
ics, the natural sciences, and other technical and nonideologi-
cal subjects. It was less effective in teaching the social sciences,
current affairs, and information technology. Language teach-
ing emphasized Russian, which was compulsory. Few learned
other European languages such as English or French.
The revolutionary events of November 1989 led to an
abrupt transformation of the institutional, political, and philo-
sophical foundations of education in the GDR. In heated
debates, grassroots groups of parents, teachers, and citizens dis-
cussed the future of education and vocational training in the
new Lander. By May 1990, the GDR educational leadership had
been dismissed, and steps had been taken to reduce the
bloated educational bureaucracy. Evaluation commissions reas-
sessed the quality of research and academic institutions and
their staff, and many social science departments suspended
activity until they were evaluated. Departments of Marxism-
Leninism were closed outright, and most institutions modeled
on the Soviet system were dismantled.
In May 1990, the ministers of education of the Lander agreed
that the new Lander should develop their own educational strat-
egies. The unification treaty of August 31, 1990, specified that
this should be done by June 30, 1991, when the new Lander
were expected to have passed new laws on education. A major
change effected by those laws is the replacement of the general
polytechnic school with the range of educational models pre-
vailing in West Germany. The five new Lander, with the excep-
tion of Brandenburg, introduced the four-year Grundschule.
Brandenburg established a six-year Grundschule, like that found
in Berlin. Secondary schooling also resembles that of the old
Lander in that the Gymnasium is common to all; however, other
schools at the junior secondary level differ somewhat in their
names and organization. Education at the senior secondary
level resembles closely that of the old Lander.
Higher education has also seen changes. To improve geo-
graphic access to higher education, regions previously without
institutions of higher learning have received a number of such
institutions. In other regions, institutions of higher learning
have been abolished, some of which have been replaced by
Fachhochschulen, nonexistent in the former GDR. University
staffs have also been cut, sometimes by as much as 50 percent.
Within two or three years of unification, about 25 percent of
239
Germany: A Country Study
university faculty were arrivals from the old Lander. By late
1994, institutions of higher learning in the new Lander had
benefited from annual payments from western Germany of
about DM3 billion.
Although the old structure has been replaced, observers
agree that the values and preferences internalized by parents,
students, and teachers who came to maturity in the GDR can
be expected to survive for many years. Because it lasted
decades longer than nazism, the Marxist-Leninist influence on
education in the new Lander will probably take far longer to
overcome.
Current Education Issues and Outlook for the Future
Germany's system of education faces a number of chal-
lenges, among them a surplus of teachers in a period of declin-
ing birth rates. A chief problem is reconciling the tradition of
Land responsibility for education, which has resulted in a vari-
ety of school types, programs, and standards, with the need for
a uniform national system. This is the central problem con-
cerning whether or how to integrate the education systems of
the new Lander with those of the old Lander. Such an integra-
tion will entail deciding whether to increase the number of
years of schooling by one year for eastern Germans or to
reduce the thirteen years of schooling for western Germans to
twelve. It will also mean deciding on whether to introduce a
postsecondary vocational qualifying examination (Fachabitur)
in the new Lander to mirror the one that has existed in the
former FRG since the 1970s. Other unresolved issues relate to
such questions as educational standards, qualifications, and the
mutual recognition of qualifying examinations and diplomas.
The diversity resulting from a reluctance to impose the same
standard norms and diplomas in all Lander, in contrast to
France and many other European countries, is so extreme that
some observers think it may hinder the mobility of students
and teachers within Germany and the larger Europe.
Unification has also thrown into sharp focus the ongoing
debate about the weaknesses of the university system in the
former FRG. Many West German universities are overcrowded,
understaffed, underequipped, and underfinanced. Frequently
criticized are the length and structure of degree courses, the
excessive length of studies, the high number of long-term stu-
dents, and the disturbingly high number of dropouts who leave
higher education without graduating. Some of these problems
240
Germany: A Country Study
result from Germany's success in expanding access to second-
ary education. About 34 percent of all students graduated with
the Abiturin 1990, compared with only 11 percent in 1970.
Critics charge that many students who fail to complete their
university studies may not have been well educated. A 1994
study cast serious doubt on the assumption that passing the Abi-
tur is adequate preparation for study at a university. It found
that almost one-third of those who had passed the examination
failed to complete their coursework at institutions of higher
education and that the number of dropouts had quadrupled
from 14,000 in the mid-1970s to 60,000 two decades later. The
study also found that on average, dropouts left the university
after three years, or six semesters, that women had a higher
dropout rate than men, and that the highest dropout rate was
in liberal arts, formerly the core of university studies.
Students cited a lack of correlation between curriculum con-
tent and career goals as one reason for breaking off their stud-
ies. One out of three students also reported feeling
unprepared for higher education. Other reasons listed were
the limited opportunities in the labor market, overcrowding,
anonymity (impersonality), a lack of mentors, and the poor
quality of teaching. Financial reasons also were mentioned
more often than they had been in the mid-1970s.
As remedies, some advocate establishing a better balance
between pure and applied research and teaching, making a dis-
tinction between first-degree courses offering training for a
profession and research-oriented postgraduate courses, and
substituting well-defined curricula for the existing uncoordi-
nated requirements. Delegating a larger share of teaching to a
new breed of middle-rank lecturers has also been recom-
mended.
* * *
The best and most comprehensive historical and compara-
tive account of German social policy, although published in
1988, is a nearly book-length chapter by Jens Alber in Growth to
Limits (Vol. 2), edited by Peter Flora. Peter J. Katzenstein also
provides a good introduction to German social policy in Policy
and Politics in West Germany. Stephan Leibfried is the author of
valuable articles on various aspects of German social policy, as
is Arnold J. Heidenheimer. AlfredJ. Kahn and Sheila B. Kamer-
man have written on family and child care policies.
242
Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education
Analyses in English of recent developments regarding spe-
cific programs after unification are regrettably rare. An excep-
tion is "Social Policy: One State, Two-Tier Welfare" by Steen
Mangen. A new British periodical, Journal of European Social Pol-
icy, publishes research findings in English and is beginning to
fill the gap in this area. Examples of the journal's articles
include Winifried Schmahl's article on the 1992 reform of pub-
lic pensions; Wolfgang Voges and Gotz Rohwer's very useful
article on social assistance; Kirsten Scheiwe's report on poverty
risks of mothers in Belgium, Germany, and Britain; and
Rudolph Bauer's analysis of voluntary welfare associations in
Germany and the United States.
The literature on the German health care system in English
is extensive. Written for readers in the United States and dating
from 1993, Richard A. Knox's Germany: One Nation with Health
Care for All is an excellent discussion of the system's compo-
nents. A more recent publication is Ullrich K. Hoffmeyer's
long article "The Health Care System in Germany." It includes
a discussion of the Health Care Structural Reform Act of 1993.
Other useful sources are John K. Iglehart's articles in the New
England Journal of Medicine, Deborah A. Stone's article "German
Unification: East Meets West in the Doctor's Office," and "Glo-
bal Budgeting in Germany: Lessons for the United States" by
Klaus-Dirk Henke, Margaret A. Murray, and Claudia Ade.
There is no recent one-volume comprehensive survey of the
German education system. Christoph Fuhr's Schools and Institu-
tions of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany, dating
from 1989, is still quite useful, however, as is his more recent
book, On the Education System in the Five New Laender of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Also valuable is Peter J. Katzenstein's discus-
sion of university reform in his book Policy and Politics in West
Germany. Val D. Rust and Diane Rust examine the difficulties of
integrating the two German education systems in The Unifica-
tion of German Education.
The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of
Germany publishes brief accounts in English and German on a
variety of topics, including social programs. These can be
obtained through the German Information Center in New
York. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib-
liography.)
243
Chapter 5. The Domestic Economy
The Frankfurt am Main skyline. In the foreground is the Paulskirche, meeting
place of the 1848-49 National Assembly.
THE GERMAN ECONOMY is replete with contradictions. It is
modern but old-fashioned. It is immensely powerful but suffers
from serious structural weaknesses. It is subject to national laws
and rules but is so closely tied into the European Union (EU —
see Glossary) that it is no longer truly independent. It has a
central bank that controls European monetary policy and has a
deepening impact on the global economy but that also insists
on making its decisions mainly on the basis of domestic consid-
erations. Finally, although Germany must compete against
highly efficient economies outside its own continent, it contin-
ues to carry the expense and burden of traditional industries
that drain resources that could be better used elsewhere.
The German economy as it is known today is an outgrowth
of the 1990 merger between the dominant economy of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and that of
the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany).
This merger will one day produce a massive economic entity
that will constitute the fulcrum of Europe as a production cen-
ter, as well as a transportation and communications center. But
each partner brings different elements to the mix, and the
merger has proved difficult and costly. The merger will domi-
nate Germany's economic policy and reality until well into the
next century.
The record of the West German economy during the four
decades before unification shows a signal achievement. The
first decade, that of the 1950s, had been that of the "economic
miracle." The second decade, that of the 1960s, had seen con-
solidation and the first signs of trouble. The 1970s had brought
the oil shocks, the generous social programs, the rising deficits,
and finally a loss of control. In the 1980s, new policies at home
and a more stable environment abroad had combined to put
West Germany back on the path of growth.
The East German economy had been a powerhouse in East-
ern Europe, where Moscow had relied on it to produce
machine tools, chemicals, and electronics. But it had grown
increasingly inefficient, and its currency had become worthless
outside its own borders. East Germans had felt frustrated at
their lack of true material well-being, as well as their lack of
freedom. They joined their economy enthusiastically with that
of West Germany in 1990. The merger gave them a rude shock,
247
Germany: A Country Study
however, in part because of the simultaneous collapse of East
Germany's markets in the Soviet empire and in part because of
the inefficiencies that the communist system had left behind.
The united German economy is a dominant force in world
markets because of the strong export orientation that has been
part of the German tradition for centuries. Although the bur-
dens of unification have cut into West Germany's traditional
export surplus, German industry continues to produce some of
the best machine tools, automobiles, trucks, chemicals, and
engineering products in the world. Its management culture,
which mingles competition and cooperation, stresses quality
and durability above all other virtues. Because many German
companies are small or medium-sized, they are able to concen-
trate on a few production lines that compete effectively even if
they are expensive.
The German culture of cooperation also extends to the rela-
tions between the private sector and the government. The
social market economy, in which all elements of the system
cooperate, stresses the importance of having all parties to the
social contract work together. Workers play a role in manage-
ment. Managers mingle with workers. The bureaucracy
attempts to create an environment in which all parties serve a
common purpose. Although the rules intended to prevent the
recurrence of the German cartel system of the last century are
strictly enforced by the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel
Office), certain practices that would be forbidden under
United States antitrust laws are widely tolerated in Germany.
The dominant force in the German economy is the banking
system. The central bank, the Bundesbank, is deeply commit-
ted to maintaining the value of the nation's currency, the deut-
sche mark, even at some potential cost to economic growth. It
fears inflation above all other ills and is determined to prevent
the recurrence of Germany's ruinous Great Inflation of the
early 1920s. Private banks also play an important role. German
industrial and service companies rely much more on bank
finance than on equity capital. The banks provide the money
and in turn sit on the supervisory boards of most of Germany's
corporations. From that vantage point, they stress the tradi-
tional banking virtues of slow but steady and nonrisky growth.
Their influence and thinking permeate the economy.
German agriculture is not as strong as German industry. It is
a relatively small part of the gross domestic product (GDP — see
Glossary) and is heavily subsidized by the EU's Common Agri-
248
The Domestic Economy
cultural Policy (CAP — see Glossary) and by the German gov-
ernment itself. The accession of East Germany to a united
Germany expanded the relative size of the agricultural sector
and somewhat improved its efficiency, but Germany is not an
agricultural producer like Spain or Italy.
West Germany developed a system of high wages and high
social benefits that has been carried over into united Germany.
The extent and the generosity of its social programs now leave
Germany at a competitive disadvantage with respect to the
states of Eastern Europe and Asia. German labor costs are
above those of most other states, not because of the wages
themselves — which are high by global standards but not out of
line with German labor productivity — but because of social
costs, which impose burdens equal to the wages themselves.
Thus, German companies and German workers must decide
either to abandon some of the social programs that are at the
core of the revered social market economy or to risk losing out
in the increasingly intense global competition of the 1990s and
beyond. The Germans have not solved this problem, but they
are beginning to address it more seriously than before.
Patterns of Development
History
Medieval Germany, lying on the open Central European
Plain, was divided into hundreds of contending kingdoms,
principalities, dukedoms, bishoprics, and free cities. Economic
survival in that environment, like political or even physical sur-
vival, did not mean expanding across unlimited terrain, as in
the United States. It meant a constant struggle that required
collaboration with some, competition with others, and an inti-
mate understanding among government, commerce, and pro-
duction. A desire to save was also born in the German
experience of political, military, and economic uncertainty.
Even under these difficult conditions, Germany had already
developed a strong economy during the Middle Ages. It was
based on guild and craft production, but with elements of mer-
chant capitalism and mercantilism. The trade conducted by its
cities ranged far and wide throughout Europe in all directions,
and Germany as a whole often had trade surpluses with neigh-
boring states. One reason for these exports was the sheer
necessity for the small states to sell abroad in order to buy the
many things they could not produce at home.
249
Germany: A Country Study
The German guilds of the Middle Ages established the Ger-
man tradition of creating products known for quality and dura-
bility. A craftsman was not permitted to pursue a trade until he
could demonstrate the ability to make high-quality products.
Out of that same tradition came an equally strong passion for
education and vocational training, for no craftsman was recog-
nized until he had thoroughly learned a trade, passed a test,
and been certified.
The Industrial Revolution reached Germany long after it
had flowered in Britain, and the governments of the German
states supported local industry because they did not want to be
left behind. Many enterprises were government initiated, gov-
ernment financed, government managed, or government sub-
sidized. As industry grew and prospered in the nineteenth
century, Prussia and other German states consciously sup-
ported all economic development and especially transporta-
tion and industry.
The north German states were for the most part richer in
natural resources than the southern states. They had vast agri-
cultural tracts from Schleswig-Holstein in the west through
Prussia in the east. They also had coal and iron in the Ruhr Val-
ley. Through the practice of primogeniture, widely followed in
northern Germany, large estates and fortunes grew. So did
close relations between their owners and local as well as
national governments.
The south German states were relatively poor in natural
resources except for their people, and those Germans there-
fore engaged more often in small economic enterprises. They
also had no primogeniture rule but subdivided the land among
several offspring, leading those offspring to remain in their
native towns but not fully able to support themselves from their
small parcels of land. The south German states, therefore, fos-
tered cottage industries, crafts, and a more independent and
self-reliant spirit less closely linked to the government.
German banks played central roles in financing German
industry. They also shaped industrywide producer coopera-
tives, known as cartels. Different banks formed cartels in differ-
ent industries. Cartel contracts were accepted as legal and
binding by German courts although they were held to be illegal
in Britain and the United States.
The first German cartel was a salt cartel, the Neckar Salt
Union of 1828, formed in Wurttemberg and Baden. The pro-
cess of cartelization began slowly, but the cartel movement took
250
The Domestic Economy
hold after 1873 in the economic depression that followed the
postunification speculative bubble. It began in heavy industry
and spread throughout other industries. By 1900 there were
275 cartels in operation; by 1908, over 500. By some estimates,
different cartel arrangements may have numbered in the thou-
sands at different times, but many German companies stayed
outside the cartels because they did not welcome the restric-
tions that membership imposed.
The government played a powerful role in the industrializa-
tion of the German Empire founded by Otto von Bismarck in
1871 (see Bismarck and Unification, ch. 1). It supported not
only heavy industry but also crafts and trades because it wanted
to maintain prosperity in all parts of the empire. Even where
the national government did not act, the highly autonomous
regional and local governments supported their own indus-
tries. Each state tried to be as self-sufficient as possible.
Despite the several ups and downs of prosperity and depres-
sion that marked the first decades of the German Empire, the
ultimate wealth of the empire proved immense. German aristo-
crats, landowners, bankers, and producers created what might
be termed the first German economic miracle, the turn-of-the-
century surge in German industry and commerce during
which bankers, industrialists, mercantilists, the military, and
the monarchy joined forces.
The German Empire also established, under Bismarck's
direction, the social compact under which the German labor-
ing classes supported the national ambitions of the newly
united German state in exchange for a system of social welfare
that would make them, if not full participants in the system, at
least its beneficiaries and pensioners. Bismarck was not a social-
ist, but he believed that it was necessary to accept portions of
the socialist platform to sustain prosperity and social cohesion.
From the prosperity of the empire during the Wilhelmine
era (1890-1914), Germany plunged into World War I, a war it
was to lose and one that spawned many of the economic crises
that would destroy the successor Weimar Republic (see The
Weimar Republic, 1918-33, ch. 1). Even the British economist
John Maynard Keynes denounced the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
as ruinous to German and global prosperity. The war and the
treaty were followed by the Great Inflation of the early 1920s
that wreaked havoc on Germany's social structure and political
stability. During that inflation, the value of the nation's cur-
rency, the Reichsmark, collapsed from 8.9 per US$1 in 1918 to
251
Germany: A Country Study
4.2 trillion per US$1 by November 1923. Then, after a brief
period of prosperity during the mid-1920s, came the Great
Depression, which destroyed what remained of the German
middle class and paved the way for the dictatorship of Adolf
Hitler. During the Hitler era (1933-45), the economy devel-
oped a hothouse prosperity, supported with high government
subsidies to those sectors that Hitler favored because they gave
Germany military power and economic autarchy, that is, eco-
nomic independence from the global economy. Finally, the
entire enterprise collapsed in the Stunde Null (Zero Hour),
when Germany lay in ruins at the end of World War II in May
1945 and when every German knew that he or she had to begin
life all over again.
The first several years after World War II were years of bitter
penury for the Germans. Their land, their homes, and their
property lay in ruin. Millions were forced to flee with nothing
but the clothes on their backs. Tens of millions did not have
enough to eat or to wear. Inflation raged. Parker pens, nylon
stockings, and Camel cigarettes represented the accepted, if
not the legal, tender of the time. Occupation projections
showed that the average German would be able to purchase a
plate every five years, a pair of shoes every twelve years, and a
suit every fifty years.
As Germany's postwar economic and political leaders shaped
their plans for the future German economy, they saw in ruin a
new beginning, an opportunity to position Germany on a new
and totally different path. The economy was to be an instru-
ment for prosperity, but it was also to safeguard democracy and
to help maintain a stable society. The new German leaders
wanted social peace as well as economic prosperity. They
wanted an economic system that would give all an equal oppor-
tunity in order to avoid creating underprivileged social groups
whose bitter frustration would erupt into revolution and — in
turn — repression.
The man who took full advantage of Germany's postwar
opportunity was Ludwig Erhard, who was determined to shape
a new and different kind of German economy. He was given his
chance by United States officials, who found him working in
Nuremberg and who saw that many of his ideas coincided with
their own.
Erhard's first step was currency reform: the abolition of the
Reichsmark and the creation of a new currency, the deutsche
mark. He carried out that reform on June 20, 1948, installing
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the new currency with the concurrence of the Western Allies
but also taking advantage of the opportunity to abolish most
Nazi and occupation rules and regulations in order to establish
the genesis of a free economy. The currency reform, whose
purpose was to provide a respected store of value and a widely
accepted legal tender, succeeded brilliantly. It established the
foundations of the West German economy and of the West Ger-
man state.
The Social Market Economy
The Germans proudly label their economy a " soziale Markt-
wirtschaft," or "social market economy," to show that the system
as it has developed after World War II has both a material and a
social — or human — dimension. They stress the importance of
the term "market" because after the Nazi experience they
wanted an economy free of state intervention and domination.
The only state role in the new West German economy was to
protect the competitive environment from monopolistic or oli-
gopolistic tendencies — including its own. The term "social" is
stressed because West Germans wanted an economy that would
not only help the wealthy but also care for the workers and oth-
ers who might not prove able to cope with the strenuous com-
petitive demands of a market economy. The term "social" was
chosen rather than "socialist" to distinguish their system from
those in which the state claimed the right to direct the econ-
omy or to intervene in it.
Beyond these principles of the social market economy, but
linked to it, comes a more traditional German concept, that of
Ordnung, which can be directly translated to mean order but
which really means an economy, society, and polity that are
structured but not dictatorial. The founders of the social mar-
ket economy insisted that Denken in Ordnungen — to think in
terms of systems of order — was essential. They also spoke of
Ordo-Liberalismus because the essence of the concept is that this
must be a freely chosen order, not a command order.
Over time, the term "social" in the social market economy
began to take on a life of its own. It moved the West German
economy toward an extensive social welfare system that has
become one of the most expensive in the world. Moreover, the
West German federal government and the states {Lander, sing.,
Land) began to compensate for irregularities in economic
cycles and for shifts in world production by beginning to shel-
ter and support some sectors and industries. In an even greater
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Germany: A Country Study
departure from the Erhard tradition, the government became
an instrument for the preservation of existing industries rather
than a force for renewal. In the 1970s, the state assumed an
ever more important role in the economy. During the 1980s,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl tried to reduce that state role, and he
succeeded in part, but German unification again compelled
the German government to assume a stronger role in the econ-
omy. Thus, the contradiction between the terms "social" and
"market" has remained an element for debate in Germany.
Given the internal contradiction in its philosophy, the Ger-
man economy is both conservative and dynamic. It is conserva-
tive in the sense that it draws on the part of the German
tradition that envisages some state role in the economy and a
cautious attitude toward investment and risk-taking. It is
dynamic in the sense that it is directed toward growth — even if
that growth may be slow and steady rather than spectacular. It
tries to combine the virtues of a market system with the virtues
of a social welfare system.
The Economic Miracle and Beyond
The economic reforms and the new West German system
received powerful support from a number of sources: invest-
ment funds under the European Recovery Program, more
commonly known as the Marshall Plan; the stimulus to German
industry provided by the diversion of other Western resources
for Korean War production; and the German readiness to work
hard for low wages until productivity had risen. But the essen-
tial component of success was the revival of confidence
brought on by Erhard's reforms and by the new currency.
The West German boom that began in 1950 was truly memo-
rable. The growth rate of industrial production was 25.0 per-
cent in 1950 and 18.1 percent in 1951. Growth continued at a
high rate for most of the 1950s, despite occasional slowdowns.
By 1960 industrial production had risen to two-and-one-half
times the level of 1950 and far beyond any that the Nazis had
reached during the 1930s in all of Germany GDP rose by two-
thirds during the same decade. The number of persons
employed rose from 13.8 million in 1950 to 19.8 million in
1960, and the unemployment rate fell from 10.3 percent to 1.2
percent.
Labor also benefited in due course from the boom.
Although wage demands and pay increases had been modest at
first, wages and salaries rose over 80 percent between 1949 and
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The Domestic Economy
1955, catching up with growth. West German social programs
were given a considerable boost in 1957, just before a national
election, when the government decided to initiate a number of
social programs and to expand others.
In 1957 West Germany gained a new central bank, the
Deutsche Bundesbank, generally called simply the Bundes-
bank, which succeeded the Bank Deutscher Lander and was
given much more authority over monetary policy. That year
also saw the establishment of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal
Cartel Office), designed to prevent the return of German
monopolies and cartels. Six years later, in 1963, the Bundestag,
the lower house of Germany's parliament, at Erhard's urging
established the Council of Economic Experts to provide objec-
tive evaluations on which to base German economic policy.
The West German economy did not grow as fast or as consis-
tently in the 1960s as it had during the 1950s, in part because
such a torrid pace could not be sustained, in part because the
supply of fresh labor from East Germany was cut off by the Ber-
lin Wall, built in 1961, and in part because the Bundesbank
became disturbed about potential overheating and moved sev-
eral times to slow the pace of growth. Erhard, who had suc-
ceeded Konrad Adenauer as chancellor, was voted out of office
in December 1966, largely — although not entirely — because of
the economic problems of the Federal Republic. He was
replaced by the Grand Coalition consisting of the Christian
Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union — CDU),
its sister party the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale
Union — CSU), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD) under Chan-
cellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the CDU.
Under the pressure of the slowdown, the new West German
Grand Coalition government abandoned Erhard's broad lais-
sez-faire orientation. The new minister for economics, Karl
Schiller, argued strongly for legislation that would give the fed-
eral government and his ministry greater authority to guide
economic policy. In 1967 the Bundestag passed the Law for
Promoting Stability and Growth, known as the Magna Carta of
medium-term economic management. That law, which
remains in effect although never again applied as energetically
as in Schiller's time, provided for coordination of federal,
Land, and local budget plans in order to give fiscal policy a
stronger impact. The law also set a number of optimistic targets
for the four basic standards by which West German economic
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Germany: A Country Study
success was henceforth to be measured: currency stability, eco-
nomic growth, employment levels, and trade balance. Those
standards became popularly known as the magisches Viereck, the
"magic rectangle" or the "magic polygon."
Schiller followed a different concept from Erhard's. He was
one of the rare German Keynesians, and he brought to his new
tasks the unshakable conviction that government had both the
obligation and the capacity to shape economic trends and to
smooth out and even eliminate the business cycle. Schiller's
chosen formula was Globalsteuerung, or global guidance, a pro-
cess by which government would not intervene in the details of
the economy but would establish broad guidelines that would
foster uninterrupted noninflationary growth.
Schiller's success in the Grand Coalition helped to give the
SPD an electoral victory in 1969 and a chance to form a new
coalition government with the Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei— FDP) under Willy Brandt. The SPD-
FDP coalition expanded the West German social security sys-
tem, substantially increasing the size and cost of the social bud-
get. Social program costs grew by over 10 percent a year during
much of the 1970s, introducing into the budget an unalterable
obligation that reduced fiscal flexibility (although Schiller and
other Keynesians believed that it would have an anticyclical
effect) . This came back to haunt Schiller as well as every Ger-
man government since then. Schiller himself had to resign in
1972 when the West German and global economies were in a
downturn and when all his ideas did not seem able to revive
West German prosperity. Willy Brandt himself resigned two
years later.
Helmut Schmidt, Brandt's successor, was intensely interested
in economics but also faced great problems, including the dra-
matic upsurge in oil prices of 1973-74. West Germany's GDP in
1975 fell by 1.4 percent (in constant prices), the first time since
the founding of the FRG that it had fallen so sharply. The West
German trade balance also fell as global demand declined and
as the terms of trade deteriorated because of the rise in petro-
leum prices.
By 1976 the worst was over. West German growth resumed,
and the inflation rate began to decline (see table 12, Appen-
dix). Although neither reached the favorable levels that had
come to be taken for granted during the 1950s and early 1960s,
they were accepted as tolerable after the turbulence of the pre-
vious years. Schmidt began to be known as a Macher (achiever),
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The Domestic Economy
and the government won reelection in 1976. Schmidt's success
led him and his party to claim that they had built Modell
Deutschland (the German model).
But the economy again turned down and, despite efforts to
stimulate growth by government deficits, failed to revive
quickly. It was only by mid-1978 that Schmidt and the Bundes-
bank were able to bring the economy into balance. After that,
the economy continued expanding through 1979 and much of
1980, helping Schmidt win reelection in 1980. But the upturn
proved to be uneven and unrewarding, as the problems of the
mid-1970s rapidly returned. By early 1981, Schmidt faced the
worst possible situation: growth fell and unemployment rose,
but inflation did not abate.
By the fall of 1982, Schmidt's coalition government col-
lapsed as the FDP withdrew to join a coalition led by Helmut
Kohl, the leader of the CDU/CSU. He began to direct what was
termed die Wende (the turning or the reversal). The govern-
ment proceeded to implement new policies to reduce the gov-
ernment role in the economy and within a year won a popular
vote in support of the new course.
Within its broad policy, the new government had several
main objectives: to reduce the federal deficit by cutting expen-
ditures as well as taxes, to reduce government restrictions and
regulations, and to improve the flexibility and performance of
the labor market. The government also carried through a
series of privatization measures, selling almost DM10 billion
(for value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary) in shares of
such diverse state-owned institutions as VEBA, VIAG, Volks-
wagen, Lufthansa, and Salzgitter. Through all these steps, the
state role in the West German economy declined from 52 per-
cent to 46 percent of GDP between 1982 and 1990, according
to Bundesbank statistics.
Although the policies of die Wende changed the mood of the
West German economy and reinstalled a measure of confi-
dence, progress came unevenly and haltingly. During most of
the 1980s, the figures on growth and inflation improved but
slowly, and the figures on unemployment barely moved at all.
There was little job growth until the end of the decade. When
the statistics did change, however, even modestly, it was at least
in the right direction.
Nonetheless, it also remained true that West German growth
did not again reach the levels that it had attained in the early
years of the Federal Republic. There had been a decline in the
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Germany: A Country Study
growth rate since the 1950s, an upturn in unemployment since
the 1960s, and a gradual increase in inflation except during or
after a severe downturn.
Global economic statistics also showed a decline in West Ger-
man output and vitality. They showed that the West German
share of total world production had grown from 6.6 percent in
1965 to 7.9 percent by 1975. Twelve years later, in 1987, how-
ever, it had fallen to 7.4 percent, largely because of the more
rapid growth of Japan and other Asian states. Even adding the
estimated GDP of the former East Germany at its peak before
unification would not have brought the all-German share
above 8.2 percent by 1989 and would leave all of Germany with
barely a greater share of world production than West Germany
alone had reached fifteen years earlier.
It was only in the late 1980s that West Germany's economy
finally began to grow more rapidly. The growth rate for West
German GDP rose to 3.7 percent in 1988 and 3.6 percent in
1989, the highest levels of the decade. The unemployment rate
also fell to 7.6 percent in 1989, despite an influx of workers
from abroad. Thus, the results of the late 1980s appeared to
vindicate the West German supply-side revolution. Tax rate
reductions had led to greater vitality and revenues. Although
the cumulative public-sector deficit had gone above the DM1
trillion level, the public sector was growing more slowly than
before.
The year 1989 was the last year of the West German economy
as a separate and separable institution. From 1990 the positive
and negative distortions generated by German unification set
in, and the West German economy began to reorient itself
toward economic and political union with what had been East
Germany. The economy turned gradually and massively from
its primarily West European and global orientation toward an
increasingly intense concentration on the requirements and
the opportunities of unification.
Unification and Its Aftermath
The East German and West German economies at the time
of unification looked very similar. They both concentrated on
industrial production, especially machine tools, chemicals,
automobiles, and precision manufactures. Both had a well-
trained labor force and an important export component,
although their exports went largely in opposite directions. But
the East German economy was highly centralized and guided
258
The Domestic Economy
by a detailed and purportedly precise planning system, with vir-
tually no private property and with no room for decision or ini-
tiative.
On July 1, 1990, the economies of the two Germanys became
one. It was the first time in history that a capitalist and a social-
ist economy had suddenly become one, and there were no pre-
cise guidelines on how it could be done. Instead, there were a
number of problems, of which the most severe were the com-
paratively poor productivity of the former East German econ-
omy and its links to the collapsing socialist economies of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Even before economic unification, the West German govern-
ment had decided that one of its first tasks was to privatize the
East German economy. For this reason, it had taken over in
June the Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency, commonly known as
Treuhand), which had been established by the GDR to take
over East German firms and to turn them over to new manage-
ment through privatization. The agency assumed the assets and
liabilities of about 8,000 East German enterprises in order to
sell them to German and other bidders. By the time the Treu-
hand was disbanded at the end of 1994, it had privatized some
14,000 enterprises.
As economic unification proceeded, issues that had been
recognized but inadequately understood in advance began to
surface. There was massive confusion about property rights. As
wave after wave of Nazi, Soviet, and later GDR expropriations
had taken place between 1933 and 1989, there was often little
knowledge of the actual ownership of property. More than 2
million claims on properties in the territory of the former GDR
were filed by the December 31, 1992, deadline. As more claim-
ants emerged, with many winning cases in the courts, potential
investors were often scared off.
Another problem was that East German production costs
had been very high. The conversion rates of East German
marks to deutsche marks often kept those costs high, as did the
early wage negotiations, which resulted in wages far above the
productivity level. Western German firms found it easier and
cheaper to serve their new eastern German markets by expand-
ing production in western facilities.
A third problem was that the inadequate infrastructure also
became a problem for many potential investors. Telephone ser-
vice was improved only very slowly. Many investors also com-
plained about energy shortages, as many East German power
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Germany: A Country Study
stations were shut down for safety and other reasons. Roads
and railroads had to be virtually rebuilt because they had been
so badly maintained.
In addition to these practical problems, there was also a
deep policy dilemma that underlay the entire process of unifi-
cation. From the beginning, there had been a pernicious link
between the earlier and later phases of the East German transi-
tion to a free-market economy. Policies calculated to make the
initial adjustment as painless as possible hampered long-run
growth and prosperity. Real economic efficiency could only be
achieved by permitting and even forcing considerable immedi-
ate dislocations, whereas temporary compromises might lead
to permanent structural burdens. However, excessive disrup-
tions could jeopardize the economic and political stability
required for a smooth unification process and might also cause
streams of East Germans to move west. The government was
never able to solve this dilemma. When it was forced to choose,
it usually selected the more expensive and slower course to
encourage persons to stay in the east.
Despite these problems, the process of unification moved
ahead, albeit slowly. The Treuhand, staffed almost entirely by
Germans from the west, became the virtual government of east-
ern Germany. In the course of privatization, the agency
decided which companies would live and which would die,
which communities would thrive and which would shrivel, and
which eastern Lander would be prosperous and which would
not. It also decided who might or might not buy eastern firms
or services.
Whether correct or not, reports persisted throughout the
first years of unification that foreign enterprises were being
screened more carefully and more skeptically than German
firms even as they were being invited to invest. Less than 5 per-
cent of all investment in eastern Germany was non-German,
and most of that was from companies with subsidiaries in west-
ern Germany who were expanding them to the east. The Japa-
nese did not invest, although they had earlier expressed some
interest, and the offices Treuhand established in New York and
Tokyo found few investors.
As might have been expected, the economy of eastern Ger-
many went into a deep and precipitous slump immediately
after unification. Within a year after unification, the number of
unemployed rose above 3 million. Industrial production in
eastern Germany fell to less than half the previous rate, and the
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The Domestic Economy
total regional product fell precipitously through 1991. One
estimate was that in 1991 the entire production of eastern Ger-
many amounted to less than 8 percent of that of western Ger-
many.
Because the process of unification was managed by persons
from western Germany, new eastern firms were usually subsid-
iaries of western firms, and they followed the western owner-
ship and management patterns. Bank participation became
customary, especially because the large Frankfurt banks
assumed the assets of the former East German State Bank, and
most eastern firms thus owed money to those Frankfurt banks.
The banks installed their representatives on the boards of the
new firms and assumed some supervisory functions — either
directly or through control by western firms with bank repre-
sentation. The Treuhand had close contacts with western Ger-
man banks. Many of its employees came from those banks and
planned to return to their jobs at the banks.
Because of these circumstances, private investment and eco-
nomic growth came to eastern Germany at a relatively slow
rate. Little new equity capital flowed in. Investment during the
early years of unification was only 1 percent of the all-German
GDP, when much more was needed to jump-start the economy
of eastern Germany. Much of the investment was for the pur-
chase of eastern German companies, not yet for their rehabili-
tation. Many western German firms bought eastern firms on a
standby basis, making sure they could produce in the east when
the time came and paying enough wages to satisfy the Treu-
hand but not starting production. Many others, including
Daimler-Benz, did not even meet the commitments that they
had made when they had purchased the eastern German firms
from the Treuhand. Thus, western German private investment
was not strong enough to boost the eastern German economy.
As private funds lagged, and in part because those funds
lagged, federal budget investments and expenditures began
flowing into eastern Germany at a consistently high rate. Gov-
ernment funds were used essentially for two purposes: infra-
structure investment projects (roads, bridges, railroads, and so
on), and income maintenance (unemployment compensation,
social security, and other social costs). The infrastructure
projects sustained employment levels, and the income mainte-
nance programs sustained income. But neither had an early
growth payoff.
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Germany: A Country Study
Although the precise level of German official expenditures
in eastern Germany has been difficult to estimate because
funds appropriated in one year might have been spent in
another, it is beyond dispute that the federal government
expended well over DM350 billion in eastern Germany during
the first three years after economic, or monetary, unification.
After 1992 this requirement has continued at an annual level of
around DM150 billion, so that the sum of private and public
funds put into eastern Germany during the half-decade
between monetary unification in 1990 and the end of 1995
would probably amount to at least DM750 billion and perhaps
as much as DM850 billion. Between one-fifth and one-fourth of
those funds were private, and the remainder were government
funds. This constituted an infusion of outside money of about
DM50,000 for every resident of eastern Germany, a far greater
level of assistance than contemplated for any other area that
had been behind the Iron Curtain and a token of German
determination to bring eastern Germany to western levels as
quickly as possible.
As eastern Germany went into a deep recession during the
first phase of unification, the western German economy went
into a small boom. Western German GDP grew at a rate of 4.6
percent for 1990, reflecting the new demand from eastern Ger-
many. The highest growth rate came during the second half of
1990, but growth continued at only a slightly slower pace into
early 1991. Prices, however, remained relatively stable because
the cost of living grew at only 2.8 percent despite some high
wage settlements in some industries. Employment rose during
the year, from 28.0 million to 28.7 million, and the unemploy-
ment rate sank to 7.2 percent. Notably, the number of regis-
tered unemployed in western Germany only declined by about
300,000, showing that at least half of the new jobs in western
Germany had been taken by persons who had moved to or
were commuting from eastern Germany.
The dramatic improvement in the western German figures
resulted from the opening in eastern Germany of a large new
market of 16 million persons and the simultaneous availability
of many new workers from eastern Germany. Many easterners
did not want the shoddy goods produced at home, preferring
western consumer products and food. Moreover, many eastern-
ers were coming to the west to work. By the end of 1990, as
many as 250,000 were commuting to work in the west, and that
262
An advanced model of a plant-protection tractor in use in Saxony
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
number was estimated to have grown to 350,000 or even
400,000 by the middle of 1991.
This meant that western Germany not only had a vast new
market but also a growth of over 1 percent in its workforce, as
sharp an increase as since the days of the economic miracle. It
also increased its capital base because eastern German deposits
were placed in western German banks that had come east and
because those deposits moved back to the central German
financial market at Frankfurt.
The Bundesbank became worried about three elements of
the sudden boom: the sudden financial shifts between east and
west, which led to a jump in money supply; government deficits
resulting from large expenditures in eastern Germany; and the
potentially inflationary effects of a rapid growth rate in the
west. The bank warned that interest rates would have to remain
high to keep price increases under control. The bank raised
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Germany: A Country Study
short-term interest rates sharply through 1991 and 1992, with
the average rate of short-term interest climbing from 7.1 per-
cent in 1989 to 8.5 percent in 1990, to 9.2 percent in 1991, and
to 9.5 percent in 1992. The Bundesbank permitted rates to
begin falling only in 1993 — to 7.3 percent — when it believed
that the inflationary pressures had been contained by the
recessionary effects of the credit squeeze.
As the Bundesbank's policies began to take hold, growth
slowed in western Germany, from 4.2 percent in the first quar-
ter of 1991 to 0.8 percent in the last quarter of 1992. For all of
1992, the western German growth rate was 1.5 percent, a
decline from the 3.7 percent rate of 1991 and even more from
the 4.6 percent rate of 1990. The eastern German growth rate
was 6.1 percent during 1992, well below the 7 percent to 10
percent growth rate originally anticipated for the region. The
number of employed in western Germany fell for the first time
in ten years, by 89,000 persons.
Despite the slowdown, during 1992 the German economy
reached a milestone of sorts. With the addition of eastern Ger-
man production, Germany's GDP rose for the first time above
DM3 trillion. Of that total, the new Lander contributed a gross
regional product of DM231 billion, or 7.7 percent. However,
the total of German unemployed also reached a record num-
ber, 4 million. Two-thirds of that number were unemployed in
western Germany; the other one-third were unemployed in
eastern Germany. Eastern Germany contributed more to
unemployment than to production.
The 1992 depression continued into 1993, so that the econ-
omy actually registered a negative growth rate of -1.2 percent.
By 1994, however, after the Bundesbank had been lowering
short-term interest rates for over a year, German growth
resumed at an annual rate of about 2.4 percent, but unemploy-
ment declined only very slowly despite the uptrend in GDP
growth. It was expected that stronger growth would begin
reducing the numbers of unemployed by 1995 and that Ger-
many would return to its postwar path toward prosperity. But
the absorption of eastern Germany, and the methods by which
it had been accomplished, had exacted a high price through-
out all of Germany.
Structural and Technological Questions
Although Germany is one of the world's most powerful econ-
omies, there have been growing doubts within Germany about
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The Domestic Economy
the state of its economy. The principal doubts have been about
the ability of the German economy to modernize quickly
enough to keep up in an increasingly competitive global envi-
ronment. There is also a fundamental debate about the direc-
tion that the economy must take if it is to remain successful and
prosperous. That debate includes a seminal discussion about
Germany's place in the global division of labor, an issue of
immense importance to an exporting nation such as Germany.
Those who have led the debate, and those who have insisted
most firmly that Germany's economy must change, are those
who have seen the world economy changing in directions that
would increasingly relegate Germany to a second rank. They
have seen the coming of a world in which the work performed
by traditional German production sectors — whether coal, steel,
chemicals, agriculture, electronics, or machinery — can be
done better and more cheaply elsewhere. They believe firmly
that Germany has to deemphasize some of those sectors and
abandon others in order to move with the greatest speed and
the most powerful possible commitment into new areas that
will lead the growth of the world economy.
Five German institutes charged with analyzing economic
issues have played a central role in the debate, issuing a series
of reports and recommendations throughout the 1980s and
1990s in which they warned that the German economy had to
change — and change quickly. They complained ever more
insistently about what they described as the inadequate
response of federal, Land, and local governments to the needs
of the evolving global economy.
Those who opposed the arguments of the institutes fell into
several categories. Some remained committed to traditional
economic sectors, which they believed could still perform com-
petitively, especially if enough effort was made to modernize
and rationalize them or to find particular specialties. Others
supported traditional sectors, not for economic but for social
and political reasons. Still others believed that the issues had to
be raised and understood but that action could and perhaps
should be postponed.
The basic complaint about modernization has been that the
German economy has not remained at the forefront of global
development and progress and is not moving decisively into
the ranks of the most advanced industrial societies, such as the
United States, Japan, and the smaller Asian economies. The
institutes have pointed out that new technologies — such as
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Germany: A Country Study
computer hardware and software — could not only improve tra-
ditional production but also could become new industries in
themselves.
As part of their assertion that Germany was not modernizing
quickly enough, the institutes have also expressed concern that
the country has not given adequate priority to research and
development and that German capital has not been venture-
some enough. They have argued that funds have not gone suf-
ficiently into the kinds of research or into the start-up ventures
that have helped keep the United States at the forefront of
international inventiveness even as that country's traditional
industries have declined.
This does not mean that German industry does not invest in
research and development. EU statistics have consistently
shown that Germany has been either first or second in Euro-
pean research and development expenditures, with only
France coming close enough to be a real competitor. But those
same and related statistics also have shown that the German
lead has been shrinking and that Germany does not have the
lead in computer-oriented research and development. In par-
ticular, they have shown that Germany has not been doing well
at the global level, lagging behind the United States and even
further behind Japan in the pace at which it has been increas-
ing its research expenditures. In advanced-technology areas,
Germany has been trailing badly. The total German private and
public research effort has consistently amounted to about 2.8
percent of GDP, but that is about the same percentage as the
United States and Japan and is clearly not enough to allow the
smaller German economy to keep up. A German patent office
study showed that by 1989 West Germany had fallen behind in
three of four major areas of domestic patent grants compared
with Japan and the United States.
German technological progress has been uneven. The
country has certainly remained competitive in biotechnology
and general medical research. The same could be said about its
competitive position in smaller robotic machine tools and in
many areas of electronic and even specialized computer
research. But this does not compensate fully for the lag in cel-
lular communications, microtechnology, and computers.
The German government has been slow to assist firms in
technological development. There has been strong German
financial and scientific participation in a variety of European
programs, such as Esprit, Eureka, Jessi, Race, or Brite — pro-
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The Domestic Economy
grams that are designed to internationalize research at the
European level to enable the smaller European states to com-
pete against the United States and Japan. These European
efforts are significant, but their results as of the mid-1990s have
not allayed the concerns of many Germans about falling
behind.
The institutes have also addressed another problem, the
German lag in establishing new ventures. This shortcoming
goes to the core of the total functioning of the German system,
including the conservatism of banking and financial practices.
Germany has not found a way to create an environment in
which small entrepreneurs in new fields arise in large numbers.
With unification as Germany's principal economic priority,
the debate about structural reform has taken second place,
and the government is giving it less priority than it received in
the 1980s. But it remains an issue and will continue to be so as
other parts of the world economy — including Eastern
Europe — become more competitive.
The Role of Government and Other Institutions
The Federal Government Role
The German federal government plays a crucial role in the
German economy, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly
through the effects of other policies on the economy. Unlike
the Japanese government, there is no single ministry that
attempts to direct industrial government and competitiveness,
but government policy can have wide-ranging effects because
of the many offices that play a role.
The three principal figures responsible for economic policy
are the chancellor, the minister for economics, and the minis-
ter of finance. The three positions have rarely been held simul-
taneously by members of a single party and are usually divided
among two or sometimes three parties. Economic policy there-
fore has to reflect the interests of at least two political parties,
with all that this means in terms of compromise and concilia-
tion. The coalition negotiations to form a new government
after a national election are never more delicate or more diffi-
cult than when they touch on economic policies.
The main parties have different economic philosophies and
pursue generally different objectives. The CDU and the CSU
are conservative, business-oriented parties, but with a long tra-
dition of support for social welfare programs. The FDP is lib-
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Germany: A Country Study
eral in the British sense, very much in favor of the free market
and a minimum of government regulation. The SPD believes
in combining political freedom with large social programs and
government involvement in the economy. It is impossible for
any of the three parties to be in a government with the others
without yielding something, and government policy has there-
fore usually contained a mixture of sometimes contradictory
objectives that then must be resolved by compromises within
the cabinet.
The Chancellor
The way the chancellor and his office, the Chancellory, deal
with the economy depends very much on the incumbent's
interests and personal style. For example, under Helmut
Schmidt (1974-82), who was very interested in economic mat-
ters, the Chancellory shaped, directed, and coordinated the
economic policy of the entire government economic appara-
tus. It also kept close contact with the business and financial
community, including the Bundesbank, and became deeply
involved in long-range planning. Helmut Kohl (1982- ), how-
ever, has operated very differently, using the Chancellory for
limited day-to-day coordination but not attempting to use it to
manage the economic policy of the government. He has used
the political, not the bureaucratic, structure to make policy,
working through the CDU/CSU and the FDP or through per-
sonal contacts. Although Kohl was definitely in charge of die
Wende and other government policies, he has not usually pre-
sented himself as either the originator or the executor of eco-
nomic and financial policy. He has chosen to control events
from behind the scenes, reducing the government's visibility as
well as its role.
The Minister of Finance and the Minister for Economy
In the cabinet, roles are more fixed, although they might
change in accordance with personalities and political parties.
The primus inter pares over the last several decades has been the
minister of finance. He is responsible for the federal budget,
which has become ever more important as the government's
share of national income has grown and as governments
increasingly use the budget to set priorities and guide national
economic activity. The minister of finance also accompanies
the chancellor to the annual financial summits and is the main
German spokesperson in the meetings of the Group of Seven
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The Domestic Economy
(G-7 — see Glossary), the world's principal economic powers.
He is thus in a position to manage not only domestic but also
international financial policy for Germany and to coordinate
the two.
The minister for economics, once the government's chief
economic policy maker (especially when the minister was Lud-
wig Erhard), has gradually lost power as many of the important
functions have been transferred to other ministries — including
new ministries concerned with environment and research.
Since the 1970s, the minister for economics has functioned
more like a United States secretary of commerce, remaining a
principal channel for contact with industry, labor, and semi-
public associations. But several of the ministers have com-
plained in bitter frustration that they were not able to carry out
the policies they wanted.
The Bundeskartellamt
The Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) is the institu-
tion specifically instructed and empowered to prevent a return
to the monopolies and cartels that periodically controlled
much of the German economy between the 1870s and 1940s.
The policies of the office, like the office itself, have been con-
troversial, with some Germans wanting it to have greater power
and others believing that it is already abusing its existing
authority.
The Bundeskartellamt was established in 1957. Many, includ-
ing Erhard, believed that it had not been given enough author-
ity to restrict cartels and other monopolistic practices. The
Western Allies had insisted that the fledgling Federal Republic
have such a law, but West German business associations used
their influence to undercut the authority of the Bundeskartel-
lamt to the point where it has sometimes been described as a
"Swiss cheese with countless holes." Some of the holes in the
Swiss cheese were closed in 1973, when the Bundestag passed a
merger law (Fusions gesetz) intended to block monopolies in
advance so that the Bundeskartellamt would not always have to
act after the fact.
In retrospect, the laws and the office have performed a cen-
tral and useful function, but they have not been able to prevent
a gradual shift toward ever larger companies in Germany. The
number of mergers in West Germany increased rapidly during
the late 1980s, rising to over 1,000 per year. And the Bundes-
kartellamt has not been effective in curtailing the countless
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Germany: A Country Study
informal contacts and discussions that have characterized the
German system (like other European systems) and that would
be suspect and perhaps illegal in the United States.
Because the Bundeskartellamt tends to use nonconfronta-
tional tactics, the office has often been denounced as ineffec-
tive. Critics contend that the office has actually blocked very
few mergers or other forms of cooperation. They also assert
that hidden monopolistic or oligopolistic practices have been
creeping back into the German economy. But others argue
that the very existence of the Bundeskartellamt has enhanced
competition and that the office's predilection for solving prob-
lems through nonjudicial processes fits properly into the Ger-
man system and is therefore effective in that system.
Despite its title, the Bundeskartellamt does not have the
final authority over German mergers and acquisitions. That
authority is reserved for the political level, the Ministry for Eco-
nomics, which on more than one occasion has overruled the
Bundeskartellamt. After the Bundeskartellamt had raised a
number of searching questions about the legality and propriety
of Daimler-Benz's 1989 acquisition of Messerschmidt-Bolkow-
Blohm (MBB), and after it had even disapproved the acquisi-
tion, the minister for economics approved the merger on con-
dition that Daimler-Benz and MBB sell off majority control in a
small marine and technology division. The government justi-
fied the step by recalling that it had specifically sought the
merger to support MBB — which was engaged in military pro-
duction and could not be permitted to collapse — with Daimler-
Benz's financial resources.
The Bundeskartellamt has faced a particularly difficult task
in the integration of the East German and West German econ-
omies. Many eastern German firms could not survive unless
they could merge with large western German firms. The pro-
cess may, however, create new enterprises whose size and com-
bination of resources could open the way for monopolistic or
oligopolistic temptations. Powerful economic and political
pressures for such mergers exist, especially to help revitalize
eastern Germany, but they also raise serious questions about
their potentially negative impact on competition. Under those
circumstances, the Bundeskartellamt has acted with consider-
able circumspection, blocking some mergers but approving
most of them.
The Bundeskartellamt faces an even greater problem in the
growing Europeanization of German business under the aegis
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The Domestic Economy
of deeper EU integration. It became clear by the early 1990s
that the EU's European Commission in Brussels was prepared
to permit greater cooperation between European firms in
order to compete more effectively against the worldwide reach
of the giant corporations of the United States and Japan. Such
cooperation went against German cartel laws. To solve the
problem, the Bundeskartellamt announced in early 1993 that it
would permit greater degrees of cooperation between small-
and medium-sized German firms if that cooperation actually
led to greater intra-European competition.
Land and Local Governments
Because Germany has a federal system, state {Land; pi.,
Lander) and local governments also have important functions.
This reflects the German tradition, which before Hitler com-
bined a mix of national, Land, and local structures with care-
fully defined and deliberately circumscribed powers. Land and
even local authorities are involved in many economic func-
tions, such as social services, development and energy policy,
education (including vocational training), public housing,
environmental protection, and industrial policy. They also
share certain tax revenues that are centrally collected but dis-
tributed among the central, Land, and local authorities in
accordance with carefully negotiated ratios that were changed
after unification slightly to the advantage of the new eastern
Lander.
The Lander do not always act and think alike. Different old
Lander have followed different economic policies since the
early years of the Federal Republic. On the one hand, the min-
ister presidents, or heads, of two Lander, Bavaria and Baden-
Wurttemberg, have stressed industrial development policies
that have departed radically from those of others, putting their
Lander into the forefront of German technological develop-
ment. On the other hand, the Lander of North Rhine-Westpha-
lia and the Saarland for a long time concentrated their
resources on subsidizing coal and steel production, entering
the competition for new industries much later than other
Lander. The possibility for creating separate Land policies has
also encouraged some new Lander to try their own develop-
ment policies. They have invited potential investors from other
countries to visit them, and they have engaged in export pro-
motion.
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Germany: A Country Study
Government Subsidies
The Lander are not alone in subsidizing or supporting cer-
tain industries: the federal government does it to a massive and
increasingly significant degree. Despite Germany's commit-
ment to a social market economy, exceptions to market princi-
ples existed in West Germany and are proliferating in united
Germany. German economic institutes and experts have
repeatedly warned that authorities at various levels have sup-
ported many economic activities that should long ago have
been discontinued or compelled to become competitive. Fed-
eral and Land authorities have ignored the complaints of the
economists but have usually promised to reduce or eliminate
subsidies as soon as feasible.
Before unification, the West German government and vari-
ous Lander supported a number of industries and services, such
as coal, steel, aerospace, shipbuilding, and agriculture, with the
federal government supporting activities across the board and
the Lander supporting locally important and influential indus-
tries. Between 1970 and 1989, the total volume of subsidies,
including those paid through the European Community (EC —
see Glossary), rose from DM12 billion to over DM45 billion.
The level of subsidies rose almost uninterruptedly, even after
Kohl assumed office and his government had committed itself
to reducing them. Although some categories of subsidies — for
example, those for agriculture — were not fully under West Ger-
man but rather under EC control, even the portion specifically
designated for German farmers also rose by 250 percent dur-
ing the 1980s. Overall, the federal government provided about
one-third of total West German subsidies. The other two-thirds
came from the Lander and the localities. During the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the total has generally averaged around 6 per-
cent of West German GDP, although it has risen because of uni-
fication.
Despite the concern expressed about West German subsi-
dies, a 1990 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD — see Glossary) survey of Germany con-
cluded that German subsidies were not unusually high by the
standards of the EC. The OECD described them as being
around the average for OECD countries. Separate Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and Ministry of
Finance studies reached a similar conclusion, indicating that
West Germany was actually somewhat below the average among
EC members in the level of subsidies.
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The Domestic Economy
Although such conclusions might have offered some com-
fort as a matter of general policy, it remains true that some Ger-
man industries — especially in the traditional coal and steel
complex — are dependent on subsidies to such an extent that
they would have to be closed if they no longer benefited from
government support of one kind or another. But subsidies are
also often paid even to some of the largest and most profitable
German concerns, such as Daimler-Benz, Siemens, Bayer, and
Volkswagen, for special production or research lines. Those
companies have usually stated that the subsidies cover only a
minute part of their expenditures.
After unification, the combined subsidies of western and
eastern budgets rose even higher, and the new all-German gov-
ernment has found itself compelled to provide even more sub-
sidies in order not to permit an excessive level of structural
unemployment in the former East Germany. Official East Ger-
man statistics suggested that the level of subsidies in the GDR
budget was 30 percent, but in reality the level may have been
much higher because of the generally low level of productivity
in the GDR. Although no total figures for German subsidies
have been available in the confusion and diversity of programs
since unification, the government has already promised to
keep a number of unprofitable East German ventures (such as
the steel complex around Eisenhuttenstadt and the shipbuild-
ing docks around Rostock) in production until they become
competitive — which will not be for decades, if at all.
Government Expenditures and the National Debt
Beyond subsidies, German politicians, businessmen, and
economists have consistently had difficulty calculating the most
suitable role for the state in the German economy. Many econ-
omists believed that the role of the state had become too large
in West Germany during the 1970s because of government
ownership of large companies, because of subsidies, and
because of the high social welfare programs established by the
SPD-led governments. The right level after unification is even
more difficult to define and to agree upon, because eastern
Germany will need much more infrastructure construction and
many more social programs than western Germany for many
years to come.
As a share of national income, German government expen-
ditures at all levels were 15 percent before World War I, 25 per-
cent during the interwar period, 35 percent around 1960, 48
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Germany: A Country Study
percent in 1975, and about 50 percent by 1980-81. The govern-
ment's share of spending, although worrisome to the West Ger-
mans, still remained lower than that of several other European
states, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium.
West Germany and Britain were the only major European states
to reduce government spending as a share of GDP during the
1980s. But their government share still remained higher than
that of two principal competitors, the United States, at about
37 percent, and Japan, at about 33 percent. The German share
has risen well over 50 percent again during the early 1990s
because of the costs of unification, and there is little if any pros-
pect that it will decline again until the end of the decade.
Despite the declining deficits of the 1980s, the cumulative
public-sector debt of various levels of German government has
grown during virtually the entire existence of the Federal
Republic. During the 1960s, the total debt doubled. During the
1970s, it doubled every five years. The growth rate in debt
began to slow after the first years of the 1980s, but it began to
rise rapidly during the 1990s as a result of unification. By the
end of 1989, the West German government said that the total
public-sector debt in Germany was DM1,020 billion, or 45 per-
cent of what was then West German GDP. By the early 1990s,
however, that figure had risen by several 100 billion deutsche
marks and was estimated to be almost DM1.5 trillion, or 50 per-
cent of united German GDP. It rose to over DM1.6 trillion by
the end of 1993 and is expected to rise to over 60 percent of
GDP by the mid-1990s and then to begin to decline slowly after
that. Interest payments on the public debt have become the
second largest single line item in the German budget, absorb-
ing 14 percent of the budget.
The Associations
All participants in the German national economy organize
themselves into various associations. They do so either volun-
tarily or, in some associations, as a legal requirement. The asso-
ciations are commonly known in German as the Verbande. Over
1,200 are represented in Bonn. Each plays a chosen or assigned
role, and together they help contribute to a broad framework
of cooperation mingled with competition.
All the Verbande operate as lobbies in Germany itself, working
with the parliament, the Bundestag, and the bureaucracy, and
they also lobby appropriate EU offices in Brussels. But they are
far more than lobbies. They act as sector and regional coordi-
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The Domestic Economy
nators. Some not only exercise a voice toward the government
but also represent a forum where industrialists or others can
meet and talk about business affairs. Some serve as planning
institutions, collecting and disseminating information on antic-
ipated sales, production capacities, and investment goals. Oth-
ers negotiate and settle conflicts between different firms or
industries. They help to administer the German economic
mechanism as a whole.
Among the main associations are the Federation of German
Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie — BDI) and
the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher
Industrie- und Handelstag — DIHT). The BDI is the central
organization representing the interests and policies of German
industry. Because of its role in organizing and representing
German industry, the BDI has immense influence. Any Ger-
man government, even one with an SPD majority, will consult
with it before making any policy or introducing any legislation
that could affect German industry or the German economy as
a whole. So will key members of the Bundestag. The BDI has
no individual members, but only other associations of one or
another industry, so that it is in effect an association of associa-
tions.
The DIHT is the umbrella organization of the German
Chambers of Commerce. It represents all business interests,
but especially small business, on a regional as well as a sectoral
basis. Membership is obligatory for German firms, and mem-
bership is on an individual or a company basis rather than on
an association basis as in the BDI.
Some of the powers of the chambers of commerce in Ger-
many would be exercised by government authorities in almost
any other country. The chambers participate in vocational
training programs, issue licenses and work permits, set store
hours, solve disputes between members, issue certificates of ori-
gin, run stock exchanges, and so on. They are legally entitled
to make their views known in a variety of governmental forums
from the local to the national level, and they thus have direct as
well as indirect influence over many elements of the economy.
Their functions are central to the operation of the German sys-
tem, as they have been throughout much of German history.
The chambers constitute an important link not only in the
formal but also in the informal coordinating mechanisms that
operate throughout the economy. Whereas the BDI might be
more visible in national policy matters and might influence
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Germany: A Country Study
national government decisions more directly, the chambers
and the DIHT have a more pervasive presence at the local and
regional level than at the national level. They shape and often
author most of the regulations that determine how commerce
and industry can act, helping to establish the day-to-day rules
under which production and trade take place.
Another important interest organization is the Federation of
German Employers' Associations (Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande — BDA). It coordinates the
collective bargaining strategy of German employers, adminis-
ters the strike fund, gives legal advice, and deals with matters
relating to social policy. Eight member federations organize
enterprises in industry, handicrafts, commerce, banking, agri-
culture, transportation, insurance, and publishing.
A broad division of labor exists among the separate German
employers' associations. The BDI, for which the closest United
States parallel is the National Association of Manufacturers,
mainly addresses matters of broad economic policy. It is, how-
ever, much more influential than any parallel United States
organization. It helps shape Germany's policies in the EU and
is a voice for an open trading system. The DIHT might be com-
pared to the United States Chamber of Commerce. It repre-
sents regional interests as well as the interests of small- and
medium-sized enterprises. It exercises a great deal more influ-
ence and even authority locally. The BDA concentrates on
labor and social legislation and also acts as the representative
of employers with the trade unions.
German farmers are organized into the German Farmers'
Association (Deutscher Bauernverband — DBV) . This organiza-
tion has over 1 million members. It has exercised a powerful
influence on German and European agricultural policies, help-
ing to keep production and consumption prices above world
levels. The proportional influence of the DBV has grown since
German unification because agriculture represented a more
important share of eastern German than western German pro-
duction (see Agriculture, this ch.).
The Culture of German Management
German management, as it has evolved over the centuries
and has established itself since World War II, has a distinct style
and culture. Like so many things German, it goes back to the
medieval guild and merchant tradition, but it also has a sense
of the future and of the long term.
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The Domestic Economy
The German style of competition is rigorous but not ruin-
ous. Although companies might compete for the same general
market, as Daimler-Benz and BMW do, they generally seek mar-
ket share rather than market domination. Many compete for a
specific niche. German companies despise price competition.
Instead, they engage in what German managers describe as
Leistungswettbewerb, competition on the basis of excellence in
their products and services. They compete on a price basis only
when it is necessary, as in the sale of bulk materials like chemi-
cals or steel.
The German manager concentrates intensely on two objec-
tives: product quality and product service. He wants his com-
pany to be the best, and he wants it to have the best products.
The manager and his entire team are strongly product ori-
ented, confident that a good product will sell itself. But the
manager also places a high premium on customer satisfaction,
and Germans are ready to style a product to suit a customer's
wishes. The watchwords for most German managers and com-
panies are quality, responsiveness, dedication, and follow-up.
Product orientation usually also means production orienta-
tion. Most German managers, even at senior levels, know their
production lines. They follow production methods closely and
know their shop floors intimately. They cannot understand
managers in the United States who want only to see financial
statements and "the bottom line" rather than inspect a plant's
production processes. A German manager believes deeply that
a good-quality production line and a good-quality product will
do more for the bottom line than anything else. Relations
between German managers and workers are often close,
because they believe that they are working together to create a
good product.
If there is a third objective beyond quality and service, it is
cooperation — or at least coordination — with government. Ger-
man industry works closely with government. German manage-
ment is sensitive to government standards, government
policies, and government regulations. Virtually all German
products are subject to norms — the German Industrial Norms
(Deutsche Industrie Normen — DIN) — established through
consultation between industry and government but with strong
inputs from the management associations, chambers of com-
merce, and trade unions. As a result of these practices, the con-
cept of private initiative operating within a public framework
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Germany: A Country Study
lies firmly imbedded in the consciousness of German manag-
ers.
The German management style is not litigious. Neither the
government, the trade unions, nor the business community
encourages litigation if there is no clear sign of genuine and
deliberate injury. Firms do not maintain large legal staffs. Dis-
agreements are often talked out, sometimes over a conference
table, sometimes over a beer, and sometimes in a gathering
called by a chamber of commerce or an industrial association.
Differences are usually settled quietly, often privately. Frequent
litigation is regarded as reflecting more on the accuser than on
the accused. Because of these attitudes, Germany has compara-
tively few lawyers. With one-third the population and one-third
the GDP of the United States, Germany has about one-twenti-
eth the number of lawyers.
German managers are drawn largely from the ranks of engi-
neers and technicians, from those who manufacture, design, or
service, although more nonengineers have risen to the top in
recent years. They are better paid than other Europeans
(except the Swiss), but on average receive about two-thirds of
the income that their American counterparts expect.
Because managers usually remain in one firm throughout
their careers, rising slowly through the ranks, they do not need
a visible bottom-line result quickly. Managers do not need to be
concerned about how their careers might be affected by a com-
pany's or a division's progress, or lack of progress, for each year
and certainly not for each quarter.
German taxation also induces management toward long-
term planning. German tax legislation and accounting prac-
tices permit German firms to allocate considerable sums to
reserves. German capital gains tax rules exempt capital gains
income if the assets are held for more than six months or, in
the case of real estate, for more than two years.
Because management has not been regarded in Germany as
a separate science, it was rare until the 1980s to find courses in
management techniques such as those taught at schools of
management in the United States. Germans believed that man-
agement as a separate discipline bred selfishness, disloyalty,
bureaucratic maneuvering, short-term thinking, and a danger-
ous tendency to neglect quality production. Instead, courses at
German universities concentrated more on business adminis-
tration, or Betriebswirtschaft, producing a Betriebswirt degree.
Despite this, two West German schools for business administra-
278
A robot in use at a Daimler-
Benz plant in Stuttgart
Turbine manufacture at the
Kraftwerk-Union plant in
Berlin
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
Germany: A Country Study
don, the Hochschule fur Unternehmensfuhrung and the Euro-
pean Business School, were established during the 1980s, but
they teach in ways that reinforce rather than overturn tradi-
tional German ways of management.
Out of this compendium of business practices arises what
might be termed a German management style, with the follow-
ing characteristics: collegial, consensual, product- and quality-
oriented, export-conscious, and loyal to one company and
committed to its long-term prospects. One could legitimately
conclude from this that the German system could stifle change
because it is not as innovative, aggressive, or results-oriented as
the United States management style. That, however, would not
be correct, for change can and does take place. It occurs gradu-
ally, not always obviously, under the mottoes of stability and
permanence, with the least dislocation possible, and often
under competitive pressures from abroad. German managers
themselves occasionally speculate that change might come too
slowly, but they are not certain whether or how to alter the sys-
tem and its incentive structures.
Labor and Codetermination
Labor
German labor has as much of a culture as German manage-
ment. The abilities and the attitudes of the labor force have
contributed at least as much to the success of the German sys-
tem as those of management, and perhaps even more so. Many
workers, especially in small- or medium-sized firms, regard
themselves as serious professionals with a stake in their com-
pany and are usually treated as such. They live in comfortable
circumstances, not as the factory workers of old. They usually
travel abroad, often own foreign property, and otherwise lead
lives that had formerly been reserved for the middle class.
German workers have consistently had the highest level of
education of any group of workers in Europe, with much of
that education acquired after they finish formal secondary
school training. Worker training usually lasts two to three years
and may last longer for highly specialized vocations (see The
Education System, ch. 4). About 2.5 million Germans, or
almost half of the fifteen- to nineteen-year-old age-group of
both genders, annually receive vocational training within a
range of about 400 designated occupational specialties, often
on the basis of contracts with preselected employers.
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The Domestic Economy
Of the many fields to choose from in German vocational
training, most apprentices select from about twenty specializa-
tions. Young men prefer training in manufacturing, crafts, car-
pentry, electronics, or painting. Young women prefer training
in sales, industrial purchasing, officework or banking, or medi-
cal assistance. Even while they are in training, the students
might receive up to DM1,200 in salary per month, although
most receive less than that, down to DM255.
After finishing vocational training, students can go to techni-
cal colleges located all over Germany, or to public health or
nursing colleges, and they can move on to advanced specializa-
tion courses in programs for continuing education. Those sys-
tems exist separately from academic colleges and universities
but can be as demanding.
The programs are expensive for industry as well as for gov-
ernment. One estimate was that West German industry before
unification spent about DM35 billion annually to support the
program. The philosophy governing the expenditure of time
and money was articulated by the head of personnel at Volks-
wagen, who said: "Training costs money; not to train costs a
great deal more money."
The high level of training of German workers produces a
"quality time" labor productivity formula. The German worker
spends fewer hours per year at work than any competitor, aver-
aging an annual 1,708 hours compared with 1,763 in France,
1,778 in Britain, 1,912 in the United States, and 2,166 in Japan.
Yet Germany has the highest share of world trade in goods with
a high skill content: 20 percent, as against 17 percent for Japan,
15 percent for the United States, and 7 percent for France.
Many of western Germany's labor traditions have moved
smoothly to eastern Germany since unification. Vocational
training already existed in the GDR, and labor in East Germany
was not as inefficient as management or as the often anti-
quated production machinery. Therefore, although there have
been problems of adjustment, especially for older workers in
the east who were not accustomed to the pace of a modern pro-
duction site, on the whole the eastern labor force has adapted
well.
Many of the generalizations that can be made about German
labor cannot be applied equally to the foreign workers who
constitute about one-tenth of the country's labor force. The 2
million foreigners employed in Germany often work in very
large companies, on assembly lines, in mining and chemical
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Germany: A Country Study
operations with little prospect for advancement, or in some ser-
vice sectors at menial tasks under difficult conditions. Approxi-
mately 25 percent of foreigners work in steel and iron
foundries, another 25 percent in hotels and restaurants (often
as cleaning staff), and another 15 percent on automobile
assembly lines. Certain industries, such as steel production, tex-
tiles, or mining, could not function without them.
Among the principal reasons for the decline in Germany's
economic growth have been the high costs associated with pro-
duction. German labor costs per hour in the manufacturing
industry have achieved the dubious honor of being the highest
in the world — largely because of high social costs. As the
Bundesbank's tight money policies have consistently made the
deutsche mark ever stronger, German labor costs have grown
even higher against those in other countries. In part because of
the rise in the value of the deutsche mark, total German wage
costs were estimated by 1992 to be about 50 percent higher
than in the average West European state, the United States, or
Japan, and many times higher than those prevailing in most
Asian states, in Eastern Europe, or in the developing world.
The Bundesbank estimated that those costs had risen by almost
10 percent between the beginning of 1991 and the beginning
of 1993. Chancellor Kohl himself complained that German
workers could not afford to continue to have "the shortest
working week, the lowest number of working years, and above
all, which is the worst, the shortest machine operating time . . .
in all the European Community." But, although a number of
German wage settlements in 1993 and 1994 raised wages by less
than the anticipated inflation rate, there are no signs that Ger-
man labor is prepared to lower its income to meet interna-
tional competition. The average German worker believes that
quality production and efficiency justify his or her high
income.
Codetermi nation
Codetermination (Mitbestimmung), under which German
workers or their representatives sit on the governing boards or
the factory councils of most German firms, is a classic example
of how the German system reconciles apparent opposites and
points them to a common purpose and in a common direction.
Codetermination did not come about in West Germany in a
single step. It evolved and expanded through five different
West German laws, beginning in 1951 and continuing in 1952,
282
The Domestic Economy
1954, 1972, and 1976. The first three laws were passed by CDU-
led coalition governments, the last two by SPD-led govern-
ments. All the codetermination statutes were applied to eastern
Germany after unification. Through the combination of those
laws, 85 percent of all German employees are included in some
form of codetermination.
Codetermination takes place through two structures, the
Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) in a large enterprise and/or
the Betriebsrat (factory council) in most companies. Over two-
thirds of all German firms have a Betriebsrat. Only about one-
fourth have an Aufsichtsrat. Many large firms have both. If a
firm is large enough to have both, the workers are twice repre-
sented. Depending on the size of the firm, the Aufsichtsrat must
have between one-third and one-half worker membership. The
Betriebsrat is composed entirely of employee representatives.
The result of forty years of codetermination is the kind of
bargain typical of the way the German economy is managed.
Management can largely direct the functioning of the com-
pany. It makes investment, financial, operational, and market
decisions, but it makes those decisions through a mechanism
in which labor can have a voice. Labor can make certain that
the conditions under which the workers operate are socially
acceptable. It can also make certain that the workers benefit
from the company's well-being. But labor in turn has a stake in
ensuring that the demands and actions of the workers do not
jeopardize the firm itself.
In addition to their participation in company management,
German workers are also represented in trade unions. The
principal organization is the Federation of German Trade
Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund — DGB), an umbrella
organization that joins seventeen trade unions along industry
lines that match those of the BDA (see Labor Unions, ch. 7).
Trade union membership is not obligatory in Germany. Less
than one-half of all West German workers belonged to the
trade unions in 1989, but German unification has led to a rise
in trade union membership in absolute and percentage terms
because the East German workers were accustomed to union
membership.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Agriculture
Agriculture is a small sector of the German economy (see
283
Germany: A Country Study
table 13, Appendix). It has declined in importance all during
the twentieth century and by 1989 amounted to only 1.6 per-
cent of West German GDP. Although agriculture's share of East
German GDP was twice as high as in the west, even after the
two economies are completely united, agriculture's share of
GDP is expected to amount to only about 2 percent. However,
despite the sector's small size, it remains politically important.
The number of farms had decreased steadily in West Ger-
many, from 1.6 million in 1950 to 630,000 in 1990. In East Ger-
many, where farms were collectivized under the socialist
regime, there had been about 5,100 agricultural production
collectives with an average of 4,100 hectares under cultivation.
Since unification, about three-quarters of the collectives have
remained as cooperatives, partnerships, or joint-stock compa-
nies. The others were returned to their original owners — if
those owners could be found — or were privately sold, becom-
ing about 14,000 private farms. In western Germany and in the
newly privatized farms in eastern Germany, family farms pre-
dominate. For the 630,000 farms, there are 750,000 full-time
employees. There are also, however, many more part-time
employees, and most farms do not represent their owners' full-
time occupation.
Although the number of farms has declined, production has
actually increased through more efficient production methods.
By the early 1990s, a single farmer could produce enough food
for seventy-five persons, far more than was the case in the 1950s
or 1960s.
Agricultural products vary from region to region. In the flat
terrain of northern Germany and especially in the eastern por-
tions, cereals and sugar beets are grown. Elsewhere, with the
terrain more hilly and even mountainous, farmers produce
vegetables, milk, pork, or beef (see table 14; table 15, Appen-
dix). Almost all large cities are surrounded by fruit orchards
and vegetable farms. Most river valleys in southern and western
Germany, especially along the Rhine and the Main, have vine-
yards. Beer is produced mainly, but not exclusively, in Bavaria.
Since the 1960s, German agricultural policy has not been
made in Germany but in the EC. All agricultural laws and regu-
lations are written in Brussels, often after difficult negotiations
between food-producing and food-consuming states. The main
objective of those negotiations is to obtain high incomes for
the farmers while keeping market prices low enough to avoid
consumer protests. To make up the difference, the EC adopted
284
The Domestic Economy
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP — see Glossary) subsidy
program and the export subsidy program, both of which bene-
fit German farmers as well as other EU farmers. In return, the
German farmers have complied with European directives on
the quality and quantity of production.
Forestry
Germany also has significant lumber production. Almost
one-third of Germany's total land area, especially in the south,
is forested. German forests produce nearly 40 million cubic
meters of timber every year, satisfying two-thirds of domestic
demand. However, Germany has to import most of its hard-
wood.
There has been growing concern for decades about environ-
mental damage to Germany's forests. By the 1970s, trees were
losing their needles or leaves and were growing less full than in
the past (see The Environment, ch. 3). A number of laws and
regulations have attempted to stem this phenomenon, which
the Germans call Waldsterben (death of the forest). The Forest
Preservation and Forestry Promotion Act was passed in West
Germany in 1975 to prevent destructive and wasteful timber
policies. It now applies to all of Germany. Under the act, forest
owners must return cut areas to their original condition, con-
verting forests into timber farms in which the cut trees are
replaced by seedlings. This policy works better for pine than
for other timber. However, despite legislation and the great
attention paid to the forests, no lasting solution has yet been
found. As a result of the decades of ecological damage, many
German forests, including the highland Black Forest in the
southwest, are badly depleted.
Fishing
The German fishing industry also suffers from depletion,
because its principal fishing grounds have become overfished
by the many modern fishing fleets that enter North European
waters. German vessels have long fished the North Sea, the Bal-
tic Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean off the British Isles and around
Greenland, all areas where many competing fishing fleets also
operate. The German ocean-fishing fleet has shrunk. Germany
attempted through the EC to establish rules that would prevent
overfishing, but those rules have proved difficult to enforce.
285
Germany: A Country Study
Industry
Manufacturing
The German economy is essentially a processing economy.
This was true of both West Germany and East Germany before
unification. It will remain true in the future, although the
detailed shares of GDP remain to be determined by unification
and may not be clearly evident until the mid- or late 1990s.
Before unification, 40 percent of the German workforce was
involved in manufacturing, with the main industries being
machine tools, automotive manufacturing, electrical engineer-
ing, iron, steel, chemicals, and optics. Although the industrial
sector in the former East Germany is still evolving, manufactur-
ing in that part of Germany is expected to concentrate in the
same industries over time. Thus, the future German economy
will retain a powerful industrial component that will likely total
well above 30 percent of German GDP.
Almost all areas of western Germany have some industry.
The main industrial areas are the Ruhr district in North Rhine-
Westphalia, the traditional center of German coal, steel, and
heavy industry; the concentration of industry around several
large cities, such as Hanover, Munich, Frankfurt am Main, and
Stuttgart; the chemical production areas that stretch mainly
along the Rhine River in Baden-Wurttemberg and farther
north; and the automotive manufacturing centers, increasingly
concentrated in southern Germany in Bavaria and Baden-
Wurttemberg.
In eastern Germany, the main industrial manufacturing
areas are in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, principally
concentrated in the Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, and Chemnitz
regions. Before World War II, Saxony was the technology cen-
ter of Central Europe. The Elbe River, like the Rhine, attracted
chemical and other industry along its shores. It is uncertain
which eastern German industries will survive, but the firms in
the southern part of the region appear to have better chances
than those farther north. Even before unification, more indus-
try was concentrated in the south than in the north. The dis-
tricts in northern East Germany had industrial employment
below 25 percent, those around Berlin had industrial employ-
ment between 25 and 35 percent, and those south of Berlin
had over 35 percent employment in industry. No such clear
geographical delineation for sector employment existed in
West Germany.
286
The Domestic Economy
The glory of German industry is not in the big firms that are
well known around the world, such as Daimler-Benz, Volks-
wagen, Siemens, or Bayer (see table 16, Appendix). It is in the
small- and medium-sized firms that constitute what the Ger-
mans call the Mittelstand. Although that term has political and
social as well as management connotations, it has been widely
accepted to mean companies that employ fewer than 500 work-
ers. Such firms constitute 98 percent of all German companies,
hire 80 percent of all employees, are responsible for a signifi-
cant share of exports, and provide one of the firmest founda-
tions of the middle class.
The government has supported and furthered the Mittel-
stand, in part for political reasons, but also because it makes a
crucial contribution to the economy. The government has
established special provisions that permit those firms to coop-
erate if they do not thereby hinder competition. It makes avail-
able special funds to promote research and development by
Mittelstand companies. After unification, the government used
investment and tax incentives to encourage Mittelstand compa-
nies to invest in eastern Germany.
The single most successful German industry is mechanical
engineering, with a total turnover in 1991 of DM240 billion.
Unlike many industries in Germany and elsewhere, it is domi-
nated by small rather than large companies. It includes over
4,000 firms throughout Germany. Only 3 percent of the com-
panies have more than 1,000 employees. German mechanical
engineering has a range of more than 17,000 products. Almost
two-thirds of the products are exported.
The best-known industry and the second-largest, with a turn-
over of DM217 billion in 1991, is automotive manufacturing.
Such companies as Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, and Bayerische
Motorenwerke (BMW) are known throughout the world.
Almost half of all German-produced automobiles are exported,
mainly to other EU members and to North America.
Electrical engineering ranks third in importance among
German industries, with a turnover of DM207 billion in 1991.
The biggest single firm is Siemens, although Bosch also ranks
among Germany's largest companies. Products range from
giant electric generating turbines exported all over the world
to smaller electric engines and some consumer goods.
The chemical industry, with a total output of DM166 billion
in 1991, is based principally on three large corporations that
have been leaders in the field for 100 years — Hoechst, Bayer,
287
Germany: A Country Study
and BASF. There are also many medium-sized companies.
About one-half of the industry's products are exported.
Other important industries are the traditional German
industries of steel and coal mining, both heavily subsidized and
still large employers. Precision engineering remains a strong
area. Aerospace is a small but growing industry, also heavily
subsidized, and German companies often join with companies
from other EU countries — such as Airbus and military aircraft
production (see fig. 10).
One reason to believe that the eastern and western portions
of the united Germany will again knit together into one large
manufacturing economy is that such an economy has been part
of the German tradition for centuries and that both Germanys
have specialized in the same general industrial sectors. Some
analysts contend that the eastern economy will even have a
competitive edge later in the 1990s because of the vast sums
being invested in modernizing its industrial plant.
Energy and Natural Resources
Like most modern states, Germany relies principally on fos-
sil fuels as sources of energy. About 40 percent of German
energy consumption comes from petroleum, largely for trucks
and automobiles. About 30 percent comes from domestic coal
deposits, half from lignite, or brown coal, in the east and the
other half from anthracite located in the west. Natural gas pro-
vides about 17 percent of energy consumed, and nuclear
energy about 10 percent. Other sources of energy, such as
hydroelectric, solar, or wind-powered electric power plants, are
relatively insignificant. Most production is in private hands.
Electrical power comes almost equally from three sources:
the largest (31 percent) is generated by lignite, the next largest
(28 percent) from nuclear reactors, and the third largest (26
percent) from anthracite. Natural gas provides about 7 per-
cent. Those proportions will undoubtedly shift over time
because of the high pollution levels generated by the relatively
inefficient lignite, especially in the new Lander, where it
accounts for over 90 percent of electricity production (see
table 17, Appendix). The public's aversion to nuclear power
that developed in Germany in the 1980s will likewise cause this
source of power to become less important. Natural gas will
become more significant.
The necessary reduction of brown coal consumption is
unfortunate for the nation's economy because it and anthracite
288
The Domestic Economy
are Germany's only significant natural resources. As of 1993,
Germany was the world's largest producer of brown coal, min-
ing nearly twice as much as the next greatest producer, Russia.
Anthracite mining is also significant, and Germany was the
world's ninth greatest producer of this substance in 1993.
Germany has over twenty nuclear reactors, most of them
small and having production levels below 2,000 megawatts per
reactor. It has virtually no domestic uranium deposits and must
import enriched uranium for its reactors. Most of the reactors
in operation in the early 1990s were built during the 1970s and
early 1980s. Reliance on nuclear power has become controver-
sial, however. Because of the controversy, no new nuclear reac-
tor has entered service since 1988. A number of older reactors
dating to the 1960s have ceased operations. A major interna-
tional energy crisis would be needed to renew impetus in Ger-
many's nuclear energy program because the country is densely
populated, and most of its inhabitants do not want a reactor
near their houses or offices.
Germany must import almost all the oil and gas that it uses.
In 1993 the three largest suppliers of crude petroleum were
Norway (18.4 percent of the total), the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS — see Glossary) (17.4 percent), and
Britain (12.4 percent) (see table 18, Appendix). Germany has
its own modest oil deposits, estimated in 1990 at 50 million
tons, in the North German Plain. It has a share of North Sea
gas reserves and production, with reserves estimated in 1990 at
9.9 billion cubic meters. But these are not adequate long-term
sources. Thus, Germany will increase its imports of oil and gas,
most likely from Russia. East Germany relied heavily on Soviet
gas before unification, and united Germany will want to pur-
chase petrochemicals from Russia to enable Russia to pay for
the German manufactures that Russia is purchasing.
Like all modern economies, Germany has become increas-
ingly cost conscious and conservation conscious about energy
consumption. Whereas GDP in West Germany rose by about 50
percent from 1973 to the early 1990s, energy consumption rose
by only 7 percent.
The Financial System
The Bundesbank
The single most important economic institution in Germany
outside the federal government is the central bank, the
289
Germany: A Country Study
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Deutsche Bundesbank (commonly called the Bundesbank). It
has the dominant voice in German monetary policy. Through
that voice, it establishes and maintains a firm policy in favor of
solid currency value within Germany and increasingly within
the EU and even the world at large.
If a central bank's reputation is its most precious asset, the
Bundesbank is among the world's most highly endowed institu-
tions. Its contribution to the economic and political stability of
290
The Domestic Economy
West Germany and Western Europe in the postwar years was
almost legendary and was given due respect even by those who
disagreed with some or many of its policies.
Although the Bundesbank often appears to be the principal
maker of German economic policy, its exact powers are care-
fully set forth and circumscribed in the 1957 law establishing
the bank. The law assigned to the bank the responsibility for
"the preservation of the value of German currency," a mandate
that was so important that it was clearly intended to override
the bank's other principal task, "to support the general eco-
nomic policy of the federal government." Even the latter task
was carefully limited by the specific provision that the bank
"shall be independent of instructions from the federal govern-
ment."
The government does have a role, if it wishes to exercise it.
Government representatives can and at times do attend the
meetings of the bank's governing board, the Central Bank
Council (see Glossary), although the government cannot block
the bank's actions but is authorized only to delay them for no
longer than two weeks. There are also informal contacts
between the government and the bank, and it is not unusual
for senior officials at the Chancellory or the Ministry of
Finance to know in advance what the council might be
expected to decide at its next meeting.
The bank has more authority in the realm of monetary pol-
icy than any other major European central bank. It is most
closely based, at least in its structure although not in its formal
mandate, on the United States Federal Reserve Bank. It exer-
cises more functions than the Federal Reserve, however, in part
because it carries out some exchange responsibilities that are
assigned to the United States Department of the Treasury. The
Bundesbank issues money and makes monetary policy by con-
trolling short-term interest rates such as the discount rate for
loans to other banks and the Lombard rate (see Glossary) for
short-term funding for business.
As of mid-1995, the president of the Bundesbank was Hans
Tietmeyer, who made his mark in the economics and finance
ministries as a career official and then as a state secretary. Kohl
appointed him Bundesbank president in 1993. The Bundes-
bank's Central Bank Council has seventeen members, with the
majority of nine being the presidents of regional or Land cen-
tral banks. The representatives of these banks can, therefore,
outnumber the eight members of the Central Bank Council
291
Germany: A Country Study
who work out of the bank's executive office in Frankfurt am
Main, the Direktorium (Directorate — see Glossary), giving the
bank a strong orientation toward developments in the country
as a whole, while public and foreign attention usually concen-
trates on the Directorate. Land central bank presidents are
nominated by Land governments. They do not serve at any gov-
ernment's pleasure, including that of the Land that nominated
them. The members of the council who are in the Directorate
are appointed by the president upon the nomination of the
chancellor, but even these members are not subject to govern-
ment direction.
The single most important fact about the Bundesbank, how-
ever, is its powerful and consistent anti-inflationary philosophy.
That philosophy, grounded in its absolute determination to
avoid the social upheaval caused by the Great Inflation of the
early 1920s, is central to the bank's thinking on every occasion
and has given it enormous influence. Although a number of
economists, especially some in the United States, have long
argued that the Bundesbank's policies are excessively restrictive
and potentially deflationary, the bank is popular with most
German voters and with much of German business. The voters
do not wish to see their savings eroded by inflation. Business-
men are inclined to believe that a lower inflation rate will per-
mit them to hold down their costs and remain highly
competitive over the long run although others might receive
some temporary advantage from devaluation. Germans believe
that a country with a stable currency will be able to have lower
capital and labor costs because lower inflation expectations
make lower interest rates and stable wages acceptable.
German demographic realities have added further reasons
for anti-inflationary policies. As the population ages and as
more Germans live on pensions or on fixed investment
incomes, the importance of price stability has become a power-
ful consideration for a growing sector of the electorate. That
sector of the electorate fully supports the Bundesbank's anti-
inflationary policies.
Banking and Its Role in the Economy
The German economy is a bank economy, with the main
role in finance and credit being played by commercial and sav-
ings banks while other forms of credit are secondary. Banks
provide most of the country's investment capital because of the
high German savings rate and because most Germans prefer to
292
A petroleum refinery in Ludwigshafen, Rhineland-Palatinate
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
A nuclear power plant outside Munich
Courtesy Inter Nationes, Bonn
293
Germany: A Country Study
put those savings into banks rather than into stocks or bonds.
As with many other German economic phenomena, this bank
role is not new. Banks have played a central role in German
financial and economic history since the Middle Ages.
German banks function as universal banks, able to offer a
full range of banking, saving, foreign exchange, and invest-
ment services to their depositors and clients. They hold funds
or other assets, broker securities, underwrite equity issues, give
advice on asset placement, manage accounts, and so on. About
one-quarter of German banks are commercial. Most of the
remainder are savings banks, mainly owned locally or region-
ally and operating under public statutes, or cooperatives that
perform such specialized services as agricultural, crafts, or
mortgage lending.
The three best known and most important German universal
banks — the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Com-
merzbank — are omnipresent throughout unified Germany and
have immense influence. These banks opened hundreds of
new offices in the east during unification and sent large staffs
of bankers to manage offices and to train permanent person-
nel there. In effect, they were the principal agents for control
of Germany's economic unification.
But the "big three," as they are often known, are not the only
large banks in Germany. A number of other banks, including
regional banks, are even more important than the big three
within their areas of operations. The DG Bank, which operates
out of Frankfurt am Main, has a higher nominal capital stock
than that of the Commerzbank. The Westdeutsche Landes-
bank, headquartered in Dusseldorf and owned in part by the
Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, has a higher nominal capital
stock value than that of the Deutsche Bank. The value of the
combined nominal stock of the three major banks in Bavaria is
even higher, and those banks have helped finance the eco-
nomic boom in southern Germany. Other major banks exist in
other Lander, often owned in part by the Lander themselves with
additional capital coming from state-wide savings associations
or other local institutions. An important element in the Ger-
man savings system is the Postbank, the postal savings bank,
with 2V, 000 employees. Almost one in three Germans has an
account in the Postbank, using it for savings and for personal
financial transactions such as paying monthly bills in prefer-
ence to bank accounts. The Postbank has 24 million savings
294
The Domestic Economy
accounts and hopes to branch into other areas of financial ser-
vices.
The most important and most controversial aspect of Ger-
man banking is the role that banks play as shareholders and
policy makers in the country's industrial firms. It has been esti-
mated that banks directly or indirectly hold more than 25 per-
cent of the voting capital in one-quarter of Germany's largest
corporations and hold about 28 percent of all seats on the
supervisory boards. The banks are empowered to vote not only
their own shares but also, by proxy, shares that they hold for
their clients. Although there are indications that the banks'
ownership proportion of major firms has been reduced over
time as other sources of investment funds have become more
available, the combined influence and presence of the banks is
considerable. They are even said to pool information on the
basis of which they steer investments throughout the economy.
According to a Commerzbank listing of ownership of 10,000
large West German companies, the Deutsche Bank owns shares
in seventy-seven different firms, the Dresdner Bank in fifty-five,
and the Commerzbank in forty-eight. Other smaller banks are
also widely invested. The Commerzbank listing did not show
the bond or loan holdings of the banks or the votes they exer-
cised in proxy, but it did show that in pure ownership terms
alone the banks have a strong voice in a significant number of
major German companies. The positions that the banks hold
could afford wide opportunities to influence industrial deci-
sion making, although they are not the kinds of true monopoly
positions that earlier German cartel arrangements offered.
A mid-1980s study by the government agency that examines
potential monopolies, the Monopolkommission, looking only
at major companies, concluded that the three major banks
could vote well over three-quarters of the shares of many major
German corporations and that all banks together had even
greater voting authority. The power of the banks also is evident
in the seats they hold on the boards of the country's most
important corporations, with bank presidents or representa-
tives sitting on the boards of every major German firm.
The banks do not appear to want to seize industrial power or
make production decisions. They would be hard put to exer-
cise monopoly power, and their actions on individual boards
are clearly subject to enough scrutiny — at least by other board
members — that improper actions would become widely known.
German business is prepared to accept the power and influ-
295
Germany: A Country Study
ence of the banks and to see it perpetuated. Nonetheless, the
direction of bank influence probably adds a conservative ele-
ment to German economic decision making because banks tra-
ditionally prefer to avoid risk-taking in favor of slow but steady
dividends and debt repayment. They also could be accused of
becoming new masters of German cartel-like structures, with
banks directing separate firms toward similar policies even if
the firms themselves are not colluding.
The role of the banks in the economy has raised questions.
Some political figures, including FDP leader Otto Lambsdorff,
have charged that the banks have accumulated excessive
power. Newspapers and magazines, including business jour-
nals, periodically make the same charge. But there are no indi-
cations that the system is changing or will change in response
to those criticisms. One could even argue that it is more perva-
sive than ever, as banks now also play roles in managing former
East German firms that were privatized with western bank
funds.
Nonbank Financing
Ever since the collapse of the Berlin stock exchange after
Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, Germany has lacked a major
international market for bonds and equities. Nothing in Ger-
many rivals those of New York or Tokyo, and even the London
market does more overall trading than Frankfurt. London even
trades almost one-third of all German shares. There are now
ten regional exchanges in Germany, but no single exchange is
very large.
To help promote nonbank financing and a greater German
interest in equities, the German government has launched a
drive for what it terms Finanzplatz Deutschland, making stock
and bond trading easier in Germany and subordinating the
roles of the smaller exchanges to the Frankfurt exchange as the
major site for German nonbank finance. Proposals include a
futures market, improved electronic links among regional mar-
kets, some computerized trading, longer opening hours, free-
dom for firms to issue commercial paper, and the elimination
of a small but annoying German turnover tax on securities
transactions. They also include tighter national supervision to
prevent misuse of the exchanges and of new methods of
finance. Finally, there are tight restrictions on insider training,
and a supervisory organization that will correspond to the
296
The Domestic Economy
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States is
being created.
The smaller regional exchanges have objected that some of
the steps proposed under the Finanzplatz Deutschland pro-
posal violate the federal principle on which postwar West Ger-
many had been founded, and they have been supported by the
Land governments that do not want Frankfurt to have too
much power. Therefore, not all parts of the government plan
have been carried out as soon as its proponents wished. None-
theless, an important step has been taken in the merger of the
Frankfurt stock exchange and the German futures and options
exchanges, the Deutsche Terminborse (DTB).
Despite such measures to encourage equity placements,
most German firms still do not seek equity financing, and even
if they do, they often work through banks to obtain it. West
Germany had 370,000 limited liability companies or closed cor-
porations (Ges ells chaf ten mit beschrankter Haftung — GmbH) as
against 2,300 corporations (Aktiengesellschaften — AG). Of those,
only 619 had their shares quoted on the markets at the end of
1990, and the number thereafter grew only slowly. There has
been no upsurge toward new equity finance as a result of unifi-
cation, with many East German firms being taken over by West
German firms and with banks supplying the needed financing
as well as sitting on new boards. Although there are some signs
that German firms appear to be turning increasingly to
exchanges for funds, and the volume of such placements
increased over the late 1980s and early 1990s, many firms still
feel more comfortable with their established banking links.
A step that may lead to a greater financial role for Frankfurt
in Germany itself as well as in Europe has been the EU's 1994
decision to place the new European central bank in Frankfurt
when that bank is established. This would reinforce Frankfurt's
place as the center of the European Monetary Union (EMU —
see Glossary) and also as the center of German finance (see
Germany and the European Monetary Union, ch. 6). Berlin's
emergence as a center for trade and services with Eastern
Europe might over time boost Berlin's prospects as an alterna-
tive center of German finance.
Other Services
Transportation
Germany has one of the world's largest and most sophisti-
297
Germany: A Country Study
cated transportation systems. This reflects the intensely mobile
nature of the German population, who are among the world's
most active drivers, tourists, and travelers. It also reflects Ger-
many's location in the center of Europe and the many far-
reaching industrial and commercial relationships developed
over centuries. Because of the density of the network, many
towns, but especially such major cities as Berlin, Frankfurt am
Main, Munich, and Hamburg, function as transportation and
communications centers, lying either at the intersections of
major east-west and north-south routes or on transshipment
points of ship, barge, road, and railroad traffic. With Europe
again uniting from the Atlantic to the Urals, Germany's posi-
tion as a transportation and communications hub for the conti-
nent will become ever more important.
To cope with the additional demands caused by German and
European unification, the German government has designated
seventeen major transport routes to be either completed or
rebuilt as soon as possible during the last decade of the twenti-
eth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The
first transport plan for newly united Germany was adopted in
1993 and will cost DM453 billion by the year 2012. More than
half of the investment will be dedicated to rail and waterway
travel, not road travel (see fig. 11).
Trucks have been the most important instrument for freight
transport throughout Germany for decades. They carried 203
billion ton-kilometers of freight in 1992, with railroads second
(83 billion ton-kilometers) and inland shipping (55 billion ton-
kilometers) third. But the railroad system is also perceived as
very important, and it will be extensively modernized. The
Deutsche Bahn railroad company, formed in January 1994
from the East German and West German railroad systems and
to be gradually privatized, has a network of over 40,000 kilome-
ters at standard 1.435 meter gauge, of which 16,000 kilometers
are electrified. Perhaps 8,000 kilometers of German railroad
tracks will be eliminated through rationalization. To speed traf-
fic, new high-speed railroad tracks have been designed to per-
mit special trains to move at up to 250 kilometers per hour
between such principal cities as Hamburg and Munich, with
more tracks to follow. The purpose of these new trains is to
relieve some of the pressure on airports by making surface
transportation fast and attractive for distances of fewer than
500 kilometers.
298
A Lufthansa Boeing 737-300 at Berlin-Tegel Airport
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
The Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, which completes the link between the
North Sea and the Black Sea
Courtesy Inter Nationes, Bonn
299
Germany: A Country Study
Figure 11. Transportation System, 1995
Germany has one of the densest road networks in the world
and the largest after the United States. There were a total of
226,000 kilometers of roads in 1992, including more than
11,000 kilometers of four-or-more-lane superhighways. None-
theless, especially in crowded areas and for the long routes
toward southern Europe, many trucks are carried piggyback on
trains to increase speed and to reduce pollution. The former
East German system required several years of rebuilding after
300
The Domestic Economy
International boundary
® National capital
• Populated place
vL Inland port
i < i i i i . Canal
50 100 Kilometers
6 " 50^ U)0 Miles
\, DENMAP"
Figure 12. Inland Waterways, 1995
unification to enable it to serve the infrastructural require-
ments of modern business travel.
Germany had 45 million motor vehicles in 1992, with 39 mil-
lion automobiles. Automobiles accounted for some 685 billion
passenger-kilometers in 1990, a number that could be expected
to rise rapidly by the mid-1990s as the eastern German popula-
tion begins to acquire automobiles at a rate similar to that of
their compatriots in the west.
301
Germany: A Country Study
The German inland shipping system is one of the world's
most highly developed, especially because of the large flat areas
in northern and western Germany. Duisburg, located in north-
western Germany on the Rhine, is the largest inland port in the
world. Germany has 6,900 kilometers of navigable inland water-
ways, including such principal canals as the Kiel Canal, the Mit-
telland Canal, and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The Rhine-Main-
Danube Canal, completed in 1992, joins the Main and the
Danube rivers in northern Bavaria and for the first time per-
mits river transport between the North Sea and the Black Sea
(see fig. 12).
The main German seaports are those of the old Hanseatic
League, with the best-known being Hamburg, Bremen-Bremer-
haven, Wilhelmshaven, Lubeck, and Rostock. To compensate
for their greater distance from the Atlantic Ocean (in compari-
son with Rotterdam), German ports have invested heavily in
technology, equipment, and training that permit fast and eco-
nomical loading and unloading.
Germany also has a large system of inland and international
air travel. Lufthansa, the national airline, has an extensive
domestic and global route system. In 1992 approximately 87.5
million passengers were registered at Germany's airports, and
1.5 million tons of air freight were carried from those airports.
The largest international airport is Frankfurt-Rhein Main,
located near Frankfurt am Main and one of the world's most
important centers for both passengers and air freight. Other
important airports are those at Dusseldorf, Munich, the three
serving Berlin (Berlin-Tegel, Berlin-Schonefeld, and Berlin-
Tempelhof), Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Cologne-Bonn. Berlin-
Schonefeld, located to the south of Berlin, will be expanded to
reestablish it as a major international air center.
Telecommunications
The German postal services are among the oldest in Europe.
In 1990 Germany celebrated 500 years of organized mail ser-
vice. At the same time, the German government broke up the
Bundespost monopoly over all forms of communications and
created three new structures to handle the services formerly
handled by the Bundespost.
The largest of the new services is the Postdienst, with
390,000 employees. It is Germany's largest service enterprise,
handling over 15 billion pieces of mail every year. The second
largest is Telekom, the telephone/telex service, with a total of
302
The Domestic Economy
260,000 employees. Telekom is intended to keep the German
telecommunications system competitive with the new systems
being developed in the United States and Asia. Germany has 35
million telephones, but service in eastern Germany took a long
time to come up to western German standards. The third is the
Postbank, with 24,000 employees, which manages the postal
savings bank system in which about 30 million Germans have
accounts (see Banking and Its Role in the Economy, this ch.).
Tourism
Germany is a principal attraction for foreign tourists, and
the Germans themselves are among the world's most enthusias-
tic tourists. Although Germany attracts millions of foreign tour-
ists, German tourists every year spend tens of billions of
deutsche marks more than foreign tourists spend in Germany.
In fact, tourism constitutes a major drain on German foreign
exchange.
The areas that attract the most tourists to Germany are the
Alps, the Rhine and Moselle valleys, and several large cities,
especially Berlin. But those are not the only attractions. Music
festivals such as those at Bayreuth and Munich draw many tour-
ists. So do some of the old German medieval cities like Rothen-
burg ob der Tauber and Dinkelsbuhl. Because of the wealth of
hiking and bicycle trails, many tourists come to the Black For-
est and to other German woodlands and mountains. Since uni-
fication, tourists have increasingly visited the former East
German states and especially the Baltic beaches and such cities
as Leipzig and Dresden.
Unlike Austria or Spain, Germany does not regard tourism
as a major source of foreign exchange. Hotel stays by foreign
visitors to Germany do not rise above 15 percent of total occu-
pancy, as opposed to the two-thirds levels that they reach in
those countries. But as many as 1.5 million jobs in Germany are
connected in one way or another to the tourist industry.
* * *
The literature on the German economy is surprisingly lim-
ited, given its importance in Europe and the world as a whole.
German economic unification produced a spate of books and
articles, but most were out of date within months of publica-
tion. The most comprehensive current book in English is The
German Economy by W.R. Smyser. Another survey is The German
303
Germany: A Country Study
Economy by Eric Owen Smith. There are also some current
books that deal with specialized topics, such as Banks, Finance,
and Investment in Germany by Jeremy S.S. Edwards and Klaus
Fischer. The Bundesbank has attracted growing attention, with
the most comprehensive work being The Bundesbank by David
Marsh. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development publishes an annual OECD Economic Survey on
Germany as well as a special section on Germany in its biannual
OECD Economic Outlook.
There is, however, a rich literature about the specifics of the
German economy. The German Council of Economic Experts
(Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaft-
lichen Entwicklung) publishes an extensive annual review of
the German economy in German, and the German economic
institutes continually publish specialized papers in German
and sometimes in English. The Bundesbank and the German
Ministry for Economics publish monthly and annual reports
that concentrate on financial and macroeconomic information
but also provide a general economic roundup. The bank also
publishes a dozen statistical annexes every month. Both pub-
lish their basic reports in English as well as in German. Other
German ministries as well as the German Federal Press and
Information Office provide large quantities of information on
a regular basis, but much of it is in primary form and requires
analysis. (For further information and complete citations, see
Bibliography.)
304
Chapter 6. International Economic Relations
■
The port of Hamburg
EVER SINCE ITS CREATION IN 1949, the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) , or West Germany, as it was also called until its
unification in 1990 with the German Democratic Republic
(GDR, or East Germany), has played an increasingly important
role in the world economy. Consistently among the most
important trading nations in the world, Germany often derives
a higher share of its gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos-
sary) from exports than any other major state. The Federal
Republic plays an even more important role in international
financial matters. Its currency, the deutsche mark, is the sec-
ond most important currency in the world after the United
States dollar.
Germany does not act alone in international economic mat-
ters. Instead, it usually acts through Europe. West Germany was
a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) and of the follow-on European Community (EC —
see Glossary), known since late 1993 as the European Union
(EU — see Glossary). Germany increasingly makes its interna-
tional policies in conjunction and consultation with other EU
members. More than half of its trade is with other EU states,
and the deutsche mark is the anchor of the European Mone-
tary System (EMS — see Glossary) and of its planned follow-on,
the European Monetary Union (EMU — see Glossary).
Despite its central role in the world economy, Germany has
never developed nor sought a high profile as a major interna-
tional economic player. It receives much less attention than
Japan in United States newspapers and economic journals,
even though it wields as least as much influence in global finan-
cial affairs. This relative discretion reflects Germany's general
reticence about projecting itself on the world stage in eco-
nomic matters and the consistent German wish to integrate its
economy into the EU.
Germany has benefited from a strikingly benign interna-
tional economic climate for the past half-century. Despite occa-
sional crises — such as the effects of the United States decision
to end the dollar's link to gold in 1971 and of the "oil shocks"
of the 1970s that resulted from exporters' sharp increases in
the price of petroleum — the global economic scene has been
remarkably stable in comparison with that of the 1920s and
1930s. This stability has favored the kind of international trad-
307
Germany: A Country Study
ing state that West Germany represented and that united Ger-
many is expected to become once unification is complete.
Under United States leadership, the Western world with
free-market economies established the International Monetary
Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary)
in 1944. In 1947 these nations created a virtually universal
trade structure, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT — see Glossary). The combination of open financial and
trade systems has helped promote continuous and even dra-
matic expansion since World War II of world trade and the
liquidity of international capital. Nothing could have better
suited West Germany and now united Germany.
The productive capacities of both East Germany and West
Germany always exceeded the absorptive capacity of their
respective domestic markets. From the West German stand-
point, this characteristic helped to fuel the German export
drive and to generate investment capital. It also strengthened
the deutsche mark and helped make the German economy
internationally prominent.
Although Germany has a global currency and a world-class
trade sector, the German economy remains essentially conti-
nental in focus. Because the economy lacks the size necessary
to deal with the effects of truly massive currency flows, Ger-
many has looked for partners in international economic mat-
ters as it has in international strategic and political matters.
The German government and the Bundesbank, Germany's
central bank, are active participants in formal and informal
international institutions and arrangements concerned with
global finance and the coordination of national economic poli-
cies. West Germany was a founding member of the association
of free-market economies known as the Group of Five (G-5),
which later became the Group of Seven (G-7 — see Glossary).
But the German government has also had to acknowledge that
it cannot direct the policies of the independent Bundesbank,
which are more often based on Germany's domestic needs
than on the wishes of the outside world.
Germany in the World Economy
Germany in World Finance and in the Group of Seven
Along with the United States and Japan, Germany has one of
the world's biggest economies and most dominant central
banks. Of the three, Germany has the smallest and most vulner-
308
International Economic Relations
able economy. Germany's GDP of DM3 trillion (for value of the
deutsche mark — see Glossary) is less than one-third of United
States GDP and less than one-half of Japan's.
Despite Germany's relatively small size, it has consistently
exerted a powerful influence on the world economy. Since the
end of World War II, the Federal Republic has played a key role
in beginning, managing, or ending each crisis and each phase
experienced by the global monetary system.
The first phase was the Bretton Woods era, named after the
New Hampshire resort where the Allied monetary conference
of July 1944 created the IMF and shaped the global postwar
order. The dollar was pegged to gold at a fixed rate of US$35
per troy ounce, constituting the official backing of the global
monetary system; other currencies were linked to the system
through their own fixed, dollar-pegged exchange rates. Coun-
tries could devalue or revalue with respect to the dollar, and
the dollar price of gold could at least theoretically remain con-
stant even as rates of exchange between separate currencies
fluctuated.
By the late 1960s, there was a surplus of dollars in the inter-
national financial system. Largely for domestic reasons, the
United States had put far more emphasis on expanding dollar
liquidity than on maintaining dollar value. Growing fear of
United States inflation had made those dollars less desirable,
and many central banks held more dollars than they wanted.
The United States proposed that other countries revalue their
currencies as provided under the Bretton Woods Agreement.
But those other countries, and West Germany in particular,
were not prepared to revalue. Money poured into purchases of
the deutsche mark, sometimes for the purchase of German
goods, but more often to hedge against the dollar or to make a
profit when — as was widely expected — the deutsche mark
would have to be revalued. West German foreign-exchange
reserves rose from US$2. V billion in December 1969 to
US$12.6 billion by December 1971, and to US$28.1 billion by
September 1973. The steady flow of foreign money into
deutsche marks not only undercut the Bretton Woods system
(see Glossary) but also threatened to import inflation into Ger-
many by expanding the German money supply.
West Germany tried to help support the dollar during the
late 1960s and early 1970s. Bundesbank president Karl Blessing
sent a letter to the chairman of the United States Federal
Reserve Board pledging not to purchase United States gold but
309
Germany: A Country Study
to maintain West German reserves in dollars. West German
chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1963-66) agreed to make large
purchases of United States dollar instruments and to make
"offset" payments to lessen demands in the United States Con-
gress for a reduction in United States forces stationed in West
Germany. The United States and several other nations pressed
West Germany to revalue in order to compensate for the dollar
glut. Although the Bundesbank would have favored revaluation
to reduce the risk of inflation, the West German government
was afraid that a revaluation would cut into West Germany's
global competitiveness and curtail exports.
Finally, after intensifying waves of speculation, the Bretton
Woods system collapsed in August 1971. The United States
stopped the sale of gold at US$35 per troy ounce and thus
removed the fixed link between the dollar and gold. With that
step, the system lost its anchor.
The deutsche mark remained under strain throughout the
post-Bretton Woods period. It was alternately used in interven-
tions to support the dollar or as a hedge against it. Other cur-
rencies again flooded into purchases of deutsche marks. To
ease pressure within Europe, West Germany and other Euro-
pean states agreed to peg their currencies to a special system of
relatively narrow exchange-rate bands formally entitled the
"European narrow-margins agreement" but informally known
as the "snake." But the snake also failed to hold. The domestic
policies and even the economic philosophies of its leading
member states — West Germany, France, Britain, and Italy —
diverged too widely. The deutsche mark was the strongest cur-
rency, and others could not hold their value against it.
The United States and West Germany played key roles in try-
ing to arrange a new global monetary system. But they had
opposite objectives: the United States was determined not to
have the dollar reassume responsibility for maintaining an
international arrangement, fearing the great cost to its exports
and economic stability. The United States government believed
that countries with a trade surplus, such as West Germany,
should accept part of the responsibility for solving exchange-
rate crises and should be prepared to revalue, and it insisted on
advance agreement for sanctions against any country that
refused to do so. Despite its readiness to make minor
exchange-rate adjustments for the sake of new currency align-
ments, West Germany refused to commit itself to any arrange-
ment that would oblige it to revalue in the future.
310
International Economic Relations
In March 1973, the United States and other governments
and central banks gave up trying to preserve the Bretton
Woods system by setting new fixed exchange rates. With that
decision, the next phase of the postwar international system,
"floating," began. With floating, the relationship between the
United States dollar and the deutsche mark became subject to
market forces rather than official negotiations. West Germany
was not certain whether floating would serve its needs but was
not prepared to pursue any alternative.
Floating did not insulate domestic economies from interna-
tional events and global economic forces. Although the float-
ing era may have ended the period of fixed links to the dollar
and to gold, it did not give countries complete monetary free-
dom. It only meant that adjustments would be made by the
markets, not by government decree or agreement. Those
adjustments would, at least theoretically, occur in reaction to
trade and payments imbalances, correcting them over time.
However, the situation did not work out as expected or
planned. The increasingly important role played by capital
flows, speculative or not, undercut the theoretically self-regu-
lating mechanism of trade flows as the basis of currency values.
The economic consequences of floating for Germany were
not uniformly beneficial. The Bundesbank welcomed floating
because it gave the bank more flexibility. The bank, in fact,
could virtually control the deutsche mark's exchange rate if it
was prepared to manipulate interest rates to that end. But West
German industry, and especially West German exporters, did
not welcome the unpredictability that flexible exchange rates
introduced into commercial arrangements and production
plans.
West German exporters also faced a particular problem that
persisted in the 1990s. The Bundesbank's favorite instrument
for fighting inflation, a high real domestic interest rate, is also
the instrument that attracts capital to the deutsche mark and
keeps the currency valuable. Many businesspeople feared then,
as they have since, that the Bundesbank's anti-inflationary pol-
icy would always keep the deutsche mark stronger than most
other currencies and would thus jeopardize exports.
German exchange-rate policy has been constantly caught on
the horns of that dilemma. When a decision absolutely needed
to be made during the floating era, however, German govern-
ments and the Bundesbank have almost always chosen an anti-
inflationary course of action. They have preferred a strong cur-
311
Germany: A Country Study
rency, which might adversely affect trade, to a weak one, which
would jeopardize the stability of the German monetary system.
With that choice, they set policy for others as well as for them-
selves. As long as the deutsche mark is strong and German
interest rates remain high, even the United States can diverge
from German policy only at the risk of seeing its own currency
fall in value. Because of Germany's monetary dilemma, and
because the German government as well as the nation's bank-
ers and industrialists have recognized German limitations and
vulnerabilities, all have been anxious to establish the highest
possible level of international predictability. The Germans have
become regular participants in international economic consul-
tations, and they have emphasized the value of such consulta-
tions at every opportunity.
Global economic coordination after the end of the Bretton
Woods system has resulted in the development of a number of
coordinating institutions. One, first known informally as the
Group of Five (G-5), consisted of the United States, West Ger-
many, Japan, Britain, and France. After Canada and Italy
joined, the association became known as the Group of Seven
(G-7). The G-7 includes the finance ministers and central
bankers of the principal economic powers, who meet periodi-
cally and consult regularly between meetings.
In addition to the meeting of G-7 finance ministers, there is
an annual G— 7 economic summit at which the heads of state or
government of the same seven countries meet to coordinate
economic and political policies or at least to attempt to under-
stand each other better. The summits have been held annually
since 1975 on a rotating basis among the summit states, usually
in the capital. At the Naples summit of the G-7 in 1994, Russia
joined the political discussions, essentially turning the gather-
ing into the Group of Eight (G-8).
Three summits, those of 1978, 1985, and 1992, took place in
Germany. Each was significant for different reasons. In 1978
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) committed West Ger-
many to a more reflationary policy, to his later regret. Seven
years later, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- ) and other sum-
mit principals made commitments toward supply-side policies
that most participants agreed were then necessary and that
both Kohl and United States president Ronald Reagan wanted
to use to reduce the role of government in their national econ-
omies. Seven years later, at Munich in 1992, the G-7 agreed to
provide aid to Russia. However, the summit did not reach
312
International Economic Relations
agreement on the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations,
and Chancellor Kohl did not carry out what the United States
had regarded as his promise to persuade the French to reduce
their insistence on large EC agricultural export subsidies.
German bankers and financial officials have usually spoken
skeptically about possible results from the summits, making
abundantly clear that the meetings do not affect their views,
although they may subsequently adjust specific policies.
Bundesbank president Hans Tietmeyer has stated that West
Germany sees them as occasions for "cooperation," not "coor-
dination." German global policy has thus been guided by broad
efforts to coordinate specific policies, but with a firm wish to
preserve German interests and its friendships with the EU
members it considers its principal economic partners.
The Deutsche Mark as an International Currency
At the core of Germany's success and influence lies its cur-
rency. The deutsche mark gave concrete expression to West
Germany's international financial and economic success and
also contributed to it. Since unification, it has become even
more important as a symbol as well as an instrument of Ger-
many's new central role in Europe. The success of the deutsche
mark has been anchored in the success of West German
exports, in the Bundesbank's solicitous management of the
currency's value, and in the confidence generated by the coun-
try's prosperity.
The deutsche mark has been a model of stability since it
became fully convertible in 1958. No other major currency,
including the Japanese yen or the Swiss franc, has been stron-
ger. The United States dollar, the cornerstone of the global sys-
tem, has lost about two-thirds of its value against the deutsche
mark since 1958.
The deutsche mark has become the second-largest currency
component of global monetary reserves, second only to the
United States dollar. Less than 10 percent of the world's mone-
tary reserves were held in deutsche marks throughout most of
the 1970s, but the amount rose to 15 percent by the end of
1987. By the end of 1989, around 20 percent of all global mon-
etary reserves were in deutsche marks. The deutsche mark's
position in global monetary reserves largely reflects the exten-
sive deutsche mark holdings in European foreign-exchange
reserve accounts as well as the desire among all industrial state
treasuries and central banks to hold a stable currency in their
313
Germany: A Country Study
reserves. According to the United States Federal Reserve
Board, the United States government holds more than US$13
billion of its reserves in deutsche marks, an amount greater
than its holdings in Japanese yen.
The deutsche mark is not used as widely for transactions as it
is to supply central-bank reserves. Global commodity prices are
still largely denominated in United States dollars. Whatever the
deutsche mark's strengths may be, it does not offer the kind of
liquidity that the dollar does. Invoicing in deutsche marks is
concentrated on Germany's own commerce, but almost 15 per-
cent of world trade is conducted on a deutsche mark basis. The
deutsche mark figures much less significantly than the dollar in
the creation of international credits or in debt servicing. But a
growing quantity of international bond issues — including some
being floated in the United States — are denominated in deut-
sche marks. Major United States banks offer deutsche mark
accounts for Americans who want to hedge some of their assets
against a fall in the dollar. The World Bank has floated Euro-
deutsche mark bonds, as have various United States corpora-
tions. In Europe the deutsche mark has virtually become a
parallel currency, with prices in Western Europe and Eastern
Europe increasingly quoted in deutsche marks as well as in
local currencies.
Bundesbank officials worry constantly that the growing cir-
culation of the deutsche mark makes it difficult to control the
supply of the central bank's own currency. Deutsche marks
held abroad, circulating abroad, and perhaps even used for
currency intervention abroad are still part of the total German
money supply. Sudden, large flows could have undesirable
impacts on German interest rates or German prices, materially
complicating the execution of German monetary policy. The
bank fears that any decline in the deutsche mark's value or in
the German current-account surplus could set off a selling
wave that would force it to intervene massively and perhaps
unsuccessfully. Bundesbank president Tietmeyer has warned
that the high deutsche mark holdings abroad place a particular
burden on the Bundesbank because any loss of faith in the Ger-
man currency could provoke large-scale selling. The deutsche
mark has thus become a burden for Germany as well as a bless-
ing. The Bundesbank stated in May 1991 that one reason it had
to maintain high interest rates was to avoid the kind of decline
and subsequent market effects that Tietmeyer had cited. The
German currency risks finding itself on a treadmill where the
314
Frankfurt am Main, a typical German mixture of old and new, has a
medieval square, the Romerplatz, and a skyline of skyscrapers,
headquarters of large banks.
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
stronger it gets, the stronger it must remain until the German
monetary authorities no longer dare to reduce interest rates
significantly for fear that they might spark a deutsche mark sell-
off.
The IMF recognized the reality of German monetary power
in 1990, when it promoted Germany and Japan to share the
second rank just below the United States and ahead of Britain
and France. German government and banking officials were
not certain that they welcomed such prominence, but they
were prepared to accept it as a reflection of international
appreciation of German monetary policies.
The West German role in the development of the global
financial and monetary system has been replete with ironies.
No state consistently had a greater interest in developing a sta-
315
Germany: A Country Study
ble system and in cooperating in such a system. Nonetheless,
West German policy helped undermine and even destroy some
of the arrangements that West Germany wanted to maintain.
During the Bretton Woods era, pressures on the dollar almost
always expressed themselves in massive purchases of deutsche
marks. The strength of the deutsche mark weakened the sys-
tem because any currency — including the United States dol-
lar — could come under attack if it were not defended and
preserved as solicitously as the deutsche mark was by Germany.
The only currencies and systems that survived this pressure
were those whose governments determined from the begin-
ning that they would follow a strict monetary discipline similar
to that applied by the Bundesbank to the deutsche mark.
Germany in the European Economy
Germany in the European Community
If Germany's global role is beset with complications, its Euro-
pean role seems relatively clear. Germany has always concen-
trated its economic interests and activities, whether in trade,
investment, or finance, within whatever form was being taken
by West European integration.
Although German economic and political interests cover all
of Europe, they have been most immediately reflected in the
EU and the European Monetary System (EMS). The Germans
have found that these two systems complement each other. But
the German government and German business and banking
establishments have long had separate attitudes toward the two
institutions, and they play a different role in each.
The EC was West Germany's economic home, and the coun-
try remains one of the organization's strongest supporters.
Chancellor Kohl on several occasions made special efforts to
promote European cooperation, especially concentrating on
the drive to create a European Single Market and on the nego-
tiation and ratification of the Treaty on European Union (com-
monly known as the Maastricht Treaty — see Glossary) (see The
European Single Market, this ch.). Kohl also intervened on
occasion to avert potential conflicts between Germany's Euro-
pean interests and its ties with the United States, although he
had great difficulty resolving the dispute over agricultural trade
that broke out between the United States and France during
negotiation of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks. He also
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followed up German unification with efforts to draw the EU
further toward Eastern Europe.
Germans have consistently pressed for closer integration of
the states of Western Europe, officially and in public opinion.
They have also been among the staunchest European advo-
cates of open trade between Europe and the outside world.
German officials and political leaders have strongly and consis-
tently asserted that United States fears about a "Fortress
Europe" are misplaced. Whereas several other European
states — especially France and Italy — have tried to limit imports
of various foreign products to the EU, the German government
has argued for open markets, imposing fewer controls or
restrictions on trade than most European states.
West Germany, and especially West German industry, carved
out an important export niche within the EC. In the process, it
made the EC an essential market for German goods and an
important factor in German prosperity. Because one-third of
West German GDP was exported and because one-half of all
exports went to countries of the EC, at least one of every six
West German jobs depended directly on the EC market. Many
other jobs depended on imports from EC states or on the gen-
eral prosperity the EC had brought to all its members.
The intimate connection with the EC was reflected in West
German trade statistics (see table 19, Appendix). Not only did
more than half of West German exports go to other EC coun-
tries, but many West German industries relied on the EC for a
major share of their total market — whether domestic or inter-
national. Before unification in 1990, 48 percent of West Ger-
many's production of office machinery was exported to other
EC countries, as was 24 percent of its chemical goods and
machinery, 23 percent of its motor vehicles, 17 percent of its
electronic goods, 16 percent of its textiles, and 14 percent of its
iron and steel.
But if West European trade was vital to West Germany and
remains so for united Germany, West Germany was vital to the
success of the EC. Even before German unification, there were
more Germans — more than 60 million — than any other
nationality in the EC. With unification the figure came to
about 80 million. West Germany alone already had the largest
share of the EC's GDP, over 25 percent; the largest amount of
private consumption, more than DM1.2 trillion in 1988; and
the largest investment in other EC countries, DM56.7 billion.
Because the German share of EC production and consumption
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Germany: A Country Study
was expected to grow in the aftermath of unification, the EC
recognized the impact of this process by allotting united Ger-
many a larger number of seats — ninety-nine — in the European
Parliament than any other state.
The Federal Republic was often termed the EC's "paymas-
ter." Its net contribution to the EC budget was often four times
as large as the next-largest contribution because West Germany
never drew as heavily as such states as France or the poorer
Mediterranean countries on either the agricultural or the
developmental support programs. West Germany regularly pro-
vided over 25 percent of the EC budget, with no other state
contributing more than 20 percent; and united Germany's pro-
jected share of the 1994 EU budget was 30 percent, or DM44.1
billion. Although Germany was receiving some EU aid in 1994
to develop the economy of the former East Germany, united
Germany will in the future be expected to contribute an even
larger share to the EU than West Germany did — in part
because Germany itself is larger and in part because many pro-
spective East European members will need support. This was
one reason Germany strongly supported the EU membership
applications of such relatively well-to-do states as Norway, Swe-
den, Finland, and Austria. Germany's contribution to the EU is
becoming increasingly controversial, however, as more and
more Germans complain about the growth of the EU budget.
Several German political figures, including Bavaria's political
leader, Minister President Edmund Stoiber, have said that Ger-
many must reduce its contribution.
Because of the multifaceted economic relationships between
Germany and other EU countries, different ministries in Bonn
can have different and even conflicting interests and policies
concerning various items on the European agenda. Many min-
istries have their own direct links to the EU bureaucracy in
Brussels, and the German government has occasionally spoken
with several voices at different levels until the problems were
brought to the attention of senior officials in Bonn and priori-
ties were established. By the same token, German ministries
have at times used elements within the European bureaucracy
to support their views at home. It has been left to the three
ministries with the broadest responsibilities — the Ministry for
Economics, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs — to try to keep these separate issues in a total
national-interest perspective. Those ministries have also had to
block collusion between European and German bureaucracies
318
International Economic Relations
to devise new subsidies and new ways to protect or subsidize
special German or European interests.
Management of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP — see Glossary) illustrates some of the conflicts in intra-
German interests. That system, by its commitment to subsidize
both production and exports, has become increasingly expen-
sive. It consumes more than half of the EU budget, or more
than US$35 billion a year. Germany's Ministry of Agriculture
has often tried to use the EU to drive support prices higher and
to prevent or restrict foreign imports. The Ministry of Finance,
by constrast, has sought to reduce the CAP in order to cut the
German contribution to the EU.
The European Single Market
To advance the EC toward a truly integrated and borderless
internal market — the European Single Market — the EC's Euro-
pean Commission (see Glossary) in 1985 submitted a white
paper to the European Council (see Glossary) in which it listed
a series of 225 steps needed to create such a market. It also pro-
posed a schedule for completing these steps in time for the
internal market to begin functioning by the end of 1992. The
council accepted the commission's proposals, with West Ger-
many strongly supporting the concept. West Germany later
advanced the process significantly during its presidency of the
council in the second half of 1988.
Once Germany was united, it remained among the Euro-
pean states the most determined to implement the conditions
of the European Single Market. Even before the formal imple-
mentation of the single market on January 1, 1993, Germany
had already incorporated 80 percent of the single-market regu-
lations into its own legislation, a higher percentage than any
European state except Denmark or France. Notably, the Ger-
man government also applied those new regulations in the five
new states {Lander, sing., Land) of the former East Germany, as
well as in the old Lander of western Germany.
Not all Germans welcomed the coming of an open internal
market. Many worried that the guidelines for such a market
would give so much power to the bureaucrats within the Euro-
pean Commission that economic initiative within the member
states might be stifled. Many German businesspeople dreaded
the prospect of more EU offices in Brussels enforcing more
regulations. Some Lander, especially Bavaria, as well as a num-
ber of German communities, became disturbed by prospects
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Germany: A Country Study
that the EU would in the future have such immense powers
over economic life that the German federal system itself could
be placed in jeopardy. As a result, Germans have become
strong advocates of the principle of Subsidaritat (subsidiarity),
under which matters not specifically covered by EU laws are left
to the practices and the laws of the individual national states.
Despite steady German government support for the internal
market, attitudes in German business and economic circles
also have remained mixed, depending on the size and interests
of the affected firms. The largest German firms with strong
export positions strongly favor the internal market. The mid-
sized firms, which are unable to relocate their main production
sites or develop subsidiary sites abroad, have a more cautious
reaction. Smaller firms, especially those involved in handicrafts
or services, are fearful of the competition that might come
from other European countries with lower production costs.
Just as firms of different sizes have reacted differently to the
internal market, so have firms in different industries. The pro-
ducers of Germany's most competitive products — whether
automotive manufacturers, toolmakers, chemical firms, or elec-
tronics firms — regard the single market as an opportunity. By
constrast, Germany's relatively inefficient service firms,
whether in telecommunications, banking, or insurance, see the
market as a threat because it would eliminate national regula-
tions that had given them privileged positions.
German trade unions particularly fear the internal market.
They have warned that it will cause production to move to
countries and regions where wages are lowest and social bene-
fits most limited. Despite the existence of strict EU standards
governing the rights and privileges of workers, the trade
unions have consistently warned of "social dumping," the temp-
tation for manufacturers to look for those sites where regula-
tions are less stringent or are less vigorously enforced than in
Germany.
German environmentalists, for their part, fear that German
manufacturers might shade their environmental commitments
in order to keep their costs as low as possible against competi-
tors who face fewer environmental problems in less densely set-
tled countries (see The Environment, ch. 3). Environmentalists
have also expressed concern that manufacturers will be
tempted to locate production facilities abroad, where environ-
mental standards might be less rigorously enforced or where
less severe population and land-use pressures might make pol-
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International Economic Relations
lution seem less onerous. As German trade unions fear social
dumping, the environmental groups fear "environmental
dumping."
With the continued development of the internal European
market, many Germans began to perceive another danger —
that the EU might become so internally focused that it could
become too protectionist. The Board of Advisers to the Ger-
man Ministry for Economics warned in 1990 that such protec-
tionist thinking, if not promptly countered, could jeopardize
European prosperity. German industry and trade associations
have expressed similar concerns, warning that the protectionist
risk of the internal market must be fought at every level to
avoid driving Germany ever more into a limited European
mold. German industry has consistently pointed out that Ger-
many stands to lose far more than any other European state if
the global trading system collapses because of the protectionist
proclivities of the EU.
The increasing power of protectionist forces in the EU has
raised concerns in Germany about the potential for the emer-
gence of three separate and competitive regional trading areas,
the EU, the Americas, and Asia, with some form of negoti-
ated — or managed — trade among them. Any such arrange-
ment negotiated by the EU would establish quotas for each
side, and Germany almost certainly would not obtain as large a
share of any European quota as that which German exporters
could obtain on their own.
Regardless of its concerns about protectionism, the German
government has continued to insist that it will fulfill its commit-
ment to complete European integration and the single market.
Political considerations, especially Germany's relationship with
France, have helped to shape and support that policy as much
as economic considerations have. But the Germans have
noticed with concern that France is often the state that tries to
make the EU more protectionist. The Germans believe that
they cannot support such French efforts, even if they cannot
block them. German minister of foreign affairs Klaus Kinkel
has warned that Germany does not agree with all French views
on international trade rules, but Chancellor Kohl remains
reluctant to press France toward a more open global trading
system.
Kohl, in fact, has sought to use EU cooperation to help
cement a close German relationship with France. He and
French president Francois Mitterrand promised in early 1994
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Germany: A Country Study
that they would use the successive German and French presi-
dencies of the European Council during the last half of 1994
and the first half of 1995 to plan and execute a joint program
for the further development of the EU.
Germany and the European Union
Kohl believed that it was important for a united Germany to
have a firm anchor in the West, especially in a structure for
West European and, later, European, integration (see Euro-
pean Union, ch. 8). He therefore played a major part in gain-
ing Europe-wide approval of the Maastricht Treaty negotiated
at the European Council summit in December 1991. He
refused to be deterred after a first Danish referendum rejected
the treaty, insisting that Germany proceed to ratification. The
two houses of parliament, the Bundestag and Bundesrat, vindi-
cated Kohl's position, approving the Maastricht Treaty by over-
whelming majorities despite reservations in some Lander that it
might undermine the German federal system by giving the EC
and its European Commission greater powers over the separate
Lander than even the Bonn government possessed.
Germany also strongly supported the creation of the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA — see Glossary), established in 1993
to create a trade area consisting of the EC and most of the
states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA — see
Glossary). It later advocated the entry of four EFTA mem-
bers — Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Austria — into the EU. By
the same token, Germany has favored developing close links
between the EU and the East European states, although Ger-
man farmers and steel manufacturers have joined other EU
producers in seeking to block those East European imports
that would be most competitive with their own output.
During the entire process of creating a more integrated
Europe, Kohl and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel continu-
ously stressed the German commitment to integration. Kohl
has told the Bundestag that Germany's national future lies in
Europe, and he has used every possible opportunity to point
out that Germany's firmly anchored position within Europe has
been mainly responsible for giving Germany peace, prosperity,
and its chance at unification.
Germany in the European Monetary System
West Germany helped to start the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS) in the late 1970s and has long provided the anchor
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International Economic Relations
of its principal operating element, the European exchange-rate
mechanism (ERM — see Glossary). It has exercised consider-
able and sometimes even dominant influence on the evolution
of European monetary affairs. Nonetheless, the EMS was much
more difficult for West Germany to propose or even to accept
than the EC. Although much of West German business and
government felt very much at home in the EC from the begin-
ning, Germany had reasons to be much more anxious about
monetary cooperation.
The concepts of the EMS and the EU are very different,
although they may be complementary, and they look especially
different to Germans. A common trading area within Europe
helps Germany to do what it does best: produce and export.
Although Germans have had to open their own borders to oth-
ers, they have always been confident about meeting such a chal-
lenge.
Money, however, is something else again, especially in Ger-
many. West Germany's strict monetary policy was seen by many
West Germans as the guarantor of the Federal Republic's stabil-
ity and prestige. Any West German political or economic
debate assumed the solidity of the deutsche mark. European
monetary cooperation could only be acceptable in West Ger-
many if it jeopardized neither the deutsche mark nor the pol-
icy that had given the currency its success and had given West
Germany its prosperity and domestic tranquillity.
Many West Germans feared that European monetary coop-
eration would have a pernicious effect on West Germany's own
money by posing a risk to the independence and integrity of
West German financial and monetary policies. They believed,
and not without reason, that many other states in Europe did
not share West Germany's belief in monetary stability as the
principal objective of financial policy. They looked with partic-
ular suspicion at Britain, Italy, and the smaller countries of
southern Europe.
The West German government and the Bundesbank tried,
therefore, to ensure that no European monetary arrangement
would interfere with West Germany's freedom to choose its
monetary objectives and policies. They consistently tried to
construct arrangements that would give them a dominant
influence over European policy or, if that was impossible,
would at least enable them to continue pursuing their tradi-
tional goals. The West German government and the Bundes-
bank did not always agree about what constituted satisfactory
323
324
Liibeck, a Baltic port, has linked Germany to the outside world since
the Middle Ages. On the left: old salt warehouses; on the right: one of
the city 's gates, the Holstentor.
Courtesy Liibeck-North America Representation, New York
325
Germany: A Country Study
arrangements, however, with the bank usually being more cau-
tious than the government. Nonetheless, West Germany
helped to establish the system of European monetary coopera-
tion and was among its main beneficiaries.
A number of proposals for European monetary cooperation
were advanced and discussed as the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) came into being in 1951, as other plans
for West European cooperation were considered, and as the
Bretton Woods system began to crumble in the 1960s. None
came to fruition, but they provided some of the intellectual
foundations for later efforts. It was only in 1972, after the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods system, that the first arrangement
for true European coordination was put into place — the Euro-
pean narrow-margins agreement, which came to be known as
the "snake" (see Germany in World Finance and in the Group
of Seven, this ch.). West Germany helped to establish the sys-
tem, a joint European float whose purpose was to ensure that
European currencies would not fluctuate more against each
other than against the United States dollar.
The deutsche mark became the strongest currency in the
snake. It remained at the top of the snake's trading range, in
part because of West Germany's export surplus but especially
because West German domestic monetary policy inspired con-
fidence that the deutsche mark's value would be protected and
might even rise against other currencies. Others soon learned
that staying in the snake meant a commitment to emulate the
policies of the Bundesbank or to suffer the exchange-rate con-
sequences of any divergence. Because most countries could not
do this, the snake had to be abandoned as a major interna-
tional currency arrangement. But a truncated snake did sur-
vive, in part because some smaller countries were prepared and
to some extent were obliged to follow the West German lead,
and in part because, despite its imperfections, it offered a
modicum of stability.
As the 1970s drew to a close, there were debates about mon-
etary policy in almost every European country. Whatever the
imperfections of the snake, it was clear to many states that any
port in a storm might be better than none. The oil shocks con-
fronted Western states with pressures that paradoxically could
be both recessionary and inflationary. Some countries, such as
the United States, chose to counteract the recessionary pres-
sures. Others, such as West Germany, chose to counteract the
inflationary threats. Most European countries increasingly
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International Economic Relations
found the West German approach more congenial than that of
the United States.
The main debate in West Germany, as in several other large
European countries, was between those who came to be known
as the "monetarists" and those who came to be known as the
"economists." The monetarists believed that introducing fixed
exchange rates would force countries to pursue similar eco-
nomic policies and that this would make interventions less nec-
essary, and perhaps even unnecessary. The economists argued
that common economic policies had to precede fixed
exchange rates because the exchange-rate system would break
down otherwise. They thought that a common currency should
cap a structure of common policy, not help to build it.
Most West German economists as well as government and
Bundesbank officials belonged solidly in the economist camp.
They did not want to join in any European monetary collabora-
tion until European states had shown that they would coordi-
nate economic policies. The experience with the snake, and
the costly and frequent interventions that it had required
before it finally broke down, only hardened their attitudes.
It was against this background of deep skepticism that Chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt decided in 1978 and 1979 to cooperate
with French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing in creating the
EMS. Because of opposition from the Bundesbank and the
Ministry for Economics, Schmidt conducted the crucial initial
phase of the negotiations in great secrecy, keeping them secret
from the German bureaucracy and the Bundesbank.
The EMS established not only a zone of monetary coopera-
tion but also a European currency known as the European cur-
rency unit (ECU — see Glossary). It was designated to represent
a basket of currencies from the EMS countries, to be used ini-
tially for certain clearing and credit transactions and ultimately
as a common European currency. Deutsche marks became the
largest element in the backing of the ECU.
When the EMS and its companion, the ERM, were formally
established on March 25, 1979, Schmidt's role committed Ger-
many to their success. Thus, West Germans became involved in
an area of European economic policy that was of the utmost
sensitivity to them. They did not do so without some reserva-
tions. But they saw no alternative.
The EMS and especially the ERM succeeded in making West-
ern Europe something of a zone of stability around the
deutsche mark. After a difficult beginning, marked by frequent
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Germany: A Country Study
currency realignments during the early and mid-1980s, the
exchange rates of the ERM currencies were much more stable
relative to each other than in relation to the United States dol-
lar or the Japanese yen until 1992.
However one might choose to allot credit for the success of
the EMS and ERM, they represented both a theoretical setback
and a practical triumph for the Bundesbank, because they
showed that the monetarist school might well have been cor-
rect and that a stable ERM, accompanied by a commitment to
hold to the agreed rates, could compel states and their central
banks to pursue congruent policies as long as they were deter-
mined to stay within a system. The effectiveness of the EMS and
ERM also suggested that a system of fixed exchange rates might
act as a catalyst in facilitating policy because it would give states
an additional reason to coordinate and could be said to pro-
vide a sanction if they failed to coordinate.
It has often been said that the ERM represents a "deutsche-
mark zone" within the EU. The deutsche mark has been the
EU's lead currency, the principal intervention currency, the
principal reserve currency, and its psychological as well as prac-
tical anchor.
During the twelve years from the onset of the ERM to the
Maastricht summit in 1991, the revaluation of the deutsche
mark against other ERM currencies had been 38 percent
(including 58 percent against the Italian lira and 45 percent
against the French franc), but most of the revaluation had
taken place early in that period, with the practice becoming
much less common after the mid-1980s. At the end of the
1980s, it could be said that the ERM had been a considerable
success for all the states involved. But it had mainly been a suc-
cess for West Germany, demonstrating the benefits to others of
associating themselves with West Germany's economic philoso-
phy.
The members of the EC decided even before the end of the
1980s to explore further monetary cooperation as the commu-
nity advanced toward the single market. In June 1988, at the
European Council meeting in Hanover, they established a com-
mission chaired by the president of the European Commission,
Jacques Delors, to study and propose "concrete stages leading
toward economic and monetary union." Delors's report, sub-
mitted on April 17, 1989, envisaged a transition in three stages
toward an EMU with a single common currency. The objectives
of the first stage, to commence on July 1, 1990, were to expand
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International Economic Relations
the ERM to include all EC members, to permit free capital
flows, and to take other measures toward coordinating eco-
nomic and monetary policies. In the second stage, for which
no starting date was then proposed, a European system of cen-
tral banks would be created, leading to the formation of a sin-
gle central bank. In the third stage, a single currency managed
by a European central bank would be created, and even greater
powers would be granted to the EC to establish common finan-
cial policies among its members.
After the Delors Plan was announced, the West German gov-
ernment and the Bundesbank reacted cautiously, although
both the Ministry of Finance and the Bundesbank had helped
to draft the report. Having been pleased with the achievements
of the ERM, the West Germans were prepared to examine an
arrangement that would go further toward monetary union.
But they were not ready to agree to anything that would upset
what they regarded as the foundations of their own prosperity.
The Bundesbank in particular wanted to make certain that any
European system would reflect its own thinking.
Germany and the European Monetary Union
Germany played a major role in shaping the currency provi-
sions of the Treaty on European Union signed in December
1991 in Maastricht, the Netherlands, especially in making cer-
tain that those provisions would assure a stable European cur-
rency. In broad terms, the agreement, often referred to as the
Maastricht Treaty, provided for the same three phases earlier
proposed in the Delors report, although with later deadlines
for each phase. It also provided for a transitional stage to eco-
nomic and monetary union to begin in January 1994 with the
creation of the European Monetary Institute. The institute was
given a mandate to coordinate EU members' monetary policy,
to oversee preparations for the transfer to a European cur-
rency, and to create the right conditions for the final stage of
monetary reform — a European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), a single European Central Bank (ECB), and a com-
mon currency.
The ESCB and ECB agreed upon at Maastricht are the types
of institutions the Bundesbank might welcome. Their common
mandate was to assure price stability and a stable European cur-
rency, although the ECB was also instructed to ensure sustain-
able growth with high employment. The structure of the ECB
itself was to resemble that of the Bundesbank (see The Bundes-
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Germany: A Country Study
bank, ch. 5). Its council, like the Bundesbank's executive Direk-
torium (Directorate — see Glossary), would consist of an
executive board and the presidents of those national banks
whose currencies qualified for entry into the EMU. The ECB
would be independent of political control, and the central
banks of all European states would be independent of such
control even before the end of the first stage of the EMU.
Thus, the principles guiding the Bundesbank and the deutsche
mark would also guide the ECB and the future European cur-
rency.
The Maastricht principals agreed that the final stage in the
movement toward the EMU would begin in 1997 if the Euro-
pean Council decided that a majority of EU members had met
five convergence criteria: inflation within 1.5 percent of the
average of the three best (i.e., lowest) rates; long-term interest
rates within 2 percent of the three best rates; a budget deficit of
less than 3 percent of GDP; a national debt of less than 60 per-
cent of GDP; and a stable currency, as shown by conformity
with the narrow band of the ERM and an absence of devalua-
tions within two years of the council's decision to move toward
a European currency. If the majority of EU members did not
meet these convergence standards, the EMU was to start in
1999 with as many members as had met the criteria. Britain was
authorized to leave the system. At France's insistence, however,
Germany was required to enter the EMU if France entered,
thus ensuring that the Bundesbank could not conduct a policy
independent of a European system.
The convergence criteria reflect the Bundesbank's determi-
nation to make certain that no unstable currencies enter the
EMU. The criteria also put pressure on European governments
and central banks to begin conforming to Bundesbank princi-
ples before a monetary union is accomplished.
The Maastricht formula represents a compromise between
the monetarist and the economist camps on the issue of Euro-
pean integration. It pleased the monetarists — and thus the
French — by establishing a strict calendar for the transitional
stages to the EMU and by using monetary policy and the desire
for a common currency to compel the European economies'
acceptance of convergence. The formula pleased the econo-
mists — and thus the Bundesbank — by making EMU member-
ship subject to the kind of criteria that would force
governments and central banks to pursue similar policies even
before the final stage of the EMU. Most important, from the
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International Economic Relations
standpoint of the economists and the Bundesbank, it created a
standard for EMU membership.
Although the Maastricht arrangements were designed to
please the Bundesbank and to assuage German concerns, the
German people reacted negatively. Popular media depicted
"Germany's beloved deutsche mark" vanishing into the dis-
tance or sinking into a swamp, and opinion surveys revealed
fears that the politicians had surrendered the cornerstone of
German prosperity for the sake of a united Europe. If the
Maastricht provisions for the EMU had been subject to a refer-
endum in Germany, they almost certainly would have failed to
gain a majority.
The German government had to offer repeated assurances
that it would never give up the deutsche mark for another cur-
rency that was not as strong or as stable. It took some time for
the German public even to entertain the notion that savings
might one day be held in a currency other than the deutsche
mark, and the public consistently made clear that it would
accept that prospect only if that currency were as strong as the
deutsche mark.
The Bundesbank's Central Bank Council followed the Maas-
tricht summit with a formal statement reiterating a number of
well-known Bundesbank positions. In the statement, the coun-
cil expressed regret that monetary union was moving forward
more rapidly than a "comprehensive political union." It stated
that such a political union was necessary if monetary union
were to be effective. The council also warned that the success
of any decisions taken on the path toward the envisaged eco-
nomic and monetary union had to be judged "solely on their
stability performance" and that "the fulfillment of the entry cri-
teria of the convergence conditions must not be impaired by
any dates set." The Bundesbank stressed that the policy unit of
the EMU would be the ESCB — in which the Bundesbank could
expect to have a strong voice — with the ECB to be subsidiary to
the ESCB and thus subject to the Bundesbank's influence. It
also stressed that the deutsche mark and the European cur-
rency would coexist for some time at fixed exchange rates until
all the conditions had been set for a European currency that
would actually displace all national currencies. The Bundes-
bank also reiterated the importance of having the ESCB and
ECB remain completely independent of national governments.
Both the German government and the Bundesbank wanted
the new ECB to be located in Frankfurt am Main. To this end,
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Germany: A Country Study
the Bundesbank and German officials indicated that they
would make every effort to enhance the appeal of Germany
and Frankfurt in particular as financial centers, although the
bank warned that Germany should not take steps that could
jeopardize financial stability for the sake of competitiveness by
loosening German financial standards. The Institut fur Kapital-
marktforschung (Institute for Research on Capital Markets)
urged fast action to boost Frankfurt, warning that a more finan-
cially integrated Europe would tend toward a single financial
capital and that London and Paris were not only better placed
than Frankfurt but also were making much greater efforts to
emerge as dominant financial centers.
But Bundesbank officials had more on their minds in early
1992 than the Maastricht conditions for the EMU and the loca-
tion of Europe's future financial center. The bank was attempt-
ing to establish German monetary union within the recently
united Germany, as well as to prepare for European unity, and
was finding neither task particularly easy. The Bundesbank
could have been expected to react guardedly to the Maastricht
Treaty no matter what its terms might have been. But the fact
that the treaty was signed as the bank was trying to deal with
the German government's large fiscal deficits and the resulting
upsurge in the German money supply made the Bundesbank
both more hesitant about proceeding toward the EMU and
more assertive in its insistence on what it considered the
proper conditions.
Since the early 1970s, the Bundesbank had effectively con-
trolled European monetary policy. The deutsche mark had
been the anchor currency of the snake and of the EMS and
ERM. But the Bundesbank would become only one of many
banks with a voice on the new council. The president of the
ECB might well be a German, and the ECB might be based in
Germany, but many different banks would have a voice in Euro-
pean monetary policy, in effect removing the Bundesbank's vir-
tual monopoly of authority. Some of those banks, even if they
were to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, might occa-
sionally want to pursue policies different from those of the
Bundesbank.
More problematic for the Bundesbank was the recognition
that those other banks, through their influence on European
monetary policy, would have a voice in German monetary pol-
icy, because the EMU could not function if separate states and
central banks could ignore any ECB policy they disliked. The
332
The port of Bremen
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
Bundesbank might not only lose control over European money
but perhaps over German money as well. Such a situation
could violate the bank's own basic mandate, and it would cer-
tainly violate its stability doctrine if the ECB failed to pursue
what the Bundesbank perceived as the right kind of policy.
The Bundesbank responded to these multiple challenges by
setting forth on a course that was designed to put the indelible
imprint of its philosophy on the new bank and the new cur-
rency, or, if that were not possible, either to break up the EMU
or to make it so selective that only a few countries could join.
Thus the bank became engaged in a rigid, even doctrinaire,
assertion of the primacy of currency stability. It proceeded to
raise short-term interest rates throughout 1991 and much of
1992, before and after Maastricht. Although it did so primarily
for domestic reasons, it was certainly mindful of the effect that
its policies would have on other European currencies.
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Germany: A Country Study
As German interest rates rose, other European currencies
and central banks found it difficult to match German policies
at home. The recession that had hit Germany spread through-
out Europe, in part for cyclical reasons but also because of the
forced emulation of Bundesbank policies by countries inter-
ested in joining the EMU. As the recession spread, several
countries could not support their currencies except at the cost
of an ever-greater slowdown.
An exchange-rate crisis erupted in September 1992, after
several countries had decided that they could no longer keep
up with German interest rates. As those central banks began to
lower short-term rates, investors began to abandon their cur-
rencies, and speculators began to dump them. In response to
desperate pleas from abroad and from large segments of the
German political and economic communities, the Bundesbank
lowered its Lombard rate (see Glossary), but only by a quarter
point. Within days, the Italian lira had to be devalued and
taken out of the ERM. The British pound also came under
attack. This triggered "Black Wednesday," September 16, 1992,
when the pound crashed while the Bundesbank refused to sup-
port it. As a result, Britain withdrew the pound from the ERM.
Only the French franc and the smaller currencies tradition-
ally tied to the deutsche mark (such as the Belgian franc, the
Dutch guilder, and the Danish krone) did not devalue, thus
remaining in the ERM. All other EC currencies effectively
devalued against the deutsche mark. The defense of the
French franc cost the Bundesbank and the Banque de France
tens of billions of deutsche marks, on which they realized a
small profit after the French currency had stabilized. More
important, however, it cost the Bundesbank its reputation for
objectivity, at least in London, because the British complained
that their currency had not been supported as the franc had
been.
In August 1993, a similar crisis erupted, but this time the cur-
rency under attack was the French franc. With French inflation
rates lower than those of Germany, the Banque de France
began lowering short-term interest rates during the spring of
1993 and continued lowering them throughout the summer.
The French bank may have assumed that the background of
firm French monetary policy since the mid-1980s would give it
some leeway to lower short-term rates below the Bundesbank
levels without weakening the franc. In the event, this proved
incorrect. A full assault on the franc erupted in August. Even a
334
International Economic Relations
coordinated intervention by the Bundesbank and other institu-
tions failed, and the franc weakened rapidly.
To help protect the franc, and to avoid having to expend
more resources in a futile fight, the ERJVI countries agreed that
they would widen the bands in which currencies could diverge
from each other from 2.25 percent to 15.0 percent. They
assumed, correctly, that this change would stop the speculative
assault on the franc. However, it also signified the collapse of
the franc, one of the main currencies of the EMS. Only a few
minor currencies remained as stable as the deutsche mark.
However, the franc was able to recover later in 1993 to virtual
parity with the deutsche mark.
The two ERM crises left the prospects for the EMU uncer-
tain. It seemed unlikely that more than two or three minor cur-
rencies would be able to meet the convergence criteria by
1997, and the system could not then come into effect because
it would not include the majority of the countries of the EU.
Under those circumstances, the earliest possible date for the
EMU to take effect would be 1999, and even that target date
would come into question if the EMU at that point were to
encompass nothing more than the deutsche mark, the French
franc, and some minor currencies. The German minister for
economics, Gunter Rexrodt, predicted in mid-1994 that the
EMU might not come about until 2001 or later.
The Bundesbank had shown its readiness to exercise its
power to shape and even to dictate the policies of other central
banks. It had shown that, if Europe were no longer to be domi-
nated by the Bundesbank itself, it should at least be dominated
by the Bundesbank's ideals. The bank's Central Bank Council
hoped that others would come to appreciate the value of stable
money through the experience of having unstable money. But
in case all central banks did not agree, Bundesbank president
Tietmeyer said after the September 1992 crisis that the bank
was prepared to accept what he called " gestaffeltes Vorgehen"
(membership by stages), a process by which some states would
join before others. The bank was clearly prepared to forego the
EMU, or at least to postpone it, if the EMU might bring
unqualified members into a common European currency sys-
tem. And it was prepared to split the EMU, if necessary, to cre-
ate at least a partial zone of European currency stability.
The bank's stern views should not lead to the conclusion that
the Bundesbank opposes a European currency. Indeed, several
senior Bundesbank figures have at various times expressed
335
Germany: A Country Study
their conviction that a common European currency is desir-
able. Such a currency would ease one of the burdens felt by the
Bundesbank: it must now defend stability with only its own
reserves and those of its immediate allies instead of with the
reserves of an entire continent. Former Central Bank Council
member Leonhard Gleske once spoke with envy about how the
large domestic market of the United States helped the dollar
adjust more easily than any single European currency to global
fluctuations and crises. Gleske also observed that one of the
objectives of a European currency would be to assume the lead-
ing international role that even the deutsche mark could not
assume and that such a European currency could gradually
replace the dollar as a transactions and reserve currency. This
prospect must be a powerful incentive for the Bundesbank,
which has long distrusted United States monetary and fiscal
policies.
The crises of 1992 and 1993 did not discourage other EU
members from accepting Bundesbank discipline. They agreed
later in 1993 to place the new European Monetary Institute as
well as the future ECB in Frankfurt. That decision was a vote of
confidence, or at least acceptance, for Bundesbank policies
and attitudes, because Frankfurt is not only the home of the
Bundesbank but is also regarded as the capital of German
monetarist thinking.
A full EMU will come about when the Bundesbank is satis-
fied that all European governments are fully committed to sta-
bility and when they have shown this commitment by adhering
to the convergence criteria and by passing whatever other tests
the bank may yet pose. As Bundesbank officials have said on
every possible occasion, the Bundesbank believes that a stable
currency is more important than a common currency. And the
German government, although it supports the EMU, must
accept the Bundesbank's policies if it is to secure the support of
the German people for a common European currency.
Foreign Trade and Investment
Trade Philosophy and the Trade Balance
West Germany has been one of the world's major trading
nations, almost from the first days of the economic miracle that
began in the early 1950s (see The Economic Miracle and
Beyond, ch. 5). It also had high trade and current-account sur-
pluses during most of these years, especially during the latter
336
International Economic Relations
half of the 1980s (see table 20, Appendix). It was the world's
largest exporter in 1988, second largest after the United States
in 1989, and first again in 1990 if East German exports before
monetary unification in mid-1990 are included. West Germany
was also consistently one of the world's largest importers.
Ludwig Erhard set the tone for the future of German trade
policy and practice when he was minister for economics in the
early days of the Federal Republic. He made his own senti-
ments very clear, saying in 1953 that "foreign trade is not a spe-
cialized activity for a few who might engage in it, but it is the
very core and even the precondition of our economic and
social order." Commentators and authors on the German econ-
omy speak of a German "export mystique," of deliberate
domestic underconsumption to facilitate exports and increase
competitiveness, and of an "almost unconscious" German mer-
cantilism. The export sector has a powerful voice in German
economic and commercial policy making, including a special
Foreign Trade Advisory Council located in the Ministry for
Economics. Senior German political figures rarely make visits
abroad without including select German businesspeople in
their official delegations.
The German economy has failed to heed the export mys-
tique only once, when the Hitler regime (1933-45) sought
autarchy, or economic independence from the global econ-
omy. Between 1910 and 1913, exports accounted for 17.8 per-
cent of Germany's GDP. Their share declined to 14.9 percent
in the second half of the 1920s and fell to only 6 percent in the
second half of the 1930s, but by 1950 accounted for 9.3 percent
of West Germany's GDP. Once the postwar economic boom got
under way, exports rose to 17.2 percent of GDP in 1960, to 23.8
percent in 1970, to 26.7 percent in 1980, and to approximately
33 percent in 1990.
Investment goods produced by West German industry were
the most successful export items and contributed most heavily
to the country's large trade surplus, although West Germany
was competitive across a wide range of goods. The country
imported more agricultural and processed food products than
it exported (see table 21, Appendix).
A number of West German industries dedicated significant
percentages of their production for export: shipbuilding, 62
percent; air and space, 59 percent; automotive products, 48
percent; machine tools, 45 percent; chemicals, 44 percent; iron
337
Germany: A Country Study
and steel, 37 percent; and precision mechanics and optics, 31
percent.
Several of the industries with a high export share, such as
shipbuilding and airframes, were heavily subsidized in West
Germany and have continued to be subsidized in united Ger-
many. They are competitive in world markets on the basis of
those subsidies. The subsidies demonstrate the extent of the
German export commitment. West Germany would have had a
substantial trade surplus even without the subsidized products
of those industries, but it did not wish to sacrifice their global
market share.
After German unification, Germany's trade surplus shrank
for several years. Whereas West Germany had shown a dramati-
cally high trade surplus during the late 1980s until 1990, reach-
ing almost US$80 billion in 1988, united Germany by 1991 was
showing a much smaller surplus. Nonetheless, it was widely
expected that large surpluses would return by the mid-1990s as
the Lander of the former East Germany began to export more
and required fewer imports.
Especially crucial to the future foreign trade position of
united Germany will be the competitiveness of industry in the
new Lander of the former East Germany, which could not be
predicted with any reliability in the years immediately following
unification. During 1993 only 2 percent of German exports
came from the new Lander. It was unclear whether this area's
competitiveness had been destroyed, or whether the West Ger-
man producers that had bought East German firms had
decided to continue to export from their western firms instead
of from their newly acquired eastern firms. Whatever hap-
pened, it is worth remembering that the new Lander, like the
western Lander, had generated a consistent trade surplus in
capital and transport equipment, industrial consumer goods,
and chemicals before unification. They could be expected to
return to competitiveness in at least some of those areas. East
Germany also suffered from several major shortages before
unification, having trade deficits in fuels, raw materials, semi-
manufactures, agricultural products, and processed foods.
Most of those deficits would persist even after unification.
With Germany united, the government expects trade with
Eastern Europe to increase well over the levels West Germany
had enjoyed and ultimately to exceed the level of separate East
German and West German trade with Eastern Europe before
unification. In fact, Germany's most important and most con-
338
International Economic Relations
sistent policy since 1990 has been to improve its connections to
Eastern Europe without loosening its links to the West and thus
to bring Eastern Europe and Western Europe together. After
the fall of communism, German business representatives began
visiting Eastern Europe in large numbers to establish or rees-
tablish trade connections and to inspect potential investment
sites or joint ventures.
German economic links and outposts are being reestab-
lished in Central Europe and Eastern Europe. The Czech
Republic is again becoming an integral part of the industrial
complex centered in Bavaria and Saxony, as Bohemia and
Moravia were before World War I. The frontier region between
Poland and Germany is already one of the most active border
investment and trading centers in the world, beginning to
emulate the Mexico-United States border and the Hong Kong
hinterland as a place where Western capital meets non-Western
labor and where goods are processed and exchanged freely.
Cross-border traffic in goods and persons is burgeoning. Ger-
man trade and investment being planned for the countries of
the former Soviet Union and for Eastern Europe will make
united Germany by far the largest single Western trading part-
ner as well as the largest Western creditor of those states.
Germany has provided more aid and investment to the
former Soviet republics than any other West European state,
contributing US$52 billion in aid to Russia and other members
of the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 1993 as well as
US$25 billion to the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
More than one-half of East European and Baltic trade with the
EU is with Germany. Other types of economic activities are also
becoming common. For example, by 1994 the Deutsche Bank
had opened a branch office in Prague and planned to open
others throughout Eastern Europe.
As part of that effort to speed the East's integration with
Western Europe, Germany has not only endorsed but has often
sponsored association agreements with the EU for the states of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It has also spon-
sored several East European applications for EU membership.
Kohl himself told Hungarians and Czechs in April 1994 that
the EU without their countries would be a "torso." A month
earlier, he told the Baltic states that they belonged in the EU as
much as the Mediterranean states. Kohl also strongly advo-
cated Russian membership in the annual Group of Seven (G-
7) meetings — at least for political discussions.
339
Germany: A Country Study
The credits that Germany has been giving to its Eastern
trading partners are not without risk. Russian and East Euro-
pean debt has been accumulating for several decades. Virtually
every East European state had trouble servicing its debts dur-
ing the early 1990s, and special arrangements had to be made
to reschedule Poland's debt. Nonetheless, the German govern-
ment and German banks were prepared to extend further
credits despite nagging doubts about when the credits would
be repaid. German determination to increase trade with East-
ern Europe and to invest more in that area reflects tradition as
well as economic and political interest. Moreover, Germany is
better located than any other West European state to trade with
Eastern Europe, especially because Berlin remains one of the
most attractive potential production, assembly, service, and
transportation centers for East European trade.
International Investment in and by Germany
Before unification, West Germany had been a principal
exporter of capital. This status was indicative of the capital sur-
plus the country's firms and banks held abroad as a result of
export earnings, but it was also a sign of the growing disparity
between production costs in West Germany and abroad. Many
West German manufacturers preferred to produce in other
countries where lower costs might give them a greater competi-
tive edge than they might have operating from a West German
base. Therefore, during most of the years between 1960 and
1989, and especially during the 1980s, the amount of West Ger-
man investment abroad exceeded the level of foreign invest-
ment in West Germany.
West German and later German direct investment abroad
remained high even around the time of unification, totaling
DM37.4 billion in 1990, DM37.1 billion in 1991, and DM28.1
billion in 1992. During those years, foreign direct investment
in West Germany or unified Germany never exceeded DM6.2
billion per year.
The nature of West Germany's investment abroad was differ-
ent from foreign investment in West Germany. About one-
fourth to one-third, and sometimes as much as one-half, of
West German investment abroad during the 1970s and 1980s
represented direct investment in production facilities, the
remainder being investment in various forms of long-term
credits such as equities, bonds, and long-term bank deposits.
However, relatively little foreign investment in West Germany
340
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Courtesy Hamburg-North America Representation, New York
during that period was in production facilities, with the annual
share ranging from about one-twentieth to one-sixth of all for-
eign investment. Instead, the dominant form of investment in
West Germany was in West German equities and bonds.
Foreign investment in German stocks and bonds was espe-
cially heavy during the early 1990s. During 1991 that invest-
ment amounted to DM37.4 billion; in 1992 it rose to DM62.0
billion. Both amounts were far higher than foreign investment
in German securities during any earlier year. As a result, Ger-
many had a long-term capital surplus of DM46.6 billion during
1992, the highest amount West Germany or unified Germany
had ever recorded and a striking departure from West Ger-
many's chronic capital deficit.
According to Bundesbank statistics, one-fifth of all German
securities at the end of 1990 belonged to foreigners, and one-
half of all German publicly offered obligations between 1986
341
Germany: A Country Study
and 1990 had been bought by foreigners. Much of the invest-
ment appears to have been motivated by the expectation that
the deutsche mark would appreciate and that investment in
German funds would thus produce an exchange profit as well
as regular income. Much of it may also have reflected the sense
that German long-term interest rates would decline as the bur-
dens of unification eased.
Because of the large amount of German direct investment
abroad, German income from foreign investments exceeds
income of foreigners investing in Germany. Bundesbank statis-
tics showed that the net return on West German capital abroad
had risen to almost DM25 billion by 1989. If Germans were
going abroad to invest, they were drawing a significant return
income.
In 1988, of West German foreign investment, 52 percent was
in Europe (with 41 percent in EC countries), 40 percent was in
the Americas (with 28 percent in the United States), and only 6
percent was in Asia (with 2 percent in Japan). The favorite sites
for West German foreign investment were France and Britain.
A fast-growing amount was going to Eastern Europe. A survey
conducted by a German economic institute showed that more
than twice as much new German investment at the end of 1993
was going to the states of Central Europe and Eastern Europe
as to West European states, with the largest amount by far
going to the Czech Republic.
The structural problems of German production were com-
pelling German investors to abandon production in Ger-
many — including eastern Germany — and were making
locations in other countries more competitive. Even before
unification, many German industrialists and investors had
been moving German production facilities to other EC states,
especially Spain and Portugal, or to the United States or other
countries where labor costs were lower. German efficiency,
thoroughness, and quality control could only compensate up
to a point for the cost advantage that producers in other coun-
tries increasingly enjoyed. The combination of high labor
costs, a high level of subsidization, and a strong currency was
putting German producers at a growing disadvantage at pre-
cisely the moment when the costs of unification were becoming
particularly burdensome.
Foreign Aid
Although Germany is a leader in foreign trade, it has never
342
International Economic Relations
been generous with foreign aid. West German official develop-
mental assistance between 1976 and 1989 ranged between 0.40
and 0.47 percent of German GDP, well below the 0.70 standard
proposed by the United Nations (UN). German aid sank to
0.36 percent of GDP in 1993 as the costs of unification rein-
forced the reluctance of the German government to grant
assistance. But German private contributions to international
causes, especially for humanitarian purposes, are consistently
high. During 1992 those contributions matched the level of
official assistance.
Because Germany was not involved in the wave of decoloni-
zation that followed World War II, it has not had the special
links to former colonies that have helped to motivate and chan-
nel aid by such former colonial powers as France and Britain.
The largest portion of West German aid, over 40 percent, went
to Africa during the 1980s. Earlier, West Germany had sent
more aid to Asia, but that portion fell to 30 percent during the
1980s because the Asian economic boom made aid less neces-
sary. Relatively little aid went to the Americas.
* * *
The literature on German external economic relations is as
limited as the general literature on the German economy. The
most comprehensive current books in English are The German
Economy by W.R. Smyser and The German Economy by Eric Owen
Smith. An annual economic survey of Germany published by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) contains current information on German exter-
nal economic relations, as does the OECD biannual, OECD
Economic Outlook. The Bundesbank publishes a monthly statisti-
cal compilation on German trade, current account, and for-
eign investment balances, but only in German.
Two books about the specific German role in European eco-
nomics are The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Com-
munity by Simon Bulmer and William Paterson and Germany's
International Monetary Policy and the European Monetary System by
Hugo M. Kaufmann. A work that offers discussion of the com-
petitive weaknesses of the German economy is Die japanisch-
amerikanische Herausforderung by Konrad Seitz. Several books on
the European economy and the EU offer some information
about Germany's role in European economics. These include
The National Economies of Europe, edited by David A. Dyker, The
343
Germany: A Country Study
Economics of European Integration by Willem Molle, and Euro-Poli-
tics, edited by Alberta M. Sbragia. Books of this kind appear
regularly and provide a continuing picture of the growing Ger-
man role in European economics. (For further information
and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
344
Chapter 7. Government and Politics
Villa Hammerschmidt, the residence of the federal president in Bonn
AS OF MID-1995, GERMANY was a country coming to terms
with the recent unification of its western and eastern portions
following four decades of Cold War division. Achieved in Octo-
ber 1990, German unification consisted, in effect, of the incor-
poration of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East
Germany) into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or
West Germany). Thus, the unified country, rather than reflect-
ing a mix of both states' systems, largely represented a continu-
ation of the West German political and economic system. West
German chancellor Helmut Kohl preferred this "fast track" to
unification, outlined in Article 23 of the West German Basic
Law, or constitution, because he feared that international cir-
cumstances might change and the chance for unification
might be missed. The alternative path to unification, detailed
in Article 146, would have required the replacement of the
Basic Law with a constitution developed specifically for a uni-
fied Germany.
During the summer of 1990, the governments of the two
German states drafted a 1,000-page treaty outlining the terms
of political union. The document explained how the political
structures and policies of West Germany would be extended to
the east, how other institutions — such as the education sys-
tem — would be coordinated, and which issues would be
resolved later — for instance, abortion policy. The parliaments
of both German states ratified the treaty, and the territory of
East Germany joined the Federal Republic under Article 23 on
October 3, 1990.
The West German system of government, outlined in the
Basic Law, reflects in particular a desire to transcend the inter-
war period of democratic instability and dictatorship. A federal
system of government, considered vital to a stable, constitu-
tional democracy, was put in place as a direct response to les-
sons learned from the Nazis' misuse of centralized structures.
After four years of Allied occupation, the FRG was established
in 1949. The country attained sovereignty in 1955 when the
Allies transferred responsibility for national security to the
newly formed armed forces, the Bundeswehr.
Creating a climate of political stability was a primary goal of
the authors of West Germany's Basic Law. Among other things,
the Basic Law established the supremacy of political parties in
347
Germany: A Country Study
the system of government. In the resulting "party state," all
major government policies emanated from the organizational
structure of the political parties. In the decades since 1949,
West Germany's parties have tended toward the middle of the
political spectrum, largely because both the historical experi-
ence with fascism and the existence of communist East Ger-
many greatly diminished the appeal of either extreme. This
reigning political consensus, challenged briefly in the late
1960s by the student protest movement and in the early 1980s
by economic recession, has led many observers to judge the
"Bonn model" a success. However, it remains an open question
whether the legal, economic, and political structures of the
past will serve the unified Germany as well in the future.
Constitutional Framework
The Constitution
The framers of the Federal Republic of Germany's 1949 con-
stitution sought to create safeguards against the emergence of
either an overly fragmented, multiparty democracy, similar to
the Weimar Republic (1918-33), or authoritarian institutions
characteristic of the Nazi dictatorship of the Third Reich
(1933-45). Thus, negative historical experience played a major
role in shaping the constitution.
Articles 1 through 19 delineate basic rights that apply to all
German citizens, including equality before the law; freedom of
speech, assembly, the news media, and worship; freedom from
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or political
beliefs; and the right to conscientious objection to compulsory
military service. In reaction to the experience of the Third
Reich, the framers of the Basic Law did, however, place limits
on extremist political activities that might threaten to subvert
the democratic political order. Article 18 states: "Whoever
abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular free-
dom of the press, freedom of teaching, freedom of assembly,
freedom of association, privacy of posts and telecommunica-
tions, property, or the right of asylum in order to combat the
free democratic basic order, shall forfeit these basic rights."
Article 18 was employed twice in the 1950s to ban political par-
ties of the extreme right and left. Article 18 is seen as an essen-
tial component of a wehrhafte Demokratie — a democracy that can
defend itself, unlike the Weimar Republic.
348
Government and Politics
Article 20 states that "the Federal Republic of Germany is a
democratic and social federal state." The word "social" has
been commonly interpreted to mean that the state has the
responsibility to provide for the basic social welfare of its citi-
zens. The Basic Law, however, does not enumerate specific
social duties of the state. Further, according to Article 20, "All
state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised
by the people by means of elections and voting and by specific
legislative, executive, and judicial organs."
Most of the Basic Law's 146 articles describe the composition
and functions of various organs of government, as well as the
intricate system of checks and balances governing their interac-
tion. Other major issues addressed in the Basic Law include the
distribution of power between the federal government and the
state (Land; pi., Lander) governments, the administration of
federal laws, government finance, and government administra-
tion under emergency conditions. The Basic Law is virtually
silent on economic matters; only Article 14 guarantees "prop-
erty and the right of inheritance" and states that "expropria-
tion shall be permitted only in the public weal."
Any amendment to the Basic Law must receive the support
of at least two-thirds of the members in both federal legislative
chambers — the Bundestag (Federal Diet or lower house) and
the Bundesrat (Federal Council or upper house). Certain pro-
visions of the Basic Law cannot be amended: those relating to
the essential structures of federalism; the division of powers;
the principles of democracy, social welfare, and fundamental
rights; and the principle of state power based on law. Of the
many amendments to the Basic Law, among the most notable
are the "defense addenda" of 1954-56, which regulate the con-
stitutional position of the armed forces, and the "Emergency
Constitution" of 1968, which delineates wider executive powers
in the case of an internal or external emergency.
Federalism
Germany has a strong tradition of regional government dat-
ing back to the founding of the German Empire in 1871. Since
unification in 1990, the Federal Republic has consisted of six-
teen Lander, the ten Lander of the former West Germany, the
five new Lander of the former East Germany, and Berlin. (How-
ever, Berlin and the eastern Land of Brandenburg are slated to
merge in either 1999 or 2002.) The Land governments are
based on a parliamentary system. Most Lander have unicameral
349
Germany: A Country Study
legislatures, whose members are elected directly by popular
vote. The party or coalition of parties in control of the legisla-
ture chooses a minister president to lead the Land government.
The minister president selects a cabinet to run Land agencies
and carry out the executive functions of the Land government.
Minister presidents are highly visible national figures and often
progress to federal office, either the chancellorship or a posi-
tion in the federal cabinet.
The Basic Law divides authority between the federal govern-
ment and the Lander, with the general principle governing rela-
tions articulated in Article 30: "The exercise of governmental
powers and the discharge of governmental functions shall be
incumbent on the Lander insofar as this Basic Law does not
otherwise prescribe or permit." Thus, the federal government
can exercise authority only in those areas specified in the Basic
Law. The federal government is assigned a greater legislative
role and the Land governments a greater administrative role.
The fact that more civil servants are employed by Land govern-
ments than by federal and local governments combined illus-
trates the central administrative function of the Lander.
The Basic Law divides the federal government's legislative
responsibilities into exclusive powers (Articles 71 and 73), con-
current powers (Articles 72, 74, and 74a), and framework pow-
ers (Article 75). The exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the
federal government extends to defense, foreign affairs, immi-
gration, transportation, communications, and currency stan-
dards. The federal and Land governments share concurrent
powers in several areas, including civil law, refugee and expel-
lee matters, public welfare, land management, consumer pro-
tection, public health, and the collection of vital statistics (data
on births, deaths, and marriages) . In the areas of mass media,
nature conservation, regional planning, and public service reg-
ulations, framework legislation limits the federal government's
role to offering general policy guidelines, which the Lander
then act upon by means of detailed legislation. The areas of
shared responsibility for the Lander and the federal govern-
ment were enlarged by an amendment to the Basic Law in 1969
(Articles 91a and 91b), which calls for joint action in areas of
broad social concern such as higher education, regional eco-
nomic development, and agricultural reform.
All policy areas not assigned to federal jurisdiction are within
the legislative purview of the Lander. These areas include edu-
cation, law enforcement, regulation of radio and television,
350
Government and Politics
church affairs, and cultural activities. The Lander retain signifi-
cant powers of taxation. Most federal taxes are collected by
Land officials.
The Land governments also exercise power at the national
level through the Bundesrat, which is made up of representa-
tives appointed by the Land governments. In this way, the
Lander affect the federal legislative process (see The Legisla-
ture, this ch.). Half of the members of the Federal Convention,
which elects a federal president, are Land officials, and the
Land governments also take part in the selection of judges for
the federal courts.
Government Institutions
The President
The Basic Law creates a dual executive but grants most exec-
utive authority to the federal chancellor, as head of govern-
ment, rather than to the president, who acts as head of state
(see fig. 13). The presidency is primarily a ceremonial post,
and its occupant represents the Federal Republic in interna-
tional relations. In that sphere, the president's duties include
signing treaties, representing Germany abroad, and receiving
foreign dignitaries. In the domestic sphere, the president has
largely ceremonial functions. Although this official signs legis-
lation into law, grants pardons, and appoints federal judges,
federal civil servants, and military officers, each of these
actions requires the countersignature of the chancellor or the
relevant cabinet minister. The president formally proposes to
the Bundestag a chancellor candidate and formally appoints
the chancellor's cabinet members, but the president follows
the choice of the Bundestag in the first case and of the chancel-
lor in the second. If the government loses a simple no-confi-
dence vote, the president dissolves the Bundestag, but here,
too, the Basic Law limits the president's ability to act indepen-
dently. In the event of a national crisis, the emergency law
reforms of 1968 designate the president as a mediator who can
declare a state of emergency.
There is disagreement about whether the president, in fact,
has greater powers than the above description would suggest.
Some argue that nothing in the Basic Law suggests that a presi-
dent must follow government directives. For instance, the pres-
ident could refuse to sign legislation, thus vetoing it, or refuse
to approve certain cabinet appointments. As of mid-1995, no
351
FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
SELECTS
SELECTS
CHANCELLOR
APPOINTS
CABINET
►
ELECTS
BUNDESTAG
PRESIDENT
FORMS
BUNDESRAT
ELECTS
FEDERAL
CONVENTION
ELECTS
ELECTS
APPOINTS
LANDER
PARLIAMENTS (16)
ELECTORATE
ELECTS
Source: Based on information from Russell J. Dalton, Politics in Germany, New York,
1993, 48; and Arno Kappler and Adriane Grevels, eds., Facts about Germany,
Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 145.
Figure 13. Structure of the Government, 1995
president had ever taken such action, and thus the constitu-
tionality of these points had never been tested.
The president is selected by secret ballot at a Federal Con-
vention that includes all Bundestag members and an equal
number of delegates chosen by the Land legislatures. This
assemblage, which totals more than 1,000 people, is convened
every five years. It may select a president for a second, but not a
third, five-year term. The authors of the Basic Law preferred
this indirect form of presidential election because they
352
Government and Politics
believed it would produce a head of state who was widely
acceptable and insulated from popular pressure. Candidates
for the presidency must be at least forty years old.
The Basic Law did not create an office of vice president. If
the president is outside the country or if the position is vacant,
the president of the Bundesrat fills in as the temporary head of
state. If the president dies in office, a successor is elected within
thirty days.
Usually one of the senior leaders of the largest party in the
Bundestag, the president nonetheless is expected to be non-
partisan after assuming office. For example, President Richard
von Weizsacker, whose second term expired in June 1994, was
the former Christian Democratic mayor of Berlin. Upon
becoming president in 1984, he resigned from his party posi-
tions. Weizsacker played a prominent role in urging Germans
to come to terms with their actions during the Third Reich and
in calling for greater tolerance toward foreigners in Germany
as right-wing violence escalated in the early 1990s. Although
the formal powers of the president are limited, the president's
role can be quite significant depending on his or her own activ-
ities. Between 1949 and 1994, the Christian Democratic Union
(Christlich Demokratische Union — CDU) held the office for
twenty-five years, the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demo-
kratische Partei — FDP) for fifteen, and the Social Democratic
Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands —
SPD) for five (see table 2, Appendix).
Elected by the Federal Convention in May 1994, Roman Her-
zog succeeded Weizsacker as President on July 1, 1994. Previ-
ously president of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karls-
ruhe, Germany's highest court, he was nominated for the presi-
dency by the CDU and its sister party, the Christian Social
Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU).
The Chancellor and the Cabinet
The federal government consists of the chancellor and his
or her cabinet ministers. As explained above, the Basic Law
invests the chancellor with central executive authority. For that
reason, some observers refer to the German political system as
a "chancellor democracy." The chancellor's authority emanates
from the provisions of the Basic Law and from his or her status
as leader of the party or coalition of parties holding a majority
of seats in the Bundestag. Every four years, after national elec-
tions and the seating of the newly elected Bundestag members,
353
Germany: A Country Study
the federal president nominates a chancellor candidate to that
parliamentary body; the chancellor is elected by majority vote
in the Bundestag.
The Basic Law limits parliament's control over the chancel-
lor and the cabinet. Unlike most parliamentary legislatures,
the Bundestag cannot remove the chancellor simply with a vote
of no-confidence. In the Weimar Republic, this procedure was
abused by parties of both political extremes in order to oppose
chancellors and undermine the democratic process. As a con-
sequence, the Basic Law allows only for a "constructive vote of
no-confidence." That is, the Bundestag can remove a chancel-
lor only when it simultaneously agrees on a successor. This leg-
islative mechanism ensures both an orderly transfer of power
and an initial parliamentary majority in support of the new
chancellor. The constructive no-confidence vote makes it
harder to remove a chancellor because opponents of the chan-
cellor not only must disagree with his or her governing but also
must agree on a replacement.
As of 1995, the Bundestag had tried to pass a constructive
no-confidence vote twice, but had succeeded only once. In
1972 the opposition parties tried to replace Chancellor Willy
Brandt of the SPD with the CDU party leader because of pro-
found disagreements over the government's policies toward
Eastern Europe. The motion fell one vote shy of the necessary
majority. In late 1982, the CDU convinced the FDP to leave its
coalition with the SPD over differences on economic policy
and to form a new government with the CDU and the CSU.
The constructive no-confidence vote resulted in the replace-
ment of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with Helmut Kohl, the
CDU party leader. Observers agree that the constructive no-
confidence vote has increased political stability in Germany.
The chancellor also may make use of a second type of no-
confidence vote to garner legislative support in the Bundestag.
The chancellor can append a simple no-confidence provision
to any government legislative proposal. If the Bundestag rejects
the proposal, the chancellor may request that the president dis-
solve parliament and call new elections. Although not com-
monly used, this procedure enables the chancellor to gauge
support in the Bundestag for the government and to increase
pressure on the Bundestag to vote in favor of legislation that
the government considers as critical. Furthermore, govern-
ments have employed this simple no-confidence motion as a
means of bringing about early Bundestag elections. For exam-
354
Richard von Weizsdcker,
president, 1984-94
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
pie, after Kohl became chancellor through the constructive no-
confidence vote in August 1982, his government purposely set
out to lose a simple no-confidence provision in order to bring
about new elections and give voters a chance to validate the
new government through a democratic election.
Article 65 of the Basic Law sets forth three principles that
define how the executive branch functions. First, the "chancel-
lor principle" makes the chancellor responsible for all govern-
ment policies. Any formal policy guidelines issued by the
chancellor are legally binding directives that cabinet ministers
must implement. Cabinet ministers are expected to introduce
specific policies at the ministerial level that reflect the chancel-
lor's broader guidelines. Second, the "principle of ministerial
autonomy" entrusts each minister with the freedom to super-
vise departmental operations and prepare legislative proposals
without cabinet interference so long as the minister's policies
are consistent with the chancellor's larger guidelines. Third,
the "cabinet principle" calls for disagreements between federal
ministers over jurisdictional or budgetary matters to be settled
by the cabinet.
The chancellor determines the composition of the cabinet.
The federal president formally appoints and dismisses cabinet
ministers, at the recommendation of the chancellor: no
355
Germany: A Country Study
Bundestag approval is needed. According to the Basic Law, the
chancellor may set the number of cabinet ministers and dictate
their specific duties. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard had the largest
cabinet, with twenty-two ministers, in the mid-1960s. Kohl pre-
sided over seventeen ministers at the start of his fourth term in
1994.
The power of the smaller coalition partners, the FDP and
the CSU, was evident from the distribution of cabinet posts in
Kohl's government in 1995. The FDP held three ministries —
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry
for Economics. CSU members led four ministries — the Minis-
try of Finance, Ministry for Health, Ministry for Post and Tele-
communications, and Ministry for Economic Cooperation.
The staff of a cabinet minister is managed by at least two
state secretaries, both of whom are career civil servants respon-
sible for the ministry's administration, and a parliamentary
state secretary, who is generally a member of the Bundestag
and represents the ministry there and in other political
forums. Typically, state secretaries remain in the ministry
beyond the tenure of any one government, in contrast to the
parliamentary state secretary, who is a political appointee and
is viewed as a junior member of the government whose term
ends with the minister's. Under these top officials, the minis-
tries are organized functionally in accordance with each one's
specific responsibilities. Career civil servants constitute virtually
the entire staff of the ministries.
The Legislature
The heart of any parliamentary system of government is the
legislature. Germany has a bicameral parliament. The two
chambers are the Bundestag (Federal Diet or lower house) and
the Bundesrat (Federal Council or upper house). Both cham-
bers can initiate legislation, and most bills must be approved by
both chambers, as well as the executive branch, before becom-
ing law. Legislation on issues within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal government, such as international treaties, does
not require Bundesrat approval.
The federal government introduces most legislation; when it
does so, the Bundesrat reviews the bill and then passes it on to
the Bundestag. If a bill originates in the Bundesrat, it is submit-
ted to the Bundestag through the executive branch. If the
Bundestag introduces a bill, it is sent first to the Bundesrat and,
if approved there, forwarded to the executive. The Joint Con-
356
Helmut Kohl, federal
chancellor, 1982-
Courtesy German
Information Center, New York
ference Committee resolves any differences over legislation
between the two legislative chambers. Once the compromise
bill that emerges from the conference committee has been
approved by a majority in both chambers and by the cabinet, it
is signed into law by the federal president and countersigned
by the relevant cabinet minister.
Bundestag
The Bundestag is the principal legislative chamber, roughly
analogous to the United States House of Representatives. The
Bundestag has grown gradually since its creation, most dramat-
ically with unification and the addition of 144 new representa-
tives from eastern Germany, for a total of 656 deputies in 1990.
A further expansion in 1994 increased the number to 672.
Elections are held every four years (or earlier if a government
falls from power). Bundestag members are the only federal
officials directly elected by the public. All candidates must be at
least twenty-one years old; there are no term limits.
The most important organizational structures within the
Bundestag are parliamentary groups (Fraktionen; sing., Frak-
tion), which are formed by each political party represented in
the chamber. The size of a party's Fraktion determines the
extent of its representation on legislative committees, the num-
ber of committee chairs it can hold, and its representation in
357
Germany: A Country Study
executive bodies of the Bundestag. The head of the largest
Fraktion is named president of the Bundestag. The Fraktionen,
not the members, receive the bulk of government funding for
legislative and administrative activities.
The leadership of each Fraktion consists of a parliamentary
party leader, several deputy leaders, and an executive commit-
tee. The leadership's major responsibilities are to represent the
Fraktion, enforce party discipline, and orchestrate the party's
parliamentary activities. The members of each Fraktion are dis-
tributed among working groups focused on specific policy-
related topics such as social policy, economics, and foreign pol-
icy. The Fraktion meets once a week to consider legislation
before the Bundestag and formulate the party's position on it.
The Bundestag's executive bodies include the Council of
Elders and the Presidium. The council consists of the Bundes-
tag leadership, together with the most senior representatives of
each Fraktion, with the number of these representatives tied to
the strength of the party in the chamber. The council is the
coordination hub, determining the daily legislative agenda and
assigning committee chairpersons based on party representa-
tion. The council also serves as an important forum for inter-
party negotiations on specific legislation and procedural issues.
The Presidium is responsible for the routine administration of
the Bundestag, including its clerical and research activities. It
consists of the chamber's president and vice presidents (one
from each Fraktion) .
Most of the legislative work in the Bundestag is the product
of standing committees. Although this is common practice in
the United States Congress, it is uncommon in other parlia-
mentary systems, such as the British House of Commons and
the French National Assembly The number of committees
approximates the number of federal ministries, and the titles
of each are roughly similar (e.g., defense, agriculture, and
labor). Between 1987 and 1990, the term of the eleventh
Bundestag, there were twenty-one standing committees. The
distribution of committee chairs and the membership of each
committee reflect the relative strength of the various parties in
the chamber. In the eleventh Bundestag, the CDU/CSU
chaired eleven committees, the SPD eight, the FDP one, and
the environmentalist party, the Greens (Die Grunen), one.
Unlike in the United States Congress, where all committees are
chaired by members of the majority party, the German system
allows members of the opposition party to chair a significant
358
Government and Politics
number of standing committees. These committees have either
a small staff or no staff at all.
Although most legislation is initiated by the executive
branch, the Bundestag considers the legislative function its
most important responsibility. The Bundestag concentrates
much of its energy on assessing and amending the govern-
ment's legislative program. The committees play a prominent
role in this process. Plenary sessions provide a forum for mem-
bers to engage in public debate on legislative issues before
them, but they tend to be well attended only when significant
legislation is being considered. The Bundestag allots each Frak-
tion a certain amount of time, based on its size, to express its
views.
Other responsibilities of the Bundestag include selecting the
federal chancellor and exercising oversight of the executive
branch on issues of both substantive policy and routine admin-
istration. This check on executive power can be employed
through binding legislation, public debates on government
policy, investigations, and direct questioning of the chancellor
or cabinet officials. For example, the Bundestag can conduct a
question hour (Fragestunde) , in which a government represen-
tative responds to a previously submitted written question from
a member. Members can ask related questions during the ques-
tion hour. The questions can concern anything from a major
policy issue to a specific constituent's problem. Use of the ques-
tion hour has increased markedly over the past forty years, with
more than 20,000 questions being posed during the 1987-90
Bundestag term. Understandably, the opposition parties are
active in exercising the parliamentary right to scrutinize gov-
ernment actions.
One striking difference when comparing the Bundestag with
the United States Congress is the lack of time spent on serving
constituents in Germany. In part, that difference results from
the fact that only 50 percent of Bundestag deputies are directly
elected to represent a specific geographic district; the other
half are elected as party representatives. The political parties
are thus of great importance in Germany's electoral system,
and many voters tend not to see the candidates as autonomous
political personalities but rather as creatures of the party. Inter-
estingly, constituent service seems not to be perceived, either
by the electorate or by the representatives, as a critical function
of the legislator. A practical constraint on the expansion of
359
Germany: A Country Study
constituent service is the limited personal staff of Bundestag
deputies.
Bundesrat
The second legislative chamber, the Bundesrat, is the federal
body in which the sixteen Land governments are directly repre-
sented. It exemplifies Germany's federalist system of govern-
ment. Members of the Bundesrat are not popularly elected but
are appointed by their respective Land governments. Members
tend to be Land government ministers. The Bundesrat has
sixty-nine members. The Lander with more than 7 million
inhabitants have six seats (Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Lower
Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia). The LdndervAth popula-
tions of between 2 million and 7 million have four seats (Ber-
lin, Brandenburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Hol-
stein, and Thuringia). The least populous Lander, with fewer
than 2 million inhabitants, receive three seats each (Bremen,
Hamburg, and the Saarland). This system of representation,
although designed to reflect Land populations accurately, in
fact affords greater representation per inhabitant to the
smaller Lander. The presidency of the Bundesrat rotates annu-
ally among the Lander. By law, each Land delegation is required
to vote as a bloc in accordance with the instructions of the
Land government.
Because the Bundesrat is so much smaller than the Bundes-
tag, it does not require the extensive organizational structure
of the lower house. The Bundesrat typically schedules plenary
sessions once a month for the purpose of voting on legislation
prepared in committee. In comparison, the Bundestag con-
ducts about fifty plenary sessions a year. Bundesrat representa-
tives rarely attend committee sessions; instead, they delegate
that responsibility to civil servants from their ministries, as
allowed for in the Basic Law. The members tend to spend most
of their time in their Land capitals, rather than in the federal
capital.
The legislative authority of the Bundesrat is subordinate to
that of the Bundestag, but the upper house nonetheless plays a
vital legislative role. The federal government must present all
legislative initiatives first to the Bundesrat; only thereafter can a
proposal be passed to the Bundestag. Further, the Bundesrat
must approve all legislation affecting policy areas for which the
Basic Law grants the Lander concurrent powers and for which
360
The old Reichstag building is to become the seat of the Bundestag when
it moves to Berlin in the late 1990s.
The plenary chamber of the Bundestag in Bonn
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
361
Germany: A Country Study
the Lander must administer federal regulations. The Bundesrat
has increased its legislative responsibilities over time by success-
fully arguing for a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation
of what constitutes the range of legislation affecting Land inter-
ests. In 1949 only 10 percent of all federal laws, namely, those
directly affecting the Lander, required Bundesrat approval. In
1993 close to 60 percent of federal legislation required the
upper house's assent. The Basic Law also provides the Bundes-
rat with an absolute veto of such legislation.
The political power of the absolute veto is particularly evi-
dent when the opposition party or parties in the Bundestag
have a majority in the Bundesrat. When this is the case, the
opposition can threaten the government's legislative program.
Such a division of authority can complicate the process of gov-
erning when the major parties disagree, and, unlike the
Bundestag, the Bundesrat cannot be dissolved under any cir-
cumstances.
This bicameral system also has advantages. Some observers
emphasize that different majorities in the two chambers ensure
that all legislation, when approved, has the support of a broad
political spectrum — a particularly valuable attribute in the
aftermath of unification, when consensus on critical policy
decisions is vital. The formal representation of the Lander in
the federal government through the upper chamber provides
an obvious forum for the coordination of policy between the
Lander and the federal government. The need for such coordi-
nation, particularly given the specific, crucial needs of the east-
ern Lander, has become only more important.
The Judiciary
The judiciary's independence and extensive responsibilities
reflect the importance of the rule of law in the German system
of government. A core concept is that of the Rechtsstaat, a gov-
ernment based on law, in which citizens are guaranteed equal-
ity and in which government decisions can be amended.
Federal law delineates the structure of the judiciary, but the
administration of most courts is regulated by Land law. The
Lander are responsible for the lower levels of the court system;
the highest appellate courts alone operate at the federal level.
This federal-Land division of labor allows the federation to
ensure that laws are enforced equally throughout the country,
whereas the central role of the Lander in administering the
362
Government and Politics
courts safeguards the independence of the judicial system from
the federal government.
Principles of Roman law form the basis of the German judi-
cial system and define a system of justice that differs fundamen-
tally from the Anglo-Saxon system. In the United States, courts
rely on precedents from prior cases; in Germany, courts look to
a comprehensive system of legal codes. The codes delineate
somewhat abstract legal principles, and judges must decide spe-
cific cases on the basis of those standards. Given the impor-
tance of complex legal codes, judges must be particularly well
trained. Indeed, judges are not chosen from the field of prac-
ticing lawyers. Rather, they follow a distinct career path. At the
end of their legal education at university, law students must
pass a state examination before they can continue on to an
apprenticeship that provides them with broad training in the
legal profession over several years. They then must pass a sec-
ond state examination that qualifies them to practice law. At
that point, the individual can choose either to be a lawyer or to
enter the judiciary. Judicial candidates must train for several
more years before actually earning the title of judge.
The judicial system comprises three types of courts. Ordi-
nary courts, dealing with criminal and most civil cases, are the
most numerous by far. Specialized courts hear cases related to
administrative, labor, social, fiscal, and patent law. Constitu-
tional courts focus on judicial review and constitutional inter-
pretation. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgericht) is the highest court and has played a vital
role through its interpretative rulings on the Basic Law.
The ordinary courts are organized in four tiers, each of
increasing importance. At the lowest level are several hundred
local courts (Amtsgerichte; sing., Amstgericht) , which hear cases
involving minor criminal offenses or small civil suits. These
courts also carry out routine legal functions, such as probate.
Some local courts are staffed by two or more professional
judges, but most have only one judge, who is assisted by lay
judges in criminal cases. Above the local courts are more than
100 regional courts (Landesgerichte; sing., Landesgericht) , which
are divided into two sections, one for major civil cases and the
other for criminal cases. The two sections consist of panels of
judges who specialize in particular types of cases. Regional
courts function as courts of appeals for decisions from the local
courts and hold original jurisdiction in most major civil and
criminal matters. At the next level, Land appellate courts ( Ober-
363
Germany: A Country Study
landesgerichte; sing., Oberlandesgericht) primarily review points of
law raised in appeals from the lower courts. (For cases originat-
ing in local courts, this is the level of final appeal.) Appellate
courts also hold original jurisdiction in cases of treason and
anticonstitutional activity. Similar to the regional courts, appel-
late courts are divided into panels of judges, arranged accord-
ing to legal specialization. Crowning the system of ordinary
courts is the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in
Karlsruhe. It represents the final court of appeals for all cases
originating in the regional and appellate courts and holds no
original jurisdiction.
Specialized courts deal with five distinct subject areas:
administrative, labor, social, fiscal, and patent law. Like the
ordinary courts, they are organized hierarchically with the
Land court systems under a federal appeals court. Administra-
tive courts consist of local administrative courts, higher admin-
istrative courts, and the Federal Administrative Court. In these
courts, individuals can seek compensation from the govern-
ment for any harm caused by incorrect administrative actions
by officials. For instance, many lawsuits have been brought in
administrative courts by citizens against the government con-
cerning the location and safety standards of nuclear power
plants. Labor courts also function on three levels and address
disputes over collective bargaining agreements and working
conditions. Social courts, organized at three levels, adjudicate
cases relating to the system of social insurance, which includes
unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and
social security payments. Finance, or fiscal, courts hear only
tax-related cases and exist on two levels. Finally, a single Fed-
eral Patents Court in Munich adjudicates disputes relating to
industrial property rights.
Except for Schleswig-Holstein, each Land has a state consti-
tutional court. These courts are administratively independent
and financially autonomous from any other government body.
For instance, a Land constitutional court can write its own bud-
get and hire or fire employees, powers that represent a degree
of independence unique in the government structure.
Sixteen judges make up the Federal Constitutional Court,
Germany's highest and most important judicial body. They are
selected to serve twelve-year, nonrenewable terms and can only
be removed from office for abuse of their position and then
only by a motion of the court itself. The Bundestag and the
Bundesrat each choose half of the court's members. Thus, par-
364
Government and Politics
tisan politics do play a role. However, compromise is built into
the system because any court decision requires a two-thirds
majority among the participating judges. The court is divided
into two senates, each consisting of a panel of eight judges with
its own chief justice. The first senate hears cases concerning
the basic rights guaranteed in Articles 1 through 19 of the
Basic Law and concerning judicial review of legislation. The
second senate is responsible for deciding constitutional dis-
putes among government agencies and how the political pro-
cess should be regulated.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court does not hear final appeals — that function
belongs to the Federal Court of Justice. The Basic Law explic-
itly confines the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional
Court to constitutional issues. By the late 1980s, the majority of
the articles in the Basic Law had been subjected to judicial
review, and the constitutionality of federal and state legislation
had been considered in hundreds of court cases. When lacking
the legislative clout to challenge a government policy, the
opposition in the Bundestag traditionally has turned to the
Federal Constitutional Court to question the constitutionality
of legislation.
The Civil Service
As of June 1992, about 6.7 million Germans were employed
by federal, Land, or local governments in Germany; close to 5
million of these were in the western part of the country, and
1.6 million were in the east. The vast majority (over 4.5 mil-
lion) were employed at the Land and local levels. Included at
the federal level were roughly 642,000 postal workers and
434,000 railroad workers. Of these civil servants, about 5.6 mil-
lion were working full time and 1.1 million part time. Public
servants have considerable social status in Germany.
Civil servants are categorized into three groups. Slightly over
2 million are career civil servants (Beamten; sing., Beamte);
about 3 million are employees (Angestellten; sing., Angestellte) ;
and roughly 1.5 million are workers (Arbeiter). Beamten are
divided into four "career groups": higher service, executive ser-
vice, clerical service, and basic service. A public servant rarely
moves from one category to another during his or her career.
Beamten, or career civil servants, constitute the highest level
of the administrative elite and enjoy special privileges. They are
appointed for life and also receive a noncontributory pension
365
Germany: A Country Study
that substantially increases their salaries in comparison with
those of public servants in other categories. Beamten can be
found everywhere, from low-level jobs in the post office to the
most senior positions in government ministries, the equivalent
of supergrade administrative positions in the United States gov-
ernment. These upper-level Beamten occupy most of the signifi-
cant administrative posts within the bureaucracy and thus
influence both formation and application of policy. Almost all
Beamten at that level of Land and federal administration have a
university degree, typically with a concentration in law or eco-
nomics.
In exercising Land authority, Beamten must obey the orders
of their superiors, possess no right to strike, are bound to
defend the constitutional order, and are legally responsible for
the application of administrative law. In 1972 the federal and
Land governments issued an executive decree that institution-
alized the ban against employing antidemocratic extremists in
the public service. This highly controversial law (known as the
Radikalenerlass or Berufsverbot) mandated that all candidates
for positions as Beamten be screened and those already
employed be examined, if deemed necessary, for evidence of
extreme political views. Other public servants may also be scru-
tinized "in accordance with the contracts regulating each case."
Public servants may run for public office, and many do so.
For example, the Bundestag is often referred to as the parlia-
ment of civil servants because a high percentage of its mem-
bers are Beamten. During the twelfth Bundestag (1990-94),
almost one-third of the deputies were Beamten The largest por-
tion of that group, 10 percent, consisted of teachers.
Land and Local Government
The Basic Law stipulates that the structure of Land govern-
ment must "conform to the principles of republican, demo-
cratic, and social government based on the rule of law" (Article
28 [1] ). Twelve of the Lander are governed by a cabinet led by a
minister president together with a unicameral legislative body,
the Landtag (pi., Landtage). The relationship between the leg-
islative and executive branches mirrors that in the federal sys-
tem: the legislatures are popularly elected, typically for four
years, and the minister president is chosen by a majority vote
among Landtag members. The minister president appoints a
cabinet to run Land agencies and carry out the executive
duties of the Land government. Bavaria is the only Land with a
366
The Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe in session
Exterior of the Federal Constitutional Court
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
367
Germany: A Country Study
bicameral legislature; the Landtag is popularly elected, but the
second chamber, the Senate, consists of representatives of the
major social and economic groups in Bavaria. In the city Lander
of Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg, the executive branch con-
sists of a popularly elected senate. The senates' members carry
out duties equivalent to those of the ministers in the larger
Lander. The senate chooses a senate president in Bremen and a
mayor in Berlin and Hamburg to serve as chief executive. Land
cabinets consist of about ten ministers; the most important is
the minister of the interior, who directs the internal adminis-
tration of the Land and commands the police.
Politics at the Land level often carry implications for federal
politics. Opposition victories in Landtag elections — which take
place throughout the federal government's four-year term —
can weaken the federal government coalition. This was the case
for the fall from the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer in
1963 and that of Willy Brandt in 1974. The Land elections are
also viewed as a barometer of support for the policies of the
federal government. If the parties of the governing coalition
lose support in successive Land elections, those results may
foreshadow difficulties for the federal government. The out-
come of Land elections also directly affects the composition of
the Bundesrat. In the early 1990s, the opposition SPD com-
manded a two-thirds majority in that legislative chamber, which
made it particularly difficult for the CDU/CSU-FDP govern-
ment to achieve the constitutional changes it sought.
Three levels of government are subordinate to the adminis-
trative authority of the states. First, the largest Lander are
divided into districts. These districts decentralize Land adminis-
tration and are run by district presidents who are appointed by
the Land minister president and report to the Land minister of
the interior.
Second, each Land is divided into Landkreis (pi., Landkreise)
governments, each consisting of an elected council and an
executive, who is selected by the council and whose duties are
comparable to those of a county manager supervising local gov-
ernment administration. The Landkreise have primary adminis-
trative functions in specific areas, such as highways, hospitals,
and public utilities.
Third, some Landkreise are divided further into Gemeinden
(sing., Gemeinde), or municipal government authorities. Gemein-
den consist of elected councils and an executive, the mayor,
who is chosen by the council. In some small municipalities, the
368
Government and Politics
mayor is popularly elected. Gemeinden have two major policy
responsibilities. First, they administer programs authorized by
the federal or Land government. Such programs typically
might relate to youth, public health, and social assistance. Sec-
ond, Article 28(2) of the Basic Law guarantees Gemeinden "the
right to regulate on their own responsibility all the affairs of
the local community within the limits set by law." Under this
broad statement of competence, local governments can justify
a wide range of activities. For instance, many municipalities
develop the economic infrastructure of their communities
through the development of industrial parks. Local authorities
foster cultural activities by supporting local artists and building
arts centers. Local government also provides basic public utili-
ties, such as gas and electricity, as well as public transportation.
To increase administrative efficiency, West Germany consoli-
dated the Gemeinden, reducing the total number from roughly
25,000 in the late 1960s to about 8,500 by the early 1990s. With
unification, however, the number of Gemeinden for all sixteen
Lander rose to about 16,000 because of the large number
(more than 7,500) of small Gemeindenm former East Germany.
The Electoral System
The Basic Law guarantees the right to vote by secret ballot in
direct and free elections to every German citizen eighteen
years of age or older. To be eligible to vote, an individual must
have resided in a constituency district for at least three months
prior to an election. Officials who are popularly elected
include Bundestag deputies at the federal level, Landtag repre-
sentatives or senate members at the Land level, and council
members at the district and local levels. Executive officials typi-
cally are not chosen in popular, direct elections; however, in a
minority of municipalities the mayor is elected by popular vote.
Elections usually are held every four years at all levels. Elec-
tions at the federal, Land, and local levels are not held simulta-
neously, as in the United States, but rather are staggered. As a
result, electoral campaigns are almost always under way, and
each election is viewed as a test of the federal government's
popularity and the strength of the opposition. All elections are
held on Sunday.
Voter turnout, traditionally high — around 90 percent for
national elections — has been decreasing since the early 1980s.
Voters are most likely to participate in general elections, but
even at that level turnout in western Germany fell from 89.1
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Germany: A Country Study
percent in 1983 to 84.3 percent in 1987, and to 78.5 percent in
1990. The 1990 general election was the first following unifica-
tion; turnout was the lowest since the first West German elec-
tion in 1949. The most consistent participants in the electoral
process are civil servants, and a clear correlation exists between
willingness to vote and increasing social and professional status
and income. Analysts had been predicting a further drop in
turnout, the result of increasing voter alienation, for the
national election in October 1994; in fact, turnout increased
slightly to 79.1 percent.
In designing the electoral system, the framers of the Basic
Law had two objectives. First, they sought to reestablish the sys-
tem of proportional representation used during the Weimar
Republic. A proportional representation system distributes leg-
islative seats based on a party's percentage of the popular vote.
For example, if a party wins 15 percent of the popular vote, it
receives 15 percent of the seats in the Bundestag. The second
objective was to construct a system of single-member districts,
like those in the United States. The framers believed that this
combination would create an electoral system that would not
fragment as the Weimar Republic had and would ensure
greater accountability of representatives to their electoral dis-
tricts. A hybrid electoral system of personalized proportional
representation resulted.
Under the German electoral system, each voter casts two bal-
lots in a Bundestag election. The elector's first vote is cast for a
candidate running to represent a particular district. The candi-
date who receives a plurality of votes becomes the district rep-
resentative. Germany is divided into 328 electoral districts with
roughly 180,000 voters in each district. Half of the Bundestag
members are directly elected from these districts. The second
ballot is cast for a particular political party. These second votes
determine each party's share of the popular vote.
The first ballot is designed to decrease the anonymity of a
strict proportional representation system — thus the description
"personalized" — but it is the second ballot that determines how
many Bundestag seats each party will receive. To ensure that
each party's percentage of the combined district (first ballot)
and party (second ballot) seats equals its share of the second
vote, each party is allocated additional seats. These additional
party seats are filled according to lists of candidates drawn up
by the state party organization prior to the election. Research
indicates that constituency representatives in the Bundestag
370
The city hall in Hamburg dates from the late nineteenth century.
Courtesy Hamburg-North America Representation, New York
are more responsive to their electorate's needs and are slightly
more likely to follow their constituents' preferences when vot-
ing than deputies chosen from the party lists.
If a party wins more constituency seats than it is entitled to
according to its share of the vote in the second ballot, the party
retains those seats, and the size of the Bundestag is increased.
This was the case in both the 1990 and 1994 federal elections.
After the 1990 election, the total number of seats in the
Bundestag rose from 656 to 662. In 1994 sixteen extra seats
were added, leading to a 672-member Bundestag; twelve of
those seats went to Kohl's CDU and accounted for Kohl's ten-
seat margin of victory.
One crucial exception to Germany's system of personalized
proportional representation is the so-called 5 percent clause.
The electoral law stipulates that a party must receive a mini-
mum of 5 percent of the national vote, or three constituency
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Germany: A Country Study
seats, in order to get any representation in the Bundestag. An
exception was made for the first all-Germany election in
December 1990, with the Federal Constitutional Court setting
separate 5 percent minimums for the old and new Lander.
Thus, a party needed only to win 5 percent of the vote in either
western or eastern Germany in order to receive seats in the
Bundestag.
The 5 percent clause was crafted to prevent the proliferation
of small extremist parties like those that destabilized the
Weimar Republic. This electoral hurdle has limited the success
of minor parties and consolidated the party system. Often vot-
ers are reluctant to vote for a smaller party if they are unsure if
it will clear the 5 percent threshold. Smaller parties, such as the
FDP, encourage voters to split their ticket, casting their first bal-
lot for a named candidate of one of the larger parties and their
second ballot for the FDP.
Small parties rarely win the three constituency seats that
automatically qualify a party for parliamentary representation
according to its overall share of the national vote. This rarity
occurred in the 1994 national election. The Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus —
PDS), the renamed communist party of the former East Ger-
many, won 4.4 percent of the national vote, an insufficient total
to clear the 5 percent hurdle. The PDS surprised seemingly
everyone, however, by winning four districts outright (all in
eastern Berlin), entitling it to thirty seats in the Bundestag.
Germany holds no by-elections; if Bundestag deputies resign
or die in office, they are automatically succeeded by the next
candidate on the party's list in the appropriate Land. There are
also no primary elections through which voters can choose
party representatives. Rather, a small group of official party
members nominates constituency candidates, and candidates
appearing on the Land party lists are chosen at Land party con-
ventions held six to eight weeks before the election. Party offi-
cials at the federal level play no part in the nominating
procedure. Roughly two-thirds of the candidates run as both
constituent and list candidates, thus increasing their chances of
winning a legislative seat. If a candidate wins in a constituency,
his or her name is automatically removed from the Land list.
There is considerable jockeying among party factions and vari-
ous interest groups as candidates are selected and placed on
the Land lists. Placement near the top of the list is usually given
to incumbents, party members of particular political promi-
372
Government and Politics
nence, or members who have the support of a key faction or
interest group. Thus, aspiring politicians are quite dependent
on their party, and successful candidates tend to evince loyalty
to the party's policy platform. Candidates must be at least
twenty-one years old.
Political Parties
Observers often describe political parties as critical stabiliz-
ing institutions in democratic systems of government. Because
of the central role played by German political parties, many
observers refer to Germany as a "party state." The government
of this type of state rests on the principle that competition
among parties provides for both popular representation and
political accountability for government action.
On the role of parties, Article 21 of the Basic Law stipulates
that "the political parties shall participate in the forming of the
political will of the people. They may be freely established.
Their internal organization must conform to democratic prin-
ciples. They must publicly account for the sources of their
funds." The 1967 Law on Parties further solidified the role of
parties in the political process and addressed party organiza-
tion, membership rights, and specific procedures, such as the
nomination of candidates for office.
The educational function noted in Article 21 ("forming of
the political will") suggests that parties should help define pub-
lic opinion rather than simply carry out the wishes of the elec-
torate. Major parties are closely affiliated with large
foundations, which are technically independent of individual
party organizations. These foundations receive over 90 percent
of their funding from public sources to carry out their educa-
tional role. They offer public education programs for youth
and adults, research social and political issues, and facilitate
international exchanges.
Party funding comes from membership dues, corporate and
interest group gifts, and, since 1959, public funds. Figures on
party financing from 1992 show that dues accounted for over
50 percent of SPD revenues and 42 percent of CDU revenues.
Federal resources accounted for 24 percent of SPD revenues
and 30 percent of CDU revenues; donations accounted for 8
percent and 17 percent, respectively. The parties must report
all income, expenditures, and assets. The government substan-
tially finances election campaigns. Any party that gains at least
0.5 percent of the national vote is eligible to receive a set sum.
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Germany: A Country Study
This sum has increased over time and, beginning in January
1984, amounted to DM5 (for value of the deutsche mark — see
Glossary) from the federal treasury for every vote cast for a par-
ticular party in a Bundestag election. Parties at the Land level
receive similar public subsidies. The political parties receive
free campaign advertising on public television and radio sta-
tions for European, national, and Land elections. Airtime is
allotted to parties proportionally based on past election perfor-
mance. Parties may not purchase additional time.
Several events, including a party-financing scandal in the
early 1980s and an electoral campaign in Schleswig-Holstein
marked by dirty tricks in the late 1980s, have contributed to
increased public distrust of the parties. A 1990 poll showed that
West Germans, in ranking the level of confidence they had in a
dozen social and political institutions, placed political parties
very low on the list.
Although only 3 to 4 percent of voters were members of a
political party, all the major parties experienced a decrease in
party membership in the early 1990s, possibly a result of the
increased distrust of political parties. SPD membership fell by
3.5 percent in 1992 to 888,000. At the end of the 1970s, the
party had had more than 1 million members. CDU member-
ship fell by 5 percent in 1992 to 714,000, while that of the FDP
fell by about one-fifth to 110,000.
Article 21 of the Basic Law places certain restrictions on the
ideological orientation of political parties: "Parties which, by
reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to
impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endan-
ger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall
decide on the question of unconstitutionality." This provision
allowed for the banning of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party in
1952 and the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische
Partei Deutschlands— KPD) in 1956.
The decision to regulate the organization and activities of
political parties reflects lessons learned from Germany's expe-
rience during the post-World War I Weimar Republic, when a
weak multiparty system severely impaired the functioning of
parliamentary democracy and was effectively manipulated by
antidemocratic parties. After World War II, many parties dotted
the West German political landscape, but electoral laws allowed
only parties with at least 5 percent of the vote to have represen-
tation in national and Land parliaments. Over time, the smaller
374
Government and Politics
parties faded from the scene. From 1962 to 1982, the Bundes-
tag contained representatives from only four parties: the CDU,
the CSU, the SPD, and the FDP (see table 4, Appendix). The
Greens gained enough of the national vote to win seats in 1983,
and unification brought additional parties into the Bundestag
in late 1990. At the federal level, the CSU coalesces with the
CDU, the largest conservative party. The SPD is the major party
of the left. The liberal FDP is, typically, the critical swing party,
which can form a coalition with either the CDU/CSU or the
SPD to create the majority needed to pass legislation in the
Bundestag.
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
Following World War II, the Christian Democratic Union
(Christlich Demokratische Union — CDU) was founded by a
diverse group of Catholics and Protestants, businesspeople and
trade unionists, and conservatives and moderates. The party
espoused a Christian approach to politics and rejected both
Nazism and communism. CDU members advocated conserva-
tive values and the benefits of a social market economy — that
is, one combining capitalist practices and an extensive welfare
system. Konrad Adenauer, the CDU's first leader and West Ger-
many's first chancellor, envisioned the CDU as a conservative
catchall party ( Volkspartei) that would attract a majority of the
electorate.
The CDU is a national party except in the Land of Bavaria,
where it is not active, in deference to its sister party, the Chris-
tian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU). Bavaria
has the largest concentration of conservative, rural, Catholic
voters, and the CSU has dominated politics there since 1957.
The CSU was personified by its leader, Franz-Josef Strauss, until
his death in 1988. By 1994 no clear heir to Strauss had
emerged, but the CSU nonetheless retained its absolute major-
ity in the Land election of September 1994 (see table 21,
Appendix). Germany's population increased through unifica-
tion, and thus it has become more difficult for the CSU to pass
the 5 percent electoral threshold at the national level. How-
ever, the CSU performed strongly in the 1994 national elec-
tion, garnering 7.3 percent of the vote. The CDU and the CSU
form a single Fraktion in parliament, choose a common candi-
date for chancellor, and have always governed in coalition.
Below the federal level, the two party organizations are entirely
separate.
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Germany: A Country Study
From 1949 until 1963, Adenauer and his CDU dominated
German politics (see West Germany and the Community of
Nations, ch. 2). At the time of the 1961 election, Adenauer was
eighty-five years old, and the opposition SPD was gaining in
popularity. Ludwig Erhard, a CDU member credited with engi-
neering Germany's postwar economic miracle, succeeded Ade-
nauer as chancellor in 1963 (see table 3, Appendix). An
economic recession then hastened the end of the CDU/CSU's
hold on power. November 1966 brought the creation of the
Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD with
Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as chancellor and Willy Brandt
(SPD) as vice chancellor (see Ludwig Erhard and the Grand
Coalition, ch. 2). The FDP was relegated to the opposition
benches. After the 1969 election, the SPD formed a coalition
with the FDP, leaving the CDU/CSU in opposition for the first
time in West German history.
For thirteen years, the CDU/CSU waited to regain power. By
the early 1980s, the CDU had adopted a new party program
consisting of conservative economic policies, resembling those
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and moderate social
and foreign policies. Helmut Kohl, as leader of the CDU/CSU
Fraktion in the Bundestag, was also rebuilding a political bridge
to the FDP. In 1982, as West Germany's economy weakened,
the liberal SPD and the economically conservative FDP could
not settle on a package of economic remedies. The FDP chose
to leave the coalition and form a new government with the
CDU/CSU. The constructive vote of no-confidence was used
successfully for the first time to unseat Helmut Schmidt as
chancellor; Kohl replaced him. West Germans ratified this
change through early elections called for March 1983 (see The
Christian Democratic/ Christian Socialist-Free Democratic Coa-
lition, 1983- , ch. 2).
By the late 1980s, the CDU/CSU was growing increasingly
unpopular. The CDU/CSU was also facing a new challenge
from the right in the form of a new extreme right party, the
Republikaner. In a series of Land elections, the Republikaner
successfully eroded some of the CDU/CSU's support. The col-
lapse of the German Democratic Republic, however, provided
Kohl with a historic opportunity to reverse the fortunes of his
party. While most Germans reacted to the change in the geopo-
litical landscape with amazement, Kohl seized the moment and
actively advocated early unification (see Unification, ch. 8).
The first, free, all-Germany election since November 1932 took
376
Government and Politics
place in December 1990. In essence, this election became a ref-
erendum on the process of unification; the CDU/CSU
emerged victorious, with Kohl promising greater prosperity for
all Germans. As the costs of unification, in economic, social,
and psychological terms, became more apparent to both west-
ern and eastern Germans, the CDU began suffering setbacks in
Land and local elections. Nonetheless, Chancellor Kohl was
able to claim a narrow victory in the national election of Octo-
ber 1994. Kohl's governing coalition benefited from an increas-
ingly positive economic outlook in Germany and from the fact
that the opposition Social Democratic candidate, Rudolf
Scharping, was seen by many as lackluster (see Political Devel-
opments since Unification, this ch.).
The organizational structure of the CDU is a product of the
parry's evolution. In its early years, the CDU was a loose collec-
tion of local groups. Over time, a weak national party emerged
to complement the strong Land party organizations. In the
early 1970s, the CDU built up its national organization to com-
pete with the more tightly structured SPD. Membership and
party income increased accordingly. The Federal Executive is
the primary executive organ of the CDU. It consists of about
sixty individuals, including the party chair (elected for two
years), several deputy chairs, a general secretary, a treasurer,
the CDU's main legislative representatives, and the leaders of
the Land party organizations. Because the Federal Executive is
too large and does not meet frequently, a smaller subset called
the Presidium, composed of the highest ranking CDU officials,
actually sets party policy and makes administrative decisions.
Each Land except Bavaria, where the CSU is active, holds semi-
annual party congresses and has an executive committee.
These party structures are primarily responsible for the selec-
tion of party candidates for Bundestag elections. Every two
years, the CDU holds a full party congress of several hundred
party activists. Kohl has served as national chairman of the
CDU since 1973, headed the parliamentary Fraktion from 1976
until 1982, and continues to lead the party as chancellor. Kohl's
single-handed management of the party has given him a politi-
cal dominance within the CDU that only Adenauer surpassed.
The CDU maintains several auxiliary organizations designed
to increase the party's attractiveness to particular societal
groups and to represent their views within the party. CDU stat-
utes list seven organizations representing youth, women, work-
ers, business and industry, the middle class, municipal politics,
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Germany: A Country Study
and refugees. Other, unofficial groupings exist as well. The
most powerful of the auxiliary organizations has traditionally
been the one representing business and industry. Although
these auxiliary organizations are legally autonomous from the
CDU, a high percentage of their members are also members of
theCDU.
Social Democratic Party of Germany
Founded in 1875, the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD) is Germany's
oldest political party and its largest in terms of membership.
After World War II, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher,
the SPD reestablished itself as an ideological party, represent-
ing the interests of the working class and the trade unions. The
party's program, which espoused Marxist principles, called for
the nationalization of major industries and state planning. A
strong nationalist, Schumacher rejected Adenauer's Western-
oriented foreign policy and gave priority to unifying Germany,
even if that meant accommodating Soviet demands. Despite
the SPD's membership of almost 1 million in 1949, it was
unable to dent Adenauer's popularity. Schumacher's death in
1952 and a string of electoral defeats led the SPD to rethink its
platform in order to attract more votes. The Bad Godesburg
Program, a radical change in policy, was announced at the
SPD's 1959 party conference. The new program meant aban-
doning the party's socialist economic principles and adopting
the principles of the social market economy. The party also
dropped its opposition to West German membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary).
Like the CDU, the SPD was becoming a catchall party ( Volks-
partei) — albeit of the left.
Introduction of the Bad Godesberg Program, together with
the emergence of a dynamic leader in the person of Willy
Brandt, marked the beginning of improved fortunes for the
SPD. Although the party gained support from election to elec-
tion, suspicion about its ability to govern persisted. Joining the
CDU/CSU in the Grand Coalition in November 1966 proved
critical in erasing doubts among voters about SPD reliability.
After the 1969 election, the FDP decided to form a coalition
with the SPD — a governing configuration that held until 1982
(see The Social Democratic-Free Democratic Coalition, 1969-
82, ch. 2).
378
Government and Politics
Brandt served as chancellor from 1969 to 1974. His most
notable achievements were in foreign policy. Brandt and his
key aide, Egon Bahr, put into place an entirely new approach
to the East — Ostpolitik — premised upon accepting the reality
of postwar geopolitical divisions and giving priority to reconcil-
iation with Eastern Europe. Brandt addressed long-standing
disputes with the Soviet Union and Poland, signing landmark
treaties with both countries in 1970. His efforts won him the
Nobel Prize for Peace in 1971. The Brandt government also
negotiated the Basic Treaty with East Germany in 1972, which
formally granted recognition to the GDR. On the domestic
side, the SPD-FDP coalition succeeded in almost doubling
social spending between 1969 and 1975.
Helmut Schmidt succeeded Brandt as chancellor in 1974.
Although Schmidt won a reputation as a highly effective leader,
the SPD experienced increasingly trying times. The oil crises of
the 1970s undermined economic growth globally, and West
Germany experienced economic stagnation and inflation. A
critical problem for the SPD-FDP coalition government was a
difference in opinion over the appropriate response to these
problems. Divisions over economic policy were exacerbated by
a debate within the party over defense policy and the stationing
of United States intermediate nuclear forces in West Germany
in the early 1980s. In 1982 the Free Democrats decided to
abandon the coalition with the SPD and allied themselves with
the CDU/CSU, forcing the SPD out of power. Schmidt,
although regarded as a statesman abroad and an effective
leader at home, became increasingly isolated within his own
party, and he chose not to campaign as the SPD chancellor can-
didate in the March 1983 elections. Hans-Jochen Vogel was the
SPD standard-bearer in that election, and the party suffered a
serious loss.
The SPD has been wrought by internal crises since the late
1970s, and these divisions have continued into the 1990s. The
party is split into two factions, one giving priority to economic
and social justice, egalitarianism, and environmental protec-
tion, and the other most concerned with controlling inflation,
encouraging fiscal responsibility, and playing a significant part
in the European security system. The SPD faces a challenge on
the left from the Greens and on the right from the CDU/CSU
and the FDP. Rather than move to the left, the SPD chose a
centrist strategy in the 1987 national election and earned only
a small increase in voter support.
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Germany: A Country Study
In 1990 the nomination of Oskar Lafontaine as chancellor
candidate suggested a tactical shift to the left aimed at attract-
ing liberal, middle-class voters. The national election in
December 1990 became, in essence, a referendum on unifica-
tion, and the CDU's Kohl, who had endorsed a speedy union,
far outstripped the more ambivalent and pessimistic Lafon-
taine in the polls. The SPD did not receive the support it had
expected in the heavily Protestant eastern Lander. Leadership
of the SPD passed to Bjorn Engholm, a moderate, who
resigned in May 1993 in the wake of a political scandal.
Rudolf Scharping, the moderate and relatively unknown
minister president of Rhineland-Palatinate, was elected by SPD
members — the first time in the history of the party that its
members directly chose a new leader — to replace Engholm in
late June 1993. Scharping opposed Kohl in the 1994 national
election. The SPD candidate began 1994 with a strong lead in
public opinion polls, but, beginning in late April, the SPD's
support began a sustained decline for several reasons. For one,
the increasingly positive economic situation was credited to the
governing coalition. For another, Scharping was perceived by
many Germans to be a lackluster candidate; further, he was not
wholly successful in portraying himself as the conciliator who
had brought harmony to a traditionally fractious SPD. Follow-
ing the election, Scharping became the leader of the SPD's par-
liamentary group in the Bundestag.
The organizational structure of the SPD is highly central-
ized, with decisions made in a top-down, bureaucratic fashion.
Technically, the SPD's highest authority is the party congress,
which meets biannually. Arguably, its only significant function
is to elect the thirty-six-member Executive Committee, which
serves as the SPD's primary executive body and its policy
maker. The members of the Executive Committee typically rep-
resent the various political factions within the party. The core
of the Executive Committee is the nine-member Presidium,
which represents the inner circle of party officials and is gener-
ally composed of the party leadership. The Presidium meets
weekly to conduct the business of the party, deal with budget-
ary issues, and handle administrative and campaign matters.
The Presidium is also responsible for endorsing policy originat-
ing either with an SPD government or with the leadership of
the parliamentary Fraktion when the party is in opposition. In
almost all cases, decisions made in the Presidium are ratified by
the Federal Executive and the party congress. All SPD organiza-
380
Government and Politics
tions below the national level elect their own party officials.
The district, subdistrict, and local levels are all subordinate to
the Land executive committees, which direct party policy below
the national level and are relatively independent of the federal
party officials. Like the CDU/CSU, the SPD maintains special-
ized groups representing particular professions, youth, women,
trade unions, refugees, and sports interests. In the case of the
SPD, these groups are closely tied to the SPD bureaucracy, and
only the Young Socialists and the trade union group have pol-
icy-making roles.
Free Democratic Party
The Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei —
FDP) is much smaller than the CDU or SPD, but its limited
electoral strength masks the party's inordinate influence. Prior
to the 1994 election, the FDP had experienced its worst results
in national elections in 1969 (5.8 percent) and 1983 (7 per-
cent) . Both of those poor showings occurred following an FDP
decision to switch coalition partners. Beyond these two excep-
tions, between 1949 and 1990 the FDP averaged 9.6 percent of
the vote in national elections. Given its pivotal role in govern-
ing coalitions, the FDP has held over 20 percent of the cabinet
posts during its time in government.
The FDP served in coalition governments with the CDU
from 1949 to 1956 and from 1961 to 1966. As of mid-1995, it
has governed with the CDU since 1982. The FDP governed in
coalition with the SPD from 1969 to 1982. The remarkable
amount of time that the FDP has spent in government has
been a source of continuity in the German political process.
FDP ministers carry a detailed knowledge of government per-
sonnel and procedures unsurpassed among the other parties.
The central role played by the FDP in forming governments
is explained by the fact that a major party has been able to gar-
ner an outright majority of Bundestag seats only once (the
CDU, in 1957); thus, the CDU and the SPD have been com-
pelled to form coalition governments. Therefore, the FDP has
participated in every government except the one from 1957 to
1961 and the Grand Coalition of 1966-69. Because the SPD
and CDU/CSU enjoyed roughly equal electoral support, the
FDP could choose with which major party it wished to align.
This ability to make or break a ruling coalition has provided
the small FDP with considerable leverage in the distribution of
policy and cabinet positions. To take one example, as of mid-
381
Germany: A Country Study
1995, the FDP, in the person of Klaus Kinkel, led the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, which it has held since 1969. The most
prominent member of the FDP, Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
served as foreign minister from 1974 until his resignation in
1992.
The FDP was created in 1948 under the chairmanship of
Theodor Heuss, who served as the first president of the Federal
Republic, from 1949 to 1959. The party's founders wanted the
FDP to revive the liberal party tradition of pre-World War II
Germany. Although there was some initial debate over what
was meant by "liberal," the party did articulate a political phi-
losophy distinct from that of the two major parties. The FDP
gave precedence to the legal protection of individual free-
doms. Unlike the SPD, it supported private enterprise and dis-
avowed any socialist leaning, and, unlike the CDU/CSU, it
envisioned a strictly secular path for itself. In the early 1990s,
the Free Democrats remained closer to the CDU/ CSU on eco-
nomic issues and closer to the SPD on social and foreign policy.
Many Germans view the FDP as the party of the middle, moder-
ating the policies of both major parties.
Following the 1949 national elections, the FDP emerged as a
natural ally of the CDU/CSU, most importantly because of a
congruity of economic policy. During the mid- to late 1960s,
the FDP, under the leadership of Walter Scheel, went through a
transformation of sorts, shedding its conservative image and
emphasizing the reformist aspects of its liberal tradition. Its
new focus on social concerns resulted in an SPD-FDP coalition
in 1969. The party's new direction was ratified at the FDP's
1971 party congress, which endorsed a program of "social liber-
alism." As economic conditions worsened in the early 1980s,
however, the FDP returned to its earlier advocacy of economic
policies more conservative than those endorsed by the SPD.
The FDP was most concerned with the growing budget deficit,
whereas the SPD gave priority to the impact of the economic
downturn on workers. The FDP abandoned the coalition with
the SPD in September 1982, shifting allegiance to the CDU/
CSU. The FDP lost considerable electoral support in the 1983
federal election but regained strength in the 1987 election.
The Free Democrats benefited initially from unification, gar-
nering 11 percent of the vote in the first all-Germany elections
in December 1990. In part, the FDP's popularity in the east was
directly attributable to Genscher, an eastern German by birth
382
Government and Politics
who played a leading role in negotiations over the interna-
tional agreements that made unification possible.
In light of the FDP's strong showing in the 1990 election, it is
perhaps surprising to note that, by the time of the 1994
national election, the FDP was, in many ways, a party in crisis. It
had lost representation in every Land that held elections in
1994, and thus the FDP has no seats in any eastern Land legisla-
ture. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel had been elected party
chairman in 1993, and some critics felt that the two posts had
overwhelmed him, leading him to perform inadequately in
both. Other observers, however, argued that it was the party's
message, rather than its messenger, that needed revamping.
Increasingly, the FDP found it difficult to differentiate its policy
from that of Kohl's CDU. Given the fact that the FDP had per-
formed so poorly at the Land level in 1994, there was much
speculation as to whether the party would cross the 5 percent
hurdle in the national election. FDP politicians breathed a col-
lective sigh of relief when the party garnered 6.9 percent of the
vote when Germans went to the polls in October 1994. Report-
edly, the FDP had over 500,000 CDU voters to thank for this
outcome, because they gave their second votes tactically to the
FDP to ensure a victory for Kohl. One poll showed that 63 per-
cent of those who voted for the FDP gave the CDU as their pre-
ferred party.
The structure of the FDP is decentralized and is loosely orga-
nized at all levels. The party basically is a federation of Land
organizations, each maintaining a degree of well-guarded inde-
pendence. The national party headquarters lacks the power to
orchestrate activities at the Land level, and the formal party
institutions — the Federal Executive, Presidium, and party con-
gress — are weak. The FDP deemed this lack of centralization
necessary to accommodate differences within the party, partic-
ularly between economic conservatives and social liberals. The
FDP has never sought to be a mass party, and its members
accordingly have little influence on decision making.
The Greens
In the early years of the FRG, several minor parties repre-
senting a range of political views from the neo-Nazi right to the
communist left played a role in the political system. Support
for these parties dwindled over time, and, after 1961, the FDP
was the only smaller party to cross the 5 percent threshold nec-
essary to gain Bundestag representation. The presence of the 5
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Germany: A Country Study
percent clause in federal, Land, and most local election laws
was a significant reason for the decline of minor parties. The
major parties have encouraged this trend by sponsoring certain
regulations — for instance, in the areas of federal financing for
political parties and procedures for nominating party candi-
dates — that have also made it more difficult for minor parties
to survive.
A challenge to West Germany's established party system
emerged in 1983 when a relatively new party, the Greens (Die
Grunen), entered the Bundestag. The Green movement had
been gaining support steadily since the late 1970s, and by the
end of 1982 the Greens were represented in six of West Ger-
many's eleven Land parliaments. The Greens' platform gave
priority to environmental concerns and an end to the use of
nuclear energy as a power source. The party also opposed the
stationing of United States intermediate-range nuclear weap-
ons in Western Europe. On the basis of this platform, the
Greens won 5.6 percent of the vote in the 1983 federal elec-
tion. The success of the Greens at the federal level — which con-
tinued in the 1987 national election with the party winning 8.3
percent of the vote — led to a "greening" of the established par-
ties, with environmental awareness increasing across the politi-
cal spectrum. The Greens also livened up the Bundestag,
appearing in jeans and sweaters rather than business suits and
bringing plants into proceedings.
The Greens were plagued by a split between the Realos (real-
ists) and the Fundis (fundamentalists). The Realos are pragma-
tists who want to serve as a constructive opposition and
ultimately exercise power. The more radical Fundis are com-
mitted to a fundamental restructuring of society and politics;
they do not want to share power with the Social Democrats —
their obvious allies — or in any way legitimate the existing politi-
cal system.
The Greens did not embrace the unification of Germany
and opposed any automatic extension of West German eco-
nomic and political principles to the east. The West German
Greens chose not to form an electoral alliance with their east-
ern counterparts, Alliance 90 (Bundnis 90), prior to the 1990
elections because of their opposition to union. This lack of
enthusiasm for unification alienated the Greens from much of
their own constituency. The party's chances for success in the
December 1990 all-Germany election were further under-
mined by the SPD's choice of Lafontaine as its candidate for
384
Government and Politics
chancellor. Lafontaine moved the SPD to the left, successfully
co-opting "green" issues. The West German Greens received
only 4.8 percent of the vote in the 1990 election, an outcome
that left them with no seats in the Bundestag. Alliance 90, com-
posed largely of former dissidents and focusing heavily on civil
rights, received 6 percent of the eastern vote and therefore
received eight seats in the Bundestag. Had these two parties
run in coalition, they could have secured about forty parlia-
mentary seats. Alliance 90 had grown out of the major human
rights groups that demonstrated against the communist system
and effectively brought down the Berlin Wall in 1989. Like the
West German Greens, Alliance 90 had not wanted quick unity
with the west either, but the sentiment of the majority of east-
ern Germans was clear.
Young middle-class voters living in urban areas form the core
of support for the West German Greens. Alliance 90 also
receives much of its support from this group, although one-
third of its supporters are over fifty years of age. Employees of
the public sector are disproportionately strong supporters of
both parties. Election results suggest that neither working-class
voters nor independent businesspeople are likely to vote for
either party.
The devastating loss for the West German Greens in the
1990 election brought the conflict between Realos and Fundis
to a head, with the pragmatic wing emerging as victor. The
party conference in April 1991 ratified a set of Realo reforms.
In the series of Land elections that followed (Hesse, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Hamburg, and Bremen), the Greens did well. This
trend continued in 1992 as the Greens received an impressive
9.5 percent of the vote in the wealthy, southwestern Land of
Baden-Wurttemberg. In the rural, northwestern Land of
Schleswig-Holstein, the Greens garnered 4.97 percent of the
vote, coming within 397 votes of surpassing the 5 percent hur-
dle.
In January 1993, the West German Greens merged with Alli-
ance 90 in preparation for the spate of federal and Land elec-
tions scheduled for 1994. The new party is listed officially as
Alliance 90/Greens (Bundnis 90/Die Grunen), but members
informally call it the Greens.
Overall, the Greens performed well in the series of Land
elections in 1994. Following the 1994 national election, with
7.3 percent of the vote, the Greens emerged as the third stron-
gest party in the federal parliament. The obvious coalition part-
385
Germany: A Country Study
ner for the Greens is the SPD, though one increasingly hears
talk of possible CDU/Green coalitions. Indeed, the Greens
have moderated many of their positions, a reflection of the
dominance in the party of the Realos. The best known figure in
the party is Joschka Fischer, a prominent Realo and a former
environment minister in the Land of Hesse.
The Republikaner and the German People's Union
On the opposite end of the political spectrum from the
Greens are two parties of the far right, the Republikaner (Die
Republikaner — REP), with about 23,000 members, and the
German People's Union (Deutsche Volksunion — DVU), with
26,000 members. As of mid- 1995, these two parties had not
gained sufficient support to win seats in the Bundestag, but the
DVU was represented in Land parliaments in Bremen (with 6.2
percent of the vote in 1991) and Schleswig-Holstein (with 6.3
percent of the vote in 1992); the Republikaner held seats in
Baden-Wurttemberg (with 10.9 percent of the vote in 1992).
The Republikaner received 2.1 percent of the vote in the all-
Germany election of December 1990 and 1.9 percent in the
October 1994 election.
In the early 1990s, the rallying cry of the far right was "Ger-
many for the Germans." This slogan appeals to many Germans,
particularly young, male, rural, less educated, blue-collar work-
ers who fear for their economic future and regard the large
pool of asylum-seekers as competitors for housing, social pro-
grams, and jobs. These particular Germans are also uneasy
about greater integration within the European Union (EU —
see Glossary), which, in their minds, requires Germany to for-
feit too much of its identity and share too much of its prosper-
ity. According to some observers, the far right's electoral
support represents, in part, a protest vote against the main-
stream parties. German politicians repeatedly remark on the
electorate's Politikverdrossenheit — a deep disaffection with all
things political.
Franz Schonhuber, a one-time Bavarian television moderator
and former officer in the Nazi Waffen-SS, formed the Republi-
kaner in 1983 from a group of discontented members of the
CSU. Schonhuber published a book in 1981 boasting of his
experiences in the Waffen-SS but has staunchly denied that his
party has neo-Nazi leanings. Elected to the European Parlia-
ment in 1989, Schonhuber, over seventy years old in mid-1995,
tried to portray the party as a mainstream group that does not
386
Government and Politics
promote bigotry but merely protects German national inter-
ests. The party platform speaks for itself. In it, the Republi-
kaner blame foreigners, who make up about 8 percent of the
German population, for the housing shortage, street crime,
and pollution. Among other things, the party has proposed
banning Islamic community centers from sponsoring political
or cultural activities other than prayer, and it has advocated
putting asylum-seekers in collection camps "to minimize the
native population's existing and growing antipathy toward for-
eign residents." The party platform also proposes creating sep-
arate classes for foreign schoolchildren, and it rejects "the
multicultural society that has made the United States the
world's largest showplace of crime and latent racial conflict."
Reportedly, the Republikaner attracted about 5,000 new mem-
bers in eastern Germany in 1992 and 1993. Schonhuber con-
tends that support in the east comes from young Germans
between twenty and thirty years of age, whereas in the west sup-
port comes from members of his own generation. Schonhuber,
the party's only nationally known figure, was deposed as party
leader in the fall of 1994 because he had proposed that his
party join forces with the more extreme DVU.
Gerhard Frey, the Munich publisher of two weekly neofascist
newspapers, Deutsche National-Zeitung (print run 63,000) and
Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (20,000), founded the DVU in 1971.
The DVU espouses many of the views held by the Republi-
kaner, but it goes one step further in tacitly supporting vio-
lence against asylum- seekers and foreign workers. Frey, over
sixty years old in mid-1995, has sought to distance himself from
pro-Nazi sentiments while simultaneously insisting that most
Germans want to live in a racially pure country.
Germany's domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfas-
sungsschutz — BfV), announced in April 1992 that the DVU was
under surveillance to determine if the party met the legal defi-
nition of "antidemocratic," a classification that would permit
the government to ban it. A similar investigation of the Repub-
likaner was announced in December 1992. Such surveillance
legally can include government infiltration of the party, moni-
toring of mail and telephone calls, and interrogation of party
members. The BfV has classified both parties as "right-wing
extremist" and "constitutionally hostile."
387
Germany: A Country Study
Party of Democratic Socialism
The communist party that ran East Germany was the Social-
ist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands — SED). Founded in 1946, the SED controlled
the government and the electoral process and supervised the
omnipresent State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst —
Stasi). To be considered for important positions in East Ger-
man government and society membership in the party was a
requirement (see The Ulbricht Era, 1949-71, ch. 2).
When the East German public toppled the communist
regime, the SED and its extensive organizational structure also
came unraveled. Membership fell dramatically; local and
regional party groups disbanded. In a desperate attempt to
save itself, the SED sought to reconstruct itself for the new
democratic climate. It changed its name in February 1990 to
the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen
Sozialismus — PDS). The old party guard was replaced by mod-
erate leaders, such as the new chairman, Gregor Gysi. The PDS
won 11 percent of the vote in eastern Germany in the 1990 all-
Germany election, an outcome that entitled the party to seven-
teen seats in the Bundestag. In the Bundestag, the PDS has
advocated communist values and has energetically criticized
the Kohl government. The PDS's all-Germany tally reached
only 2.4 percent because of a showing in western Germany of
0.3 percent.
The party's electoral base is limited to the east, particularly
areas in which substantial numbers of former SED members
live. In mid-1995 the PDS had roughly 130,000 members in the
east, giving the PDS the largest membership of any party in
eastern Germany. The party's strongholds are Saxony, Berlin,
and Brandenburg. The party continues to have a tiny following
in the west, with 1,200 members.
Two main factors account for the success of the PDS in the
east: the PDS inherited the infrastructure and local grassroots
organization of the SED, and the PDS has come to be seen by
many in the east as the only party that represents specifically
eastern German interests and that stresses the positive aspects
of eastern German life. Over 90 percent of PDS members
belonged to the SED, and 66 percent are over the age of sixty.
The established parties have largely ostracized the PDS.
The PDS garnered 4.4 percent of the vote in the 1994
national election, an outcome that, as predicted, left the party
beneath the 5 percent hurdle. However, the party won parlia-
388
Government and Politics
mentary representation, thanks to a peculariarity of the Ger-
man electoral law: the fact that the PDS won four districts
outright (all in eastern Berlin) entitled it to thirty seats in the
Bundestag. Much credit for the strong showing of the PDS in
the east has been given to the party's leading figure, the lawyer
Gysi, an articulate and charismatic member of parliament.
Extraparty Political Forces
German society is highly organized into associations that
represent the occupational, socioeconomic, religious, and rec-
reational interests of individuals — a tradition that dates back to
the corporate guild system of the Middle Ages. Most Germans
belong to at least one voluntary association, and many belong
to several. The vast majority of these organizations (such as
sports clubs) have little political significance, but an important
core of groups combines a strong organizational base with a
particular interest in policy issues. The size of these interest
groups varies. Smaller groups represent subsectors of the popu-
lation, such as farmers. The large associations include trade
unions, professional associations, and religious groups. More
than 1,000 of these interest groups are registered formally as
lobbyists with the federal government, and hundreds more are
active at the Land level.
The primary interest associations in Germany are organized
differently from interest groups in the United States. The
United States offers a pluralist model of interest groups, in
which loosely structured factions compete within the policy
process to represent the same social interests. The government
offers a neutral forum in which these groups vie for influence
on policy. In contrast, many of the major interest associations
in Germany reflect a neocorporatist model of interest articula-
tion that channels interests into a number of unified, noncom-
petitive associations.
Four large, national "peak" associations (Spitzenverbdnde;
sing., Spitzenverband) represent groups of similar interest associ-
ations as a whole. The labor unions, business, the churches,
and the agricultural lobbying organizations each has its own
Spitzenverband. Membership in one of these peak associations is
often mandatory for individuals in a given social or occupa-
tional sector. Most peak associations are also organized hierar-
chically, with the national office determining the objectives
and directing the strategy of the association as a whole.
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Germany: A Country Study
The influence of the interest associations is institutionalized
in several ways. Political parties provide one major channel of
influence. Although the associations eschew formal party ties
and claim to remain above partisan politics — for instance, they
do not officially endorse a party at election time — ties between
these associations and the parties are close. To take one exam-
ple, the labor unions maintain a highly developed relationship
with the Social Democrats, and a large percentage of SPD party
activists are union members. Another forum for interest group
activity is the Bundestag. The interest associations not only
monitor legislation, lobby members, and testify at hearings, but
they also maintain formal affiliations with deputies. Since 1972,
when the Bundestag first started keeping records, roughly 50
percent of the members reported either being employed by an
interest group or holding an executive position in a group.
About 25 percent of the members are affiliated with economic
groups, such as labor unions or the business lobby, and about
17 percent are affiliated with religious or cultural associations.
Members of key committees such as agriculture, labor, and
education are particularly likely to have ties to the relevant
groups. The government ministries themselves provide yet
another means by which interest groups influence the policy
process. The neocorporatist system encourages formal ties
between the two. For instance, ministries are required by law to
consult with the peak associations about draft legislation that
would affect them. To fulfill this obligation, the federal minis-
tries have established standing advisory committees, which
include representatives of the relevant interest groups.
Business and Industry
There are three levels at which business and industrial inter-
ests seek representation. First, business wants its perspective
heard as the government formulates policy. Second, business
needs representation in negotiations with labor unions. Third,
business may desire support in cultivating new clients or suppli-
ers. Each of these objectives is met by a separate umbrella orga-
nization.
The Federation of German Industry (Bundesverband der
Deutschen Industrie — BDI) is the most important representa-
tive of business interests in the policy-making process. The BDI
is the national peak association for thirty-nine separate
national trade associations, including associations for the auto-
mobile and machine tool industries. Thus, it is the primary
390
Government and Politics
representative of the business community in the political pro-
cess and the principal intermediary between business and gov-
ernment. The importance of the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) in the United States pales in compari-
son with that of the BDI in Germany. In western Germany, the
BDI's associations represent over 90 percent of all industrial
firms; by contrast, the NAM accounts for only a fragment of
United States industry. Although private businesses were still in
the early stages of development in eastern Germany in the
early 1990s, most trade associations have already set up offices
there to coordinate the new industries.
The Federation of German Employers' Associations
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande —
BDA) is the second important representative of business. The
BDA is a peak association of sixty-four employers' associations,
consisting of seventeen regional organizations, including the
employers' associations of each Land, and forty-seven national
trade associations organized by economic sector. The BDA rep-
resents the full range of business activity in Germany, but most
of its members are in industrial associations. Almost every
medium or large employer is a member of a BDA association.
The BDA provides advice and serves as a coordinating mecha-
nism for employers on social and labor policy. Among other
things, the BDA negotiates general salary guidelines with
unions, and it lobbies Land and federal governments on legisla-
tion affecting the interests of its members, such as social secu-
rity and labor practices.
The German Chambers of Industry and Commerce
(Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag — DIHT) is the third leg
of businesses' representational triad. All companies paying
business taxes are required by law to join the local chamber
and pay membership dues. Thus, several million firms belong
to the eighty-four district and local associations of the DIHT,
including the fifteen postunification chambers in eastern Ger-
many. Beyond its national role, the DIHT represents German
business abroad, as well as on international trade issues. The
DIHT has been particularly engaged in attracting foreign
investment to the east.
Labor Unions
During the Weimar Republic, labor unions were divided
along partisan lines, a situation that led to competition among
the socialist, communist, Catholic, and liberal trade associa-
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Germany: A Country Study
tions. After World War II, labor leaders wanted to break with
the past and form a trade union federation independent of
political parties. The result was the establishment of the Feder-
ation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund— DGB) in 1949.
Four principles guided the founders of the DGB. First, the
labor movement wanted representation through an organiza-
tion that was unitary and autonomous, with no ties to particu-
lar religions or political parties. Second, labor leaders decided
to organize the unions along industrial lines so that all workers
at one firm would belong to the same union irrespective of
their individual occupations. For instance, an electrician at an
automobile plant would join the metalworkers' union. This
organizing principle provides unions with greater bargaining
power when negotiating with employer associations, because
one union represents the entire workforce of an industry.
Third, a decentralized system of interest representation was
created. Individual unions typically emulate the federal struc-
ture, with local, district, Land, and national offices. Each level
has some input into the shape of union policy. Fourth, the
unions chose to rely on legislation for the protection of work-
ers' rights, rather than on direct negotiations with business rep-
resentatives. Thus, when the unions enter into contract
negotiations with employers, they can focus on improving
workers' economic welfare.
The DGB is the national peak association of the German
labor movement and encompasses sixteen unions, from metal-
workers to leather workers. The DGB represents virtually all
organized industrial workers, most white-collar employees, and
many government workers. As of mid-1995, out of a total work-
force of 35 million, 9.8 million workers were members of these
labor unions. Although the DGB does not represent even half
of the German workforce, its unions negotiate the collective
bargaining agreements covering over 90 percent of all jobs.
Thus, the work of the labor unions affects nearly all workers.
The DGB lost over 2 million members between the end of 1991
and the end of 1994. The vast majority of these members (1.7
million) were from eastern Germany, which has been in the
throes of radical economic restructuring and has suffered high
unemployment. Some DGB officials express the hope that,
once the economy in the eastern part of the country stabilizes,
DGB membership will grow.
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Government and Politics
In 1995 the three largest unions were the Metalworkers'
Union with just under 3 million members, the Public Services
and Transport Workers' Union with 1.9 million, and the Chem-
icals, Paper, and Ceramics Workers' Union with 742,000.
Roughly 31 percent of all members are women.
DGB members can be divided into "activist" and "accommo-
dationist" factions. The activists, led by the Metalworkers'
Union and the Industriegewerkschaft Medien, the union for
workers in the media, aggressively challenge business interests
and are major advocates of social reform. For example, the
Metalworkers' Union led the drive for codetermination (Mit-
bestimmung) in the early 1950s, for substantial wage gains in the
1960s, and for the thirty-five-hour workweek in the 1980s (see
Codetermination, ch. 5). The activist unions are more likely to
strike if collective bargaining fails to achieve desired results. In
contrast, the accommodationist unions, including those repre-
senting chemical workers, construction workers, textile work-
ers, and food-processing workers, prefer to cooperate with
employers to achieve stable, sustainable economic growth. The
individual unions have responded differently to German unifi-
cation as well. Activist unions have been assertive in pushing
for wage equalization between east and west, an effort that cul-
minated in a massive strike in the metalworking industry in
eastern Germany in May 1993.
Two other, significantly smaller peak interest associations
represent labor sectors independent of the DGB. The German
White-Collar Employees' Union (Deutsche Angestellten-
Gewerkschaft — DAG) is composed solely of salaried employ-
ees, principally high-level technocrats and managers in private
enterprise. The Federation of German Civil Servants (Deut-
scher Beamten Bund — DBB) has competed successfully with
the DGB to represent civil servants. The DBB is better
described as a lobbying organization, because civil servants can
neither strike nor engage in collective bargaining.
The Churches
Religious associations represent a third major group of orga-
nized interests in the German policy process. The experience
of the Third Reich had a profound influence on the postwar
development of Protestant and Roman Catholic churches in
the Federal Republic (see Religion, ch. 3). Both espoused the
view that moral responsibility extends to political responsibility
and that passivity toward the political process is inappropriate.
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Germany: A Country Study
Both also desired greater ecumenism in German society. The
establishment of the CDU perhaps best illustrates this last
point. The CDU sought to include both Roman Catholics and
Protestants in a catchall party that was committed to Christian
values. The two churches maintain distinct identities, but the
major cleavage in German society is no longer between reli-
gious denominations, but between religious and secular inter-
ests.
In postwar West Germany, many people felt that organized
religion was an important element in the country's newly form-
ing political ethos. Unlike the United States, West Germany
acknowledged no separation of church and state. The state for-
mally recognized the political role of the churches, establishing
a special legal status for them as public law corporations.
Under a German system developed in the nineteenth century,
unless church members formally leave the denomination into
which they were baptized, they must pay an annual church sur-
tax equal to 8 or 9 percent of their income tax. The federal gov-
ernment collects this surcharge and remits the proceeds to the
churches to finance their activities. In 1992 the figure totaled
about US$10 billion for Protestant and Catholic churches com-
bined. Churches are included on government commissions
and supervisory bodies that influence social and family policy,
education, and related topics.
Not surprisingly, the relationship between church and state
in East Germany was markedly different. The communist
regime wanted control over all aspects of society, and the exist-
ence of autonomous churches was unacceptable. In the 1950s,
the regime sought to limit the role of the churches to the reli-
gious sphere, keeping them out of politics or education. The
state proved unable to suppress the churches fully, however,
and by the 1970s the SED had resigned itself to accommodat-
ing them.
Roman Catholics constituted only 7 percent of the popula-
tion in the east; thus, it was the Protestant church, with broad
backing among East Germans, that played an important social
and political role. The Protestant church retained some auton-
omy from the state, and by the late 1980s the church had
become gathering places for dissidents. In 1989 weekly peace
services at churches in big cities, such as East Berlin and
Leipzig, became hotbeds of opposition to the regime and led
to the mass demonstrations that ultimately brought down the
communist regime.
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Government and Politics
The Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche
in Deutschland — EKD), the peak association for the seventeen
autonomous provincial churches in West Germany, was estab-
lished in 1948. The structural unity of the German Protestant
church officially ended in 19.69, when the eight provincial
churches in East Germany withdrew from the EKD and formed
the Federation of the Evangelical Churches (Bund der Evange-
lischen Kirchen — BEK). German unity ushered in the reunifi-
cation of these two federations in 1991, under the auspices of
the EKD. As the formal political representative of German
Protestant churches, the EKD represents its member congrega-
tions in all formal agreements with the government on church-
state affairs. On religious and social matters, however, the EKD
serves only as a coordinating agent for its largely independent
member churches.
The principal organizational forum for the German Roman
Catholic Church is the Bishops' Conference, at which all Ger-
man bishops convene semiannually. Since unification, the east-
ern bishops also have attended these meetings. As elsewhere in
the Catholic world, all decisions on theological matters and
general policy emanate from the Vatican; the annual Bishops'
Conference addresses current pastoral and religious issues
within Germany.
In West Germany, the Roman Catholic Church was tradition-
ally much more active politically on a day-to-day basis than the
Protestant denominations. The Bishops' Conference maintains
a permanent secretariat in Bonn to monitor activity in parlia-
ment and in the federal ministries. Catholic leaders regularly
lobby the government on pending legislation relating to social
or moral issues. The EKD participates less actively in the politi-
cal process, but it is more inclined than its Catholic counter-
part to speak out on controversial political issues that have
spiritual implications. Examples include the Protestant
church's strong stance against the remilitarization of West Ger-
many in the 1950s and its continued activism in the areas of
peace and nuclear nonproliferation.
Agriculture
Although agriculture accounts for only 5 percent of the
labor force in western Germany, the agricultural lobby has long
been known as the best organized and most successful in Bonn.
The peak association of this lobby, the German Farmers Associ-
ation (Deutscher Bauernverband — DBV), focuses exclusively
395
Germany: A Country Study
on farm issues. The DBV has consistently convinced the gov-
ernment to guarantee the financial welfare of farmers through
generous programs of price supports, subsidies, and agricul-
tural grants. These programs have made German food costs
among the highest in Western Europe, but no strong call for
reform has ever emerged. The minister of agriculture is often a
farmer and, regardless of whether the CDU or the SPD is in
power, that minister has single-mindedly pursued policies ben-
eficial to farmers.
Citizens' Initiative Associations
In the early 1970s, a new form of political participation in
the form of citizens' initiative associations sprang up through-
out West Germany. These associations, in essence nontradi-
tional interest groups, were loosely and often temporarily
organized groups of citizens mobilized in response to one par-
ticular local issue. Concerns ranged from school reform, urban
redevelopment, and traffic to environmental protection. The
staying power of these associations reflected a dissatisfaction
with established political institutions. Unlike traditional inter-
est groups, these associations aimed to improve the quality of
life, rather than the material well-being, of their supporters.
Although their ultimate goal is to produce a new social model,
these groups tend to be more skilled at critiquing the existing
order than at constructing a new one. Activists in these organi-
zations tend overwhelmingly to be young and highly educated,
espousing a New Left ideology. Citizens' initiative associations
employ diverse tactics, ranging from lobbying and circulating
petitions to organizing mass demonstrations and protest
marches. Three major political movements have grown out of
these associations: the environmental lobby, the women's
movement, and the peace lobby.
With public consciousness of the environment growing sub-
stantially in the 1970s and 1980s, a new set of nationwide orga-
nizations was formed, including the Federal Association of
Citizens' Initiatives on Environmental Protection (Bundesver-
band Burgerinitiativen Umweltschutz — BBU), Greenpeace,
and Robin Wood. The BBU was at its strongest in the late
1970s, when it coordinated more than 1,000 local citizens' ini-
tiative associations and when almost 1 million people were affil-
iated with the environmental movement. By the late 1980s, the
BBU was associated with several hundred local groups whose
cumulative membership reached only 150,000. Environmental
396
Government and Politics
activists have focused on a range of issues, including nuclear
power, acid rain, and Waldsterben (death of the forest).
The women's movement, organized in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, sought to fight discrimination against women in
the workplace and at home. Guarantees of gender equality in
the Basic Law had done little to alter the traditional male bias
within society. The women's movement in western Germany
developed a two-pronged approach to securing equality for
women: programs for raising the consciousness of women, and
programs aimed at legislative reform. The first approach
focused on the personal development of women and has met
with success at the local level, with most larger cities offering a
women's center, women's bookstores, self-help groups, and a
network of other women's organizations. The attempt at the
national level to mobilize the movement's supporters and bring
about legislative change remains underdeveloped.
The peace movement blossomed in the early 1980s in
response to the controversy over the stationing of intermedi-
ate-range nuclear weapons in West Germany. Mass demonstra-
tions called for the government to pursue arms control
negotiations to eliminate these weapons altogether. Instead,
the Bundestag voted for deployment in October 1983, and,
with its major objective lost, the peace movement lost momen-
tum. The end of the Gold War brought a reduction in East-
West tensions and the conclusion of substantial arms control
agreements. These developments have further deprived the
peace movement of focus. The peace movement was able to
mobilize activity against the Persian Gulf War in early 1991,
however.
Autonomous citizens' initiative associations were unaccept-
able in East Germany. The communist government established
official organizations — the Society for Nature and the Environ-
ment, the Peace Council, and the Democratic Women's Federa-
tion of Germany — to co-opt the issues. The peaceful revolution
of 1989 that brought down the communist regime in East Ger-
many showed both the willingness among eastern Germans to
demonstrate and protest in large numbers, as well as the power
of such citizen action. Nonetheless, the levels of protest and
direct action are lower in the east than in the west. However, as
easterners become more accustomed to the freedoms afforded
in a democracy, it is thought that they might become more
inclined to exercise them.
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Germany: A Country Study
The Mass Media
Newspapers
West Germany has always had highly developed mass media.
The independence of the press and its freedom from censor-
ship are guaranteed in Article 5 of the Basic Law. Conversely,
the communist regime in East Germany tightly controlled the
media. Despite government censorship, East Germans were
voracious newspaper and magazine readers. More than three
dozen newspapers enjoyed a combined circulation of almost 10
million in the GDR.
The complexion of the print media in eastern Germany
changed markedly with unification. By mid-1991 only 100,000
copies of East Germany's most widely circulated newspaper,
Neues Deutschland, the newspaper of the communist party, were
being printed daily, down from roughly 1 million in the recent
past. Western consortia bought many of the other established
urban newspapers and brought in new management. Accord-
ing to a public opinion survey during the 1990 national elec-
tion, 68 percent of western Germans and 88 percent of eastern
Germans read a newspaper on a regular basis. Not surprisingly,
Germany boasts among the highest per capita newspaper circu-
lations within Europe.
The press is privately owned, and most Germans rely on
local or regional newspapers for their information. Five daily
newspapers enjoy good reputations nationally because of their
sophisticated domestic and international coverage: Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Suddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rund-
schau, Handelsblatt, and Die Welt. The FAZ is probably Ger-
many's most prestigious daily newspaper and is the one
newspaper read by virtually all members of the political and
business establishment. Although independent of any political
party, its views are similar to those of the right-of-center CDU.
Handelsblatt is the leading business daily. Die Zeit, a weekly news-
paper, provides an erudite review of news and culture from a
perspective sympathetic to Social Democratic views. Weekly edi-
tions of Die Zeit are often more than 100 pages, with in-depth
articles filling an entire page. Former chancellor Schmidt is
one of its publishers; the paper's circulation is 493,000.
Because these newspapers appeal to an elite readership, their
circulation figures are much lower than that of the tabloid
press. Bild Zeitung, with a daily circulation of close to 5 million,
is Germany's most widely circulated daily. It puts a sensational-
398
Government and Politics
ist spin on topical issues and tends to support right-of-center
policies.
Both Bild Zeitung and Die Welt are published by the Axel
Springer Group, based in Hamburg. Axel Springer, now
deceased, built an enormous media empire, which also
includes the two largest Sunday newspapers, Bild am Sonntag
and Welt am Sonntag, two Berlin daily newspapers, and many
popular magazines. Springer publications are generally consid-
ered to have a strong conservative bent.
The liberal counterpart to Axel Springer and his successors
has been Rudolf Augstein, founder and publisher of the weekly
Der Spiegel, a highly respected and influential newsmagazine
combining news coverage with investigative journalism. The
magazine's decidedly liberal critique of politics and politicians
has often steeped it in controversy (see Ludwig Erhard and the
Grand Coalition, ch. 2). In 1994 its circulation stood at over 1
million copies. Der Spiegelis distributed in 165 countries, and
close to 15 percent of its sales are outside Germany.
In 1993 competition for market share held by Der Spiegel
emerged with the publication of Focus, a newsmagazine fash-
ioned after Time and Newsweek, with shorter articles and a more
colorful layout than that offered by Der Spiegel Focus appeared
on newsstands in January 1993, was less expensive than Der Spie-
gel, and, after a few months, was faring better than expected. By
mid-April Focus was maintaining a circulation of 600,000 and
had exceeded its annual target for pages of advertising sold.
Since its founding in 1946, Der Spiegel has successfully faced
down competition from more than fifty publications. However,
the circulation of Focus is growing while that of Der Spiegel is fall-
ing.
Although newspapers owned by political parties were com-
mon during the Weimar period, the partisan press is much less
significant in the Germany of the 1990s. Vorwdrts is the official
newspaper of the SPD, and Bayernkurier serves the GSU. Rhei-
nis cher Merkur has informal links to the CDU, and Neues Deutsch-
land offers views of the PDS.
Radio and Television
Radio and television are administered in a decentralized
fashion as prescribed in the Basic Law. The intent behind the
pattern of regional decentralization is to prevent the exploita-
tion of the media by a strong national government, as had hap-
pened under the Nazi dictatorship. Germany has two public
399
Germany: A Country Study
broadcasting corporations. The first, ARD, was established in
1954 and encompasses eleven regional public television and
radio stations. ARD employs roughly 23,000 people and has an
annual budget of about US$6 billion. The second, ZDF was
founded in 1961 and is structured as a single corporation, not
as a consortium. A third channel broadcasts cultural and edu-
cational programs for all Land corporations.
The Land broadcasting corporations have similar organiza-
tional structures. Each governs itself under the direction of a
broadcasting council consisting — in most Lander — of represen-
tatives of the major social, economic, cultural, and political
groups, including political parties, churches, unions, and busi-
ness organizations. The broadcasting corporations are
financed largely through monthly fees (DM23.80 per house-
hold as of late 1994) charged to television and radio owners.
Public television is allowed to devote no more than thirty min-
utes per day to commercial advertisements. No advertisements
are aired after 8:00 RM. on weekdays or on Sundays. Advertis-
ing provides roughly one-third of television revenues and one-
fourth of radio revenues. What distinguishes public television
from commercial television is the ability to offer greater cover-
age of public service activities and cultural events.
Most eastern Germans were familiar with western German
television even before unification because broadcasts from the
west could be received in most of East Germany. According to a
1990 survey, 49 percent of western Germans and 70 percent of
eastern Germans watched a nightly news program at least five
times each week. Surveys also indicate that television is the
most important source of political information: 51 percent of
Germans rank television first, ahead of newspapers and maga-
zines (22 percent), conversation (16 percent), and radio (6
percent).
Private broadcasting was virtually nonexistent in West Ger-
many until 1981, when the Federal Constitutional Court recog-
nized the right of the Lander to grant broadcasting licenses to
private companies. Enabling legislation took the form of a new
broadcasting treaty enacted by the Lander in 1987 that allowed
the creation of private broadcasting companies to compete
with public stations. In general, private broadcasters do not
have an internal supervisory council, but the Lander in which
they broadcast can exercise supervisory rights.
Commercial broadcasters finance their operations solely
with advertising revenues. Beyond the substantial capital costs
400
Government and Politics
associated with starting up a new television channel, private
broadcasters have to rely on satellite and cable transmission
because the airwaves do not offer unlimited capacity. Thus,
viewers have to pay an additional fee to get access to private
channels. In 1983 the federal post office undertook a large-
scale program of wiring the country for cable television. In
March 1993, of the 27 million households in western Germany
that had televisions, 70 percent had access to cable service; of
the 6.4 million households in eastern Germany, 12 percent had
access to cable. However, at that point only about 60 percent of
those eligible households had chosen to subscribe to cable.
In 1985 SAT-1 became Germany's first private satellite televi-
sion station. A group of publishing firms, including Springer,
owns SAT-1; the channel offers a program of popular enter-
tainment and news. Other stations subsequently sprang up,
including 3-SAT, a joint production of German, Swiss, and Aus-
trian national television; RTL, or Radio-Television-Luxem-
bourg; and various European satellite stations. In early 1993,
two all-news channels made their debut: Time Warner and
CNN own one, n-tv; and German publishing giant Bertelsmann
and the Siiddeutsche Zeitung are major financial backers of Vox,
the second news channel. Vox failed quickly, however, closing
its doors in April 1994. On the whole, private channels none-
theless are prospering. The percentage of Germans watching
public channels has dropped to less than one-half since the
start of private broadcasting in 1987.
Political Developments since Unification
The political institutions of unified Germany are remarkably
similar to those of the former West Germany, reflecting minor
adjustments to accommodate the larger population rather
than making fundamental changes. The unfolding drama of
unification is much more evident when one takes into consid-
eration Germany's political landscape, including elections,
political climate in the unified country, and issues that have
dominated that landscape.
The Bundestag election of December 2, 1990, was the first
all-Germany election since 1932. The election returned to
power the governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDR
The central issue of the campaign was unification. Parties that
strongly supported unification scored well; those that were
ambivalent or opposed to unification, such as the SPD and the
Greens, fared poorly.
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Germany: A Country Study
Helmut Kohl's political fortunes soon declined, however, in
the wake of problems with the unification process. Increasing
unemployment in the east, and anger in the west about a tax
increase that Kohl had pledged to avoid before the 1990 elec-
tion, caused the CDU to lose a series of Land elections after
unification. As a result, in 1991 the ruling coalition lost its
majority in the Bundesrat when the CDU lost power in the
Lander of Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate (Kohl's home Land).
This development made it more difficult for the Kohl govern-
ment to gain approval for key legislative initiatives.
The year 1994 was nicknamed the "super election year"
because Germany conducted approximately twenty elections at
the local, Land, federal, and European levels, culminating in
the national election in October. In eight Land elections
throughout 1994, the SPD fared better than did the CDU. The
SPD thus increased its majority in the Bundesrat. The FDP per-
formed miserably at the Land level, failing to gain the required
5 percent for representation in all eight elections. Given this
poor showing, many observers question the staying power of
the FDP as a political force in Germany. Observers were sur-
prised by the strength of the former Communists (PDS) in the
eastern Lander, all five new Lander held elections in 1994, with
the PDS garnering from 16 to 23 percent of the vote in each
(see table 21, Appendix). The PDS increased its share of the
vote over the results in 1990 and solidified the party's position
as the third strongest political force in eastern Germany. On
November 9, 1994, Germans celebrated the fifth anniversary of
the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, much still divides eastern
and western Germans, not least economic success, and the PDS
was able to capitalize on eastern resentments.
Germans voted in national elections on October 16, 1994.
Chancellor Kohl was challenged by Rudolf Scharping, the min-
ister president of the western Land of Rhineland-Palatinate and
the chairman of the SPD. Election themes included unemploy-
ment and economic growth, particularly in light of unification,
as well as law and order. Except for the future of the EU, for-
eign policy issues did not figure in the election campaign.
Scharping began 1994 with a strong lead in public opinion
polls, but, beginning in late April, the SPD's support began a
sustained decline for several reasons. First, the CDU benefited
from an increasingly positive economic outlook in Germany.
Second, Scharping was seen by many to be a lackluster candi-
date; further, he was not wholly successful in portraying himself
402
Government and Politics
as the conciliator who had brought harmony to a traditionally
fractious SPD. Chancellor Kohl, however, was seen to embody
stability, continuity and predictability; one of his election slo-
gans was "no experiments." Third, the CDU/CSU launched a
fierce campaign against the PDS, whose members had
belonged to the Communist SED, calling them "red-painted
fascists," and Kohl succeeded in incriminating the SPD, at least
marginally, in this seeming Communist revival. The SPD pro-
vided Kohl with this opportunity by forming a minority govern-
ment with the Greens in the eastern Land of Saxony-Anhalt
that depended on the votes (or abstention) of the PDS to
remain in office. This CDU/CSU tactic was aimed, effectively it
would seem, at those western German voters who, despite
Scharping, questioned the SPD's commitment to centrist poli-
cies.
Kohl's governing coalition claimed a narrow victory; its
majority in the Bundestag was reduced from 134 to ten seats
(see table 4, Appendix). The Greens and the former Commu-
nists also won representation in the Bundestag. The far-right
Republikaner, seen as a spent political force, failed to clear the
5 percent hurdle necessary to enter the Bundestag. Voter turn-
out, up slightly from the 1990 election, was 79.1 percent. Fol-
lowing the election, Scharping became the leader of the SPD's
parliamentary group in the Bundestag, which will allow him to
keep a high national profile in preparation for the next
national election. The coalition government of Kohl's CDU,
the CSU, and the FDP will focus on creating jobs, trimming
bureaucracy, fighting crime, and expanding the EU eastward.
The FDP's seemingly chronic inability to win representation
in Land parliaments means that it is increasingly losing its
regional bases and its reservoirs of future political talent. If and
how the FDP can regenerate support remains to be seen.
Recent CDU overtures to the Greens — until recently an
unthinkable development — also suggest a CDU awareness of
the possible need for an alternate coalition partner in the
future. The 1994 election may thus mark the beginning of
some profound changes in political alignments in Germany.
Unified Germany's second national election suggests that
the country's east-west divide has not narrowed. The strongest
evidence is the success of the PDS in winning parliamentary
representation. In eastern Germany, the PDS received 19.2 per-
cent of the vote, compared with only 0.9 percent in the west.
The national tally of 4.4 percent was insufficient to clear the 5
403
Germany: A Country Study
percent hurdle for parliamentary representation, but the PDS
benefited from an oft-forgotten electoral law that automatically
qualifies a party for representation according to its overall
share of the national vote when the party wins three electoral
districts outright (first votes). The PDS surprised seemingly
everyone in winning four districts outright (all in eastern Ber-
lin), entitling it to thirty seats in the Bundestag.
The future of the PDS is unclear and may well depend on
whether the CDU and the SPD develop programs that attract
current PDS constituents. Kohl's coalition lost twice as many
votes in the east as in the west, winning 49.9 percent of the vote
in the west and 42.5 percent in the east. The SPD faces the
challenge in the east of competing against two other parties of
the left, the PDS and the Greens. When considering the success
of the PDS, however, one must recall that 80 percent of eastern
Germans did not vote for the former Communists. At present,
PDS leaders are working to rid the party of its Stalinist heritage;
if successful, the PDS would certainly have a broader appeal.
As of mid-1995, right-wing extremist parties held seats in
three of sixteen Land parliaments (Baden-Wurtemberg, Bre-
men, and Schleswig-Holstein) and appeared to be fading from
the German political landscape. The most significant of these
parties, the Republikaner, with about 23,000 members,
attracted support principally by criticizing a government policy
that allowed hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers into Ger-
many. However, the Kohl government engineered a revision of
the German constitution in 1992 that severely restricts the right
to asylum (which had been the most liberal in Europe), thus
largely calming public concerns. The far right has thereby lost
its major platform and has been tainted by violent attacks
against foreigners in Germany. In-fighting has also divided the
party and resulted in the ouster of leader Franz Schonhuber, a
former Waffen-SS member and the party's one nationally
known figure (see The Republikaner and the German People's
Union, this ch.). In the October 1994 election, with close to 80
percent voter turnout, the Republikaner received only 1.9 per-
cent of the national vote, thus once again failing to win repre-
sentation in the Bundestag. This outcome cemented a
downward trend, which had been evinced in the European Par-
liament election and Land elections throughout the year. That
downward trend is particularly notable in light of the fact that
extreme right parties have met with considerable electoral suc-
404
Government and Politics
cess in several West European countries, such as France, Bel-
gium, and Italy.
A plethora of controversial issues has marked political
debate in united Germany, for example, the right to political
asylum, the upsurge in right-wing violence, and the tensions
surrounding the unification process itself. The Basic Law origi-
nally contained a liberal regulation on the right to asylum, and
in 1992 a total of 438,191 asylum-seekers streamed into Ger-
many — up from 256,112 in 1991. Most asylum-seekers were
from Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Many Ger-
mans complained that the German law permitted many people
who were not political refugees, but rather economic migrants,
to take advantage of the country's generous welfare system and
compete with Germans for scarce housing. Extreme right-wing
parties capitalized on this widespread resentment against asy-
lum-seekers in April 1992 elections in two western Lander.
On December 6, 1992, Kohl's governing coalition and the
opposition Social Democrats agreed on a constitutional
amendment to limit the right to asylum. The asylum compro-
mise between the government and the opposition included sev-
eral important changes. First, asylum-seekers from European
Community (EC — see Glossary) states or states that accept the
Geneva Convention on Refugees and the European Human
Rights Convention have no right to asylum in Germany. Sec-
ond, any refugee passing through "safe third countries," which
include all of Germany's neighbors, is ineligible for asylum. An
individual may appeal this decision but may not stay in Ger-
many during the course of that appeal. In exchange for these
concessions, the Social Democrats won agreements to place an
annual limit of 200,000 on the immigration of ethnic Germans
eligible for automatic German citizenship and to ease the
terms of citizenship for longtime foreign residents of Germany
(see Immigration, ch. 3). Parliament approved the new asylum
law in late May 1993, and it took effect on July 1. About 10,000
protesters surrounded the Bundestag on the day of the vote,
but apparently about 70 percent of Germans approved the
more restrictive asylum law. The number of foreigners seeking
asylum in Germany has fallen substantially since the new law
went into effect.
Another pressing issue has been the escalation of right-wing
violence. In 1992 right-wing extremists committed 2,584 acts of
violence in Germany, an increase of 74 percent from 1991. Sev-
enteen people were killed in the 1992 attacks, six in 1991.
405
Germany: A Country Study
About 60 percent of the attacks occurred in western Germany
and 40 percent in eastern Germany — home to only 20 percent
of the population. About 90 percent of the right-wing attacks in
1992 were directed against foreigners — above all, at asylum-
seekers and their lodgings. People under the age of twenty-one
committed 70 percent of these attacks.
In November 1992, three Turkish residents were killed in a
firebombing in Molln in western Germany. Of the 80 million
people living in Germany in 1993, about 1.8 million were
Turks, making that ethnic group the country's largest minority.
Two-thirds of those Turks had lived in Germany at least a
decade. The overwhelming majority of Germans condemn
xenophobia and neo-Nazism, and after the Molln attack, over 3
million Germans demonstrated across the country against
right-wing violence. Following the violence in Molln, the gov-
ernment began a crackdown on far-right violence. The federal
prosecutor took over for the first time the investigation of an
antiforeigner attack. The decision was made to charge the per-
petrators with murder, rather than manslaughter, as had been
done following previous arson attacks leading to fatalities. In
December 1993, a judge imposed maximum sentences on the
two men convicted in the Molln killings. Other measures taken
by the government included banning four small neo-Nazi orga-
nizations and outlawing the sale, manufacture, and distribution
of the music of several neo-Nazi rock bands.
Despite the government's actions, the number of right-wing
attacks increased in the first six months of 1993. The most seri-
ous incident occurred on May 29, 1993, when right-wing youths
firebombed a house in Solingen in western Germany, killing
five Turks. In late December 1993, four right-wing youths were
charged with murder in the Solingen attack. In late October
1993, United States citizens for the first time became the target
of right-wing violence. Two skinheads harassed African-Ameri-
can members of the United States Olympic luge team, which
was practicing at an eastern German training center. When a
white luger intervened on his teammates' behalf, he was
severely beaten by the skinheads.
By the end of 1993, the surge in right-wing violence
appeared to be abating. The federal police reported that, in
the first eleven months of 1993, rightist crime dropped by 28
percent compared with the same period in 1992. As of Decem-
ber 2, 1993, eight people had died in rightist violence com-
pared with seventeen in 1992. A police spokesman stated that
406
An estimated 10,000 mourners, including Minister of Foreign Affairs
Klaus Kinkel, paid their respects in Hamburg to the memory of three
Turks killed in late 1992 by right-wing extremists.
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
the decline reflected decisive executive action, including faster
police responses, tougher sentences, and bans on neo-Nazi
groups.
Much of the public debate on how to address the causes of
right-wing violence has focused on how better to integrate for-
eigners into German society. Chancellor Kohl announced
some steps to make it easier for foreigners to become German
citizens. He stopped short, however, of advocating dual citizen-
ship. Concern exists in law enforcement circles that neo-Nazis
are building an underground network of small, organized cells
patterned in part on those of the Red Army Faction (Rote
Armee Fraktion — RAF), the far-left organization that carried
out bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings in the 1970s
and 1980s (see The Student Movement and Terrorism, ch. 2;
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Germany: A Country Study
Dissidence and Terrorist Activity, ch. 9). The establishment of
such 3. network would make it much more difficult for the
authorities to monitor neo-Nazi activities.
A final issue dominating Germany's political scene has been
the ongoing challenge of implementing unification. Among
other things, the two Germanys have had to enact uniform leg-
islation, decide on what city should serve as their capital, and
bring the former leaders of East Germany to justice.
Unification left Germany with a population possessing
widely different views on matters such as the family, religion,
and the work ethic. A particularly sensitive issue has been abor-
tion. East Germany, which permitted free abortion on demand
up to the twelfth week of pregnancy, had a markedly more lib-
eral policy on abortion than did West Germany. In June 1992,
the Bundestag, in an attempt to unify abortion policy,
approved an abortion law — opposed by Chancellor Kohl — that
granted a woman the right to an abortion up to the twelfth
week of pregnancy, provided she accepted counseling first.
Thirty-two of the 268 CDU legislators, primarily from eastern
Germany, broke ranks with the party leadership and approved
the bill.
On August 4, 1992, the Federal Constitutional Court issued
an injunction against the parliament's decision, and abortion
continued to be available on demand in the east and largely
prohibited in the west, pending a final court judgment. On
May 28, 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court struck down
the compromise law on the basis of the Basic Law's explicit pro-
tection of the rights of the unborn child. The ruling held that
abortion was no longer a criminal offense but that abortions
would only be allowed in the first three months of pregnancy
for women who first participated in a formal consultation pro-
cess. Further, the ruling barred insurance funds from paying
for abortions and Land hospitals from performing them. The
ruling went into effect on June 16, 1993. Women's groups,
opposition politicians from the west, and easterners from
across the political spectrum expressed outrage at the court's
decision. At some point in the future, the Bundestag is still
expected to pass a uniform abortion law for the entire country.
Another question that arose with unification was where to
locate the new German capital. The Bundestag voted in June
1991 to move the capital from Bonn to Berlin, fulfilling a long-
standing promise of West German politicians across the board.
The vote in favor of Berlin was surprisingly narrow, with 338
408
Government and Politics
legislators supporting Berlin and 320 supporting Bonn. Many
of the parliamentarians who voted for Bonn spoke of the sym-
bolic importance of the capital's geographical location, with
Bonn bearing witness to the critical importance of the Atlantic
Alliance and Germany's commitment to Western democracy.
Many who supported Berlin saw their choice as a necessary act
of conciliation toward eastern Germans and a necessary step
toward Germany's return to the world stage as a "normal"
nation.
The quick move to Berlin that many eastern Germans had
hoped for was thwarted by a quiet, yet effective, campaign led
by Bonn bureaucrats and certain key politicians who opposed
the Bundestag decision on several grounds. First, members of
this group cited the huge expense of moving the government,
estimated at just under US$19 billion by the Ministry of
Finance. Second, they argued that Berlin's historical associa-
tions as the capital of a united Germany were negative and that
Germany should avoid doing something to suggest to its neigh-
bors a return to expansionist or aggressive tendencies. Third,
many officials balked at the personal inconvenience of moving
to Berlin if they owned homes in the Bonn area or otherwise
faced having to uproot their families from the rather provincial
Rhineland and relocate in a booming metropolis.
After two years of indecision, the Kohl cabinet announced in
October 1993 that the government would complete the move
to Berlin by December 31, 2000; the move will begin in 1998.
The opposition Social Democrats had threatened to make the
government's reluctance to move an issue in the 1994 national
election campaign. Foreign embassies and private companies
had delayed their moves to Berlin while waiting for an official
announcement of a timetable. The cabinet decision sent a
decisive message to investors and property developers who
believed the move would attract greater investment in the five
eastern Lander. The Bonn lobby won certain important conces-
sions as well: eight government ministries will keep their head-
quarters in Bonn, and the remainder will retain offices there.
Kohl received sharp criticism about the distant deadline from
some commentators, who argued that the government's hesita-
tion to complete the move was impeding the social and psycho-
logical unification of east and west.
Many Germans see the prosecution of former East German
officials as a necessary part of coming to terms with divided
Germany's past. On November 12, 1992, a trial opened in Ber-
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Germany: A Country Study
lin involving six defendants, including former East German
leader Erich Honecker, former minister of state security Erich
Mielke, and former prime minister Willi Stoph. These men
were put on trial for the killings of East Germans trying to cross
the border to the west. Two days later, however, Mielke and
Stoph were declared unfit to stand trial for health reasons.
Charges were then dropped against Honecker because of his
advanced cancer, and he was allowed to join his family in Chile
in early 1993. The remaining three defendants — all former
members of East Germany's National Defense Council — were
convicted in September 1993, receiving prison sentences rang-
ing from four-and-one-half years to seven-and-one-half years.
From the start, the legal basis for the trials was questionable.
German law does not apply to acts committed by East German
citizens in a state that no longer exists. Thus, the defendants
had to be prosecuted for transgressions of East German law,
and East Germany's border law allowed guards to shoot anyone
trying to flee. The Berlin prosecutors argued that the law was
evil and ought not to have been obeyed, a form of reasoning
with which the judges agreed. Many legal scholars believe that
the convictions could be reversed on appeal, however. In part,
the prosecution of these former East German leaders grew out
of public indignation over the trials of border guards while
senior policy makers were going free. By late 1993, ten border
guards had stood trial. Nine received short, suspended sen-
tences or acquittals; one received a sentence of six years for
having shot and killed a fugitive who had already been caught
and was under arrest. In the fall of 1993, the Bundestag
extended the statute of limitations by three years for minor
crimes by former East German officials and by five years for
more serious crimes.
Most observers of Germany believe the country will solve the
economic and political challenges associated with the unifica-
tion process. However, polls indicated that, as time passed, east-
ern and western Germans seemed to see the gap between them
widening rather than narrowing. In an April 1993 poll, when
asked whether eastern and western Germans felt solidarity or
antagonism toward one another, 71 percent in the west and 85
percent in the east answered "antagonism." In the coming
years, perhaps the greatest challenge to Germans of the east
and west will be to master the task of achieving social harmony.
Only then can they become one nation.
410
Government and Politics
* * *
A rich literature on German government and politics is
readily available in English. The Press and Information Office
of the Federal Republic of Germany offers the public a wide
range of documents, including the Basic Law, free of charge.
That office also publishes the Week in Germany, which covers
current events. The Financial Times and the International Herald
Tribune provide good daily coverage of German news as well.
English-language studies of the political system are pub-
lished regularly. One of the most comprehensive and readable
texts available is Politics in Germany by Russell J. Dalton.
Another general volume providing valuable information is
Developments in German Politics, edited by Gordon Smith, Will-
iam E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padgett. A more
specialized, comparative parliamentary study is The United States
Congress and the German Bundestag, edited by Uwe Thaysen,
Roger H. Davidson, and Robert Gerald Livingston. The Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Germany is a comprehensive exam-
ination of the Basic Law by the noted constitutional scholar
David P. Currie. Three journals — German Politics, German Politics
and Society, and West European Politics — are useful sources of
information as well. (For further information and complete
citations, see Bibliography.)
411
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs, 1974-92
GERMANYS FOREIGN POLICY faces formidable challenges
and difficult decisions. For forty years, Germany was divided
between East and West, its border the focus of a nuclear stand-
off. On October 3, 1990, the two German states, the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), were
united under one democratic government. As Germany begins
to search for a new voice abroad, some circles fear that the
country might once again come to dominate the continent.
After unification, the country was beset by difficult domestic
problems. Integration of Germany's five new eastern states
{Lander; sing., Land) proved more costly and time consuming
than experts had originally estimated. In addition, there was
persistent friction between the former West Germans ( Wessis in
colloquial German) and the former East Germans (Ossis). This
friction often centered on the costs and burdens of unification.
A spate of right-wing radicalism and violence also erupted
throughout Germany, primarily directed against foreign work-
ers and refugees. Between 1990 and mid-1995, Germany had
taken in more asylum-seekers than all other European Union
(EU — see Glossary) members combined, a fact that angered
some Germans because of the expense this humanitarian
action entailed. Finally, there was a debate on the competitive-
ness of the German economy. West German workers had come
to enjoy some of the highest wages and most extensive benefits
among workers anywhere in the industrialized world. As a
result of high labor costs, however, companies had begun to
downsize, and many were relocating production facilities
abroad. Unemployment was increasing throughout Germany.
In this context of domestic preoccupation, Germany began
to confront disorienting external circumstances as well. The
European Community (EC — see Glossary) had embarked on a
process of profound change as it considered its course toward
political and economic union. In December 1991, the EC's
twelve members signed the Treaty on European Union (com-
monly known as the Maastricht Treaty — see Glossary), creating
the EU, a blueprint for unifying the continent. The United
States, previously West Germany's most important ally, began to
rethink its own European role as it adapted to the new
post-Cold War environment and its own domestic challenges.
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Germany: A Country Study
Russia and the other states of the former Soviet bloc entered
into an uncertain relationship of dependence on Germany, the
country that led the international aid effort for the emerging
democracies of the new Europe.
Meanwhile, Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, the
humanitarian mission of the United Nations (UN) in Somalia,
and war in the former Yugoslavia created significant challenges
for German foreign policy. Germany's policy makers were con-
fronted with the question of whether or not their country's par-
ticipation in multilateral actions sanctioned by the UN would
be restricted to nonmilitary or peacekeeping roles. Would Ger-
many be able to overcome internal legal obstacles and psycho-
logical inhibitions stemming from its turbulent twentieth-
century history of militarism to participate in peace-enforcing
combat missions?
Despite initial reluctance and arduous debate, Germany's
foreign policy planners began to accept a new role with regard
to Germany's military, and incremental steps were taken to nor-
malize the use of the country's armed forces. The German navy
patrolled the eastern Mediterranean off the coasts of Egypt
and Syria during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. From May 1991
to October 1993, German military personnel served with UN
forces in Cambodia. In March 1994, German troops joined the
UN's operation in Somalia. German Alpha Jets were deployed
in eastern Turkey to help enforce the UN's Kurdish safe zone
in northern Iraq. And German pilots flew North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) missions over Bos-
nia as part of the UN's "Deny Flight" operation. By the
mid-1990s, the chief legal obstacles to the deployment of Ger-
man armed forces abroad had been overcome, but the "nor-
malization" of German foreign policy, it had become clear,
would still take some time.
Once unified, Germany struggled to think clearly about its
national priorities. For Germans, unification meant new bor-
ders, new resources, and a return to the center of the conti-
nent, or Mittellage. It also meant new responsibilities and new
expectations. Historically, Germany had often been either too
strong or too weak to be accepted by its neighbors.
Germany's return to the center of Europe entailed for the
country's foreign policy establishment the beginnings of a sub-
tle recalculation of the country's national interests and a grad-
ual reexamination of its relationship to a number of
international bodies. Those bodies included NATO, the EU,
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Foreign Relations
the Western European Union (WEU — see Glossary); the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — see
Glossary) — which was renamed the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE — see Glossary) in January
1995 — and the UN. In the early post-Cold War years, Germany
had assumed a leading role in advocating the expansion of
NATO and the EU to include emerging democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe.
Although German foreign policy remains deeply influenced
by patterns of behavior developed during the Cold War, uni-
fied Germany's major foreign policies and goals are evolving.
During the unification process, Germany had reaffirmed its
pledge not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But post-
unification Germany also made clear its interest in obtaining a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Foreign observers
and Germans alike had begun the search for answers to emerg-
ing questions. What will it mean for Germany to be a "sover-
eign nation" again? Will German attempts of the past four
decades to develop a postnational, European identity begin to
fade, or will they be reinforced in this postunification era?
What role will Germany play in Europe as well as globally? Will
Germany dominate Europe again, and, if so, in what way? How
will the new Germany, still carrying burdens from the past,
define its national interest in the future?
Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies
Early Developments
Imperial Germany's foreign policy, from Otto von Bismarck's
founding of the empire in 1871 until the empire's collapse at
the end of World War I, was influenced by the country's
exposed geographical situation, Germany's Mittellage, as well as
by domestic difficulties. Looking abroad, German policy mak-
ers were often obsessed with the threat of encirclement (Ein-
kreisung) by hostile neighbor states. Thus, after 1871 German
foreign policy objectives centered on two principal tasks: to
keep France, Germany's historical rival and enemy, isolated;
and to balance the other major powers of the day in order to
ensure that no single power would be able to exert pressure or
militarily confront the newly united German state.
"Modern Germany was born encircled," writes David P. Cal-
leo, a noted foreign affairs specialist. Indeed, German leaders
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often
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Germany: A Country Study
concerned with their country's vulnerability. They were preoc-
cupied with national frontiers and responded to this preoccu-
pation with a heavy emphasis on military power. Yet the
international policy, or Weltpolitik, of Bismarck (1862-90) and
Kaiser Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918) differed little from that of
other major European powers of the day, such as Britain or
France. But Germany would come to fight and lose two world
wars in the first half of the twentieth century. And the disas-
trous consequences of German militarism and the barbaric
actions of Nazi Germany, in particular, had a profound impact
on the development of West Germany's foreign policy between
1949 and 1989.
At first glance, the situation facing united Germany in the
1990s resembles the situation faced by imperial Germany, inso-
far as Germany has reclaimed a Mittellage and has returned geo-
graphically to the heart of the continent (surrounded by nine
immediate neighbors). Yet the parallel ends there. Peaceful
relations exist between Germany and bordering states. Like
Germany, the country's neighbors are democratic. Relations
between Germany and these neighbors are characterized not
by confrontation but by economic cooperation and interde-
pendence. In the first years following unification, there was no
dispute about continued German membership in NATO. And
Germany remains a faithful member of the EU — even as Ger-
man policy makers have begun to reexamine their country's
foreign policy and to search for a new hierarchy of German
interests in Europe.
Postwar Developments
In the postwar period, the Federal Republic became known
as "an economic giant" and a "political dwarf." During the Cold
War, German foreign policy had been formulated under
extraordinary circumstances. After World War II, the country
was divided, and its sovereignty was limited. As a member of the
Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), communist East Germany's foreign
policy was closely aligned with that of the Soviet Union. West
Germany's foreign policy became characterized by a penchant
for political and economic power over military power, by its
preference for multilateralism over the exercise of unilateral
actions, and by its concentration on European rather than glo-
bal policy issues.
The characteristics of West Germany as a civilian European
power wedded to multilateral structures stood in stark contrast
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to German colonialism of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries and the military expansion pursued by Germany
under Adolf Hitler's National Socialist rule from 1933 to 1945.
In fact, the patterns of West Germany's foreign policy were very
much a direct consequence of military defeat and occupation
by the Allied Powers at the end of World War II. In reaction to
the excesses of the past, the Federal Republic's foreign policy
establishment developed a clear and strong aversion to power
politics and remained reluctant to draw on populist, national
sentiment in support of foreign policy goals.
Emblematic of West Germany's foreign policy was Bonn's
Ostpolitik — the opening to the east that became a continuous,
albeit varied, thread in the policies practiced by both center-
left and center-right governments in Bonn over the two
decades preceding the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Ostpolitik
began in 1969, when Germany's coalition formed by the Social
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands — SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei — FDP) first took office. Ostpolitik was
the result of a concept known as Wandel durch Anndherung, or
change through rapprochement, created by Chancellor Willy
Brandt (1969-74) and his close adviser, Egon Bahr.
Ostpolitik was Bonn's policy of detente toward communist
Europe. It rested on two assumptions: that the Federal Repub-
lic, despite the crimes subsequently committed by communist
regimes, had a special responsibility to compensate Eastern
Europe for the aggression and atrocities carried out by Nazi
Germany; and that a web of treaties and agreements with the
Soviet bloc would improve human rights for the citizens of
these neighboring communist states, while creating a
peace-inducing dialogue with communist regimes. Conse-
quently, Ostpolitik consisted of three components: West Ger-
many's relations with the Soviet Union, its ties to East Germany,
and its dealings with the rest of Eastern Europe. In the case of
East Germany, Ostpolitik represented Bonn's attempt through
dialogue and cooperation with communist rulers to help over-
come some of the burdens of Germany's division.
Unification
On November 28, 1989, three weeks after the breach of the
Berlin Wall, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- ) presented to the
Bundestag (the lower house of West Germany's parliament) his
Ten-Point Plan outlining his proposal for the incremental cre-
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Germany: A Country Study
ation of a confederation between the two German states. Kohl
believed at the time — an overly optimistic assessment as history
would soon show — that the process of internal economic unifi-
cation could be achieved in three to four years.
There was much talk at the time that in presenting his
Ten-Point Plan Chancellor Kohl was engaging in an overly
assertive style of diplomacy because he had failed to adequately
consult his partners within the governing coalition as well as
the Western Allies. A number of leading members of the oppo-
sition SPD, moreover, rejected the idea of unification, viewing
moves toward unity as a threat to the postwar order of peace
and stability in Europe. The initial push by the Kohl govern-
ment toward unification was driven by a number of consider-
ations.
Kohl feared that if Bonn were not able to immediately set
the terms and course of international discussion about events
in East Germany, other European countries, particularly the
Soviet Union and France, might seek a new variation on the
most recent solution of the "German Question," namely,
arranging for the containment of Germany within Europe's
international order by dividing it into two. French president
Francois Mitterrand's announcement of his intention to visit
East Berlin just days prior to Kohl's Bundestag speech, for
instance, fueled fears in Bonn that anxious neighbors might
attempt to stabilize East Germany's fragile communist regime
and its hemorrhaging economy.
There were domestic considerations for West Germany's
chancellor as well. Kohl worried that if his party, the Christian
Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union — CDU),
did not seize the issue of unification and articulate a bold plan
of action, political opponents might step in to fill the vacuum.
Kohl's rivals included the SPD, but also the FDP, the junior
partner in Kohl's coalition government, in power since late
1982. West Germany's federal president, Richard von
Weizsacker (1984-94), a member of Kohl's party, feared that
the right-wing radical Republikaner (Die Republikaner) could
make the issue their own in the upcoming national election
campaign if the CDU did not preempt it.
It also had become clear within weeks of Kohl's proposed
Ten-Point Plan that governing elites would be forced to
respond to overwhelming pressure from the streets of East Ger-
man cities and towns. The ways in which Kohl later defended
the terms and timing of economic and monetary union with
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East Germany illustrate this fact. He often reminded his critics
that if Bonn were not prepared to bring the deutsche mark to
East Germany, the East Germans would surely come to the
deutsche mark, an allusion to the growing tide of East-West
migration during the first six months of 1990.
Chancellor Kohl's Ten-Point Plan sought to intensify rap-
prochement with East Germany. The ten points consisted of
calling for immediate measures to provide aid; cooperation
with the GDR on an economic and cultural level; fundamental
political and economic change in the GDR; a close-knit net-
work of agreements; confederative structures, with the goal of
forming a federation in Germany; a future structure of Ger-
many that would fit into the future architecture of Europe as a
whole; the power of attraction of the EC to remain a constant
feature; the continuation of the CSCE process as a crucial part
of the total European architecture, but with the possibility of
new institutional forms; disarmament and arms control to keep
step with political developments; and freedom within Europe
to be maintained in such a way that the German people could,
via self-determination, restore their unity. The reattainment of
German state unity by peaceful means remained the political
goal of the federal government.
In fact, East Germany disintegrated at an astonishing pace,
and German foreign policy from late 1989 throughout 1990
was driven by concerns directly related to the unification pro-
cess. In February 1990, East Germany's communist party, the
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands — SED), transformed itself into the Party of Dem-
ocratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus —
PDS). East Germany's new prime minister, Hans Modrow,
insisted that the reformed PDS would be able to find a "third
way" between capitalism and socialism, permitting the GDR
another life as a separate independent German state. Democ-
ratization and elections in May 1990 would legitimate the PDS's
leading role in this process, Modrow believed, and would pro-
vide a new basis for relations between East Germany and West
Germany.
The plans of East German reform communists were derailed
in a matter of months, however. Discredited SED officials were
publicly harassed and in some cases arrested for abuse of
power and privilege. The leading role of the communist party
was revoked from the GDR's constitution, and offices of the
State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, commonly
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Germany: A Country Study
referred to as Stasi), the despised secret police, were occupied
by citizens groups at sites throughout the country. Of the SED's
2.3 million members, nearly 1.6 million had deserted by early
1990.
By the end of January 1990, a deteriorating economy, sus-
tained demonstrations throughout the country, and the daily
exit of some 2,000 East German citizens for West Germany
compelled opposition leaders who made up the Round Table,
an interim "government," to convince Modrow to advance the
date of East German elections from May 6 to March 18. By late
spring, most observers agreed that the elections would no
longer be a referendum on communist rule (opinion polls sug-
gested that the communists would be defeated in fair, free elec-
tions), but rather on the terms and timing of German
unification.
Confronted by this reality, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,
having previously insisted that Moscow would not accept aboli-
tion of the East German state, retreated from this hard-line
position. Although Gorbachev had renounced the Soviet
Union's right to determine the national policies of Warsaw Pact
members during the years and months prior to the breach of
the Berlin Wall, the Soviet leadership had remained steadfastly
committed to the overall status quo in Europe and to Ger-
many's division into two states.
As the Berlin Wall collapsed and Kohl announced his
Ten-Point Plan, the Soviet leadership delivered a number of
statements and gestures that made it clear that Moscow had no
intention of relinquishing its East German ally. Reasserting
occupation rights, the Soviet Union called for a meeting of the
ambassadors of the World War II Allies, which took place on
December 11 at the Allied Control Council building in Berlin.
A stream of Kremlin advisers insisted in interviews that unifica-
tion was neither desirable nor feasible.
Nevertheless, on January 30 Prime Minister Modrow flew to
Moscow for a meeting with Gorbachev, after which Gorbachev
consented in principle to Germany's self-determination. When
Modrow returned to East Berlin, he announced his own plan
for inner-German rapprochement, a "Declaration on the Way
to German Unity." The plan envisaged a confederation
between the two German states, leading eventually to an
all-German federation. According to the plan, both Bonn and
East Berlin would gradually distance themselves from their
respective alliance commitments.
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Foreign Relations
In a speech delivered in West Berlin on December 12,
United States secretary of state James Baker, echoing the posi-
tion outlined by United States president George Bush in a
meeting with Chancellor Kohl earlier that month, had already
tacitly given Washington's green light for German unity.
Although the French and British gradually overcame initial
misgivings, Baker, and later Kohl and West German minister of
foreign affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, visited Gorbachev in
February to further assuage Soviet security concerns. In a
meeting with Gorbachev, Baker formally presented what
became known as the Nine Assurances, a collection of various
Western guarantees provided to the Soviet Union to make the
process of German unification more palatable.
Meanwhile, pressured by fears that East Germany might col-
lapse (and by the conviction that the opportunity to unite the
two German states would exist only as long as Gorbachev
remained in power), the Kohl government began to push dip-
lomatic negotiations toward a speedy solution of the German
Question. Kohl's Ten-Point Plan was being overtaken by events.
Already in the beginning of February, discussions had begun
about the introduction of West Germany's currency into East
Germany. Also as a result of the quickened pace of events, the
foreign ministers of the four World War II Allies and of the two
German states agreed in mid-February to begin formal talks on
German unity (the Two-Plus-Four Talks). The external condi-
tions for unification were put into place.
The Two-Plus-Four Talks were intended to provide an instru-
ment with which to shape German unification and hence the
new post-Cold War world in Europe without excluding key
players from the process. There were fears, in particular in
Washington and Bonn, that a bitter sense of defeat and exclu-
sion in Moscow might engender a climate analogous to that
which had developed in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles
and that had characterized the Weimar period. The existence
of a humiliated and vanquished power that might later seek to
forcibly reshape the European order (as Hitler's Germany had
sought to do) was to be precluded at all costs. More immedi-
ately, United States, German, and other West European diplo-
mats wanted to avoid creating a domestic crisis for Gorbachev,
to whom most Western leaders had tied their hopes for a sus-
tained liberal posture of the Soviet Union.
Free and fair elections for East Germany's Volkskammer
(People's Chamber) were held on March 18, 1990. The result
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Germany: A Country Study
was a victory for the CDU-led Alliance for Germany, which
received a plurality of the vote. The alliance and the other par-
ties that supported unification (the SPD, the Alliance of Free
Democrats, and the German Social Union) received the votes
of roughly three-fourths of the East German electorate. Opin-
ion polls underscored the same message expressed in the elec-
tion results. The vast majority of the population in the GDR
rejected communism, reformed or otherwise, and supported
unification with the Federal Republic.
East Germany's first (and last) democratically elected prime
minister, Lothar de Maiziere, promptly fulfilled his mandate.
On April 19, he announced that he would seek unity with West
Germany as soon as possible. As a first step, East Berlin's new
government agreed with Bonn on economic and monetary
union, which took place on July 1.
The external conditions governing Germany's unification
had meanwhile been in process. Following the first Two-Plus-
Four meeting in mid-February, subsequent meetings were held
in March, June, July, and September 1990. In late June, the
national legislatures in East Berlin and in Bonn approved a res-
olution recognizing the inviolability of Poland's borders as
determined after World War II, confirming the Oder-Neisse
rivers as the permanent border between Poland and the future
united Germany. On August 31, 1990, the Unification Treaty
was signed in East Berlin by officials of both German states.
The treaty stipulated that the five newly reconstituted Lander in
the GDR would accede to the Federal Republic on October 3,
1990, as provided for under Article 23 of the Basic Law.
The remaining external aspects relating to German unifica-
tion were quickly settled. After having consented to unification,
Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze,
had at first insisted that united Germany accept a demilita-
rized, neutral status. When this was rejected by West Germany,
they then argued that Germany should remain in both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact for a transitional period. In this context,
GDR minister of national defense Admiral Theodor Hoffmann
proposed in late February 1990 the creation of a joint army for
united Germany (a force that would be reduced to less than
one-third the combined size of the armed forces of the FRG
and the GDR) . He also proposed that, pending elections and
further negotiations, both states continue to belong to their
respective alliances.
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Foreign Relations
That same month, however, following a meeting at Camp
David, Chancellor Kohl and President Bush had reemphasized
their commitment to unified Germany's full membership in
NATO. They stressed that East Germany would initially enjoy a
special military status in deference to security concerns of the
Soviet Union. To this end, West German minister of foreign
affairs Genscher, especially attuned to Soviet sensitivities, had
formulated a plan to assuage Soviet concerns. According to
Genscher's plan, NATO forces would not be moved to the terri-
tory of the former GDR.
In the early weeks of the spring of 1990, Soviet resistance to
united Germany's full membership in NATO, particularly in
light of the GDR's elections in March, became increasingly
untenable. Finally, in mid-July, consultations among Kohl,
Genscher, and Gorbachev in the Caucasian town of Stavropol
secured Soviet permission for Germany to enjoy full sover-
eignty and remain in NATO.
A communique issued by NATO from London the previous
week had helped to facilitate the reversal of the Soviet position
as did West German largesse to the Soviet Union in the form of
aid and credits. The London declaration announced that
NATO had become "an indispensable factor of stability" for
Europe's profound transition and hence would seek to extend
the Alliance's "hand of friendship" to its former enemies in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Kohl and Genscher agreed that united Germany would
recommit to earlier pledges to renounce production and pos-
session of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Both Ger-
man states also declared on August 30, 1990, at the Conven-
tional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna, that the united
country would reduce its armed forces to 370,000 within three
to four years. West Germany's leadership also guaranteed that
NATO's military organization would not be extended to GDR
territory as long as Soviet forces remained stationed there. In
return, Kohl obtained from Gorbachev agreement that the
roughly 400,000 Soviet troops stationed in East Germany would
be withdrawn by the end of 1994. The Kohl government also
pledged financial assistance for the repatriation of the Soviet
troops.
The Kohl-Gorbachev agreements paved the way for signing
the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,
or, as it is more commonly known, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, on
September 12, 1990. Within this framework, the two German
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Germany: A Country Study
states, together with the United States, the Soviet Union,
France, and Britain, were able to confirm the unification of
Germany as consisting of the GDR, the FRG, and Berlin. In
addition, the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union signed a
Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation
in September 1990. That same month, the GDR's minister of
defense and disarmament and the commander in chief of the
Warsaw Pact's armed forces concluded an agreement that pro-
vided for the GDR's immediate withdrawal from the Warsaw
Pact.
Bonn and Warsaw also concluded a separate treaty that took
into account the special concerns Poland had about its security.
For a period of time, the topic of the German-Polish border
had proved a controversial and divisive issue for coalition poli-
tics in Bonn and for the unification process in general. Kohl's
reluctance to declare the issue settled, stemming from legal
concerns as well as domestic political considerations, fueled
anxieties in Poland and elsewhere in Europe about the course
of a united Germany. On June 21, 1990, however, both German
parliaments had passed resolutions recognizing Poland's west-
ern border as final, stipulating that a separate treaty between
Poland and a united Germany would formally consummate
this understanding.
On October 1, 1990, all Four-Power rights in Germany and
Berlin ended when representatives of the four victorious coun-
tries in World War II signed a document in New York recogniz-
ing full German sovereignty. On October 3, the Unification
Treaty went into effect, and the five new Lander formed in the
territory of the former GDR acceded to the Federal Republic
as provided for under Article 23 of the Basic Law.
Foreign Reaction to Unification
German unification upset the political equilibrium in many
of Western and Eastern Europe's political establishments.
Although French public opinion had tended to support Ger-
man unity, French leaders feared that a resurgent united Ger-
many would dominate Europe and usurp their aspirations to
play a leading role on the continent. President Mitterrand's
trip to the GDR in December 1989, when he cautioned the East
Germans against hasty unification, illustrated this sentiment.
In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government
harbored fears that German unification would accelerate Euro-
pean unification, quickening and deepening the gap between
426
The departure of the United States, British, and French city
commanders from Berlin in 1991
Joyous crowds at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin in November 1989
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
427
Germany: A Country Study
London and the continent. Nicholas Ridley, an official in the
Thatcher government, was forced to step down in the summer
of 1990 in the wake of impolitic remarks he made about Euro-
pean economic union's being a German design for the domi-
nation of Europe. Thatcher, for her part, initially urged
Chancellor Kohl's government to be patient on unification and
only with reluctance later joined the United States in its pro-
unity stance.
In the former Soviet bloc, aside from the Soviet Union,
Poland sheltered the greatest distrust and suspicion of develop-
ments in Germany. These anxieties accounted for the separate
treaty signed between united Germany and Poland in Novem-
ber 1990. The treaty confirmed the border (stipulated in the
Two-Plus-Four Talks) and also outlined principles for
good-neighborliness and cooperation between Warsaw and
Bonn.
From the United States perspective, after offering Germany
support for unification, President Bush promptly sought to
reshape the German-United States alliance from a relationship
in which West Germany had served as a junior partner to a
more equal status in which Germany would become a "partner
in leadership." Germany's changing relationship with the
United States was in fact already evident. For example, it was
without prior consultation with Washington that Chancellor
Kohl and Soviet president Gorbachev had reached their agree-
ment on the limit of 370,000 troops for Germany's armed
forces, the Bundeswehr (West Germany had roughly 495,000
troops under arms in 1990; the GDR, 170,000) and the exclu-
sion of NATO troops from the territory of eastern Germany.
Postunification Developments
United Germany, a state with 80 million inhabitants and an
area bordering nine countries in Central Europe, confronted a
daunting array of responsibilities and expectations with regard
to its international role in the early 1990s. Following unifica-
tion, its government adopted a policy aimed at fully integrating
the newly enlarged Federal Republic into the primary instru-
ments of international cooperation: the EC, NATO, the WEU,
and the CSCE. In a deliberate effort to further assuage the con-
cerns of its neighbors about German dominance on the conti-
nent, Bonn worked assiduously to bolster its multilateralist
image.
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Foreign Relations
President von Weizsacker, Chancellor Kohl, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Genscher all went to great lengths to stress Ger-
many's intention to renounce the power politics of past eras in
favor of a "policy of responsibility." In the German view, this
meant, on the one hand, a continuation of West German for-
eign policy based on the use of nonmilitary instruments. On
the other hand, it meant a higher international profile in eco-
nomic, human rights, and environmental issues. With the end
of the Cold War, economic power, in the view of many officials
and policy experts in Europe, had superseded military power
in terms of political influence. Germans, above all, adhered to
this belief.
At times, however, German foreign policy was self-centered.
Squabbling over German interest rates (both in Europe and in
the United States) in the autumn of 1992 underscored what
many perceived as a new tilt toward German self-absorption
and unilateralism that had been established the previous win-
ter through Germany's policy toward the Balkans. Until the
summer of 1991, Germany's policy toward Yugoslavia had mir-
rored the thinking in Washington and European capitals,
namely, that Yugoslav unity should be preserved. For a number
of domestic reasons, however, Bonn began to shift away from
this policy, finally deciding on unilateral recognition of Croatia
and Slovenia in December 1991.
In general, united Germany's foreign policy followed the res-
olutely multilateral stance developed in the postwar period.
The German government played an enthusiastic role in the
environmental summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, empha-
sizing the importance it attached to international ecological
concerns in its foreign policy. In the area of international aid,
Bonn established criteria for developmental assistance based
on a recipient country's respect for human rights, commitment
to democracy and a market economy, and responsibility in
arms development and procurement.
In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Ger-
many led the international aid effort for the former Soviet
Union and for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Aid to Russia was paramount for policy makers in Bonn for a
variety of reasons, including the desire to expedite the with-
drawal of Soviet troops from eastern Germany and the wish to
enhance Germany's security by promoting democracy and a
market economy in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union's
successor states.
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Germany: A Country Study
Because of these vital concerns, the German government
emerged as an important champion of aid to the former Soviet
bloc. Chancellor Kohl repeatedly prodded his Western part-
ners toward what he often termed "fair international
burden-sharing" with regard to aid for the emerging democra-
cies in the former Soviet bloc. The US$24 billion aid package
of the Group of Seven (G-7 — see Glossary) for Russia in April
1992 had come about to a large extent as a result of German
insistence. In April 1993, the G-7 announced an additional aid
package for Russia totaling approximately US$50 billion. By
this time, German aid to the successor states of the Soviet
Union totaled more than DM90 billion (for value of the deut-
sche mark — see Glossary). According to Chancellor Kohl, this
amount represented more than half of all Western contribu-
tions since 1989. German aid to the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS — see Glossary) included export credit
guarantees for long-term loans; sustained support for the with-
drawal and reintegration of CIS troops stationed in eastern
Germany; financial help to aid the CIS in its development of
market institutions and infrastructure; and more than DM100
million in bilateral and multilateral aid to improve safety stan-
dards in Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.
Part of German aid to the CIS was to provide for the material
well-being of the estimated 2 million ethnic Germans who still
resided in former Soviet republics. This aid was designed to
offer incentives for ethnic Germans to remain in Russia and in
other CIS states rather than to emigrate to Germany, where
they had the right to become citizens of the Federal Republic
and receive significant amounts of help in becoming inte-
grated into the homeland of their ancestors (see Immigration,
ch. 3). The German government has even discussed with Rus-
sian representatives the possibility of restoring the "Volga
Republic" disbanded by Joseph Stalin in 1941 as a possible area
of settlement for ethnic Germans in Russia.
Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the subject of ethnic German
minorities has played a role in German foreign policy. By the
mid-1990s, German-Czech relations, for example, still had not
been fully normalized, to a large extent because expellee
groups in the Federal Republic continued to lobby for restitu-
tion or compensation for property owned by Germans in the
former Czechoslovakia and confiscated after World War II. The
German-Czech Friendship Treaty was signed in 1992, but it
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Foreign Relations
failed to address the question of compensation for Czech vic-
tims of Nazism.
Foreign Policy Formulation
Institutional Framework
Structural weaknesses of the German central government
were deliberately crafted during the years of Allied occupation
(1945-49) to preclude the possibility that extremists could
once again return to government (see Constitutional Frame-
work, ch. 7) . The chancellor, the cabinet, and the legislature all
contribute to the policy-making process. Moreover, power is
divided between the federal and Land governments. Foreign
policy is the prerogative of the federal government, but Lander
are permitted to conclude agreements with foreign countries;
such agreements in turn are subject to approval by the federal
government.
Article 65 of the Basic Law stipulates that the federal chan-
cellor is responsible for general policy, and the Federal Chan-
cellery (the chancellor's office) serves as the center for policy
review and coordination. The chancellor's direct executive role
is limited, however. Although he or she has wide powers to
name political appointees in government, the chancellor does
not enjoy complete freedom in making appointments to cabi-
net posts. Political necessity demands, for instance, the guaran-
tee of a number of cabinet posts to coalition partners. In 1995,
for example, important portfolios, such as economics and for-
eign affairs, were controlled by the FDP, Helmut Kohl's junior
coalition partner. The resulting diversity of views at the highest
level of government accounts for sustained policy splits and a
process in which it is at times difficult to resolve particularly
contentious issues.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the central department for
planning and implementing foreign policy. Like the United
States, Germany has a corps of professional diplomats. Those
wishing to join Germany's foreign service may file their applica-
tion once a year. Successful candidates undergo a two-year
training program. About one-third of Germany's diplomats are
lawyers.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shares responsibility for for-
eign economic policy with the Ministry for Economics and the
Ministry of Finance; security policy is coordinated with the
Ministry of Defense. Although the executive branch generally
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Germany: A Country Study
takes the initiative in foreign affairs, the Bundestag (the lower
house of parliament) and the Bundesrat (the upper house of
parliament) are involved in the policy-making process. These
bodies ratify foreign treaties and approve most legislation and
budgetary provisions. Parliamentary groups (Fraktionen; sing.,
Fraktiori) in the Bundestag and various committees pertaining
to foreign affairs provide organizational structure for the pol-
icy-making process.
Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Positions of the Political Parties
Members of Kohl's CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the
Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union — CSU),
assert that transatlantic links should be given priority over
more European-dominated organizations such as the CSCE,
especially in the discussion of security matters. They also stress
that assumption of responsibility in international affairs would
necessarily demand a resolution of the "out-of-area M debate,
that is, whether Germany would be allowed to participate
alongside Alliance partners in future military operations.
The CSU has distinguished itself from the CDU by pushing a
slightly more confident tone regarding what its members per-
ceive as German national interests. Notable in this regard were
CSU demands that Bonn and Prague renegotiate a friendship
treaty to give greater emphasis to property claims of ethnic
Germans (living mostly in Bavaria) who had emigrated or been
expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II. In May 1992,
the CSU announced that it would vote against the German-
Czechoslovak friendship treaty in the Bundesrat.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher's party, the FDP, is per-
haps the least nationalistic and the most multilateral in philoso-
phy of the German political parties when it comes to the
subject of foreign policy. Although FDP voters, like those of the
CDU, strongly favor membership in NATO and rapid Euro-
pean unification, FDP supporters have stressed to a greater
extent than the other parties the importance of CSCE institu-
tions and policies aimed at arms control and arms reductions.
Holding views markedly different in this regard than those
held by the CDU/CSU, FDP voters place far less emphasis on
the participation of German soldiers in peacekeeping and
peacemaking missions under UN auspices.
432
Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher with
Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Douglas Hurd during the Two-Plus-Four Talks in Bonn in May 1990
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
On foreign policy issues, the SPD is distinct in a number of
ways from the ruling coalition government in Bonn. Like the
FDP, the SPD is a strong supporter of the CSCE but favors
greater restrictions on out-of-area missions for the Bundeswehr.
Although fundamentally multilateralist in sentiment (the SPD
supports a United States of Europe and more responsibility for
the UN in collective security), the SPD is apt to express its
desire that Germany play a singular and special role in interna-
tional relations because of its recent troubled history. A survey
taken in the early 1990s found that 35 percent of SPD voters
preferred a neutral status for united Germany Of the major
political parties, the SDP is the biggest supporter of neutrality
and on balance offers the lowest support for NATO.
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Germany: A Country Study
The Greens (Die Grunen), a western German environmen-
talist party, united in 1993 with an eastern German political
group, Alliance 90 (Bundnis 90), to form Alliance 90/The
Greens, commonly called the Greens. Surveys from the early
1990s found that one-third of the traditionally pacifist Green
voters supported continued membership in NATO. Nearly 50
percent backed European unity. Although the Greens ada-
mantly opposed German participation in Operation Desert
Storm, some members have begun to call for a multilateral mil-
itary intervention in the Balkan war. However, they either
eschew the question of or oppose German involvement.
Other small parties, such as the PDS and the right-wing radi-
cal Republikaner (Die Republikaner — REP), are either
opposed to or reluctant to support German membership in
NATO and reject European integration (according to the
Republikaner) as subordinating German interests to a
pan-European bureaucratic architecture. Neither the PDS nor
the Republikaner played a significant role in mainstream
debate during the first several years following unification.
Public Opinion
After unification, Germany soon became confident about its
greater responsibility in international relations. According to a
1991 Rand Corporation survey, 62 percent of the population
said they thought that Germany should pursue a more active
international role. Some 77 percent voiced the opinion that
their country was best suited to play the leading foreign policy
role in Europe. There were even signs that Germans were com-
ing to terms with the idea of international military interven-
tion. In 1992 about 53 percent of Germans (compared with 43
percent the previous year) said they believed that the use of
military force is justified when principles of international law
and human rights are violated.
The reluctance of Germans to think in terms of their coun-
try's involvement in multilateral military actions remained
high, however. Although 53 percent supported participation of
the Bundeswehr in peacekeeping operations after unification,
barely 33 percent favored German military involvement in
NATO operations outside of German territory. Only 20 per-
cent were sympathetic to the idea of German forces participat-
ing in collective security actions such as Operation Desert
Storm. A 1994 follow-up study by the Rand Corporation found
increasing support in German public opinion for a German
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defense role beyond the country's borders. But data also
reflected uncertainty about what that role should entail.
In the aftermath of communism's demise, Germans, espe-
cially Germans living in the old Lander, continued to believe
that NATO was essential to their security. They did so even
though the contours of a distinct threat had not emerged and
even though Germany's new international role remained very
much in question. A 1990-91 study by the Rand Corporation
commissioned by the United States Air Force discovered that
85 percent of the German populace supported membership in
international alliances in general, with two out of three western
Germans considering NATO essential for their security. (A
West German Emnid poll in the autumn of 1988 had shown 86
percent favoring NATO membership.) By contrast, only 35 per-
cent of eastern Germans considered NATO indispensable. The
fact that western Germans made up roughly four-fifths of
united Germany's population and that western Germans domi-
nated the united country's policy establishment led most ana-
lysts to conclude that the addition of eastern Germany would
have a minimal impact on the Federal Republic's foreign pol-
icy.
The German position on the presence of United States
troops remains one of ambivalence. According to the Rand
study, 57 percent supported a complete withdrawal of United
States troops from the territory of the Federal Republic. West-
ern Germans were divided in their view — 43 percent favoring
and 49 percent rejecting the sustained presence of these
troops. Eastern Germans demonstrated greater consensus on
the issue of United States troops, with 84 percent opposing a
future United States military presence.
When asked why one should support NATO in the post-Cold
War era, western Germans gave as the primary reason the fact
that the defense organization had become a fixture on the
political landscape over the course of previous decades and
had done a good job in maintaining peace on the continent.
Few respondents felt that NATO should have more military
responsibilities, however. In fact, 42 percent voiced apprehen-
sion that NATO could be used in the future to draw Germany
into conflicts where its interests were not represented. The
impressions from these results were roughly aligned with the
findings from polls conducted by German institutes during the
same time frame. In 1991 a majority of Germans regarded Swit-
zerland — a neutral although not demilitarized state — as an
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Germany: A Country Study
appropriate model for the new Germany's role in international
affairs.
The Out-of-Area Debate
Immediately after unification, the prevailing interpretation
of the Basic Law allowed for the Federal Republic's participa-
tion in systems of collective security but precluded its armed
forces from any activity not specifically attributable to the coun-
try's defense, unless explicitly authorized elsewhere in the con-
stitution. Article 26 of the Basic Law forbids any act of war or
aggression, and Article 87 stipulates that German military
forces are permitted to become involved only in defense
actions. The question of German participation in out-of-area
operations played an important role in German foreign policy
debates of the early 1990s.
The interpretation that combat missions outside the tradi-
tional area covered by NATO are not permitted under the con-
stitution had been ratified by a decision by the SPD-led
government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) in April
1981. This view was reconfirmed in 1983 by the new Kohl gov-
ernment soon after it took power.
The debate on out-of-area operations during the Persian
Gulf War led to a consensus by the major political parties —
although for varying reasons — that rather than reinterpreta-
tion, the constitution was in need of amendment to allow Ger-
man forces to assume a new role in collective security.
Amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in
both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Conflict arose, first
because the opposition SPD rejected the idea of an amend-
ment, then later because neither the SPD nor the other parties
could agree on the precise provisions of such an amendment.
The SPD insisted that an amendment to the constitution
allow for German participation in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions only. This position was reached after heated debate at the
party's convention in May 1991, and even then, only with the
strong push of SPD leader Bjorn Engholm and the party's mod-
erate faction. The measure passed by the relatively small mar-
gin of 230 to 179. The SPD stopped short of supporting
German participation in combat missions sanctioned under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that in the future,
operations such as Desert Storm would not mandate German
involvement.
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Foreign Relations
Citing special constraints stemming from German history
and fears that Germany, against its own interests, would be
drawn into conflicts by other powers (notably the United
States), the SPD envisioned a narrow set of circumstances for
the deployment of German forces. These included a mandate
by the UN Security Council; a cease-fire; consent of the warring
parties; operational control by the UN; and the participation of
other European countries. The SPD's position also reflected
the party's devotion to the idea that diplomatic and economic
means, and only rarely, if ever, the military, could provide for
Germany's defense and security.
The FDP followed the lead outlined by Genscher, its dovish
foreign minister, and, like the SPD, agreed on restricting the
Bundeswehr's activities to blue-helmet peacekeeping missions.
An amendment to the constitution would explicitly require UN
authorization for out-of-area deployments, even when Ger-
mans were participating within NATO and WEU units. In an
attempt to further limit the opportunity for actual combat
involvement and to stress the European character of the new
German state, the FDP also stipulated that fighting missions be
permitted only when other EC members were present.
The CDU was predictably not satisfied with restrictions that
provided exclusively for blue-helmet missions. Members of the
CDU and the CSU had initially argued that an amendment to
the constitution was not necessary in order for German troops
to cooperate in multilateral military operations abroad. They
pointed to Article 24(2), of the Basic Law, which empowers the
Federal Republic to participate in systems of collective security
such as the UN. Proponents of this argument rejected the idea
that the term "defense," as applied in Article 87a(2) of the
Basic Law, should be interpreted narrowly and tied exclusively
to the defense of Germany or of an alliance partner.
Nevertheless, Kohl's party had agreed that the constitution
must be amended in order to permit German troops a role in
peacekeeping and peacemaking missions abroad. Kohl's party
wanted not only UN missions mandated by the constitution but
also NATO and WEU out-of-area missions. In the view of lead-
ing defense experts in the CDU, these were the only organiza-
tions capable of providing defense. Neither the UN nor the
CSCE, favorites of the FDP and the SPD, were considered via-
ble instruments of military action. Some more outspoken
members of the CDU and CSU favored a reduction of all con-
straints on the exercise of German power in an attempt to
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Germany: A Country Study
equalize the Federal Republic's room for maneuvering with
Britain and France.
Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe strongly argued in favor of
Germany's assuming full and normal responsibilities in peace-
keeping and peacemaking operations within the Alliance. But
he also frequently stressed that German public opinion would
only gradually adapt to its new international circumstance.
In an attempt to sensitize the German public to changes in
the international climate and the united country's emerging
responsibilities, the Kohl government had been incrementally
enlarging German military participation in operations abroad,
arguably within the confines of the constitution. Bonn allowed
German minesweepers and their crews to operate in the Per-
sian Gulf from April through July 1991 after the war had
ended, justifying the mission on humanitarian grounds. The
German government used Bundeswehr personnel to supply
transportation and to assist in the establishment of refugee
camps in Iran and Iraq for Kurds, who had been persecuted by
Iraqi forces. German military medical personnel were assigned
in May 1992 to participate in the UN mission in Cambodia.
German military units joined in the UN's humanitarian effort
in Somalia in 1992-93, but only after arduous parliamentary
debate. German forces also were involved in the Adriatic when
UN forces monitored compliance with the internationally
imposed arms embargo by parties in the Yugoslav conflict. In
an important decision of July 12, 1994, Germany's highest
court, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruled that German
troops can take part in both UN peacekeeping and peacemak-
ing missions, as long as the Bundestag approves each operation
by a simple majority. The court also stated that Germany can
assign forces to NATO and WEU operations directed at imple-
menting resolutions of the UN Security Council. Thus, the
decision cleared the way for a German military role beyond the
country's and NATO's current borders, and German fliers sub-
sequently participated in NATO missions over Bosnia.
The conduct of foreign policy continues to belong to the
domain of the executive branch of government in Germany.
But the highly controversial and emotional debate concerning
German participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking mis-
sions abroad has meant that the Bundestag will continue to be
directly involved in the actual decision-making process.
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Foreign Relations
International Cooperation
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
During the Cold War era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) was central to the formulation and implemen-
tation of West Germany's foreign and defense policies. In 1954
and 1955 (the year the Warsaw Pact was established), agree-
ments were reached by the Allied powers to end the occupa-
tion of the Federal Republic and grant West Germany
sovereignty. It was in conjunction with these decisions that West
Germany had been permitted to rearm and to obtain member-
ship in the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Nev-
ertheless, under the Western European Union Treaty of May
1955, the Federal Republic was prohibited from possessing
weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, all West German
armed forces were assigned to NATO and could not operate
out of area.
During the Cold War, the underlying tone of NATO's strat-
egy shifted at times to accommodate the changing security
environment in the United States and in Europe. For example,
in 1967 the Harmel Report, developed during the advent of
Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in Germany, helped initiate the West's
dual strategy of defense and detente with the Soviet bloc. The
Harmel Report's aversion to confrontation was further ampli-
fied by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, or the Final Act of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The
CSCE was to provide a framework for cooperation between
NATO and Warsaw Pact members by intensifying contacts and
respecting the inviolability of Eastern Europe's postwar bor-
ders.
Despite the prevailing climate of detente in the 1970s,
NATO remained for the United States and its allies the princi-
pal instrument with which to deter Soviet aggression on the
continent and if necessary to defend the West European
democracies from attack by the Warsaw Pact. To this end, the
role of the Federal Republic was indispensable. West Germany
was the frontline state and home to the largest concentration
of United States troops and NATO-controlled nuclear weapons
in the European theater. Across the border in the GDR, the
Soviet Union had amassed its greatest number of troops out-
side its own territory.
Since its founding, NATO had served other functions as
well. After World War II, policy makers in Washington and in
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Germany: A Country Study
major European capitals had sought to curb and control Ger-
man power by wedding the West German state to multilateral
institutions. Hence, NATO (and to some extent the EC) was
designed not only as an instrument with which to keep the
Soviet Union out of Western Europe but also as a means to con-
strain Germany from returning to the expansionist behavior
that had characterized its foreign policy in the first half of the
century. Thus, NATO's purpose was often said to reflect a strat-
egy of double containment: to contain the Soviet Union as well
as Germany. In addition, NATO was also to perform the
broader function of muting the traditional regional rivalries
that had previously undermined Europe's peace and stability.
As far as West Germany was concerned, it practiced what was
often referred to as a policy of self-containment. West Ger-
many's postwar leaders deliberately subjugated national inter-
ests to the stated objectives of the EC and NATO. Embracing
federalism and the inculcation of democratic values, the West
German public and political elites also accepted Germany's
adjustment to the role of civilian power and junior partner in
the Alliance. Once the economic miracle had taken place and
the reconstruction of Germany had given way to prosperity,
this development in the German posture was reflected in the
adage that the West German democracy was "an economic
giant but a political dwarf."
Although NATO's primary raison d'etre collapsed with the
disintegration of the Soviet empire (in Germany the GDR's
armed forces were absorbed by the Bundeswehr), new uncer-
tainties and instabilities in the international climate after 1989
led many observers to conclude that the Atlantic Alliance,
which came into force in April 1949, ought to remain intact.
Many viewed NATO's expansion to the east as a necessary
means to ensure the security of the emerging democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe. Others continued to view NATO
as a means to prevent the renationalization of German security
policy. Questions about united Germany's role in international
affairs in general, and in a revamped NATO in particular,
became paramount to policy makers on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.
In the early summer of 1992, NATO officials announced that
the Alliance was prepared to assume a peacekeeping role in
Europe beyond the border of its sixteen member states.
According to a plan approved at the June 1992 meeting of
NATO foreign ministers in Oslo, NATO would henceforth con-
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sider contributing troops, supplies, and logistical support to
CSCE peacekeeping missions. Clearer details regarding
NATO's new military mission, however, remained in doubt in
the mid-1990s.
NATO had already begun to grapple with questions about its
future during the Two-Plus-Four Talks. The London Declara-
tion on NATO of July 6, 1990, articulated a vision that kept the
NATO treaty in force as a factor of stability across Europe.
Reflecting a fundamental change of atmosphere precipitated
by communism's collapse, NATO members committed them-
selves to transforming the Western Alliance from adversary to
friend for the members of the former Soviet bloc. Illustrating
this transformation were the visits of Czechoslovak president
Vaclav Havel and Polish president Lech Walesa to NATO Head-
quarters in Brussels in early 1991. In fact, by the end of that
same year Russian president Boris Yeltsin suggested that his
own country might apply for NATO membership.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher was a staunch propo-
nent of institutionalizing cooperative links between East and
West. In the Declaration on Peace and Cooperation adopted
on November 8, 1991, leaders of the sixteen NATO nations
meeting in Rome submitted to eight Central and East Euro-
pean countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) and the Soviet Union
proposals to institutionalize consultations among former adver-
saries on a broad range of security concerns.
Because many Central and East European countries were
beset with ethnic tensions in the early 1990s and still had unre-
solved border disputes with neighbors, NATO officials felt it
unreasonable to anticipate early NATO membership. Short of
full membership, however, former members of the Warsaw Pact
were invited to join Western states to form the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC had been proposed
at the initiative of Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher and
Secretary of State Baker at the end of 1991.
The NACC began by mid-1992 to hold regular meetings at
the ministerial or ambassadorial level with various NATO com-
mittees and authorities tasked with the oversight of military,
political, and economic issues of concern to member states. In
April 1993, German Minister of Defense Ruhe traveled to Mos-
cow to sign the first extensive agreement between Russian and
German armed forces. Under the ten-year agreement, a wide
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Germany: A Country Study
range of contacts between Russian and German officers would
take place.
In the context of this new collaborative posture between
West and East, NATO members had already pledged them-
selves to a smaller, restructured field of active forces, reduced
training and exercises, and enhanced flexibility and coopera-
tive dialogue in deciding how to respond to future interna-
tional crises. Also as a result of the London Declaration, which
declared NATO's forward posture in Europe no longer neces-
sary, NATO countries had begun to reduce or withdraw their
forces from the Central European theater, and from Germany
in particular.
NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in January
1994, sought even stronger links between democratic countries
of the former Soviet bloc and the Alliance. Membership in the
PfP enabled these countries to consult with NATO and cooper-
ate in joint multilateral crisis activities.
In the 1990s, the predominant view held by the mainstream
of Germany's defense establishment is that NATO remains
essential for German security for three primary reasons: the
Alliance is a crucial source of stability for a continent in the
throes of profound transformations; NATO serves as an indis-
pensable bridge to the United States and functionally helps to
counter that country's neo-isolationism by maintaining a visible
United States presence in Europe; and NATO remains the only
viable instrument for German and European defense, given
that the EU, WEU, and OSCE are all still untested in the coor-
dination and implementation of defense policies.
Western European Union
The EC had also taken steps during the first post-Cold War
years to enhance its competence in foreign affairs. In the
Treaty on European Union, signed on February 7, 1992, in
Maastricht, representatives of the EC's twelve members agreed
to take steps toward developing a common European foreign
and defense policy. The treaty (commonly referred to as the
Maastricht Treaty) stipulated that the European Council, com-
posed of the heads of state and government in the member
states, would decide together on guidelines that would frame a
common foreign and security policy. The council would also
monitor the implementation of policies agreed upon. In con-
junction with this diplomatic consensus, it was agreed that the
Western European Union (WEU), after decades of relative dor-
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mancy, would become the primary instrument with which the
continent would enhance its own defense capability.
Some European proponents suggested that the WEU could
act as a complement to NATO by serving in capacities in which
NATO would not. The WEU, for example, recognized no for-
mal geographic limits to its potential operations. Those in the
United States critical of moves to revive the WEU, however, sug-
gested that a European defense structure was redundant and
could evolve as a competitor for NATO resources and person-
nel. Italy and Britain proposed that the WEU become an arm
of NATO, rather than an independent European security struc-
ture. NATO formally supported the process toward a European
defense identity but emphasized that the Atlantic Alliance
should remain the primary forum for the discussion of Euro-
pean security issues.
In Germany's view, the WEU, as the defense arm of the EU,
would complement NATO. The December 1991 EC summit in
Maastricht declared that the WEU would serve as an instru-
ment of European defense and as such would have the effect of
strengthening the European pillar of NATO.
Members of the WEU, meeting in Bonn on November 18,
1991, had issued a communique expressing a desire for
enhanced dialogue with the emerging democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the Soviet Union.
This represented a parallel step to that which NATO had
already taken through creation of the NACC. The Bonn com-
munique announced that foreign and defense ministers from
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
would be invited to take part in special meetings with members
of the WEU Council and would be invited to participate in
WEU-organized seminars in various European countries. The
WEU also committed itself to creating a fact-finding mission to
the former Soviet republics to further investigate meaningful
ways in which security dialogue could be fostered.
The Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 empowered the
WEU member states with significant room for maneuver. Ger-
many's new minister of foreign affairs, Klaus Kinkel, and Minis-
ter of Defense Ruhe endorsed the WEU's intention not only to
maintain peace but also to enforce it if necessary, even in areas
outside the Alliance.
Europe's development of a common foreign and defense
policy and its establishment of a mature wing of the Western
Alliance that would act as a complement to NATO underscored
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Germany: A Country Study
the development of Europe as a new world power center. Some
suggested that united Europe should receive a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council. They noted that a united Europe
would have more inhabitants than the United States and Japan
combined and its gross national product (GNP — see Glossary)
would be larger than that of the United States.
Eurocorps
Germany remained determined to pursue a multitracked
approach in the development of its foreign and defense poli-
cies. The Germans firmly rejected subordination of European
integration to other priorities that would, among other things
in the German view, endanger the mutually important relation-
ship that Bonn and Paris had carefully cultivated since the end
of World War II.
West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (1949-
63), together with French president Charles de Gaulle, had
worked assiduously to dismantle the historical enmity between
their two countries and to lay the foundation for German-
French reconciliation after World War II (see Rearmament and
the European Defense Community, ch. 2). West Germany had
become France's most important trading partner by the 1980s
(accounting for 40 percent of French trade), and the 1983
revival of the defense clauses in the German-French Friendship
Treaty (Elysee Treaty) of 1963 had allowed a deepening of the
two countries' military ties. Thus on October 16, 1991, Chan-
cellor Kohl and President Mitterrand first announced a plan
proposing that the WEU become the EC's defense arm and
that a Franco-German Eurocorps (based on an already existing
brigade) serve as the core of a new European army.
The decision by Kohl's government to develop a
Franco-German Eurocorps was to be seen in this context (Ger-
many and France had also been frustrated by the British domi-
nation of NATO's rapid reaction force established in 1991).
The Eurocorps not only would provide the basis for a Euro-
pean force but also, on a political level, would assuage French
(and broader European) concerns about a return to German
unilateralism in foreign and defense policy. It had been French
policy since the end of World War II to oppose any move by the
Federal Republic perceived as leading to the establishment of a
German national foreign and defense policy.
In the face of criticism from the NATO establishment, the
Germans argued that the Eurocorps would have the positive
444
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Klaus Kinkel with Pope John
Paul II in December 1993
Courtesy German Information
Center, New York
effect of drawing the French closer to the Atlantic Alliance.
French troops belonging to the joint military corps could be
made available to NATO, either as rapid deployment forces or
as main defense forces, the Germans argued. Skeptics — the
Dutch, for instance — contended, on the contrary, that the
Eurocorps would actually decrease the number of French and
German troops available to NATO. Although Germans claimed
that the joint military corps would intensify French links to
NATO, it was also undoubtedly true that the collaborative step
was viewed as an altogether different opportunity by the
French defense establishment, long dominated by elements
favoring an independent European security identity.
It was not exclusively in France, although perhaps most
prominently, that some strategic thinkers sought to "European-
ize" the continent's defense by seeing to it that certain NATO
functions were delegated to the EC or the WEU. Not surpris-
ingly, Bonn's moves to help develop the Eurocorps provoked
concern and in some circles irritation among NATO advocates
both in the United States and in Europe. The Netherlands,
Britain, and Denmark all expressed various degrees of reserva-
tion or opposition to the corps. Britain and the Netherlands in
particular were reluctant to accept the premise that a Euro-
pean defense could be dominated by the French and the Ger-
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Germany: A Country Study
mans. Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg, however, welcomed
the German-French initiative to form a joint military corps,
and eventually all these countries pledged troops to it.
The Eurocorps was formally proposed by Chancellor Kohl
and President Mitterrand in May 1992. Both leaders invited all
members of the WEU to participate. The headquarters for the
corps was established in Strasbourg in July 1992, and the corps
was scheduled to become operational by late 1995. At the time
of its inception, the corps was to have three military functions:
to join and assist NATO missions; to fulfill missions under WEU
command outside traditional NATO territory; and to provide
international humanitarian assistance.
Germans balanced their push for European security struc-
tures in the early 1990s by repeatedly stressing their commit-
ment to NATO. NATO remained central to German foreign
and defense policies because of the organization's institutional
ties to the United States, a fact that caused unrest in the French
foreign policy establishment and among like-minded thinkers
in Germany, who sought evolution away from an alliance domi-
nated by the United States. A middle ground was sought by
some defense experts who, like Bundeswehr General Inspekteur
Klaus Naumann, contended that a "more European NATO"
would appropriately bring balance to the previously United
States-dominated defense organization.
European Union
Since its creation in 1957, the central objective of the Euro-
pean Community (EC — see Glossary) has been to advance the
economic integration of Western Europe, primarily through
the reduction or elimination of barriers to free trade and
investment. The EC has long enjoyed a high level of sustained
popularity in West Germany. Building on this foundation of
support, West German leaders in the late 1980s set out to pur-
sue, in concert with other West European states (Britain and
some of the smaller countries in northern Europe did not par-
ticipate), the objective of a more complete political and eco-
nomic union (see Germany in the European Economy, ch. 6).
The Single European Act of 1986-87, designed to create a
single common market without internal frontiers, was imple-
mented in principle on January 1, 1993. In December 1991, EC
leaders met in Maastricht to reach agreement on the Draft
Treaty on Political Union. As a consequence of the treaty,
Europe was committed to the creation of a common currency,
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Foreign Relations
set to begin in 1999 at the latest. At Maastricht, EC heads of
state, in addition to agreeing on a path to political union, also
agreed to the goal of establishing a common foreign and
defense policy. The Maastricht Treaty provided the foundation
for a federalized United States of Europe by creating the Euro-
pean Union (EU — see Glossary), of which the EC is a part.
In part as a consequence of the momentous changes in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, steps toward
European unity suffered setbacks in the early 1990s. War in
Yugoslavia and the inability of the EC to fashion a cogent and
effective response decimated the infant concept of a common
defense policy. Meanwhile, mired in the uncertainties about
Maastricht's chances for ratification during the autumn of
1991, Europe's financial markets were driven into a brief con-
vulsive episode in September, with the result that EC efforts to
impose a common financial discipline were effectively under-
mined.
At the same time, popular opinion in EC countries signaled
that their own elected leaders and EC bureaucrats had lost
touch with their respective electorates' concerns. Paramount
were popular fears in Europe about a loss of sovereignty and
national identity and the uncontrollable expansion of the EC's
bureaucracy. Although political elites in Germany remained
firmly committed to Maastricht, the German public was espe-
cially restive about the potential loss of the deutsche mark — the
country's symbol of postwar economic success and in some
respects its postnational identity. Roughly 70 percent of Ger-
mans rejected the notion that they should trade their vaunted
currency for an untested European currency, the European
currency unit (ECU — see Glossary).
In the wake of votes in Denmark and in France against ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty, Chancellor Kohl showed no
loss of overall optimism. Continuation of the process of Euro-
pean integration had been a central foreign policy objective of
the Federal Republic. Following a special one-day EC summit
in Birmingham, England, on October 16, 1992, Kohl pro-
claimed that the "European locomotive [would] continue,"
because all EC members still voiced a desire to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty. In a speech before the Bundestag delivered three
weeks earlier, Kohl had restated his support for what he inter-
preted as the treaty's five main objectives: common foreign and
security policies; development of an economic and monetary
union; development of common policy on domestic security
447
Germany: A Country Study
matters; intensified cooperation in environmental protection;
and enhancement of the role of the European Parliament.
In political terms, German officials viewed the Maastricht
Treaty as a way to reassure European neighbors of Germany's
trustworthiness as an international partner. To this end, in fact,
Germany had actually sought a special leadership role of sorts.
In October 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel stressed his
country's unique responsibility, as the most populated and eco-
nomically strongest country in Europe, "to send a signal of con-
fidence in a common future to our still-hesitant partners."
Germany (where only parliamentary approval was required)
approved the treaty in December of the same year.
Indeed, many Europeans, the French perhaps in particular,
interpreted the Maastricht Treaty as a German containment
policy. EC president Jacques Delors had already sought to place
German unification within the EC framework. Rather bluntly,
during the weeks prior to the country's referendum, a number
of Maastricht's supporters in France had argued that European
unity would serve as an instrument with which to bind and
tame the newly united Germans. French opponents of the
treaty, conversely (and ironically), contended that European
union would inevitably be controlled by an overwhelmingly
powerful Germany. British prime minister Thatcher later
stated essentially the same view, calling for a halt to the process
of European union, whose final form would inevitably be dom-
inated by the Germans. Indeed, because of its economic size
and success, at the time of unification Germany presented a
foreboding economic appearance on the European landscape.
In principle, united Germany is not in a position to advance
its own agenda within the EU without compromise and consen-
sus. On larger issues, approval by all EU members is required.
On minor legislation, a weighted majority voting is applied,
meaning that Germany has the same number of votes as France
or Britain. Nevertheless, few would dispute the incomparable
importance of German support in the EU for significant policy
initiatives. Likewise, a strong German effort to implement a
policy could be opposed in practice only with considerable dif-
ficulty.
A new German confidence, provoking irritation from Ger-
many's allies and partners within the EC, became evident dur-
ing the first years after unification. Member states fighting
recession in the early 1990s blamed Germany's refusal to lower
interest rates on Bonn's irresponsible self-absorption with its
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domestic issues. Through tight-fisted monetary policies, critics
argued, the Germans were forcing their European neighbors
to pay for the high and unexpected costs of unification. The
United States also called on Germany to lower its interest rates
to stimulate the international economy.
In addition to economic disagreements, Bonn's policy
toward the Balkans in the second half of 1991 provoked
charges of unilateralism and strong-arm tactics both within the
EC and in Washington, as Bonn attempted to convince its EC
partners and allies to recognize the Yugoslav breakaway repub-
lics of Croatia and Slovenia. A number of European govern-
ments, notably Britain and France, tended to view German
policy through the lens of the world wars. German policy was
not driven, however, by resurgent hegemonic impulses toward
the region, as some critics argued. In fact, German motives
were varied.
On the one hand, Germany made it clear that it wished to
see the principle of self-determination applied in Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, domestic considerations also played an
important role. The unofficial lobby of several hundred thou-
sand guest workers from Croatia and the millions of West Ger-
mans who had vacationed in Zagreb and along Croatia's
Dalmatian coast strongly expressed their horror at the daily
bloodshed they viewed on television.
In this context, and ignoring reservations among a number
of EC members, Germany unilaterally recognized Croatia and
Slovenia before Christmas 1991. Germany's recognition forced
the EC to follow suit by January 15, 1992. The United States,
after initial opposition over the recognition policy, recognized
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992.
These developments led Chancellor Kohl to declare that the
recognitions represented a major "success for German and
European policy." Some European observers were left cha-
grined, however, by what they saw as the diplomatic flexing of
united Germany's muscles.
The Yugoslav case aside, it had become clear in the early
1990s that the EC's policy toward the former Soviet bloc would
be shaped to a large extent by German interests. Germany
above all was preoccupied with fostering stability and prosper-
ity in the region, especially in neighboring Central and Eastern
Europe. In the early 1990s, Germany had established itself as
the leading donor of aid, the single largest investor, and the
most important trading partner for the former Soviet bloc. In
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Germany: A Country Study
addition to assisting democratic and market reforms, the
expansion of economic and commercial ties was of direct bene-
fit to German industry.
In the first years immediately after unification, Germany
established bilateral agreements and treaties on good neigh-
borly relations and friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In the case of the last
three, Germany pledged to help set up contacts with EU mem-
ber states.
German policy makers soon began to advocate expanding
the EU by admitting northern and eastern European countries
as members. Germany's interest in this so-called "widening" of
the EU appeared at times in conflict with France's preference
for a "deepening" of the western structures of the EU before
taking on new members. In the French view, new members,
including Austria, Sweden, and Finland, strengthened Ger-
many's hand in the EU and, as a consequence, diminished
France's influence in the organization.
Although it remained unclear in the mid-1990s just how
quickly the EU might expand in membership, it was evident
that the EU would search for ways to include the emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. With strong Ger-
man support, the EU had begun to develop, for example, asso-
ciation agreements or "European agreements" that were
intended to offer former communist countries access to EU
markets to sell their goods. The EU also sought to provide a
framework for economic and technical cooperation and for
political and cultural dialogue.
At least on a rhetorical level, EU officials, in accord with the
goals of the 1957 Treaty on the European Economic Commu-
nity, envisaged the gradual establishment of a free-trade area
for industrial products. To this end, the EU pledged to disman-
tle barriers to the access of industrial goods from Central and
East European countries at a quicker pace than the partners
were required to remove trade barriers to EU goods. This step
was to be supplemented, when economic conditions in appli-
cant countries existed, by the free movements of capital, ser-
vices, and labor. Legal foundations of the new economic
systems would also be required to conform with the EU model.
The EU's track record of stubborn adherence in certain
instances to restrictive trade practices (especially in the agricul-
tural and textile sector), however, raised profound questions
about the feasibility of a smooth and relatively prompt EU
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Foreign Relations
membership for Europe's developing democracies. Nonethe-
less, in the first half of the 1990s, a number of analysts specu-
lated that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland
might reasonably expect EU membership by the end of the
twentieth century, followed shortly thereafter by Slovenia and
the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
As the EU's largest and economically strongest state, united
Germany assumed an enhanced role in discussions about liber-
alizing world trade. Although some signs had emerged in the
early 1990s that cast doubt on a successful conclusion of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glos-
sary) negotiations, there were strong reasons to believe that
Germany would use its influence to strengthen international
trade and thwart any moves that could lead to transatlantic
trade wars (see Foreign Trade and Investment, ch. 6).
When the EU's generous price supports of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP — see Glossary) came under heavy fire
from the United States in the GATT negotiations, Germany
and Britain — leading food importers — showed an inclination
to accept cuts in EU subsidies. But when Paris resisted vehe-
mently, officials in Washington had looked for a stronger Ger-
man role, hoping Bonn would exert greater pressure on its
neighbor to cut farm subsidies and thereby overcome an
important stumbling block in the GATT talks.
Germany itself was locked in debate over the issue of agricul-
tural policy. Germany's free-trade lobby was led by the classi-
cally liberal FDP, which traditionally had one of its members
serve as minister for economics. Kohl had shown himself sym-
pathetic to Germany's farm lobby, and the German govern-
ment had traditionally been a strong defender of the CAP. The
German economy's dependence on foreign trade and invest-
ment, however, often pushed the country toward pragmatism
and compromise on trade issues. In the early 1990s, Germany
was exporting a third of its GNP. In the United States alone, it
held a stake of US$34 billion in direct investment.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), established in 1975, provided an organization whose
structure helped join West Germany and other Western coun-
tries with the emerging democracies of the former Soviet bloc.
The CSCE, renamed the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995, gained expanded
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Germany: A Country Study
responsibilities after the end of the Cold War. For Germany, an
avid champion of the organization, the OSCE will provide a
forum for greater inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries to discuss and coordinate security activities.
Although NATO officials insisted that the OSCE's role be
restricted to a complementary one as concerned with the
West's defense alliance, the foreign ministers of NATO mem-
ber states had explicitly called for the OSCE to play a more
prominent role in confidence-building and security coopera-
tion. In September 1991, Genscher proposed a number of
ideas for expanding the CSCE's capability and mandate. These
proposals included creation of a security council and establish-
ment of special forces for peacekeeping (blue helmets) and
fighting of ecological disasters (green helmets). Germany
actively pushed for the development of a conflict settlement
procedure and for authorization for the OSCE to monitor the
compliance of member states with human and minority rights
standards. It would also use violations of member states as a
legitimate condition for diplomatic intervention.
Germany's enthusiasm for the OSCE reflected the German
preoccupation with multilateralism, a central theme in the
country's foreign policy. The powerful emphasis on economic
relations in the CSCE process also reflected the growing belief
in Bonn that economic factors, rather than military capabili-
ties, would be primary in shaping a new European and interna-
tional security order. In this context, Bonn proposed and
hosted the 1990 CSCE conference on economic cooperation in
Europe. The Bonn CSCE document provided a framework for
an integrated economic community based on market princi-
ples that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Support for the CSCE, German officials argued, did not con-
flict with their government's commitment to other European
and transatlantic defense organizations. On the contrary, if
appropriate steps were taken in the design of a post-Cold War
security order, one would simply overlap, or neatly dovetail,
with another. Moves toward mechanisms that would strengthen
Europe's collective security intensified in the first years after
the breach of the Berlin Wall.
As a consequence of the November 1990 Paris Charter and
the July 1992 Helsinki Summit, efforts commenced to
strengthen the CSCE process through the establishment (in
different capitals) of a parliamentary assembly, a permanent
secretariat, an election monitoring center, and a conflict pre-
452
Chancellor Helmut Kohl with
President William J. Clinton at
the White House
Courtesy The White House
vention center. Proponents championed the CSCE as the only
pan-European forum for the discussion of security issues. From
the beginning, however, skeptics warned of the limitations of
an organization encompassing over fifty members — from Rus-
sia to Canada, and from Cyprus to the Vatican — whose
decision-making capacity was governed by a prerequisite of
unanimity among its members. CSCE members undertook the
formidable and, in the view of many, unreasonable legal obliga-
tion "to provide mutual assistance in the case of an attack from
the outside and the duty to submit to arbitration in the case of
local conflicts."
The bickering and reservations over Maastricht — best sym-
bolized by the defeat of the treaty in Denmark in the summer
of 1992 and the victory by a narrow margin in France the fol-
lowing autumn — disrupted the carefully cultivated process of
European economic and political unity, which had been sup-
ported on the continent, especially by policy makers in Ger-
many and France. The paralysis of the CSCE, EU, and WEU in
responding to the fighting in the Balkans in 1991 and 1992 also
did much to dampen earlier optimism in Europe that the EU
was on the verge of forging a framework for common foreign
and defense policies.
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Germany: A Country Study
United Nations
Since October 3, 1990, the day of German unification, the
interests of Germans in the former FRG as well as those citizens
in the former GDR have been represented by a single mission
in the UN. Although German politicians repeatedly stated that
the country was committed to assuming the same rights and
responsibilities as other member states, Germany had
remained undecided during the first years after unification as
to what extent it would participate militarily — under Article 51
of the UN Charter — in collective security actions abroad.
Although Germany supported the policy pursued by the
United States and its allies — condemnation of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, endorsement of the UN's peace initiatives, and the
campaign to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory — the Ger-
mans did not join combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.
Although German participation in a combat role was barred
primarily by legal constraints, Germany's abstention was
related to other deeper, more complex issues as well. Many
Germans believed that an out-of-area conflict such as the Per-
sian Gulf War lay beyond the scope of German interests. The
support of Germany's parliament for the war was tepid and ini-
tially ambiguous. Germany's traumatic twentieth-century his-
tory figured prominently in Bonn's hesitation.
Under pressure from the United States and other allies, Ger-
many agreed in the fall of 1990 initially to contribute US$2.1
billion, together with military equipment and munitions, to the
gulf peacekeeping force. Ultimately, German financial contri-
butions to the UN for the Persian Gulf War totaled about
US$10 billion.
Nevertheless, Germany remains committed to the UN's use
of military force. In his first address to the UN General Assem-
bly on September 23, 1992, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel
pledged that his country would support the UN's system of col-
lective security. In his address, Kinkel stated that it was essential
that "democracies . . . remain capable of defending them-
selves," even though the East-West conflict had been relegated
to history. Kinkel maintained that the collective security system
of the UN and regional arrangements such as the CSCE should
be transformed into "powerful instruments of a new world
domestic policy."
In the mid-1990s, German policy is that the country will con-
tinue to participate in peacekeeping missions. The German
government continues to support the general outlines of UN
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policies and programs on humanitarian relief, developmental
assistance, and environmental protection. However, statesmen
from United States president Bush to UN secretary general Jav-
ier Perez de Cuellar (and later his successor Boutros Boutros-
Ghali), have called for Germany to accept greater responsibil-
ity in world affairs by making use of not just its financial
resources, but of its political and military capabilities as well.
Despite the fact that Germany has not yet resolved key ques-
tions about its international role, and specifically its contribu-
tions to peacemaking efforts, German politicians have already
begun to suggest that the united country, presumably along
with Japan, be considered for permanent membership on the
UN Security Council. One school argues that a permanent seat
is consistent with Germany's growing power and influence and
the reconfiguration of world politics five decades after the end
of World War II. Others contend that Germany's attainment of
a permanent seat will occur only if states from Asia, Latin
America, and Africa join as well. Because such expansion
would have the effect of weakening the leadership role of the
Security Council and thus the UN as a whole, many of these
commentators reject the idea of permanent Security Council
membership for Germany.
* * *
Since 1990 there have been a number of excellent publica-
tions on the process of unification and the emerging chal-
lenges to Germany's foreign policy. Among the best are
Germany's Position in the New Europe, edited by Arnulf Baring;
The New Germany and the New Europe, edited by Paul B. Stares;
and Developments in German Politics, edited by Gordon Smith,
William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padget. Also
valuable is Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, edited by Karl Kaiser
and Hanns W. Maull. Stephen F. Szabo's concise The Diplomacy
of German Unification provides examinations of the unification
process. Authoritative fuller accounts of unification are Beyond
the Wall by Elizabeth Pond and Germany Unified and Europe
Transformed by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice.
For an analysis of public opinion data from united Germany,
see the Rand Corporation's study conducted by Ronald A.
Asmus, Germany in Transition. On United States-German rela-
tions, see W.R. Smyser's Germany and America. Also valuable is
Daniel Hamilton's Beyond Bonn, which offers a critical survey of
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Germany: A Country Study
issues relating directly to United States-German bilateral rela-
tions. For an examination of Franco-German relations, see
Philip H. Gordon's France, Germany, and the Western Alliance. The
Germans and Their Neighbors, edited by Dirk Verheyen and Chris-
tian S0e, provides chapter-length surveys of Germany's bilat-
eral relations with nearly a score of European countries and
with the United States.
A number of articles also offer excellent overviews of Ger-
man foreign policy: Angela Stent's "The One Germany," Eliza-
beth Pond's "Germany in the New Europe," and Reinhard
Stuth's "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe." Two
essays published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford Univer-
sity bear particular note as well: Burkhard Koch's Germany: New
Assertiveness in International Relations Between Reality and Misper-
ception, and L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan's Germany: Key to a
New Continent.
The German Information Center in New York makes avail-
able weekly press summaries and important statements and
speeches by German government officials. The Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service's Daily Report: West Europe also provides
useful information in translation from sources published or
broadcast in Germany. (For further information and complete
citations, see Bibliography.)
456
Chapter 9. National Security
of the Federal Republic of Germany
THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES (Bundeswehr) of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) came into
being in 1955. Assigned a solely defensive role, the
Bundeswehr at its creation constituted the largest component
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glos-
sary) ground forces in Central Europe. Throughout the Cold
War, the fighter aircraft and air defense missiles of the
Bundeswehr's formidable air force came under NATO com-
mand, and the small, well-equipped West German navy was
committed to NATO missions in the Baltic and North seas.
NATO carefully delineated the Bundeswehr's missions; in
effect, West German security objectives were identical with
those of the Alliance.
By mid-1995, however, the Bundeswehr, numbering approxi-
mately 368,000 troops, had been through a radical restructur-
ing and downsizing brought about by the sudden end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary)
and the Soviet empire. After Germany was united in October
1990 by the accession of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR, or East Germany) to the Federal Republic, the
Bundeswehr absorbed some of the personnel and equipment
of the East German armed forces, the National People's Army
(Nationale Volksarmee — NVA) , in a unique merger of two for-
merly hostile militaries that had been unimaginable even one
year earlier.
Prior to unification, the armed forces of East and West Ger-
many were considered among the shock troops of their respec-
tive alliances. The leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact — the
United States and the Soviet Union, respectively — each main-
tained powerful forces based in the two Germanys, the pre-
sumed battleground. In terms of tactics, force organization and
structure, and equipment, superpower influence on each Ger-
man military was pervasive. On the Soviet side, with more than
400,000 troops, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
(GSFG) was far larger than the NVA itself and was the Warsaw
Pact's most potent military force outside the Soviet Union. The
United States was clearly the most important member of
NATO, but only a small portion of its total military forces were
stationed in West Germany or in Europe. Unification changed
the Bundeswehr's situation dramatically and in the process
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Germany: A Country Study
added about 30 percent more territory and hundreds of kilo-
meters of Baltic Sea coastline to the task of preserving the terri-
torial integrity of the enlarged country.
Paving the way for unification and restoration of full sover-
eignty, an agreement with Moscow in July 1990 committed Ger-
many to reducing its armed forces to a level of 370,000 by
December 1994 in return for the complete withdrawal of all
troops of the former Soviet Union in eastern Germany by the
end of that year. Initial Soviet objections to unified Germany's
membership in NATO were dropped when Germany agreed to
finance the relocation and housing of the departing troops.
Under the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE
Treaty — see Glossary), Germany also undertook to make mas-
sive cuts in its weapons inventory. But even after these reduc-
tions, the Federal Republic would still possess the largest
European forces in NATO.
Since World War II, the prospect of an independent German
military had been a source of anxiety both within West Ger-
many and among its former foes and neighbors. In addition,
German irredentist claims had led to war in the past. So it was
only after Germany publicly and officially recognized the valid-
ity of its existing borders that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the
Soviet Union consented to the idea of German unification.
Traditional German militarism has been tempered in the
Bundeswehr, which remains a part of society rather than a soci-
ety unto itself. The officer corps has not become an elite, as it
had previously. Every member of the armed forces retains indi-
vidual rights as a citizen and enjoys liberties unavailable to
United States troops, such as the right to join a union or run
for public office while in the service. In the Bundeswehr, sexual
orientation has not been a contentious issue. Female citizens of
the Federal Republic interested in a military career are, how-
ever, restricted to service in the medical and musical corps.
Although a powerful peace movement uniting environmen-
talists, students, trade unionists, and religious leaders articu-
lated pacifist and antimilitarist positions with some success in
the postwar period, the armed forces continues to be staffed
largely by conscription. About 40 percent of the troops are
draftees; the remainder are regulars or extended-service volun-
teers. In 1972 the term of service was reduced from eighteen
months to fifteen months; in 1990 it was further reduced to
twelve months; beginning in 1996, it will fall to ten months.
Thousands of young men have been exempted or had their
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service deferred for educational, health, or hardship reasons.
A growing number of young men (60,000 of 200,000 called)
are granted conscientious objector status. These men perform
alternative service (Ersatzdienst) in hospitals or homes for
senior citizens or for people with disabilities. Those aspiring to
become officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are
required to enter as conscripts before volunteering for longer
enlistments. Only the most qualified are permitted to undergo
the rigorous preparation for a full career in the armed services.
Because the West German armed forces had been so subor-
dinated to NATO — an alliance in search of a new identity and
mission in the 1990s — the Bundeswehr of united Germany has
experienced difficulty in defining its missions and justifying the
need for a large and costly military establishment. Until July
1994, Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, had been inter-
preted as prohibiting the deployment of German forces out-
side the NATO area in United Nations (UN) or other inter-
national peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Conse-
quently, despite pressure from some allies, no German troops
were included in the UN coalition that fought Iraq in the 1991
Persian Gulf War. Instead, Germany made financial contribu-
tions to the action, and some German units were deployed to
Turkey as a defensive measure. German soldiers joined human-
itarian operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, but
the opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozial-
demokratische Partei Deutschlands — SPD) strenuously
opposed involvement that could bring German forces into
combat. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court, the
highest court in the land, ruled that the Bundeswehr could
participate in international military operations if each deploy-
ment received approval in the Bundestag, the lower house of
Germany's parliament.
In unified Germany, the maintenance of internal security is
for the most part the responsibility of the individual police
forces of the sixteen states (Lander; sing., Land), controlled by
the individual ministries of interior of the Lander. This decen-
tralized system has its roots in the post-1871 German Empire.
The Western Allies after World War II insisted on a return to
the Land system because of abuses by Hitler's highly centralized
police forces during the Nazi era (1933-45). To an increasing
extent, Land police activities are coordinated and supported by
the federal Ministry of Interior, which has its own criminal
police agency and domestic intelligence services. The paramili-
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Germany: A Country Study
tary border police is available as a uniformed federal backup
force in the event of major disorders.
In the early 1990s, controversy and scandal erupted over the
opening of the records of the former East German State Secu-
rity Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst — Stasi). Former dissidents
and political figures were discredited by revelations of dealings
with the Stasi, whose repressive influence had permeated most
aspects of life in the former GDR. As a result, police forces of
the five new Lander underwent restructuring and retraining to
bring them up to the level of competency of Western police
forces.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the danger of violence by terror-
ist groups has been a chronic problem for the police. After uni-
fication in 1990, the principal threat to public order shifted
from left-wing extremists to right-wing and neo-Nazi groups
that targeted the growing numbers of asylum-seekers, as well as
the millions of foreign workers, many of whom had been
employed in Germany for decades. Federal authorities
responded to criticism that law enforcement agencies and
courts were lax in dealing with right-wing violence by strength-
ening federal-Land cooperation and acting more aggressively
to curb extremist incidents.
In the 1990s, Germany's security forces are experiencing
their share of the confusion and disarray brought about by the
hastily executed process of unification. For nearly half a cen-
tury, two radically different societies had evolved in the two
Germanys. In the east, under Soviet occupation, an aggressive
campaign of early indoctrination and militarization was intro-
duced. Overlapping premilitary and paramilitary organizations
perpetuated antagonism toward NATO, West Germany, the
United States, and the free-market system. Initiative was stifled,
and obedience was demanded. When the communist system
collapsed, the superstructure upon which it relied (armed
forces, police, and border guards) was discredited. Meanwhile,
in the West, support for NATO and the United States troop
presence fell as the threat diminished, and growing numbers of
German youth opted for alternative service.
Military Tradition
Early History
The first Germans to win repute as fearsome adversaries in
combat were members of the various tribes who fought the
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encroachment of Roman legions upon their territories. The
Roman historian Tacitus praised the leadership and military
acumen of Arminius, a chief of the Cherusci who commanded
the German forces in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in
A.D. 9. The tribal warriors led by Arminius annihilated three
Roman legions, effectively preventing Roman expansion
beyond the Danube and Rhine rivers. By the fifth century, Ger-
man tribes had entered the Italian peninsula and brought
about the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west.
The empire created by Charlemagne (r. 768-814) in west-
central Europe split up soon after his death, the eastern por-
tion occupying much of the territory of modern Germany.
These German lands gradually evolved into the Holy Roman
Empire, with extensive territories in Italy (see Medieval Ger-
many, ch. 1). Many of the German kingdoms, principalities,
and cities that were components of the empire were noted for
the emphasis their leaders placed on military might. However,
no imperial army or law held sway over the local princes and
free cities. The absence of a strong central power, plus the
emergence of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, resulted in a near-permanent state of civil conflict,
wars of succession, and religious strife (see The Protestant Ref-
ormation, ch. 1). The Thirty Years' War (1618-48), a series of
conflicts between Protestant and Catholic forces, decimated
Germany's population (see The Thirty Years' War, ch. 1).
Prussia's Emergence as a Military Power
After the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom
of Prussia eventually emerged as the dominant power in cen-
tral Europe (see The Age of Enlightened Absolutism, 1648-
1789, ch. 1). Prussia had been colonized and Germanized dur-
ing the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the Knights of
the Teutonic Order, a military order of German monks that
pushed back or overran the Slavs in the area. The knights were
crushed by the Poles and Lithuanians in 1410 at the Battle of
Tannenberg, but in the next century the Hohenzollern
Dynasty that ruled Brandenburg and made Berlin its residence
was able to win control over West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania,
and eventually much of the Rhineland and Westphalia.
The German military heritage was epitomized by a succes-
sion of Prussian rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. The first of these was the Great Elector, Frederick
William (r. 1640-88), who recognized that a standing army
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Germany: A Country Study
with an elite officer corps was the key to the development of a
powerful state in his remote part of the empire. His grandson,
Frederick William I (r. 1713-40), more than doubled the size
of his professional army to 90,000 and added a trained reserve
of conscripted peasants, forming one of the most modern and
efficient fighting units in eighteenth-century Europe. Heavy
taxes supported the army, which consumed 80 percent of state
revenues even in peacetime. The next Prussian king, Frederick
II (r. 1740-86), known to posterity as Frederick the Great,
raised the strength of the army to 150,000 and launched a
series of wars between 1740 and 1763, wresting control of the
province of Silesia from Habsburg Austria. Prussia had become
one of the most powerful continental states and a contender
with the Habsburgs for domination over the myriad German
political entities.
The aristocratic character of the officer corps was estab-
lished early in the eighteenth century as Prussian kings tried to
gain the support of wealthy landed aristocrats, known as Junk-
ers, by granting them a virtual monopoly over the selection of
officers. In 1733 a cadet school was established in Berlin to
train sons of Junkers to be officers. The officer corps was well
on the way to becoming the most privileged social class in Prus-
sia.
The chauvinistic militarism of Prussia inspired fear and
hatred among other European states and peoples. Under the
strong leadership of a self-perpetuating general staff, the army
brooked little interference in its affairs by the civil government.
Nevertheless, the failure to reform and the lack of prepared-
ness after the death of Frederick the Great in 1786 led to the
army's decisive defeat by Napoleon's forces at Jena in October
1806.
Over the next few years, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst
guided the revitalization of the army. Reforms included the
introduction of universal military service and an end to depen-
dence on mercenaries. The officer corps was expanded to
include commoners, and officers were encouraged to take
greater initiative in battle. The new Prussian army distin-
guished itself at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 and again at
Waterloo in 1815, where, under the command of Field Marshal
Gebhard von Blucher, the army was instrumental in the ulti-
mate defeat of Napoleon.
Prussia's reputation for military efficiency was reestablished
by the army's final victories over Napoleon. The Prussian War
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College (Kriegsakademie) became a model for military staff
colleges around the world in the early nineteenth century. A
book of that era — On War — written by Karl von Clausewitz, a
Prussian general, became a classic, its theories of land warfare
still studied by officers of many armies more than 160 years
after the author's death.
The unification of the many German states into the German
Empire (1871-1918) followed Prussian-led victories over Den-
mark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870-71. Prussia's
aggressive policies were masterminded by Otto von Bismarck,
who became united Germany's first chancellor (see Bismarck
and Unification, ch. 1). Following unification, the legendary
Prussian General Staff became the German General Staff.
Clausewitz's dictum that civilians should control the military
was ignored, and the General Staff became a power center in
the highly militaristic regimes of Kaiser Wilhelm I (1858-88)
and Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) (see Imperial Germany, ch.
1).
The German Military in Two World Wars
Prussian-German excellence in military matters was an
accepted fact of life, but in the twentieth century the excessive
accent on militarism led to two disastrous world wars. Ger-
many's insistence on building a fleet that could challenge Brit-
ain's naval domination underscored German bellicosity and
pushed Britain toward alignment with France and Russia.
When World War I broke out in 1914, Germany attempted to
conquer France quickly with a sudden thrust through Belgium.
The Germans nearly reached Paris, but the desperate French
managed to stiffen their defenses along the Marne River. The
front was stabilized in northern France and shifted little during
the course of the war in spite of the sacrifice of whole armies in
the effort to break through opposing defenses. Although Ger-
many was able to force Russia out of the war in March 1918, the
arrival of fresh United States troops, strikes and protests among
German workers, and the exhaustion of material resources
brought about Germany's collapse in November 1918. General
Erich Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
formed what was in effect a military dictatorship in 1917 but
sidestepped responsibility for the military catastrophe by
restoring civilian control in the chaos of 1918. They then falsely
claimed that the military, undefeated in the field, had been
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Germany: A Country Study
"stabbed in the back" by domestic enemies, a charge that Adolf
Hitler employed later to great effect.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the German
General Staff was abolished. The army was limited to 100,000
personnel and the navy to a force of 15,000. Aircraft, tanks,
submarines, and other offensive weapons were prohibited. The
left bank of the Rhine was demilitarized. The Allies intended
that the civilian government of the postwar Weimar Republic
(1918-33) completely control the military and that the
destruction of the General Staff epitomize the end of Prussian-
ism. Nevertheless, a general staff continued to function under
the sobriquet "Troop Office," and its leaders took advantage of
the weak civilian government to reassert their privileged posi-
tions. When Hindenburg was elected president of the republic
in 1925, the general staff officers regained their influence in
the government (see The Weimar Republic, 1918-33, ch. 1).
During the 1920s, a clandestine alliance was formed between
the armies of the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union to cir-
cumvent the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The German
high command under General Hans von Seeckt made secret
arrangements with the Soviet high command enabling German
officers and specialists to study and train with modern weapons
in the Soviet Union in return for German technical assistance
in the establishment of Soviet defense industries. This collabo-
ration helped keep alive the military know-how used later as
the basis of Hitler's war machine.
By September 1939, when Hitler's invasion of Poland trig-
gered World War II, Germany had a formidable army, a potent
navy, and the best equipped air force in the world. The blitz-
krieg (lightning war), in which highly mobile, tank-heavy land
armies were deployed in conjunction with large numbers of
close-support aircraft, included tactics never before seen in
warfare. In the spring of 1940, the German army, the Wehr-
macht, defeated Denmark and Norway, outflanked French
defenses along the Maginot Line, destroyed the armies of
France and Belgium, and forced the evacuation of the British
Expeditionary Forces at Dunkirk — all in a little over a month.
The rapid victories of the early war period did not lead to
peace, however. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway, and Poland were occupied, but the staunch resistance
of Britain's Royal Air Force deterred Hitler's planned invasion
of Britain. The war took on a global character in 1941, with the
Wehrmacht's invasion of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, in
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June and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor the following Decem-
ber, which drew the United States into the conflict. Even
though the redoubtable Nazi war machine fought on for
almost four more years, the resources and manpower that the
Allies could invest eventually sealed the fate of Hitler's vaunted
"Thousand-Year Reich."
Once the Soviet forces were able to turn the tide in their
favor on the Eastern Front and the Western Allies established
themselves in France, there could no longer be any doubt
about the outcome of the war. Nevertheless, Hitler refused to
seek peace. The inevitable result was the destruction not only
of the country's armed forces but also of its towns and cities, its
industrial capacity, and its transportation system. Despite this
second catastrophic defeat in fewer than thirty years, the Ger-
man reputation for military excellence survived. The defeats
could be attributed to strategic blunders, two-front wars, and
madness and depravity among the Nazi leadership.
The Allies demanded and received Nazi Germany's uncondi-
tional surrender in May 1945. Two months later, at a summit
conference held at Potsdam, near Berlin, the leaders of the
United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union decreed, inter alia,
the demilitarization of Germany. Although the Allies disagreed
on many issues discussed at Potsdam, they were in accord on
the need to prevent a resurgence of German militarism; toward
that end, they ordered total disarmament. In the immediate
postwar years, however, the Allies could not agree on the terms
of a peace treaty, and before long they were aligning on oppo-
site sides of the Cold War. By 1949 the British, French, and
United States zones of occupation had become West Germany,
and the Soviet zone had become East Germany. The border
between the two republics became the front line of the Cold
War, or, in the term popularized by Winston Churchill, the
Iron Curtain. Soon, uniformed Germans carrying weapons
were appearing on both sides of the border (see Postwar Occu-
pation and Division, ch. 2).
Creation of the Bundeswehr
In the summer of 1955, ten years after the Nazi surrender
and the end of World War II, the West German Bundestag
(lower house of parliament) voted to authorize the recruit-
ment of volunteers for the initial formation of the Bundeswehr
(Federal Armed Forces). Later in the year, a cadre of about 100
officers and NCOs were sworn in at a ceremony in Bonn. Most
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Germany: A Country Study
of the initial volunteers were veterans of the World War II
Wehrmacht who had been serving in the Federal Border Force
(Bundesgrenzschutz — BGS) since the inception of that lightly
armed organization in 1951 (see Federal Police Agencies, this
ch.).
Training facilities and equipment were made available by the
United States Army, and 1,500 volunteers reported for the first
training cycle, which began in January 1956. The Bundestag
soon promulgated compulsory military service. By the end of
the year, the force numbered about 65,000, including 10,000
volunteers from the BGS, almost all of whom were war veter-
ans. The reappearance of a German armed force, which would
have been inconceivable a decade earlier, had become a reality
as a direct result of the Cold War.
The London and Paris agreements of 1954 restored sover-
eignty to the Federal Republic and opened the way for German
membership in NATO. The four Allies retained occupation
powers in Berlin. Allied troops remained in West Germany for
purposes of NATO defense pursuant to status-of-forces agree-
ments. With the exception of French troops, Allied and Ger-
man forces were under NATO's joint defense command.
In East Germany, the national legislature passed a bill estab-
lishing the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense in Janu-
ary 1956. The swift creation of an East German armed forces,
the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee — NVA),
more than 120,000 personnel practicing Prussian-style drill,
was a dramatic gesture of nationalism impossible for the world
to ignore. Thus, the 1950s saw both Germanys embark upon
the reestablishment of their military forces, albeit ones firmly
restrained within the mutually antagonistic Cold War alliances.
Strategic Concerns and Military Missions
Until the late 1980s, the Federal Republic was confronted by
a single preponderant threat arising from the forward deploy-
ment of armored and highly maneuverable Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces. The threat to NATO and to Germany abated after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the phased withdrawal
during the first half of the 1990s of Soviet (and, later, Russian)
units from the former East Germany and from other Warsaw
Pact nations.
Instead of having to prepare for the contingency of direct
attack from the east, a united Germany faces more diffuse and
intangible security problems. Under the new conditions, Ger-
468
Two soldiers during an exercise
A Leopard-2 main battle tank
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington
469
Germany: A Country Study
many's concerns focus on the possibility of armed conflicts aris-
ing in any one of three regions. The first is in the former Soviet
Union, where fifteen former Soviet republics, several of them
with powerful conventional forces and even nuclear capabili-
ties, are undergoing a difficult transition to independent
nationhood. Second, in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of
communist rule and the problems of the fragile democratic sys-
tems that followed have also created the potential for danger-
ous upheaval. Historical animosities previously suppressed
under an authoritarian regime have already brought civil war
to the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic or religious violence could
easily break out elsewhere in the region, producing destabiliz-
ing conditions, including the arrival of waves of refugees.
Finally, German military planners also foresee possible conflict
in the volatile area extending from the southern rim of the
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. In this region, the emer-
gence of fundamentalist or radical regimes poses a potential
threat to NATO member states such as Turkey, which could
lead to a call for German force deployments.
The primary mission of the German armed forces remains
the protection of German territory in conjunction with other
NATO armies. This task would fall to NATO's main defense
forces, which, under guidelines adopted in 1991, will constitute
the bulk of NATO forces in Central Europe. The main defense
forces will consist of four multinational corps, only partially
mobilized in peacetime. Two corps will be under German com-
mand, and German divisions will also be assigned to the
remaining corps commands. NATO's Rapid Reaction Force will
be available to assume regional crisis management and to take
limited action in either Central Europe or elsewhere in the
NATO area. The force will also provide protection during the
buildup of the main defense forces. Germany's contribution to
the Rapid Reaction Force will include its operationally ready
combat brigades. The air component of the Rapid Reaction
Force will include twenty aircraft squadrons under the com-
mand of a German officer.
In addition to maintaining NATO-committed combat units,
the evolving Bundeswehr will retain support forces to provide
military infrastructure and logistics, training units and schools,
medical services, and non-NATO air defense. It will be
required to have contingents ready to conduct peacetime mis-
sions of disaster relief, search and rescue, and humanitarian
assistance. German commanders also must plan for possible
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deployments in support of out-of-area NATO or UN operations
(see International Military Missions, this ch.; The Out-of-Area
Debate, ch. 8).
The Armed Forces
Command and Control
Under the Basic Law, the federal minister of defense com-
mands the Bundeswehr in peacetime, but that official relin-
quishes this role to the federal chancellor in the event of a
"state of defense," that is, an outbreak of hostilities. The Minis-
try of Defense is traditionally headed by a civilian and assisted
by two parliamentary state secretaries and two state secretaries.
There are six nonmilitary divisions staffed primarily by civil-
ians — personnel; budget; administrative and legal affairs; quar-
termaster, real estate, and construction; social services; and
armaments. The military side of the ministry is composed of
five military staffs — the armed forces office, army, navy, air
force, and surgeon general (see fig. 14).
The top military position is that of General Inspekteur of the
armed forces, an individual who is roughly equivalent to the
United States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General
Inspekteur is the supreme military representative of the
Bundeswehr and military adviser to the minister of defense.
The General Inspekteur 's planning responsibilities require him to
develop overall concepts governing the structure, organiza-
tion, command and control, equipment, and training of the
Bundeswehr. The General Inspekteur also represents the
Bundeswehr in international bodies. However, he is not part of
the chain of operational command between the minister and
the chief of staff ("inspector") of each branch of the armed
forces.
The Bundeswehr has no general staff. Because of its tainted
history and condemnation at the Nuremberg trials, that partic-
ular structure was omitted when the Bundeswehr was being
planned. Non-NATO joint planning is conducted by represen-
tatives from the Bundeswehr and the service general staffs
under the overall supervision of the Bundeswehr's Operations
Directorate. The staffs of the army, air force, and navy are
responsible for the operational readiness of their respective
force components. They are involved in the coordination and
approval processes of NATO plans for the defense of German
territory but do not undertake operational wartime planning.
471
Germany: A Country Study
Because Germany will relinquish operational command over
its combat units — together with certain formations of its terri-
torial army — in the event of war, there is little requirement for
independent German war plans.
In passing the annual budget law, the Bundestag determines
the number of military and civil personnel to be employed in
the defense sector, sets out the basic features of the Bundes-
wehr organization, and authorizes the financing of specific
sums for defense. Parliament also decides other important
aspects of defense policy, such as the duration of conscription.
Before forces can be committed to military action, parliament
must determine in accordance with Article 80a of the Basic
Law that a state of tension exists or in accordance with Article
115a that a state of defense exists. If parliament cannot be con-
vened on time, the twenty-two-member Joint Committee, with
the president of the Bundestag presiding, acts on its behalf.
Many Bundestag committees also exercise some controlling
functions over the Bundeswehr. The twenty-seven-member
Defense Committee focuses on defense and security policy but
can also function as an investigating committee.
Army
In early 1995, the army (Bundesheer), headquartered in
Koblenz, had a personnel strength of appropriately 255,000,
including 123,000 conscripts. It was composed of two principal
elements, the field army and the much smaller territorial army.
Territorial army units were slated to be merged with the field
army by the end of 1995. The field army is listed in The Military
Balance, 1994-1995 as consisting of three corps and eight divi-
sions (four armored divisions, three armored infantry divi-
sions, and one mountain division).
A radical reshaping of the army was completed by the end of
1994, in which the Bundeswehr was adapted to the diminishing
threat in Central Europe, the recasting of NATO's force struc-
ture, and Germany's 1990 commitments to reduce its force
level and armaments. These commitments were embodied in
the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,
or, as it is more commonly known, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty
signed in September 1990 and the CFE Treaty signed that
November. According to these commitments, manpower had
to be reduced so that all services could meet the CFE ceiling of
370,000 by December 1994, with a sublimit of 345,000 for the
army and air force. Naval forces also had to be cut, although
472
National Security
they were not included in the CFE Treaty except for land-based
marines (of which Germany has none) and naval air units.
The treaty obligations were met successfully, and in early
1995 the Bundesheer amounted to about 255,000 soldiers, of
whom about 123,000 were conscripts. The army consists of
three corps, under the overall direction of the Army Forces
Command. The headquarters of I Corps is in Munster, that of
II Corps in Ulm, and that of IV Corps in Potsdam. Only IV
Corps is solely German. The other two are joint corps: I Corps
is German-Dutch; II Corps is German-United States. Under the
corps commands are seven divisions in place of the previous
twelve, and twenty-four combat brigades instead of the previous
forty-eight. Six of the divisions are committed to NATO's main
defense force, but the two divisions of IV Corps in the east
remain under German national command. Under the opera-
tional command of II Corps is the Eurocorps, scheduled to be
operational in late 1995 with 50,000 troops. Lastly, there is the
Air-Mobile Forces Command, which commands crisis-reaction
forces.
The army's twenty-four combat brigades include sixteen
mechanized brigades, three airborne brigades, one mountain
brigade, and the German component of the Franco-German
Brigade. Only six brigades are maintained at full strength — two
airborne brigades, three mechanized brigades, and the moun-
tain brigade. Some of these ready brigades are committed to
the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. All of the active units are
staffed with a high proportion of regulars. The remaining bri-
gades are staffed at about a 60 percent level in peacetime,
mainly with conscripts. In each brigade, one armored battalion
and one infantry battalion are filled out by drawing cadres
from staffed units when expanded to full strength. Tanks and
other armored vehicles of the cadre units are stored, as are 25
percent of the vehicles of active battalions.
According to Ministry of Defense plans, the Bundesheer will
become even smaller in the second half of the 1990s. By the
year 2000, the army is to consist of about 233,000 personnel, of
which 37,000 will be assigned to rapid-reaction units. The army
will eliminate one division headquarters and two brigade head-
quarters. To meet NATO obligations, the 14th Division head-
quarters in Neubrandenburg will assume the mission of the 6th
Division, which is to be disbanded. This move will integrate a
division in the new Lander into the NATO military structure for
the first time.
475
CHANCELLOR
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
PARLIAMENTARY STATE SECRETARY
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PARLIAMENTARY STATE SECRETARY
PLANNING STAFF
ORGANIZATIONS !
INFORMATION I
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STATE SECRETARY
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ARMED FORCES
INTELLIGENCE
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ARMED FORCES
COUNTER-
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COMMAND AND
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LIAISON WITH
FRENCH FORCES
IN GERMANY
CHIEF OF STAFF
ARMY OFFICE
ENLISTED
PERSONNEL
OFFICE
CHIEF OF STAFF
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ENLISTED
PERSONNEL
OFFICE
SURGEON GENERAL
CENTRAL MEDICAL
AGENCIES OF THE
BUNDESWEHR
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NONMILITARY DIVISIONS
PERSONNEL
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COMMUNICATIONS
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QUARTERMASTER,
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COMMUNICATIONS
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COMMAND
FEDERAL OFFICE
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Figure 14. Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1995
•474
National Security
they were not included in the CFE Treaty except for land-based
marines (of which Germany has none) and naval air units.
The treaty obligations were met successfully, and in early
1995 the Bundesheer amounted to about 255,000 soldiers, of
whom about 123,000 were conscripts. The army consists of
three corps, under the overall direction of the Army Forces
Command. The headquarters of I Corps is in Munster, that of
II Corps in Ulm, and that of IV Corps in Potsdam. Only IV
Corps is solely German. The other two are joint corps: I Corps
is German-Dutch; II Corps is German-United States. Under the
corps commands are seven divisions in place of the previous
twelve, and twenty-four combat brigades instead of the previous
forty-eight. Six of the divisions are committed to NATO's main
defense force, but the two divisions of IV Corps in the east
remain under German national command. Under the opera-
tional command of II Corps is the Eurocorps, scheduled to be
operational in late 1995 with 50,000 troops. Lastly, there is the
Air-Mobile Forces Command, which commands crisis-reaction
forces.
The army's twenty-four combat brigades include sixteen
mechanized brigades, three airborne brigades, one mountain
brigade, and the German component of the Franco-German
Brigade. Only six brigades are maintained at full strength — two
airborne brigades, three mechanized brigades, and the moun-
tain brigade. Some of these ready brigades are committed to
the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. All of the active units are
staffed with a high proportion of regulars. The remaining bri-
gades are staffed at about a 60 percent level in peacetime,
mainly with conscripts. In each brigade, one armored battalion
and one infantry battalion are filled out by drawing cadres
from staffed units when expanded to full strength. Tanks and
other armored vehicles of the cadre units are stored, as are 25
percent of the vehicles of active battalions.
According to Ministry of Defense plans, the Bundesheer will
become even smaller in the second half of the 1990s. By the
year 2000, the army is to consist of about 233,000 personnel, of
which 37,000 will be assigned to rapid-reaction units. The army
will eliminate one division headquarters and two brigade head-
quarters. To meet NATO obligations, the 14th Division head-
quarters in Neubrandenburg will assume the mission of the 6th
Division, which is to be disbanded. This move will integrate a
division in the new Lander into the NATO military structure for
the first time.
475
Germany: A Country Study
Equipment
With the absorption of equipment from the NVA in 1990,
the Bundesheer had more than 7,000 main battle tanks, most
of them highly regarded German-built Leopards plus nearly
2,300 Soviet models. It had 3,250 armored infantry fighting
vehicles, of which about two-thirds were German Marder Al/
A2 models and the remainder Soviet BMPs. The Bundesheer's
inventory listed 11,000 armored personnel carriers, including
a large number of Soviet vehicles inherited from the NVA.
As of 1995, Germany had kept little of the weaponry of the
former NVA, giving away many spare parts, destroying huge
caches of weapons and ammunition, and selling surplus equip-
ment. East German tanks had been shipped to Finland, and
warships had been sold to Paraguay and Indonesia.
In line with its GFE commitments, Germany reduced its
inventory of main battle tanks to 2,855, its armored infantry
fighting vehicles to 2,443 units, and its artillery to 2,090 pieces
(see table 23, Appendix). This represented the highest rate of
disarmament among the CFE signatories, with the exception of
Russia.
In accordance with several international commitments, no
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are in the German
arms inventory. Under the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, Germany
reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession,
and control of such weapons. A number of German weapons
systems are nuclear-capable, but nuclear warheads and bombs
remain under the control of the United States. Some Tornado
aircraft have been fitted to accept nuclear bombs.
Franco-German Brigade and Eurocorps
In 1987 German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French presi-
dent Francois Mitterrand agreed on the formation of a Franco-
German Brigade to be stationed in southwest Germany, but
with headquarters in Strasbourg, France. Once established, the
French and German units in the brigade were not integrated;
the brigade functioned jointly only at the command, secretar-
iat, and logistic levels. The German contribution consisted of
one mechanized infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, and
one self-propelled antitank company. Troops are attired in the
uniforms of their own armies but wear a distinctive blue beret
bearing the insignia of both armies.
In May 1992, Kohl and Mitterrand announced the establish-
ment of a Eurocorps intended to form the nucleus of a Euro-
476
National Security
pean army. All the states of the Western European Union
(WEU — see Glossary) were invited to participate. Three possi-
ble missions were identified: deployment under NATO control
in time of war; peacemaking and peacekeeping operations
under WEU command in places outside the NATO treaty area,
subject to constitutional limits on German troop deployments;
and employment for humanitarian purposes abroad.
The Eurocorps is scheduled to be operational by October
1995 and to number about 50,000 troops, including a French
armored division, a German division, a Belgian mechanized
division, and a Spanish mechanized infantry brigade. The Ger-
man division, the 10th Armored, will remain simultaneously
committed to NATO. The troops will be stationed on German
soil and will retain their separate national identities under a
joint command at Strasbourg. Before the Eurocorps can be
deployed, every government that has contributed troops will
have to approve the mission.
Navy
The primary areas of operation of the navy (Bundesmarine)
in the event of war are the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. Until
1990 the navy's mission had been to block the Baltic
approaches on behalf of NATO to prevent the deployment of
the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.
The navy also contributed to protection of NATO sea routes by
helping to control the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea.
Although lacking large surface units, the navy was well
equipped to carry out intelligence and reconnaissance, mine
countermeasure operations, and antisubmarine and antiship
warfare. The navy regularly participated in NATO exercises as
part of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval
Force Channel.
The political changes that unfolded in 1990 enabled the
navy to reduce its concentration on the Baltic Sea and north-
ern flank, shifting from defending against a tangible Warsaw
Pact threat to preparing for a broader spectrum of maritime
defense missions and tasks beyond home waters. The deploy-
ment of mine countermeasure vessels to the Mediterranean for
NATO during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 and to the Persian
Gulf after hostilities broke out in 1991, as well as Germany's
participation in monitoring the naval blockade against Serbia
in 1992, undoubtedly foreshadow other possible requirements
distant from German coastal waters.
477
Germany: A Country Study
Although the navy is preparing for possible involvement in
future multilateral and humanitarian missions, its primary task
will continue to be to prevent attacking forces from controlling
German territorial and adjacent waters. The nations of the
former Soviet Union are no longer regarded as hostile; how-
ever, the presence of Russian naval units in the Baltic, with
their potential to deny Germany the use of its territorial waters
and the high seas, remains a relevant factor in strategic plan-
ning.
As of early 1995, the navy had about 30,000 personnel,
including 4,230 Naval Air Arm personnel, and 6,700 conscripts.
The ship inventory included as its principal combat units
twenty submarines, thirteen destroyers and frigates, and thirty-
eight missile craft (see table 24, Appendix). The Naval Air Arm
is equipped with Tornado fighter-ground attack aircraft and
Breguet Atlantic aircraft fitted for long-range reconnaissance,
including some dedicated to electronic intelligence. Dornier
Do-28s are used for short-range surveillance and patrol of the
Exclusive Economic Zone. Two Westland Sea Lynx helicopters
are based on each frigate for antisubmarine warfare and target
acquisition.
Four Brandenburg-class frigates are under construction to
replace Hamburg-class vessels by the end of 1996. Four Type
212 submarines are scheduled to be introduced after 2000 to
begin the replacement of Type 205 and unmodernized Type
206 submarines.
At unification the East German navy had a substantial fleet
of twenty-three frigates, fifty-two missile boats, and twenty-four
mine warfare vessels. Because the West German navy was
already facing a sharp reduction, all East German ships were
scheduled to be scrapped or sold, rather than absorbed within
the unified navy.
Proportionately, the cuts imposed on the navy in response to
the improved security situation in Europe have been the great-
est among the three services. The ship inventory will be
reduced to nearly half by the year 2005. The future German
fleet will consist of about ninety vessels, including fifteen frig-
ates, eight submarines, fifteen corvette patrol vessels, and
twenty mine countermeasure ships. Personnel strength will
decline to about 27,000 by 2000.
Under the chief of staff of the navy are three major com-
mands: the Fleet Command at Glucksburg on the Baltic Sea;
the Naval Office at Rostock, responsible for enlisted personnel,
478
A frigate of the Bremen class
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany,
Washington
Sailors in winter uniform
Courtesy Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany,
Washington
Germany: A Country Study
schools, armament, and the medical service; and the Naval
Logistics Command at Wilhelmshaven. Under the consolida-
tion plans, a number of bases will be closed and headquarters
merged, leaving four main bases: Wilhelmshaven (frigates plus
support vessels); Kiel (frigates, submarines, and support ves-
sels); Olpenitz (mine countermeasure vessels); and
Warnemunde (patrol boats). The naval air combat arm will be
reduced from four to three wings of about forty-six Tornados
based at Eggebek (near the Danish border), mainly for recon-
naissance and attack sorties. The naval air station at Jagel and
the remaining Tornados will be assigned to the air force.
Air Force
The air force (Luftwaffe) has faced dramatic changes in
structure and strategic concepts as a result of the diminished
threat in Central Europe and shrinking budgetary resources
for modernized weapons systems. Prior to the demise of the
Warsaw Pact, the air force had as its primary mission the air
defense of Central Europe in conjunction with other NATO air
forces. This included reconnaissance to forestall surprise
attack, interdiction of enemy ground and air forces, prevention
of enemy aircraft from reaching strategic targets, protection of
friendly forces against air attack, and close battlefield support
for NATO ground troops. The new security environment in
Europe has brought a change in tasks for the Luftwaffe. With
the absorption of the former East Germany, the national air-
space that had to be patrolled increased substantially With a
major confrontation in Central Europe now only a slight possi-
bility, the Luftwaffe has had to adjust its missions to take
account of the possibility of involvement in conflict beyond the
borders of Europe and in unstable regions within Europe.
As of early 1995, the Luftwaffe had a personnel strength of
83,000, including 25,000 conscripts. The principal combat
units were eight squadrons of fighter-ground attack aircraft,
equipped with Tornado fighter-ground attack aircraft. There
were seven fighter squadrons, six with F-4Fs and one with
MiG-29s (see table 25, Appendix). Developed as a joint effort
by Britain, Italy, and West Germany, the Tornado is a high-
speed, low-altitude, all-weather attack aircraft. The McDonnell
Douglas F-4F Phantom, introduced in the United States in the
1960s, is still regarded as an outstanding fighter and attack air-
craft of exceptional versatility However, it is scheduled to be
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National Security
replaced by a new combat aircraft in the late 1990s, the Euro-
pean Fighter Aircraft (EFA).
Ground-based air defense consisted of six groups, each with
six squadrons, equipped with Patriot surface-to-air missile
(SAM) launchers; six groups, each with six squadrons,
equipped with Hawk launchers; and fourteen squadrons
equipped with Roland launchers for point defense. The Ger-
man air defense units covering Central Europe and the Baltic
approaches were fully operational, subject to control by
NATO's integrated air-defense system even during peacetime.
By 1998 two squadrons of Tornado fighter-bombers are
scheduled to be transferred from the navy to the air force,
along with 800 naval personnel, as part of the plan to trans-
form the naval air base at Jagel on the Baltic Sea into a Luft-
waffe base. Of all the equipment taken over from the East
German air force, only one squadron of MiG-29 fighter air-
craft was absorbed by the Luftwaffe.
The ranking uniformed member of the Luftwaffe is the air
force chief of staff, with headquarters in Cologne. Also at
Cologne is the Combat Command, subdivided into the South-
ern Tactical Command and Northern Tactical Command. The
Southern Tactical Command is collocated with NATO Com-
bined Air Operations Center at Messstellen in the southwest-
ern corner of Germany; the Northern Tactical Command is at
Kalkar near the Dutch border. The Transport Command at
Munster also comes under the Combat Command, as does the
Communications and Electronic Command. The Air Force
Office in Cologne is responsible for personnel, training, com-
munications, and armaments. The Air Force Logistics Com-
mand, also in Cologne, is responsible for logistic units, training
installations, and materiel.
Training
The basic objective of Bundeswehr training is to impart the
technical knowledge necessary for mastery of advanced weap-
onry while instilling the discipline required in combat situa-
tions. Educational opportunities offered to service personnel
vary with the length of enlistment and are intended to produce
combat readiness while, to the extent possible, providing skills
that will ease the eventual transition to civilian life. The
Bundeswehr operates more than forty schools in addition to
thirty-three apprentice workshops and ten nursing schools at
station hospitals.
481
Germany: A Country Study
Basic and small-unit training are scheduled on a continuing
basis. For conscripts, the entire period of service is devoted to
one kind of training or another, but conscripts are not eligible
for attendance at advanced service schools unless they volun-
tarily extend their term of service. After an introductory assign-
ment to basic training regiments, air force conscripts prepare
for their special tasks in on-the-job training. Because the Luft-
waffe wishes to attract a higher proportion of longer-term per-
sonnel, it offers temporary career training and regular officer
advanced training at air force extension schools, as well as at
training facilities of the other services and other Allied forces.
In the navy, sailors prepare' for their duties at schools ashore
before being assigned to ships for more on-the-job training.
Volunteers receive advanced training at various schools offer-
ing courses in supply, engineering, radar, weapons, and other
specialties. In both the air force and the navy, training culmi-
nates in national operational exercises and large-scale NATO
exercises.
About 2,000 pilots and missile personnel of the air force and
navy are trained in the United States under long-standing
agreements between the German and United States govern-
ments. Primary pilot training is conducted at Sheppard Air
Force Base in Texas on Beech Bonanzas, followed by jet train-
ing on T-37Bs and T-38As. A Tornado squadron is based at
Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico for advanced weap-
ons training. German personnel attend the Patriot and Hawk
missile school at Fort Bliss, Texas, and navigator training at
Randolph Air Force Base near San Antonio. Helicopter train-
ing is conducted at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
Much training is conducted jointly with service personnel of
other NATO countries. Joint courses include forward air con-
troller training at Furstenfeldbruck Air Force Base, training at
the army engineer school in Munich, and NATO logistics
courses at the Bundeswehr Logistics School in Hamburg. Ger-
man and other NATO pilots train in low-level flight techniques
in Canada at Goose Bay, Labrador. German troops are shuttled
to the Canadian province of Manitoba for armored infantry
training on German equipment permanently maintained
there.
The basic qualification for voluntary enlistment in the
Bundeswehr is completion of five years at the secondary school
(Hauptschule) level (see The Education System, ch. 4). Those
with a university or technical college admission certificate can
482
483
Germany: A Country Study
apply to become temporary career or regular officer candi-
dates. Junior NCO training lasts about fifteen months and
stresses leadership qualities and practical skills. An opportunity
for further training leading to senior NCO rank usually comes
after about four years of service. Particularly qualified NCOs
are admitted to a three-year course whose graduates are com-
missioned as officer specialists with the rank of lieutenant or
captain. Officer specialists fill positions corresponding to those
occupied by warrant officers in the United States military.
Officer candidates in the army, navy, and air force face a
long, arduous training program. Those aspiring to be regular
officers, as well as temporary career officers who serve up to
twelve years on active duty, generally spend about five years in
formal training programs. Officer candidates generally begin
their career with nine months of basic training and specialized
weapons training followed by twelve months at an officer candi-
date school — the army school in Hanover, the air force school
in Furstenfeldbruck, or the naval academy at Murwik in Flens-
burg.
After a year or more as a small-unit leader, officers with at
least a twelve-year enlistment begin a three-year course of study
at the Bundeswehr's military academy in Hamburg or the mili-
tary academy in Munich that leads to an academic degree or
technical diploma. Most officers leave the service between the
ages of thirty and thirty-two after serving as company com-
manders or the equivalent. A smaller number of senior cap-
tains or navy lieutenants qualify for attendance at the four-
month staff officer course at the Federal Armed Forces Com-
mand and General Staff College in Hamburg.
Those officers with outstanding grades in the staff officer
course and a generally excellent record — about 10 percent of
the officers completing the course — are selected to undergo
the twenty-four-month general and admiral staff training pro-
gram, also offered at Hamburg. The remaining 90 percent
attend an eight-week staff officer course in various specialties
such as operations, logistics, personnel, and transportation.
Promotion to the rank of major follows completion of the
course. Field-grade officers not selected for general staff train-
ing usually retire as lieutenant colonels; general staff officers
can expect to be promoted to colonel or naval captain. About
80 percent of the officers who reach the rank of general or
admiral have been selected from the general staff group.
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National Security
Reserves
Under the revised military structure introduced in 1992, the
Bundeswehr will become increasingly dependent on the rapid
mobilization of reserves to bring both the main combat bri-
gades and the support units up to authorized strengths in an
emergency. In early 1995, the reserves of former service mem-
bers (enlisted to age forty-five; officers and NCOs to age sixty)
numbered about 441,900, of whom 358,000 would report to
the army, 10,900 to the navy, and 73,000 to the air force. Some
50 percent of the army's main weapons systems depend for
their operation on staffing by reservists.
After discharge, former soldiers are liable for reserve service
until age forty-five, or until age sixty in time of war. Officers
and NCOs are subject to recall until age sixty. Reservists can be
called up for one fifteen-day period of training a year and for
any number of call-ups of up to three days in emergencies. The
average reserve unit assembles once every two years. Reservists
with crucial skills tend to be called up more frequently; less-
skilled reservists or those in less vital units may not be called up
at all. The number of call-ups is determined in the annual
defense budget in terms of reserve slots, each slot equivalent to
365 duty days. A total of 4,000 reserve slots were authorized in
1993, which permitted about 100,000 individual call-ups. By
contrast, 35,000 slots were authorized per year during the early
1980s.
Morale
The deep reductions in the first half of the 1990s in the size
of the active Bundeswehr and the accompanying deactivation
and consolidation of units, together with base closings and per-
sonnel transfers, have placed serious strains on the morale of
the armed forces. Previously, an NCO could expect to pass
almost his entire career at a single post, usually in or near his
hometown. In the restructured army, many senior NCOs have
been reassigned to distant parts of Germany; serious disrup-
tions of family often have been the result. Garrison housing is
likely to be unavailable, and affordable housing may be diffi-
cult to find off post. In many cases, wives must give up jobs that
provide a much-needed second income. Frequently, NCOs pre-
fer to commute long distances to their new posts or simply to
live apart from their families. Assignment to eastern Germany,
485
Germany: A Country Study
where there is a strong need for NCO cadres, can be especially
burdensome because of poor living conditions there.
The decline in popular support for the Bundeswehr further
undermines the morale of service personnel. According to a
poll taken in mid-1992, only 47 percent of Germans were con-
vinced that the country needed armed forces, down from 75
percent in 1984. A similar spirit has pervaded the ranks of con-
scripts and young soldiers who accept military training rather
than the alternative of civilian service. Pacifist and church
organizations have counseled young Germans on seeking con-
scientious objector status, and in 1991 the number of conscien-
tious objectors was roughly equal to the number of draftees. A
vocal peace movement has also influenced many civilians to
reject the company of military professionals. Soldiers often
avoid wearing their uniforms in public to escape unfriendly
comments or treatment.
NCOs complain that it is difficult to instill discipline and
impose a strict training regimen on indifferent conscripts who,
in the changed international atmosphere, never expect to be
faced with an actual military contingency. Conscripts expend
minimal effort during their months of military training, living
mainly for weekends with their families. Conscripts generally
are garrisoned close to home; some can even commute on a
daily basis, treating military service as little different from a fac-
tory or office job. Conscripts are entitled to free time to com-
pensate for exercises conducted beyond regular duty hours,
although this entitlement will end in 1996.
Some professional soldiers, skeptical that twelve months of
service (scheduled to be ten months in 1996) can produce
combat-ready soldiers and fearing that political pressures could
lead to an even shorter period of service, advocate abandoning
the universal military system. One reason for retaining univer-
sal military service is the belief that it helps prevent the military
from again becoming a distinct caste with few roots in demo-
cratic civilian society. Officers hoping to induce promising con-
scripts to volunteer for longer enlistment also view
conscription favorably.
The pride the Bundeswehr takes in the high standards of its
personnel and the quality of its training and weaponry was
blunted by the absence of German contingents from the inter-
national forces assembled to defeat Iraq in 1991. The constitu-
tional limitation on German troop deployments outside the
NATO area has been a blow to the prestige of the career mili-
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National Security
tary men, many of whom feel that they are regarded as shirkers
by their NATO partners. The July 1994 decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court to permit out-of-area deployment when
approved by the Bundestag will reduce the likelihood of such
situations occurring again.
Integration of East German Armed Forces
Established in 1956, the National People's Army (Nationale
Volksarmee — NVA) of the German Democratic Republic was
considered one of the most formidable elements of the Warsaw
Pact's armed might. It comprised about 170,000 personnel in
all three services, which could quickly be expanded to a mobili-
zation strength of 350,000. NVA land forces consisted of six
standing divisions and five reserve divisions. The army was
equipped with some of the Warsaw Pact's most modern weap-
ons, as well as enormous stockpiles of ammunition. The NVA's
structure and training followed Soviet lines. Detailed war plans
called for the NVA to combine with other Warsaw Pact forces in
a powerful and sudden assault against NATO's central region
to overrun Western Europe in blitzkrieg fashion. The offensive
use of tactical nuclear weapons was assumed.
Although the NVA's weapons and vehicles were maintained
at a high level of operational readiness, signs of deterioration
and personnel preparedness in manpower were evident even
before the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Once
the Wall opened, many reservists and some conscripts fled the
country, disappearing into West Germany. Authority and
morale declined as ordinary soldiers rebelled against strict dis-
cipline and military exercises. When soldiers' councils sprang
up, NVA commanders bowed to pressure to allow soldiers to
wear civilian clothes off post and enjoy relaxed discipline,
reduced training time, and an end to political indoctrination.
The morale of officers facing the loss of careers and status
began to waver as the internal situation worsened and the pros-
pect of unification grew.
Until mid-1990 the leadership of the NVA still hoped that
the force might survive as a distinct entity in a reconstituted
German state. As a result of the summit agreement between
West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet president
Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990, however, the Soviet Union
withdrew its objections to a united Germany's membership in
NATO. The NVA was disbanded upon unification, and its facili-
ties and resources were taken over by the Bundeswehr.
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Germany: A Country Study
On October 3, 1990, the date of unification, control over all
NVA commands and border troops passed to the newly created
Bundeswehr Eastern Command. The command's function was
to deactivate unneeded units, to dispose of surplus materiel
and weapons, and to extend support to the withdrawing Soviet
forces. The command was terminated after nine months, and
the various elements of the former NVA were transferred to the
three chiefs of staff and the medical service corps of the
Bundeswehr.
The 90,000 NVA service personnel and 47,000 civilian
employees who remained were merged into the Bundeswehr
on a preliminary basis. It was decided that up to 50,000 of the
former NVA troops would be retained as part of the
Bundeswehr. Of 14,600 NVA officers, 5,100 were permitted to
enter the Bundeswehr for a transition period of two years.
Some 70 percent of these — mostly junior officers — would be
retained after approval for regular Bundeswehr service and
screening to eliminate former members of East Germany's
State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst — Stasi) . Many of
the 25,000 NVA enlisted personnel were assigned to a three-
month basic training course with West German units. The
dilapidated condition of NVA barracks, mess halls, and other
facilities necessitated large expenditures to bring them up to
minimal Bundeswehr standards.
All 190 NVA general officers were retired, as were all colo-
nels and many other officers over age fifty-five. Most of those
retained were no older than thirty-five. Many former NVA offi-
cers were demoted by one or two ranks if they were younger
than officers of corresponding ranks in the Bundeswehr.
Although East German troops had been paid at a lower scale
than their West German counterparts, parity was achieved by
1994. Junior NVA officers, unused to exercising initiative, had
to be trained in a new doctrine of command.
A major effort was needed to instill democratic principles of
leadership and a new perspective on historical and political
questions. NVA officers had been indoctrinated with commu-
nist beliefs and had been considered among the most politi-
cally reliable elements of the East German state. Although
forced to acknowledge that Marxist theories had diverged from
social and economic realities in East Germany, many still
tended to view communism as a valid, if Utopian, political phi-
losophy.
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National Security
After absorption of the East German armed forces, the six
active NVA divisions were converted to brigades, with three bri-
gades in each of two divisions. One division was headquartered
at Neubrandenburg and the other at Leipzig. Both divisions
became part of IV Corps, which has its headquarters at Pots-
dam.
During a transition period, the brigades operated Soviet
BMP armored vehicles, but Soviet tanks were replaced by Leo-
pards. In the air force, the division at Eggerdorf controlled two
fighter wings of Phantom F-4Fs and Soviet MiG-29s, with the
Soviet aircraft to be gradually reduced in number. The former
East German naval base at Warnemunde on the Baltic Sea was
developed as the home port for fast-attack missile craft.
Large quantities of East German weapons were turned over
to the Bundeswehr, including 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800
armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 400 combat aircraft,
fifty attack helicopters, and many missile and rocket systems.
More than 300,000 tons of ammunition had been stockpiled.
With exceptions that included MiG-29s, BMP infantry fighting
vehicles, and some transport helicopters, the Bundeswehr
decided against trying to integrate former NVA weapons into
its inventory. Ceilings imposed by the CFE Treaty, as well as
problems of convertibility and safety, ruled out the wholesale
absorption of the weapons. After first being concentrated in
special depots, massive stocks of equipment and munitions,
except for a few items transferred to other countries, were
slated for destruction — a task of unprecedented magnitude.
Defense Budget
From about 1960 until 1990, the West German defense bud-
get rose at a remarkably steady rate, just under 3 percent a year
in real terms. If NATO definitions of defense expenditures are
applied, outlays remained constant during the 1980s before ris-
ing about 4.7 percent in real terms in 1990 and then declining
by 6.8 percent in 1991. At the same time, defense spending as a
ratio of the overall federal budget decreased from 11.2 percent
in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 1989. Outlays for defense also tended
to decline as a proportion of the gross national product
(GNP — see Glossary), from 3.3 percent in 1979 to 2.8 percent
in 1989.
The Bundeswehr frequently experienced difficulty securing
adequate funds to maintain personnel and equipment at
desired levels because of the disinclination of the post-World
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Germany: A Country Study
War II generation to earmark resources for the buildup of the
military establishment. The absence of any palpable threat
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, combined with the unex-
pectedly high costs of integrating eastern Germany into the
Federal Republic, generated even stronger pressures to make
deep cuts in defense spending.
From a high of DM57.5 billion (US$35.6 billion) in 1990,
the defense budget was scaled back to about DM52.0 billion
(US$34 billion) in both 1991 and 1992, to DM49.6 billion
(US$31.8 billion) in 1993, and to DM47.2 billion (US$28.6 bil-
lion) in 1994. According to Ministry of Defense plans, the
annual defense budget should level off at about DM48 billion
(US$32 billion) through the year 2006.
Announced cuts in the procurement budget are expected to
produce savings of more than DM72 billion in the period
between 1992 and 2006. Replacement of the Leopard 2 main
battle tank was canceled, and the number of Leopard 2s to be
upgraded was reduced. A replacement for the Jaguar antitank
vehicle was deleted, and fewer Marder infantry fighting vehi-
cles and self-propelled howitzers will be introduced. Also, a
smaller number of the new Franco-German Tiger PAH-2
attack helicopters will be acquired than originally planned. To
effect additional savings, the construction schedule for new
frigates and submarines has been stretched out.
According to data compiled by the United States Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Germany's military
expenditures per capita in 1993 (US$454) were above the
NATO Europe average (US$416) and below those of France
(US$740) or Britain (US$587). United States expenditures per
capita were US$1,153 in the same year. Expressed as a percent-
age of GNP, military expenditures in 1993 (2.2 percent) were
lower than the NATO Europe average (2.7 percent). The 1992
share of military spending in central government expenditures
(6.3 percent) was also below the NATO 1992 average of 6.5 per-
cent.
Military Justice
Members of the German armed forces are subject to the civil
criminal code and are tried for common criminal offenses in
the civil court system. There are no military correction facili-
ties; incarcerated military offenders serve their sentences in
ordinary civilian prisons. Soldiers enjoy the same civil rights
and liberties possessed by other citizens. They are permitted to
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National Security
take an active part in political life, be members of political par-
ties, and join trade unions and professional associations. Sev-
eral courses of action are open to soldiers with complaints or
grievances, both within the Bundeswehr and in ordinary courts
of law.
Offenses of a specifically military character committed by
members of the Bundeswehr are tried in two military court
divisions of the Federal Administrative Court and by three mili-
tary disciplinary courts having a total of twenty-nine chambers.
A civilian professional judge presides over each chamber,
assisted by honorary military judges. The chambers are the
courts of first instance for disciplinary court proceedings
against soldiers. The military courts of the Federal Administra-
tive Court are the courts of appeal, each being composed of
three civilian judges and two honorary military judges. Sen-
tences range from discharge from service to financial penalties
to reduction in rank. The lowest level of offense, such as dis-
obedience or unauthorized absence, may be dealt with infor-
mally in a soldier's own unit.
Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
The service uniform is the most common type of
Bundeswehr uniform for general duty and most off-post activ-
ity. The army's service uniform consists of a light gray, single-
breasted coat and darker gray trousers, worn with a light blue
or white shirt, black tie, and black shoes. The peaked, visored
cap has been replaced by the beret as the most common form
of headgear. Dress uniforms featuring dinner jackets or dou-
ble-breasted coats are worn by officers for various social occa-
sions. The battle and work uniform is olive green. Camouflage
fatigues are also worn on field duty. In all three services, light
sand-colored uniforms are available for duty in warmer cli-
mates.
The traditional arm-of-service colors appear as lapel facings
and as piping on shoulder straps. General officers wear an
inner piping of gold braid; other officers wear silver piping.
Lapel facings and piping are maroon for general staff, green
for infantry, red for artillery, pink for armor, black for engi-
neers, yellow for communications, and various other colors for
the remaining branches. Combat troops wear green (infantry),
black (armor), or burgundy (airborne) berets. Logistics troops
wear blue berets, and combat support troops, such as artillery
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Germany: A Country Study
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493
Germany: A Country Study
or engineers, wear red ones. A gold or silver device on the
beret denotes the individual branch of service.
The naval forces wear the traditional navy blue, double-
breasted coat and trousers; enlisted personnel wear either a
white shirt or a navy blue shirt with the traditional navy collar.
White uniforms provide an alternative for summer. The offi-
cer's dress cap is mounted with a gold anchor surrounded by a
wreath. The visor of the admiral's cap bears a double row of
oak leaves.
The air force service uniform consists of a blue-gray jacket
and trousers with a light blue shirt, dark blue tie, and black
shoes. Olive battle dress similar to the army fatigue uniform is
worn in basic training and during other field duty. Flying per-
sonnel wear wings on their right breast. Technical personnel
wear a modified wing device with a symbol in its center denot-
ing service specialization. The latter is bronze, silver, or gold,
depending on one's length of service in the specialty. Wings,
superimposed over a wreath, in gold, silver, or bronze, depend-
ing on rank, are also worn on the service or field cap.
Officer ranks correspond directly to equivalent ranks in the
United States Armed Forces (see fig. 15). Officer rank insignia
are worn on shoulder straps or shoulder boards; in the case of
naval officers, rank is indicated by gold stripes on the lower
sleeve of the blue service jacket and on shoulder boards of the
white uniform. The semicircular wreath on the shoulder straps
is gold for general officers and silver for field grade officers.
NCO ranks are based on those used long ago in the Prussian
armies, and it is difficult to relate them directly to United
States NCO ranks (see fig. 16). In the army and air force, a
Hauptgefreiter corresponds approximately to a private first class
or airman first class. An Unteroffizier, with the responsibilities of
a squad leader, is the lowest-ranking sergeant, followed by the
Stab sunt er of fizier, Feldwebel, Oberfeldwebel, and Hauptfeldwebel.
Ranks of army and air force enlisted personnel are designated
by stripes, chevrons, and looped chevrons worn on shoulder
straps. Naval enlisted rank designations are worn on the upper
sleeve along with a symbol of the service specialization (rating).
Army and air force officer candidates hold the separate ranks
of Gefreiter, Fahnenjunker, and Oberfahnrich and wear the equiva-
lent enlisted rank designations plus a silver diamond on their
sleeves. Medical personnel of all three services wear a version
of the traditional caduceus (staff with entwined serpents) on
their shoulder straps or sleeve.
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Citizens in Uniform
When the Federal Republic was founded in 1949, and dur-
ing the ensuing years, public discussion of the re-creation of a
German armed force was unavoidably shaped by the memories
of wartime disaster and the terrible legacy of German milita-
rism. For many Germans, even the thought of rearming the
country was distasteful. Those citizens favoring the formation
of new armed forces were convinced that these forces would
have to represent a near-complete break with German military
history. The consensus was that the military would require a
constitutional basis for its existence, with the Bundeswehr
unequivocally controlled by civilian authorities.
The planners of the new Bundeswehr wanted to be sure that
no images of the armed forces (Reichswehr) of the Weimar
Republic or Hitler's Wehrmacht would be associated with it.
The twin concepts of "citizens in uniform" and Innere Fuhrung
(inner leadership) were introduced to ensure that there could
be no resurgence of German militarism. Behind the emphasis
on citizens in uniform was the concept that military personnel
were of the people and worked for the people, not part of a
military elite that would precipitate a "state within a state" phe-
nomenon. In the new Bundeswehr, the constitutional rights of
service members are guaranteed, even though those rights
might be restricted at times because of the special nature of
military duties.
Military personnel do not give up their political status as citi-
zens when they don a uniform. They continue to be members
of the community from which they entered the service, as well
as of the West German political community as a whole. They
can run for office on local councils and for seats in the parlia-
ments of the Lander and the Bundestag. Regulars and volun-
teers are permitted to join a military or civil service union and
have the right of free expression, although by law they have the
obligation to exercise discipline and restraint in expressing
their views publicly.
The concept of Innere Fuhrung imposes the responsibility
upon all military personnel to defend their country according
to the dictates of conscience rather than out of blind loyalty.
For the NCOs, officers, and generals who formed the nucleus
of the new forces in 1956, most of whom were veterans of the
Wehrmacht or Luftwaffe of World War II, adherence to the
new principles meant unlearning principles that had guided
them in their earlier service. Officers and NCOs received train-
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Germany: A Country Study
ing to help them respect and impart the principles of Innere
Fuhrung, including the role of the Bundeswehr in the state and
society and the duties and rights of individual service person-
nel.
The West German military and the political leadership had
difficulty agreeing on the measures needed to forge a new
democratic spirit that would break with Germany's military
past. Specific issues continued to be debated during the
1980s — whether some traditions could properly be carried over
from the Wehrmacht, the place of military pageantry, public
oath-taking by new soldiers, and attitudes toward the Wehr-
macht's complicity in the crimes of the Nazi period and toward
the officers implicated in the 1944 attempt on Hitler's life.
A strong antimilitarist element within the left wing of the
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands — SPD) repeatedly protested against mili-
tary symbolism and public military ceremonies. In a wider
sense, these protests reflected the reluctance among young
people to devote time to military service and objections to a
NATO strategy of defending Europe by using nuclear weapons
in the heart of Germany.
An innovation to help ensure civilian oversight of the
Bundeswehr was the establishment of the defense ombudsman
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Federal Armed Forces),
who is appointed by the Bundestag. The ombudsman is respon-
sible for overseeing the administration of the services while
upholding the constitutional rights of individual service per-
sonnel. All Bundeswehr personnel have the right of direct peti-
tion to the ombudsman; several thousand exercise this right
each year. The ombudsman and staff can also be called upon
by the Bundestag or the Bundestag Defense Committee to
investigate specific problems.
Personnel Policies
Serious shortages of eligible conscripts began to appear in
the late 1980s. Because of the declining birth rate in the 1970s
and the increasing number of conscientious objectors, the
Bundeswehr struggled to meet its recruiting goals. However,
the reduction of the Bundeswehr's active-duty soldiers to
370,000 by the end of 1994, as required by the 1990 Two-Plus-
Four Treaty and CFE Treaty, meant that the annual require-
ment for conscripts could be decreased from 180,000 to
140,000. Also, the incorporation of East Germany into the Fed-
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eral Republic added significantly to the pool of potential
inductees. About 50,000 personnel in 1994 were career soldiers
transferred from the NVA or draftees from the new Lander.
The Bundeswehr has been handicapped by a shortage of
NCOs, a problem that is expected to become more critical as
the army increases its dependence on career cadres to staff
reserve battalions subject to mobilization. A soldier must meet
high entry qualifications, undergo extensive training, and com-
plete years of service before reaching the rank of sergeant,
which entitles him to make the military a career and remain in
the service until retirement. Reliance on experienced NCOs is
a distinctive feature of the Bundeswehr, where the ratio of offi-
cers to enlisted personnel is the lowest in Europe. An infantry
company may have a captain and one lieutenant, but most pla-
toon leaders and the company executive officer are usually
master sergeants. However, NCOs of the former NVA are gen-
erally confined to specialist categories, without experience or
training as unit leaders.
Service Obligations
Under the Obligatory Military Service Law enacted in 1956,
all males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight were
subject to conscription for military service. In 1985 the period
of active duty was increased from fifteen to eighteen months,
but before the new provision was introduced, the term of ser-
vice was reduced to twelve months, effective in 1990. Beginning
in 1996, conscripts will be required to serve ten months. The
Basic Law guarantees the right to refuse military service on
grounds of conscience.
During the 1970s, about 35,000 young men applied for con-
scientious objector status annually. Under liberalized rules and
the decline of the overt threat from the east, the number who
claimed the right to alternative civilian service in 1992
(134,000) was about as high as the number of draftees needed
by the Bundeswehr. Alternative service, which is one-third
longer than military service, usually takes the form of such
social service as serving as a hospital orderly. In fact, one of the
obstacles to shifting to an all-volunteer force is the effect it
would have on the health and social agencies that have come to
depend upon conscientious objectors to perform essential
work.
Under Bundeswehr policy, all soldiers begin their careers as
conscripts. Those performing satisfactorily may be induced —
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Germany: A Country Study
in part through considerable financial incentives — to volunteer
for a short-term enlistment of two years, or as temporary career
personnel for four years. Those attaining NCO rank during
their four-year enlistment period may then be permitted to
serve up to fifteen years or longer if accepted as career profes-
sionals. The army has been able to recruit about 10 percent of
its conscripts for extended service.
The maximum retirement age of career sergeants is fifty-
three. The mandatory retirement age rises, depending on
rank, to fifty-nine for colonels and sixty for generals and medi-
cal officers. Special rules may apply to particular specialties.
Two branches of the Bundeswehr, the medical and health
service and military music, accept women as volunteers. As of
the mid-1990s, about 900 women were in uniform. No signifi-
cant expansion of the role of women is foreseen, particularly in
light of the overall contraction of the services. The Basic Law
states: "Women shall not be required by law to render service in
any unit of the armed forces. On no account shall they be
employed in any service involving the use of arms." Of more
than 50,000 women occupying civilian positions in national
defense, only a few serve in higher civil service posts, although
officially women enjoy the same career opportunities available
to men.
Benefits
The pay of conscripts amounted to about US$160 a month
in the mid-1990s. Bonuses are paid at Christmas and upon dis-
charge. Conscripts can be compensated for loss of their civilian
wages, up to 60 percent of the lost income in the case of mar-
ried personnel. Those recalled for reserve duty are also com-
pensated for lost earnings. Longer-term volunteers receive
about US$1,100 a month. Basic monthly pay for a sergeant as
of early 1995 was about US$1,350 and for a sergeant first class
about US$1,900. In addition to basic pay, allowances are paid
for housing (about US$600 a month), dependents, hazardous
duty, ship duty, and other special circumstances.
All temporary career and regular service personnel are enti-
tled to a range of benefits, including compensation for duty in
excess of fifty-six hours per week and change-of-station allow-
ances. These include disbursements to cover extra educational
expenses for children; a monthly travel allowance to distant
duty stations; and a rental subsidy if local rent is high in pro-
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portion to income. Working wives are entitled to preferential
employment at new duty stations.
Every qualified regular serviceman can expect to advance
within his career category to sergeant first class in the case of
NCOs, to captain or naval lieutenant in the case of officer spe-
cialists, and to lieutenant colonel or naval commander for line
officers. Upon retirement, regular personnel can be entitled to
a pension of up to 75 percent of their final salary. In addition,
they receive a one-time payment to compensate for the disad-
vantage of retiring earlier than civil servants, plus a 5 percent
supplement to their retirement. Special reintegration allow-
ances and preferential treatment for employment in the public
sector are also available to service members, especially those
below retirement age but with at least twelve years of service.
Defense Production and Export
Germany's capacity to produce its own arms and military
equipment grew simultaneously with the development of the
Bundeswehr. As a matter of policy, arms production is confined
to the private sector. There are no government-operated
defense plants, and most companies involved in arms manufac-
ture are predominantly engaged in civilian industrial produc-
tion. Private industry accounts for 85 percent of all military
research and development, procurement, and maintenance.
Nevertheless, defense production represents no more than 3.4
percent of the total value of output by the country's processing
industries. Although some 225,000 persons work on defense
contracts, this group constitutes less than 1 percent of the
workforce.
The Armaments Division of the Ministry of Defense has
responsibility for planning, controlling, and supervising the
armaments sector. Under it the Federal Office for Military
Technology and Procurement (Bundesamt fur Wehrtechnik
und Beschaffung — BWB) in Koblenz procures all defense
materiel. The BWB is a civilian agency staffed by some 18,300
persons, about one-third of whom work at seven armaments
research and testing centers, each responsible for a particular
category of systems. Certain major joint projects, such the Tor-
nado and the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), are indepen-
dent of the BWB's supervision.
The Bundeswehr estimates that about 70 percent of its major
procurement items are produced as part of international
projects. These have included the EFA and Tornado aircraft
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Germany: A Country Study
(both developed in cooperation with Britain, Italy, and Spain) ;
the Alpha Jet, the Roland short-range air defense system, and
the Tiger PAH-2 antitank helicopter (all joint projects with
France); and the multiple-launch rocket and NATO identifica-
tion systems, developed in cooperation with several NATO
countries.
Only in the aerospace and munitions industries does
defense account for 50 percent or more of sales. Among the
largest firms is Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), founded in 1989
to incorporate the aerospace and other defense activities of the
Daimler-Benz group. DASA has a controlling interest in Mess-
erschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), located at Ottobrunn near
Munich, which produces combat aircraft, helicopters, and
HOT, Milan, and Exocet missiles. It also controls Dornier,
which produces various equipment and aircraft and which has
been a major contractor in the EFA program. Motoren und
Turbinen Union (MTU), another unit of DASA, is a large pro-
ducer of parts for aircraft, ships, and tanks.
Rheinmetall Berlin, another major defense contractor, pro-
duces armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions. Rheinmetall
is based in Berlin and Dusseldorf. In 1991 it assumed a control-
ling interest in Krupp Mak Maschinenbau, thereby adding
tracked armored vehicles, such as the Marder, to its output.
The Krupp industrial group's defense sector was thenceforth
limited to naval weapons systems. AEG-Telefunken is a leading
supplier of electronics and radar; Krauss-Maffei of Munich pro-
duces the Leopard tank.
According to ACDA, known German exports of arms were
valued at an estimated US$1.1 billion in 1993 and constituted
0.3 percent of total German exports; arms imports had a value
of US$250 million and amounted to 0.1 percent of total
imports. During the 1991-93 period, nearly half of Germany's
arms transfers were made to other NATO countries, notably
Portugal, Greece, the United States, Turkey, and Norway. Swit-
zerland, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Finland
were also substantial clients, while smaller quantities were
shipped to Singapore and Colombia. In the Middle East, arms
valued at US$820 million were exported to five countries dur-
ing this period, Saudi Arabia taking US$525 million and Israel
US$200 million.
West Germany's grant-type military assistance to other
NATO countries focused on Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. The
major recipient was Turkey, a beneficiary of German military
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aid since 1964. Arms transfers included Leopard tanks, Milan
antitank missiles, and retrofit kits for M-48 tanks. West Ger-
many also assisted Turkey with infrastructure and defense man-
ufacturing facilities.
Although West Germany imposed controls on weapons
exports, repeated charges have been made that arms ship-
ments by private West German suppliers were not carefully
monitored. In the 1980s, evidence mounted that West German
firms were instrumental in assisting Iraq and Libya in develop-
ing weapons of mass destruction. In 1988, based on informa-
tion supplied by the United States implicating West German
firms in the construction of a poison gas plant at Rabka, Libya,
the owner of one company was sentenced to prison for illegal
exports and tax evasion. In early 1993, the German govern-
ment announced that German firms were being investigated
for delivering equipment for a second chemical weapons fac-
tory in Libya. In a report issued in 1991 by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, thirteen Western companies, more
than half of them German, were identified as having contrib-
uted to the Iraqi nuclear program.
In 1992, after extensive international publicity over the inad-
equate enforcement of arms controls, the Bundestag approved
legislation to create a new government monitoring agency. The
new law authorized screening of mail and use of wiretaps to
facilitate investigations of suspected violators. Harsher punish-
ments could be imposed, including confiscation of profits from
illicit arms sales and imprisonment of company officers.
Under German arms policy, export permits are denied for
the sale of weapons to areas of tension. This policy has applied
in particular to the Middle East, where Germany felt a moral
obligation to avoid actions that could endanger Israel. In 1992,
despite a ban imposed by the Bundestag, at least fifteen Leo-
pard tanks were shipped to Turkey, where they were apparently
used by the Turkish army to attack strongholds of the rebel
Kurdish Workers' Party. The minister of defense, Gerhard Stol-
tenberg, claimed that the shipment had been approved with-
out his knowledge. Nevertheless, Stoltenberg was forced to
resign from the government in the ensuing uproar.
In early 1993, the Bundestag disapproved the delivery of
submarines and frigates to the Taiwan government, although
SAM systems produced in conjunction with the United States
were approved for sale under the rationale that they were
purely defensive weapons. Diesel engines for a large quantity of
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Germany: A Country Study
French tanks sold to the United Arab Emirates were also
approved for export.
Domestic critics of Germany's arms export practices assert
that German firms have easily circumvented controls through
coproduction schemes or deliveries of key parts to other coun-
tries; through licensed production in other countries of arms
that reach prohibited users; through the sale of technology and
whole weapons plants, of which Germany is the world's fore-
most exporter; and through sales of items improperly labeled
civilian goods. Critics claim that the UN embargo on arms sales
to South Africa was violated by false labeling of troop transport
vehicles, helicopters, and minesweepers.
Foreign Military Relations
Since the end of World War II, the military forces of six
NATO Allies have been deployed in West Germany — first as
occupation troops. Soviet troops were stationed in East Ger-
many as part of the Warsaw Pact forces. Although the United
States maintained the largest of the foreign NATO contingents,
Britain and France also deployed substantial forces. Belgium,
Canada, and the Netherlands maintained smaller troop units,
heavily dependent on reinforcement to be of value in crises.
Events in Europe culminating in German unification in Octo-
ber 1990, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian
compliance with the terms of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty to evac-
uate its troops from the territory of the former East Germany
by late 1994 ended the necessity for NATO to maintain large
standing forces in the European theater. As a result, all NATO
countries have made deep cuts in their forces based in Ger-
many.
Germany grants NATO forces on its territory the use of mili-
tary installations and training areas free of charge — airfields,
barracks, schools, hospitals, and logistics facilities. Thousands
of housing units have been placed at the disposal of the station-
ing countries. The financial value of German support for Allied
bases is balanced in some degree by the impact of Allied wages
paid to German employees, orders by Allied forces placed with
German firms, and spending by soldiers and their families in
Germany. By the 1980s and the 1990s, the physical burden of
providing bases for large numbers of Allied troops had become
a cause of widespread complaint. Low-level training flights and
large-scale exercises that sometimes result in injuries and prop-
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erty damage are particular sources of discontent, especially
when carried out at night or on weekends.
By early 1995, about 100,000 United States troops were still
stationed in Germany. United States army forces in Germany
include one army headquarters, one corps headquarters, and
two divisions; the air force has two air force headquarters, one
tactical fighter wing, one combat support wing, one air control
wing, and one airlift wing. Armor and other weapons are stock-
piled for units in the United States earmarked as reinforce-
ments for Europe.
British forces in Germany numbered about 38,000 in mid-
1995. British forces in Germany include one corps headquar-
ters (multinational), one armored division, and an air force
group headquarters and two air bases. Belgium and the Neth-
erlands maintain about 10,000 and 3,000 troops, respectively.
France maintained about 15,000 troops in Germany as of
mid-1995, reduced from 44,000 in 1989. Most of these troops
are part of the Eurocorps. The position of France among
NATO countries maintaining forces in Germany is unique.
French units are not committed to NATO, and the participa-
tion of France in the event of conflict is subject to a decision by
the French president. Nevertheless, French staff and troops
cooperate in certain NATO exercises and maneuvers.
International Military Missions
In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that
Bundeswehr units could participate in UN and other opera-
tions outside the NATO area if such actions had the approval
of the Bundestag. That decision was preceded by much politi-
cal controversy in the early 1990s, including charges from
opponents of out-of-area deployment of Bundeswehr elements
that provisions of the Basic Law were being ignored (see The
Out-of-Area Debate, ch. 8).
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Germany received inter-
national criticism for its unwillingness to assume a role propor-
tionate to its military power and political importance. The
strong pacifist streak in German society again manifested itself
in anti-United States and antiwar demonstrations that contrib-
uted to an impression in some quarters of German indiffer-
ence to Iraq's aggression. Germany did make a contribution of
US$10 billion to the UN operation against Iraq, but its military
actions were confined to the NATO area. German naval units
and mine countermeasure ships were shifted to the Mediterra-
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Germany: A Country Study
nean to cover for NATO vessels sent to the Persian Gulf. After
hostilities ended, German ships took part in mine-clearing
operations in the gulf. German Alpha Jets and air defense mis-
siles were deployed to Turkey, largely as a political gesture to
demonstrate solidarity with other NATO countries involved in
the conflict with Iraq. Later, German troops and helicopters
were sent to northern Iran and Iraq to aid Kurdish refugees.
In December 1992, the government pledged to provide
some 1,600 troops to regions of Somalia where peace had been
restored to assist in reconstruction and the distribution of
relief goods. The contingent included specialized logistic and
medical units plus a small protective detachment of infantry
troops. Despite political opposition, the government said it was
determined to deploy troops to areas of Somalia where there
was no fighting. German troops subsequently participated suc-
cessfully in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNO-
SOMII).
German armed forces participated to a limited extent in sev-
eral other UN-organized operations, generally ones with a
humanitarian purpose that would evoke minimal criticism that
the Basic Law was being flouted. In 1992 a group of some 150
Bundeswehr medical personnel went to Cambodia to provide
health care to the 2,200 members of the UN mission in that
nation. Amid objections from opposition parties, a destroyer
and three reconnaissance aircraft were sent to join forces from
seven other NATO countries in an attempt to monitor the UN
embargo of Serbia. German troops were involved in delivery of
food to the besieged city of Sarajevo but avoided airdrops that
could result in conflict. Service by German crews on unarmed
NATO reconnaissance aircraft to help enforce the "no-fly zone"
was only narrowly approved by the Federal Constitutional
Court.
Internal Security
The German legal system is the product of many centuries of
development, starting with the tribal laws of the first Germans.
Those indigenous customs were influenced and changed
under Roman law and later by the laws that prevailed in the
Holy Roman Empire. Feudal law also had a strong influence.
When more formal law and legal institutions appeared in the
eighteenth century, codes of law and police systems were left to
the individual territorial entities. The codes that evolved were
mixtures of German, Roman, and ecclesiastical law.
504
German soldiers serving with United Nations peacekeeping forces
arrive in Somalia in 1993.
Courtesy German Information Center, New York
The drive toward political unification during the nineteenth
century was accompanied by a trend toward legal unification,
especially in commercial matters. In other areas of law, how-
ever, the prerogatives of each political entity still governed.
Only after the achievement of political unification under Prus-
sian dominance in 1871 was a start made on drawing up Ger-
man legal codes.
The codes and laws on police and penal institutions adopted
after unification showed in varying degrees the influence of
the Napoleonic Code. Patterns were established that, despite
modifications, continued to prevail. The most important of the
early models were the Penal Code of 1871, defining three
classes of imprisonment still in use in 1995; the procedural
codes of 1877; the law of 1877 establishing a unified court sys-
tem; and the comprehensive Civil Code, which took effect in its
full scope of 2,385 paragraphs in 1900.
Parallel with the courts and laws, there developed a structure
of penal institutions and a police system, both characterized by
the efficiency for which German administrative organs had
long been noted. Although their administration was somewhat
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Germany: A Country Study
relaxed during the Weimar period (1918-33), these bureaucra-
cies tended toward rigidity. The police and penal authorities
saw their positions and responsibilities as servants of the state
as overshadowing any obligation of service to the people.
When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they capitalized on
the tendencies of the legal bureaucracy, centralizing control of
the police and administration of the courts and making wide-
spread use of special courts. Ostensibly, the laws and institu-
tions remained the same. However, the spirit of the law and the
legal system were gradually and totally subverted by the agenda
of the Nazi leadership. When the "sound instincts of the peo-
ple" demanded it, as interpreted by the Nazis, the rule of law
was completely ignored.
The impact of Nazi ideology was greatest on the Criminal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Reich
greatly broadened the definition of criminal activity, particu-
larly in the category of crimes against the state, and made pun-
ishment much harsher. The Code of Criminal Procedure was
distorted almost beyond recognition by the activities of the
Nazi-inspired People's Court, in which those convicted of
crimes against the state were often sentenced to death. In
twelve years, an extensive network of special and summary
courts of indeterminate jurisdiction was developed.
The police, whose powers and responsibilities were signifi-
cantly broadened, became tools of the ruling party under the
direct control of the minister of interior. The regular police —
including city and town forces, motorized gendarmerie in rural
areas, and administrative police, who administered codes and
regulations — were supplemented by much more powerful
internal security units. These included the Security Police
(Sicherheitspolizei), which incorporated the Criminal Investi-
gation Police and the Border Police, as well as the newly
formed Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei — Gestapo) .
Two other of Hitler's organizations, the Storm Troops (Sturm-
abteilung — SA) and the Guard Detachment (Schutz-Staffel —
SS), in company with the Gestapo, became infamous as instru-
ments of Nazi brutality.
After World War II, each of the Allied authorities permitted
the formation of West German police forces, although under
terms that reflected their own police structures and traditions.
In all three Western zones, however, the police were decentral-
ized, democratized, and demilitarized. Some restrictions were
lifted within two years as Cold War tensions grew, and certain
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National Security
police functions necessitated central rather than local direc-
tion. The Federal Border Force was created to handle special
functions that overlapped Landjurisdictions. In addition to this
force, federal agencies were created to handle interstate crimi-
nal matters and overall security affairs.
Federal Police Agencies
Established in 1951, the Federal Border Force (Bundes-
grenzschutz — BGS) was the first federal police organization
permitted by the Allied occupation authorities. During the
early 1950s, there were frequent incidents on the borders with
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the occupation author-
ities became convinced of the need for a competent border
police. Even though the BGS is organized along paramilitary
lines, that is, in battalions, companies, and platoons, and is
armed as light infantry, it remains a police force controlled by
the Ministry of Interior rather than by the Ministry of Defense.
The strength of the BGS was 24,000 in early 1995. The BGS is
equipped with armored cars, machine guns, automatic rifles,
tear gas, hand grenades, rifle grenades, and antitank weapons.
All personnel on border duty wear sidearms. Some units have
light aircraft and helicopters to facilitate rapid access to remote
border areas and for patrol and rescue missions. A coast guard
force (Bundesgrenzschutz-See) of approximately 550 members
forms a part of the BGS. It is equipped with fourteen large
patrol craft and several helicopters.
In addition to controlling Germany's border, the BGS serves
as a federal reserve force to deal with major disturbances and
other emergencies beyond the scope of Land police. The BGS
guards airports and foreign embassies, and several highly
trained detachments are available for special crisis situations
requiring demolition equipment, helicopters, or combat vehi-
cles. After shortcomings in police procedures and training
were revealed by the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the
1972 Olympics, a BGS task force known as Special Group 9
(BGS-9) was formed to deal with terrorist incidents, especially
hostage situations. The BGS-9 won world attention when it res-
cued eighty-six passengers on a Lufthansa airliner hijacked to
Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977.
A military rank structure similar to that of the Bundeswehr
was replaced in the mid-1970s by civil service-type personnel
grades. The service uniform is green, but field units also wear
camouflage fatigues and, at times, steel helmets.
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Germany: A Country Study
Another central police agency, the Federal Criminal Investi-
gation Office (Bundeskriminalamt — BKA), with approximately
3,000 agents, operates nationwide from headquarters in Wies-
baden. Similar in some respects to the United States Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the BKA is a clearinghouse for crimi-
nal intelligence records. It provides assistance to Lander in
forensic matters, research, and criminal investigations. It is also
the national point of contact for the International Criminal
Police Organization (Interpol). The BKA enters cases only
when requested by Land authorities, or in cases involving two
or more Lander. The BKA is involved in combating various ter-
rorist gangs, which have plagued the country since the 1960s.
Two federal agencies involved in security matters are the
Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst —
BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Consti-
tution (Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz — BfV). Based in
Munich, the BND is restricted to the investigation of threats
originating abroad. It depends heavily on wiretapping and
other surveillance techniques applied to international commu-
nications. Such activities are authorized only to counter the
danger of an armed threat to the country, but intelligence
authorities have pressed for the added power to monitor sus-
pected international traffickers of weapons and drugs. The BfV
is primarily a domestic intelligence-gathering service con-
cerned with espionage, treason, and sedition. It has no powers
of arrest and cannot use force, but it carries out surveillance
and supplies the BKA and other police agencies with informa-
tion on international crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and
other illegal activities. Its main office is in Cologne. Similar
offices exist in each Land; although they cooperate closely with
the federal office, they operate under the control of Land
authorities.
Land Police Agencies
Below the federal level, police forces are organized by the
Lander and are collectively known as Land police (Land-
polizei). The forces are organized by cities, towns, or rural
communities, but all are integral components of the police
forces of the Land in which they are located. The Land minister
of interior supervises police operations in his or her jurisdic-
tion. Although the internal organizations differ somewhat, all
Land police are divided into Protective Police (Schutzpolizei —
"Schupos"), a uniformed service carrying out routine law and
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order duties, and Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei — "Kripos"),
who carry out criminal investigations. The separate Administra-
tive Police formerly had duties that included the registration of
residents and the issuance of passports, identity cards, and vari-
ous permits. These functions have been transferred to civil gov-
ernment departments in nearly all Lander.
Readiness Police (Bereitschaftspolizei — "Bepos") are avail-
able in each Land for riot control although their primary func-
tion is training police recruits. The Readiness Police receive
standardized weapons, vehicles, and communications equip-
ment from the federal government. An office in the federal
Ministry of Interior monitors and coordinates the deployment
of Readiness Police units, which can be called upon to assist the
police of other Lander in case of riots or other civil distur-
bances.
Although the Land police are regulated by sixteen different
legislatures and are, in fact, different police forces, there has
been an increasing tendency toward standardization of police
activities nationwide. Concerns about terrorism and the growth
of organized crime have strengthened the movement to cen-
tralize police procedures and operations. Since 1979 the police
of all Lander have worn the same uniform, consisting of a for-
est-green jacket, brown trousers, yellow shirt, and white cap.
An ordinary police officer (Polizeihauptwachtmeister) wears a
single green star on his or her shoulder straps, denoting rank
in the first echelon of the police service. In the regular progres-
sion, a uniformed police officer may expect to retire at age
sixty with the rank of Hauptmeister (four green stars). The rank
of Polizeikommissar (one silver star), corresponding to the
former rank of police lieutenant, is the first step of the upper
echelon, which ascends through Ersterhauptkommissar (four sil-
ver stars). The highest echelon of the police begins with Polizei-
rat (one gold star) and culminates with the Land director of
police (gold half-wreath with one star). About 10 percent of the
police attain the upper echelon, and 1 percent reach the high-
est executive level.
Unlike the military services, which do not recruit women,
the Land police have had women members since the forces
were reconstituted after World War II. Initially, female officers
were assigned to cases involving juveniles and women, working
in plainclothes without weapons. Since the mid-1970s, police-
women have performed general police duties; many fill the
uniformed ranks, although their acceptance varies by Land.
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Germany: A Country Study
Women are not, however, included in units of the Readiness
Police or the BGS.
Police training is primarily the responsibility of the individ-
ual Lander, although the federal government provides assis-
tance and coordination. The high level of police
professionalism is attributed in large degree to the length and
thoroughness of training. The situation is different in the five
new Lander of eastern Germany. Long accustomed to a compli-
ant society, police forces of the eastern Lander have been
described as understaffed, undertrained, poorly equipped, and
woefully unprepared to cope with the challenges posed by the
growing numbers of skinheads and neo-Nazis engaged in vio-
lent hate crimes against foreign workers and refugees.
Most police recruits spend about three years in combined
training and service in the Readiness Police, although the
training time may be shorter depending on previous educa-
tion. Recruits are exempt from military service. Training
encompasses a six-month course at a police school that pro-
vides a grounding in law, legal procedures, and police conduct.
After about six years of duty as a patrol officer, an individual
with an outstanding record who does well on a highly competi-
tive examination can go on to two or three years at a higher
police school or a college of public administration to qualify
for the upper echelon. The very few candidates who qualify for
the highest ranks of the police study for one year at the Federal
Police Leadership Academy in Munster-Hiltrup.
The Readiness Police are assigned to barracks where they
are organized along military lines into squads, platoons, and
120- to 150-member training or standby companies. In most
Lander, the Readiness Police contingent consists of one 600- to
800-member battalion, but in six of the larger Lander they are
organized into regiments. Duties vary according to local
requirements. In Hamburg, for example, Readiness Police
patrol the subway system, assist in police raids in the red-light
district, and are present at large demonstrations and soccer
matches. Their units are equipped with their own transport,
tents, and rations, enabling them to be shifted quickly to other
Lander without having to rely on outside support. The Readi-
ness Police have water cannons and armored vehicles but are
armed with lighter weapons than those of the BGS.
The Criminal Police enjoy greater prestige and generally
receive more compensation than Protective Police officers with
comparable service time. Most Criminal Police candidates are
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regular police officers who have done well in police school and
in their first years of street duty. After rigorous screening and
examination, a small number are chosen to receive a technical
education in criminology at a police college. Those completing
the course then serve a three-year apprenticeship before attain-
ing full status in the Criminal Police.
Criminal Justice
Law in Germany is codified and is predominantly federal.
The Penal Code is a revised version of a legal code introduced
after the unification of Germany in 1871 and is therefore influ-
enced by Prussian legal concepts. The system of criminal jus-
tice is derived from the civil law, rather than the common law
that provides the basis for the systems used in Britain and the
United States. In its modern development in Western Europe,
including Germany, civil law incorporates ideas of nonconfine-
ment punishments, work-release programs, and other mea-
sures aimed at rehabilitation rather than the mere isolation of
a criminal from society. Toward these goals, the West German
state in the mid-1970s promulgated the revised Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure and the Federal Prison Act. West Germany also
joined several other civil-law countries by abolishing the death
penalty, which was done under the Basic Law. East Germany
abolished the death penalty in 1987.
Even before the unification of Germany was completed in
1990, East German laws had been modified to delete provisions
empowering authorities to detain people for exercising free-
dom of expression, association, assembly, and movement. The
East German prison population fell from 24,000 to 5,000 per-
sons because so many political crimes had been abolished. Fol-
lowing unification, West Germany's criminal code was adopted,
with minor modifications.
Criminal cases get their initial hearing at any of the courts of
the three-tiered Land system — local courts, regional or Land
courts, and the higher regional (appellate) Land courts — and
can be appealed or revised from the lowest to the next two lev-
els or from all three courts to the highest court in the criminal
justice system — the Federal Court of Justice (see the Judiciary,
ch. 7). Prosecutions leading to a maximum sentence of one
year are heard by a judge of the local court. In more serious
cases involving possible sentences of up to three years, the
judge is assisted by two lay judges, comparable to jury members
in a common law system. Criminal cases in which the sentence
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Germany: A Country Study
exceeds three years are referred to a Land court, where they
are heard by three judges and three to six lay judges. A Land
court of appeal presided over by five judges usually hears only
appeals from the lower courts, plus cases concerning extraordi-
nary crimes in violation of the Basic Law, such as treason and
genocide.
Individual rights of citizens are guaranteed in the Basic Law
and in the country's statutes. The law prevents police from sub-
jecting suspects to physical abuse, torture, drugs, deceit, and
hypnosis. The record of the police in conforming to these
guidelines is good. A suspect has to be brought before a judge
no later than the day following arrest, and the judge is obliged
to issue a warrant of arrest specifying reasons for detention or
else release the suspect. A relative or another person selected
by the detainee has to be notified immediately of any detention
lasting beyond the day after arrest. Accused persons have the
right of free access to legal counsel, although this right has
been restricted in the cases of some terrorists who used con-
tacts with lawyers to continue terrorist activity while in prison.
Bail bonds exist but are seldom employed. Criminal trials are
held in public; protection against double jeopardy and the
usual guarantees of due process are observed.
The judiciary is free from political influence and intimida-
tion by terrorists. Substantial progress has been made in
reforming the court system of the former East Germany to
meet West German standards. Nevertheless, many experienced
East German judges had to be disqualified for political and
judicial reasons. Judges introduced from West Germany are
handicapped by the unfamiliar circumstances in which they are
required to function.
Incidence of Crime and Incarceration
Criminal acts are classified as felonies or misdemeanors, the
latter encompassing less serious crimes but including many acts
considered felonies in most common-law countries. Crimes cat-
egorized as misdemeanors include extortion, fraud, larceny,
and even negligent homicide. Felonies are punishable by
prison sentences of one year or more; misdemeanors can be
punished by shorter prison terms, by combined imprisonment
and fines, or solely by fines.
By far the largest number of persons convicted in German
courts are fined. In 1991, although nearly 600,000 persons
were sentenced for criminal acts in the old Lander, the number
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National Security
of persons committed to prison was only about 100,000. About
80 percent of this number were sentenced to a prison term of
less than one year, 16 percent were sentenced to between one
and five years, and 1 percent were sentenced to between five
and fifteen years. Fifty-six persons received life sentences in
1991.
Approximately 43.8 percent of the 6,750,000 crimes regis-
tered in 1993 were solved by the authorities. By far the largest
category of crime was theft, which accounted for 61.5 percent
of the total, followed by damage to property (8.6 percent),
fraud (7.8 percent), and crimes of violence (2.4 percent). In
the old Lander and including all of Berlin, there were 4,230
murders and incidents of manslaughter, of which 84.7 percent
were solved by the authorities.
According to federal police data, the crime rate has
increased since unification in 1990, especially in the new
Lander, where the crime rate before unification was lower than
that of the old Lander. During 1991 the number of criminal
offenses recorded amounted to 5 million, compared with 6.3
million in 1992 and nearly 6.8 million in 1993. To some extent,
the upsurge in crime was associated with the radical upheaval
in the former East Germany and the accompanying loss of jobs
and benefits. In 1993, for example, the number of registered
crimes in the new Lander amounted to 1.4 million, compared
with 1.1 million in 1992. The old Lander and all of Berlin, in
contrast, had 5.3 million registered crimes in 1993, compared
with 5.2 million in 1992.
The large concentration of refugees, foreign workers, and
illegal immigrants, combined with weaker border controls, has
attracted a growing underworld of organized crime in Berlin
and in other major German cities, which have a crime rate
three times higher than towns with fewer than 20,000 inhabit-
ants. The most common crimes involve narcotics, automobile
theft (especially of late-model luxury cars), arms smuggling,
counterfeiting, prostitution, gambling, and white-collar crime.
Germany is both a market for narcotics and a transshipment
point for drugs destined for Scandinavia and Britain. Mari-
juana enters from the Middle East and North Africa, cocaine
from Central and South America, and heroin from Pakistan,
Turkey, and Southeast Asia.
Dissidence and Terrorist Activity
Opposition to the West German government has existed
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Germany: A Country Study
since its inception in 1949, and, in keeping with German tradi-
tion, radical students have sometimes been in the front ranks
of those protesting various policies and situations: the use of
nuclear power and the presence of atomic weapons; the gov-
ernment's policy toward the universities; and United States
involvement in Vietnam and in the Persian Gulf War. Violence
and injuries to both sides were common in confrontations
between protesters and police. By the 1960s, individuals on the
fringes of mainstream student organizations dropped out to
form extremist groups. A lethal succession of terrorist activities
followed, continuing throughout the 1970s and at a somewhat
reduced level in the 1980s.
The left-wing Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion —
RAF) became internationally known through its bloody
exploits in West Germany and through its contacts with terror-
ist groups in other countries. The RAF was an outgrowth of the
Baader-Meinhof Gang, which held up banks, bombed police
stations, and attacked United States army bases in the 1970s. By
1975 some ninety members of the gang were in custody. In the
middle of her trial in 1976, Ulrike Meinhof, one of the RAF
ringleaders, committed suicide in prison. Another member,
Andreas Baader, was sentenced to life imprisonment, but in
1977 he too took his own life in prison.
By the early 1980s, the original leaders of the RAF had been
succeeded by a new and equally violent group that was Marxist-
Leninist in orientation and saw itself as part of an international
movement to topple the power structures of the capitalist
world. A core group of twenty to thirty terrorists carried out the
most deadly operations of the RAF. Periodic attacks were
mounted against United States and NATO military leaders and
bases and against prominent German officials and business-
people. Demonstrations were held throughout the country to
support a hunger strike by RAF prisoners and to protest the
introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. RAF vio-
lence had declined somewhat by 1990, although the RAF and
other left-wing radical groups like the Revolutionary Cells car-
ried out attacks against United States government and business
targets. In November 1989, the chief executive of the Deutsche
Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was assassinated. In April 1991,
Detlev Rohwedder, the director of the Treuhandanstalt (Trust
Agency), the mammoth agency charged with privatizing East
German state enterprises, was murdered by terrorists with con-
nections to the Stasi. In August 1992, the RAF published a
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lengthy statement admitting past errors and announcing a
decision to suspend the strategy of violence in carrying on its
struggle.
By the early 1990s, attention had shifted to violence by neo-
Nazi and other right-wing fringe groups. The fanaticism of the
xenophobic rightists was fueled by the presence of large num-
bers of foreign workers and by the increasing number of aliens
seeking political asylum in the country. Legal but extreme
right-wing parties such as the German People's Union (Deut-
sche Volksunion — DVP) and the Republikaner (Die Republi-
kaner — REP) maintained their legal status by avoiding Nazi
symbols and propaganda and keeping their distance from
smaller neo-Nazi groups. With members numbering mostly in
the low hundreds, the latter tended to be splintered and indis-
tinct, which helped them evade bans and government surveil-
lance.
Right-wing extremism found new supporters in the wake of
the unemployment and turmoil that accompanied German
unification. In both the eastern and western parts of Germany,
outbreaks of violence were sparked by the growth of racial and
ethnic intolerance. The federal police reported 2,285 acts of
rightist violence in 1992, a sevenfold increase over the number
reported in 1990. Seventeen deaths resulted. The greatest
number of perpetrators were youths under the age of twenty.
The police count of known right-wing extremists, estimated at
some 40,000 in the early 1990s, slightly exceeded the estimated
number of left-wing extremists. Some 6,400 of these extreme
right-wingers were considered prone to violence. Their attacks
were directed against asylum-seekers, migrants from Eastern
Europe, nonwhites, and in some cases homosexuals, prosti-
tutes, and members of the former Soviet armed forces. Some of
the most serious outrages, such as street assaults and firebomb-
ings of hostels for foreigners, occurred in gritty eastern indus-
trial centers — Rostock, Chemnitz, Cottbus, and Leipzig. The
west, however, was not immune to such violence, and deaths
occurred in bombing incidents in Molln in late 1992 and in
Solingen in mid-1993.
The police were accused of responding slowly when hostel
residents were threatened and of treating neo-Nazis too gently,
often releasing without charge those allegedly involved in ter-
rorizing hostel-dwellers. Courts handed down mild sentences,
in most cases probation or brief jail terms. Western police units
had to be deployed to the eastern region to help control the
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Germany: A Country Study
violence. Under pressure to act more forcefully, the federal
police raided premises occupied by the neo-Nazis to gain evi-
dence to suppress them. In December 1992, the federal Minis-
try of Interior banned four small neo-Nazi groups and also
placed the Republikaner under observation to determine
whether the organization could be banned as undemocratic
under the constitution. A new federal police division to moni-
tor and repress rightist violence was also announced at that
time.
These actions soon bore fruit, and in 1993 the number of
deaths caused by right-wing violence fell to eight and declined
still further in 1994. Tough sentences on right-wing extremists
acted as a deterrent to violence, and a tightening of the coun-
try's liberal asylum law in May 1993 reduced social tensions
about the large number of foreigners living in Germany (see
Political Developments since Unification, ch. 7).
International terrorist organizations are represented among
several of the colonies of workers and asylum-seekers in Ger-
many. Although more than 2 million Muslims from Turkey, the
Middle East, and North Africa live in the cities of western Ger-
many, only a tiny minority can be considered political extrem-
ists. In the 1980s, members of the Palestinian groups Hizballah
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command had been involved in airline hijackings and attacks
on United States service members. During the same decade,
members of the Kurdish Workers' Party bombed and staged
violent protests at the offices of the Turkish government in
Germany, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army carried
out several attacks against British military targets in Germany.
The number of incidents of international terrorism abated
during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, however, in
part because of more determined investigation and prosecu-
tion of international terrorism by the German police and judi-
ciary authorities.
* * *
The literature on the German military is vast. Readers seek-
ing an introduction to the subject can consult Gordon A.
Craig's classic and widely available The Politics of the Prussian
Army, 1640-1945. The same author's The Battle of Koniggratz
explains why Prussia defeated Austria in 1866. Makers of Modern
Strategy, edited by Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gil-
516
National Security
bert, presents several of Germany's military thinkers. Donald
Abenheim's Reforging the Iron Cross, published in 1988, exam-
ines the contradictions between the military traditions of the
past and the modern concept of "citizens in uniform."
The information on current staffing levels and equipment of
the Bundeswehr reported in this chapter is derived from the
1994-95 edition of The Military Balance, an annual produced by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Jane's
Fighting Ships, 1994-95.
Geoffrey Van Orden, a British general who has served in
Germany, appraises the changes in sight for the Bundeswehr as
it shifts to a new role in "The Bundeswehr in Transition," in the
London-based journal Survival Thomas-Durell Young of the
Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War Col-
lege examines military reforms in The "Normalization" of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany's Defense Structures. The commander of
Germany's Eastern Corps, Lieutenant General Werner von
Scheven, describes how the Bundeswehr approached one of its
most difficult problems in "The Merger of Two Formerly Hos-
tile German Armies" in the English-language edition of Aussen-
politik.
In German Police, Erika S. Fairchild discusses law enforce-
ment under the German system, as does Jurgen Thomaneck in
his article "Germany" in Police and Public Order in Europe, edited
by John Roach and Jurgen Thomaneck. The United States
Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices and its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism summarize
the threat to internal security and assess police efforts to pre-
vent violence. (For further information and complete citations,
see Bibliography.)
517
Appendix
Table
1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
2 Presidents of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-
3 Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-
4 Composition of the Bundestag by Party, 1949-
5 German Population, Selected Years, 1850-1990
6 Population of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic, Selected Years, 1950-90
7 Population, Area, and Capitals of the Lander, December 31,
1992
8 Cities with Population over 250,000, January 1, 1993
9 Registered Foreign Residents in Germany by Nationality,
Selected Years, 1961-92
10 Principal Causes of Death by Gender, 1991 and 1992
1 1 Overview of Education System, Academic Year 1992-93
12 Real Changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1970-93
13 Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected
Years, 1985-93
14 Agricultural Production, 1993
15 Production of Selected Crops, 1991, 1992, and 1993
16 Germany's Thirty Largest Industrial Firms, 1993
17 Sources of Electricity, 1993
18 Sources of Imported Crude Petroleum by Country, 1993
19 Major Trading Partners, 1991, 1992, and 1993
20 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1986-93
21 Foreign Trade by Principal Commodity Group, Selected
Years, 1985-94
22 Land Legislative Elections, 1992-95
23 Major Army Equipment, 1994
24 Major Naval Equipment, 1994
25 Major Air Force Equipment, 1994
519
Appendix
Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
When you know
Multiply by
To find
Millimeters
0.04
inches
Centimeters
0.39
inches
Meters
3.3
feet
Kilometers
0.62
miles
Hectares
2.47
acres
Square kilometers
0.39
square miles
Cubic meters
35.3
cubic feet
Liters
0.26
gallons
Kilograms
2.2
pounds
Metric tons
0.98
long tons
1.1
short tons
2,204
pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)
1.8
degrees Fahrenheit
and add 32
Table 2. Presidents of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-
President
Years in Office
Former Party Affiliation
Theodor Heuss
1949-59
FDP 1
Heinrich Lubke
1959^69
CDU 2
Gustav Heinemann
1969-74
SPD 3
Walter Scheel
1974-79
FDP
Karl Carstens
1979-84
CDU
Richard von Weizsacker
1984-91
CDU
Roman Herzog
1994-
CDU
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party).
2 Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union).
3 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) .
Source: Based on information from David Childs, Germany in the Twentieth Century, New
York, 1991, 296.
521
Germany: A Country Study
Table 3. Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 949-
L)3.tc rormccl
Reason for
Change
vX)3iition z 3.rtncrs
Ljn3.n. ccllor
September 1949 . . .
Election
CDU/CSU, FDP, DP 1
Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
October 1953
-do-
CDU/CSU, FDP, DP,
All German Bloc/
Federation of
Expellees and Dis-
placed Persons
Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
October 1957
-do-
CDU/CSU, DP
Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
November 1961. . . .
-do-
CDU/CSU, FDP
Konrad Adenauer (CDU)
Drtr\hu=r 1 Qfi^
Chancellor
retirement
-do-
j_,uciwiy iLriid.ru \\jXJ\J)
October 1965
Election
-do-
Ludwig Erhard (CDU)
December 1966
Coalition
change
CDU/CSU, SPD 2
Kurt Georg Kiesinger
(CDU)
Drtnhpr 1 QfiQ
Election
SPD FDP
vv in y jji diiui ^ ox xj j
jjecemuer . . .
-do-
-do-
winy .Drd-iiui \or u )
Mnv 1 Q74
{~!Vt ^lT\Cf 3, \ \ c\T
retirement
-do-
Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
December 1976
Election
-do-
Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
November 1980
-do-
SPD, FDP
Helmut Schmidt (SPD)
October 1982
Constructive
no-confi-
dence vote
CDU/CSU, FDP
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
March 1983
Election
-do-
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
January 1987
-do-
-do-
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
December 1990
-do-
-do-
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
November 1994
-do-
-do
Helmut Kohl (CDU)
1 CDU/CSU — Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) /Christlich-Soziale Union
(Christian Social Union) , FDP — Freic Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) , DP — Deutsche Partei
(German Party) .
2 SPD — Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).
Source: Based on information from Russell J. Dal ton, Politics in Germany, New York,
1993, 64; and Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge], 40, No. 11, 1994,
40292.
522
Appendix
o o o o o o o
I I I I I I I I I I
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I I I I I I I I I fc
i— < >— < <7> © CM
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& £ »
^ Ol ^
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m<o<r><oi>r^ooaoaocr>o
O^OO^OCiCftCiCftO^C^C^
1 1
4a a
i s-
I f
.2 .a
5 I
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el?
lis
1 s
|| 3
S a- Oh
52*
§11
■a
a s
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523
Germany: A Country Study
Table 5. German Population, Selected Years, 1850-1990
(in
millions)
Year
Population
Year
Population
1850
35.3
1930
65.1
1860
37.6
1940
69.9
1870
40.8
1950
68.4
1880
45.1
1960
72.7
1890
49.2
1970
77.7
1900
56.0
1980
78.3
1910
64.6
1990
79.4
1920
61.8
Source: Based on information from David Childs, Germany in the Twentieth Century, New
York, 1991, 303; and Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt,
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1 994 far die Bundesrepubtik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994, 50.
524
Appendix
Table 6. Population of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic, Selected Years, 1950-90
(in thousands)
r> , , r, ... German
Year Federal Republic Dem0 cratic Total 1
1950 49,989 18,388 68,377
1955 52,382 17,944 70,326
1960 55,433 17,241 72,674
1965 58,619 17,028 75,647
1970 60,651 17,058 77,709
1975 61,847 16,850 78,697
1980 61,538 16,737 78,275
1981 61,663 16,736 78,399
1982 61,596 16,697 78,293
1983 61,383 16,699 78,081
1984 61,126 16,671 77,796
1985 60,975 16,644 77,619
1986 61,010 16,624 77,635
1987 61,077 16,641 77,718
1988 61,450 16,666 78,116
1989 62,063 16,614 78,677
1990 63,254 16,111 79,365
1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisch.es Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
50.
525
Germany: A Country Study
Table 7. Population, Area, and Capitals of the Lander, December 31,
1992
Population
Land
Capital
Area
(in square
kilometers)
Total (in
thousands)
Density
(persons
per square
kilometer)
Bs-d c n-Wur t tc m be rg"
Stuttgart
35,751
10,149
284
A/fi l t\ i rYi
1VJ1LL1J1 l^l I
70 554
11 770
167
Berlin
Berlin
889
3,466
3,898
Brandenburg 1
Potsdam
29,476
2,543
86
Bremen
Bremen
404
686
1,697
Hamburg
Hamburg
755
1,689
2,236
Hesse
Wiesbaden
21,114
5,923
281
Hanover
47,348
7,578
160
Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania
Schwerin
23,421
1,865
80
North Rhine-Westphalia. . .
Dusseldorf
34,072
17,679
519
Rhineland-Palatinate
Mainz
19,846
3,881
196
Saarbriicken
2,570
1,084
422
Saxony
Dresden
18,408
4,641
252
Saxony-Anhalt
Magdeburg
20,443
2,797
137
Schleswig-Holstein
Kiel
15,732
2,680
170
Thuringia
Erfurt
16,176
2,546
157
TOTAL 1
356,959
80,975
227
1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 jur die BundesrepublikDeutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
52.
526
Appendix
Table 8. Cities with Population over 250,000, January 1, 1993
City
Population City
Populs
Berlin
Hamburg
Munich
Cologne
Frankfurt am Main
Essen
Dortmund
Stuttgart
Diisseldorf
Bremen
Duisburg
Hanover
Nuremberg
Leipzig
Dresden
3,466,000
Bochum
1,689,000
Wuppertal
1,257,000
Bielefeld
aci AAA
yoi, uuu
664,000
Halle
627,000
Bonn
601,000
Gelsenkirchen
599,000
Chemnitz
578,000
554,000
Magdeburg
539,000
Wiesbaden
524,000
Munster
500,000
Monchengladbach
497,000
Augsburg
482,000
Braunschweig
400,000
388,000
324,000
318,000
300,000
298,000
295,000
284,000
279,000
273,000
268,000
267,000
265,000
265,000
258,000
Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., Der Fischer Weltalmanach,
1995, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 153.
527
Germany: A Country Study
Table 9. Registered Foreign Residents in Germany by Nationality,
SelectedYears, 1961-92 1
(in thousands)
Nationality 1961 1970 1987 1992
European Community
Greece
42
305
256
346
Italy
197
528
500
558
Portugal
1
48
69
99
Spain
44
239
129
134
Other
107
186
286
370
Total European
Community. . . .
391
1,306
1,240
1,507
Austria
57
123
150
185
Poland
n.a 3
17
121
286
Turkey
7
429
1,454
1,855
United States 4
15
48
76
104
Yugoslavia
16
410
552
1,018
Other
200
268
648
1,541
TOTAL
686
2,601
4,241
6,496
1 Prior to 1992, figures are for the former West Germany only.
2 Figures are for the European Community membership as of 1992: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
3 n.a — not available.
4 Figures do not include United States officials and military personnel based in Germany.
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
72.
528
Appendix
Table 10. Principal Causes of Death by Gender, 1991 and 1992
(in thousands)
1991 1992
Cause of Death
Males
Females
Males
Females
Cardiovascular diseases
190.4
265.4
182.0
255.3
Cancer
105.2
105.3
106.8
105.8
Respiratory diseases
29.7
24.1
28.2
22.2
Injuries and poisonings,
including traffic accidents
and suicides
28.0
18.7
27.2
17.6
Diseases of digestive tract
22.4
20.6
22.0
20.0
Neurological diseases
12.6
10.8
12.9
11.2
Diabetes
6.3
13.3
6.3
13.2
Diseases of reproductive system
and urinary tract
4.5
5.5
4.2
5.3
Other
22.7
25.7
21.0
24.3
TOTAL
421.8
489.4
410.6
474.9
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die BundesrepubUk Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
458.
529
Germany: A Country Study
Table 11. Overview of Education System, Academic Year 1992-93
Type of Institution
Number of
Schools
Number of
Teachers
Number of
Students
Primary and secondary schools
Grundschukn
17,941
208,768
3,419,584
Hauptschulen
9,209
101,939
1,483,229
Realschulen
3,634
59,176
1,056,739
Gymnasien
3,126
146,124
2,047,241
Gesamtschulen
930
48,419
493,406
Evening schools
352
3.734
48.606
Total primary and secondary
schools
35,192
568,160
8,548,805
Secondary vocational schools
Berufsschulen
3,233
56,779
1,796,452
Berufsaujbauschulen
230
423
6,564
2,612
22,103
263,592
740
4,983
75,461
Fachgymnasien
564
9,842
151,819
Total secondary vocational
/,3/y
y4,13U
Advanced vocational schools
1,537
10,953
171,693
Schools of higher education*
Universities
81
127,755 s
1,223,907
Comprehensive universities
7
8,732
136,731
Teacher-training colleges
8
n.a. 3
22,518
Theological seminaries
17
n.a.
2,828
Technical colleges
126
5.281 4
389,501
45
1,136
29,718
Colleges of administration
30
n.a.
53,252
Total schools of higher
education
314
142,904
1,858,455
TOTAL
44,422
816,147
12,872,841
1 Figures for numbers of schools and students are for the 1993-94 academic year; figures for number of
teachers are for the 1991-92 academic year in the territory of the former West Germany.
2 Includes teachers at teacher-training colleges and theological seminaries.
3 n.a. — not available.
4 Includes teachers at colleges of administration.
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
402-5,411,421.
530
Appendix
Table 12. Real Changes in Gross Domestic Product ( GDP) and in
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1970-93 1
(in percentage change from previous year)
Year GDP Exports Imports
1970-77 (average) 2.7 5.7 5.0
1978 3.0 2.9 5.5
1979 4.2 4.3 9.2
1980 1.0 5.2 3.6
1981 0.1 7.2 -3.1
1982 -0.9 3.9 -1.1
1983 1.8 -0.8 1.4
1984 2.8 8.2 5.2
1985 2.0 7.6 4.5
1986 2.3 -0.6 2.7
1987 1.5 0.4 4.2
1988 3.7 5.5 5.1
1989 3.6 10.2 8.3
1990 5.7 11.0 10.3
1991 5.0 10.9 11.6
1992 2.2 0.7 3.8
1993 -1.1 -£.4 -6.3
Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.
Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Main Economic Indicators [Paris], March 1995, A4, A12-A13.
531
Germany: A Country Study
Table 13. Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected
Years, 1985-93 1
(in billions of deutsche marks at current prices)
Sector
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
Agriculture, forestry, and
fishing
31.9
37.2
36.3
36.6
33.0
Mining, quarrying, and
energy
66.5
70.2
Manufacturing
578.9
741.0
> 1,075.1
1,126.9
1,096.6
Construction
94.8
127.5
Trade, transportation, and
communications
261.5
346.6
406.2
416.8
419.8
Government
207.3
253.2
382.0
418.2
439.7
Nonprofit organizations
and work done at
home
42.7
58.3
J- 916.3
1,029.2
1,118.5
Other services
539.7
791.2
TOTAL 3
1,823.2
2,425.2
2,815.9
3,027.6
3,107.5
Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.
For value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary.
Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Economic Surveys, 1993-1994: Germany, Paris, 1994, 150.
532
Appendix
Table 14. Agricultural Production, 1993
(in percentages of total production)
Product Percentage
Animal products
Milk 25.6
Hogs 15.2
Catde 13.8
Eggs 3-1
Other 2 _Ai
Total animal products 61.1
Plant products
Grains 11.2
Fruit 6.3
Sugar beets 4.2
Flowers and decorative plants 4.2
Wine 3.2
Potatoes 1.8
Oilseed 1.1
Other 3 6.7
Total plant products 38.7
Services 0.2
TOTAL 100.0
1 Agricultural production amounted to DM64.4 billion (for value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary) in
1993.
2 Includes poultry, horses, sheep, and wool.
3 Includes other vegetables, hops, tobacco, and seeds.
Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., Der Fischer Weltalmanach,
1995, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 921.
533
Germany: A Country Study
Table 15. Production of Selected Crops, 1991, 1992, and 1993
(in thousands of tons)
Crop
1991
1992
1993
Apples
365
1,378
931
Barley
14,494
12,197
11,006
Beans, broad (dry)
87
56
83
Beans, green
48
59
47
Cabbage
679
714
746
225
232
293
Cauliflower ,
166
150
151
1,937
2,139
2,657
Cucumbers and gherkins
124
142
118
126
170
170
Grains, mixed
1,035
1,145
1,405
1,373
1,806
1,440
Oats
1,867
1,314
1,731
Onions (dry)
156
201
217
Pears
13
55
43
13
63
31
Potatoes
10,201
10,897
12,260
Rapeseed
2,972
2,617
2,848
Rye
3,324
2,423
2,984
Strawberries
54
55
59
Sugar beets
25,926
27,150
28,606
126
161
210
Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1995, 1, London, 1995,
1294.
534
Appendix
Table 16. Germany's Thirty Largest Industrial Firms, 1993
Firm
Sales
(in billions of
deutsche marks) 1
Employees
(in thousands)
Daimler-Benz
97.7
366.7
81.6
391.0
Volkswagen
76.6
253.0
VERA
66.3
128.3
RWE
55.8
118.0
Hoechst
46.0
172.5
BASF
43.1
112.0
Bayer
41.0
151.9
Thyssen
33.5
141.0
32.5
156.6
BMW
29.0
71.0
28.0
127.7
Metallgesellschaft
26.1
42.6
VIAG
23.7
80.7
Ruhrkohle
23.4
111.2
Preussag
23.3
73.3
Adam Opel
23.0
50.8
21.4
3.2
Ford
21.2
43.8
Hoesch-Krupp
20.5
78.4
1 O A
MAN
19.0
57.8
Bertelsmann
17.2
50.5
Degussa
14.9
32.1
Deutsche BP
14.7
2.8
Ruhrgas
14.3
11.6
Henkel
14.1
40.5
IBM Deutschland
12.6
25.0
Ph. Holzmann
12.5
43.8
Agiv
10.0
42.7
For value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary.
Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., Der Fischer Weltalmanach,
1995, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 997-98.
535
Germany: A Country Study
Table 1 7. Sources of Electricity, 1 993
(in percentages of total production)
Source
Former West
Germany 1
Former East
Germany 2
33.9
3
31.9
Lignite
17.9
91.5
Natural gas
6.6
3.3
Hydroelectric power
4.4
2.3
Petroleum
1.9
1.5
Other.
3.4
1.4
TOTAL
100.0
100.0
Electricity production amounted to 453.2 billion kilowatt-hours in 1993.
2 Electricity production amounted to 72.9 billion kilowatt-hours in 1993.
3 — means no production from this source.
Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., Der Fischer Weltalmanach,
1995, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 1005-6.
Table 18. Sources of Imported Crude Petroleum by Country, 1993
(in percentages of total imports) 1
Country Percentage
Norway 18.4
CIS 2 17.4
Britain 12.4
Libya 11.6
Saudi Arabia 8.2
Algeria 7.8
Nigeria 7.7
Venezuela 5.4
Syria 5.4
Iran 2.5
Kuwait 1.0
Other 3 2.2
TOTAL 100.0
1 Crude petroleum imports amounted to 99.5 million tons in 1993.
2 Commonwealth of Independent States.
3 Includes Angola, Yemen, Tunisia, and others.
Source: Based on information from Mario von Baratta, ed., Der Fischer Weltalmanach,
1995, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 972.
536
Appendix
Table 19. Major Trading Partners, 1991, 1992, and 1993
(in percentages of total value)
Country 1991 1992 1993
Exports
13.1
13.0
11.7
Italy
9.2
9.3
7.2
Netherlands
8.4
8.3
7.4
Britain .
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.3
7.4
6.6
United States
6.3
6.4
7.7
Austria
5.9
5.9
6.2
Switzerland
5.7
5.3
5.6
Spain
4.0
4.1
3.2
Former Soviet Union
2.7
2.1
2.6
Tap an
J r
2.5
2.2
2.6
Sweden
2.3
2.2
2.1
Other
25.1
26.2
29.4
Total exports 1
100.0
100.0
100.0
n ports
France
12.2
12.0
11.2
9.7
9.6
8.3
Italy
9.3
9.2
8.1
7.1
7.0
5.7
Britain
6.6
6.8
6.0
United States
6.6
6.6
7.4
Japan
6.2
6.0
6.3
Austria
4.2
4.4
4.8
3.9
4.0
4.4
Spain
2.6
2.7
2.6
Former Soviet Union
2.2
2.0
2.4
China
1.8
1.8
2.6
Other
27.5
27.9
30.2
Total imports 1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994 fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stuttgart, 1994,
322.
537
Germany: A Country Study
Table 20. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1986-93
(in billions of deutsche marks)
1986
1989
1991
1993
Exports, f.o.b. 3
526.4
641.0
665.8
603.5
-413.7
-506.5
-643.9
-543.7
Supplementary trade items
-1.5
-1.3
2.6
-2.3
Trade balance
111.2
133.3
24.5
57.5
Services (net)
1.7
8.5
1.6
-44.0
Transfer payments (net)
-27.1
-33.7
-59.2
-49.5
Current account balance ....
85.8
108.1
-33.1
-35.8
Long-term capital
33.4
-22.2
-25.4
198.2
Short-term capital
-116.0
-112.8
43.4
-164.7
-82.6
-135.1
18.0
34.3
Balance of payments
6.0
189.0
-0.3
35.8
Change in reserves
2.8
-21.6
0.8
-34.2
Figures prior to 1991 are for West Germany only.
For value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary,
f.o.b. — free on board,
c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight.
Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Economic Surveys, 1993-1994: Germany, Paris, 1994, 155;
and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, 1993-1994: Germany, London,
1994, 46.
538
Appendix
Table 21. Foreign Trade by Principal Commodity Group, Selected
Years, 1985-94 1
(in billions of deutsche marks)
Commodity Group 1985 1990 1992 1994
Exports, f.o.b.
Food and live animals
21.5
25.1
29.7
28.7
3.5
3.7
4.7
5.2
Crude materials (inedible), except
fuels
10.7
11.7
12.5
12.4
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and
lo.o
ft 9
o.Z
ft 9
/ .o
Animal and vegetable oils and
rats
2.8
1.5
1.5
i.y
Chemicals
71.1
81.7
84.7
92.2
Manufactured goods, classified
chiefly by material
100.3
113.5
111.0
110.0
Machinery and transport equip-
246.7
317.2
333.1
339.3
Miscellaneous manufactured
53.6
71.7
75.5
71.8
Commodities and transactions not
TIE
1 1.5
iv. 4
OIK
537.1
642.8
671.1
690.5
i ports, c.i.f. 5
Food and live animals
44.4
46.4
54.7
50.2
Beverages and tobacco
4.6
5.4
6.7
6.3
Crude materials (inedible), except
fuels
31.9
29.5
28.5
26.8
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and
related materials
92.2
45.5
47.5
42.9
Animal and vegetable oils and
fats
2.8
1.5
1.7
1.8
Chemicals
41.3
49.7
54.6
53.7
Manufactured goods, classified
chiefly by material
74.9
98.3
106.2
97.9
Machinery and transport equip-
ment
106.0
178.1
220.5
205.8
Miscellaneous manufactured
articles
52.9
83.1
103.3
97.3
Commodities and transactions not
13.0
13.1
13.8
28.4
Total imports 4
463.8
550.7
637.6
611.1
Prior to 1991, figures are for West Germany only.
For value of the deutsche mark — see Glossary,
f.o.b. — free on board.
Figures may not add to totals because of rounding,
c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight.
Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Economic Surveys, 1994-1995: Germany, Paris, 1995, 173.
539
Germany: A Country Study
2^3
2 P
to ^ i— ( 00 o
O Ttf 00 O
rH N CM i-h
,_ ,_ o
cm o m cm
CM r— « l-H
I I I I I
I I I I
2 I 3 2 00 2 !
I I I
o
ct> <y>
0> 05
< % Q
2 W li<
1 1 2 1
2 • c 2
o § < o
bo
c &
P3 Cfl p3 CQ I
II
bo. 2
II
1 s
2 o
! 2
540
Appendix
I I
* 2
541
Germany: A Country Study
Table 23. Major Army Equipment, 1994
Type and Description
Country of Origin
Number in
Inventory
Main battle tanks
Leopard-1/2 Germany 2,855
Armored vehicles
Reconnaissance
Various models -do- 514
Infantry fighting vehicles
MarderAS -do- 2,443
Armored personnel carriers
M-113 United States 2,900
Various models Germany 900
Ardllery
105mm to 155mm, towed Various 378
155mm, self-propelled -do- 577
Multiple rocket launchers
110mm to 227mm -do- 228
Antitank guided missiles
Milan France/Germany 1,964
TOW United States 233
HOT France/Germany 316
Surface-to-air missile launchers
Roland, self-propelled -do- 142
Attack helicopters
PAH-1 with HOT missiles -do- 205
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 50.
542
Appendix
Table 24. Major Naval Equipment, 1994 1
Type and Description
Number in
Service
Year
Commissioned
Submarines
Type 205 2 1964-66
Type206/206A 18 1973-75
Destroyers
Adams class 3 1969-70
Hamburg class, Type 101A 1 1964-65
Frigates
Bremen class 8 1982-90
Brandenburg class 1 1994
Fast-attack craft (missile)
Gepard class 10 1982-84
Albatross class 10 1976-77
Tiger class 18 1972-75
Minesweepers and minehunters
Various types 45 Various dates
Naval aircraft
Tornado fighter/ ground attack 64 -do-
Atlantic marine reconnaissance and electronic
intelligence 18 -do-
Do-28 search and air rescue 2 -do
Helicopters
Sea Lynx antisubmarine 17 -do-
Sea King search and air rescue 22 -do-
Mi-8 transport 29 -do
1 Main fleet units were constructed in West Germany except Adams-class destroyers, which were built in the
United States and reconditioned in West Germany.
Source: Based on information from The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World,
1995, Annapolis, 1995, 212-23; and The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London,
1994,50-51.
543
Germany: A Country Study
Table 25. Major Air Force Equipment, 1994
Type and Description
Country of Origin
Number in
Inventory
Air defense and fighter-ground attack
aircraft
F-4F United States 150
Tornado Germany (consortium) 193
MiG-29 Soviet Union 20
Alpha Jet France/Germany 34
Reconnaissance and electronic intelli-
gence
RF-4E United States 7
Tornado Germany (consortium) 35
Transport
Transall G-160 Germany/France 85
Helicopters
UH-1D -do- 108
Air defense missiles
Hawk launchers United States 216
Roland launchers France/Germany 95
Patriot launchers United States/Germany 288
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994,
51-52.
544
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593
Glossary
alb — A flat or gently inclined shelf high in a glaciated moun-
tain valley.
Bretton Woods system — The global financial and monetary sys-
tem established in 1944 at the New Hampshire resort of
Bretton Woods. It created the World Bank (q.v.) and the
International Monetary Fund (q.v.), as well as a fixed link
between the United States dollar and gold at US$35 per
troy ounce. The system collapsed in 1971, when the link
between the dollar and gold was broken, but the institu-
tions survive.
Bundesbank — The German central bank, with headquarters in
Frankfurt am Main, was established in 1957.
Central Bank Council — The seventeen-member decision-mak-
ing body of the Bundesbank {q.v.). The council includes
the presidents of the Land central banks (q.v.) and the
members of the Directorate (q.v.). The council meets
every second Thursday.
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) — First established in 1962,
the CAP aims at ensuring the free trade of farm products
within the European Union (EU — q.v.), guaranteeing the
prices of these products, and maintaining protective tariffs
against farm products from outside the EU.
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Created on
December 8, 1991, with the signing of the Minsk Agree-
ment by Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. The Alma-Ata Dec-
laration, signed by eleven heads of state on December 21,
1991, expanded membership in the CIS to all other
former Soviet republics except Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. Moldova joined the CIS in April 1994. The
CIS is a confederation of former Soviet republics in which
"coordinating bodies" oversee common interests in the
economy, foreign policy, and defense of its members.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) —
See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) — An
agreement signed in 1990 by the member nations of the
Warsaw Pact (q.v.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO — q.v.) to establish parity in conventional
595
Germany: A Country Study
weapons between the two organizations from the Atlantic
to the Urals. The treaty included a strict system of inspec-
tion and information exchange and remained in force,
although not strictly observed by all parties, in the mid-
1990s.
deutsche mark (DM) — The national currency unit, consisting
of 100 pfennigs. The value of the deutsche mark has fluc-
tuated with international monetary developments — gener-
ally upward since its introduction in the currency reform
of 1948. The number of deutsche marks per US$1 aver-
aged 4.20 in 1950, 4.20 in 1960, 4.00 in 1965, 3.65 in 1970,
2.62 in 1975, 1.96 in 1980, 2.94 in 1985, 1.62 in 1990, 1.56
in 1992, 1.65 in 1993, 1.64 in 1994, and 1.43 in 1995.
Directorate — The eight-member executive board of the
Bundesbank (q.u). Its members sit on the Central Bank
Council (q.u).
discount rate — Interest rate at which the Bundesbank (q.v.)
lends to banks by rediscounting trade bills and treasury
bills falling due within three months.
European Commission — A governing body of the European
Union (EU — q.v.) that oversees the organization's treaties,
recommends actions under the treaties, and issues inde-
pendent decisions on EU matters.
European Community (EC) — A grouping of three primarily
economic organizations: the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom or EAEC), and the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). Founded separately in 1952 and
1957, the three came to be known collectively as the EC.
Executive power rests with the European Commission
(q.u). Members in 1993 were Belgium, Britain, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. In November 1993, the
EC was subsumed under a new organization, the European
Union (EU — q.u).
European Council — A body formed when the heads of state or
government of European Union (EU — q.u.) member
states meet. Held at least twice a year, these meetings
determine the major guidelines for the EU's future devel-
opment.
European currency unit (ECU) — Established in 1979 as a com-
posite of the monetary systems of European Community
(EC — q.u.) member nations, the ECU functions in the
596
Glossary
European Monetary System (EMS — q.v.) and serves as the
unit for exchange-rate establishment, credit and interven-
tion operations, and settlements between monetary
authorities of member nations.
European Economic Area (EEA) — An economic area encom-
passing all the members of the European Union (EU —
q.v.) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA —
q.v.), with the exception of Switzerland. Established in
1993, the EEA went into effect on January 1, 1994. The
EEA is a single market for the free movement of labor, ser-
vices, capital (with some restrictions on investments), and
most products. EFTA members have agreed to accept EU
regulations in many areas, including company law, educa-
tion, environmental protection, mergers, and social policy.
European Economic Community (EEC) — See European Com-
munity (EC).
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) — Founded in 1960,
EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members
and increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis,
particularly within Western Europe. In 1995 the organiza-
tion's member states were Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
and Switzerland.
European Monetary System (EMS) — Established in 1979 by the
European Economic Community (EEC — q.v.), the EMS
was created to stabilize currency values because the Bret-
ton Woods system (q.v.) proved not fully satisfactory. All
European Union (EU — q.v.) countries are EMS members.
The EMS is to be succeeded by the European Monetary
Union (EMU — q.v.).
European Monetary Union (EMU) — The EMU is a plan for a
single European central bank and for a single European
currency to replace national banks and currencies for
those European states that qualify. The EMU is the
planned follow-on of the European Monetary System
(EMS — q.v.).
European Union (EU) — Successor organization to the Euro-
pean Community (EC — q.v.), officially established on
November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union
(q.v.) went into effect. The goal of the EU is a closer eco-
nomic union of it member states, including the European
Monetary Union (EMU — q.v), a greater unity in matters of
justice and domestic affairs, and the development of a
common foreign and security policy. To the members of
597
Germany: A Country Study
the EC, the EU added Austria, Finland, and Sweden, effec-
tive January 1, 1995.
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) — A mechanism of the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS — q.u), the ERM is designed
to establish fixed exchange rates among EMS currencies.
Not all European Union (EU — q.u) states are members.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — The global
trading system, based on the Havana Treaty of 1947, that
obligates states to follow the "most favored nation" princi-
ple to avoid discriminatory trade practices. GATT was suc-
ceeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
January 1, 1996.
gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and
services produced exclusively within a nation's domestic
economy, in contrast to the gross national product
(GNP — q.v.). Usually computed over a one-year period.
gross national product (GNP) — The total value of goods and
services produced within a country's borders and the
income received from abroad by residents, minus pay-
ments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Usually computed
over a one-year period.
Group of Seven (G-7) — The seven-nation organization was
established in 1973, with an annual summit beginning in
1975, to attempt to coordinate its members' economic pol-
icies. Members are Britain, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United States.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized
agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes
responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates
and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provi-
sion of loans to its members when they experience balance
of payments difficulties. These loans often carry condi-
tions that require substantial internal economic adjust-
ments by the recipients.
Land central bank — The central bank of a German state (Land;
pi., Lander) or group of Lander. The presidents of the nine
Land central banks sit on the Central Bank Council (q.v.)
of the Bundesbank (q.u).
Lombard rate — The interest rate at which the Bundesbank
(q.u) extends credit to commercial banks in order to cover
temporary financing gaps. It is usually somewhat higher
than the Bundesbank's discount rate (q.u).
598
Glossary
Maastricht Treaty — Treaty on European Union.
nomenklatura — The communist party's system of appointing key
personnel in the government and other important organi-
zations, based on lists of critical positions and people in
political favor. Also refers to the individuals included on
these lists.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — Frequently
called, particularly in official NATO publications, the
Atlantic Alliance or the Alliance. Created as a defensive
political and military alliance by the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, with twelve charter members:
Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the
United States. Greece and Turkey became members in
1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain
in 1982.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)— -Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the OECD
is an international organization composed of the industri-
alized market economy countries, as well as some develop-
ing countries, by providing a forum in which to establish
and coordinate policies.
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) —
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD).
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) — The Conference on Security and Cooperation
Europe (CSCE) was established as an international pro-
cess in 1972. The group, consisting of fifty-three nations in
1995, included all the European countries and sponsored
joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to
European security. The Charter of Paris (1990) changed
the CSCE from an ad hoc forum to an organization having
permanent institutions. In 1992 new CSCE roles in conflict
prevention and management were defined, potentially
making the CSCE the center of a Europe-based collective
security system. In the early 1990s, however, applications of
these instruments to conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Cauca-
sus did not have a decisive impact. In January 1995, the
CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Treaty on European Union — The agreement that established
599
Germany: A Country Study
the European Union (EU — q.v.) in November 1993. It is
usually referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, the small
Dutch town where it was negotiated by the twelve Euro-
pean Community (EC — q.v.) members in December 1991.
Uruguay Round — The trade negotiating round, under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT — q.u), concluded at the end of 1993. It pitted the
United States against France and some other European
Union (EU — q.v.) states over EU agricultural subsidies,
with Germany in the middle. A compromise was reached,
including agreement for establishing a World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO). On January 1, 1996, GATT was suc-
ceeded by the WTO.
value-added tax (VAT) — A tax applied to the additional value
created at a given stage of production and calculated as a
percentage of the difference between the product value at
that stage and the cost of all materials and services pur-
chased as inputs. The VAT is the primary form of indirect
taxation applied in the European Union (EU — q.v.), and it
is the basis of each country's contribution to the commu-
nity budget.
Warsaw Pact — Informal name for the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-
tion, a mutual defense organization founded in 1955,
which included the Soviet Union, Albania (which with-
drew in 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet
Union to station troops in the countries to its west to
oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO — q.v.). The pact was the basis of the invasion
of Hungary (1956) and of Czechoslovakia (1968); it was
disbanded in July 1991.
Western European Union (WEU) — Founded in 1948 to facili-
tate West European cooperation in economic, social, cul-
tural, and defense matters. Reactivated in 1984 to
concentrate on the defense and disarmament concerns of
its members, the WEU is headed by a council consisting of
its members' ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The
council meets twice a year; lower-level WEU entities meet
with greater frequency. In 1995 WEU members were Bel-
gium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden were observers;
600
Glossary
Iceland, Norway, and Turkey were associate members; and
a number of East European states were associate partners.
World Bank — Informal name for a group of four affiliated
international institutions: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA); the International
Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe
their capital for credit and investment in developing coun-
tries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding
economic growth in target countries.
601
Index
Abitur, 225, 228
abortion, 153, 211, 408; church position
on, 176; in East Germany, 152-53,
164-65, 211; number of, 167; in West
Germany, 107, 153
ACC. See Allied Control Council
Accident Insurance Law (1884) , 200, 206
acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS), 223
Adenauer, Konrad, 87, 91, 375; back-
ground of, 91; as chancellor, xliv, 91,
97, 368, 376, 444; goals of, 92; resigna-
tion of, 98
Administrative Police, 509
AEG-Telefunken, 500
aerospace industry, 500; subsidies for,
272, 288
Africa: defeat of Axis in, 66; financial
assistance to, 343
agricultural: policy, 284-85, 451; produc-
tion, 284; products (see also under indi-
vidual crops), 284
agriculture, 139, 140, 250, 283-85, 395-
96; collectivized, 103; in East Ger-
many, 102, 103, 182, 249; lobbying by,
395-96; as percentage of gross domes-
tic product, 248, 284; and potato
blight of 1845-46, 36; price controls
on, 97; subsidies for, 97, 248-49, 272;
work force in, 182
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency
syndrome
air force, East German, 103
air force (Luftwaffe) (see also air force,
East German), 478-81; aircraft of,
480; chief of staff, 481; conscripts in,
480; creation of, 63; missions, 480;
number of personnel, 480; organiza-
tion of, 481; ranks, 494; reduction of,
472; training, 482; uniforms, 494
airports, 302
air travel, 302
alcohol consumption, 222
Alexander III, Pope, 12
Algauer Alps, 141
Allensbach Public Opinion Institute, 166
Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization
Alliance for Germany, 126, 424; mem-
bers of, 126
Alliance 90 (Bundnis 90), xlv, 385; and
foreign policy, 434; support for, 385
Alliance 90/Greens, 385; in elections,
xlv, 385
Alliance of Free Democrats, 424
Allied armies (see also Four Powers), 66;
destruction by, 73; invasion of France
by, 69; occupation by, 502, 506
Allied Control Council (ACC), 78, 439;
education under, 226; police under,
506-7; social programs under, 202;
Soviet withdrawal from, 86; and unifi-
cation, 422
Allied Reparations Commission, 49
Alpine Foreland, 141; climate of, 142;
drainage of, 142
Alps, 141; climate of, 142
Alsace: annexed by Prussia, 40, 46;
under French rule, 25; relinquished,
49
Anabaptists, 21
Anschluss (1938), 64
Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 63
Anti-Fascist Bloc, 81-82
armed forces (united Germany) (see also
Bundeswehr; National People's
Army), 471-87; agreement with Rus-
sia, 441-42; attitudes toward, 45;
under Basic Law, 349; civilian control
over, 95, 495-99; command and con-
trol, 471-72; conscription for, 460-61,
472, 496, 497; deployment of, 436-38,
461, 485-86, 486-87; early history of,
462-63; of early states, 28; Eastern
Command, 488, 489; environmental
problems caused by, 147; General
Inspekteur of, 471; Innere Fiihrung con-
cept, 495-96; materiel of, 489; mis-
sions of, 433, 434-35, 436-38, 461,
470, 503-4; morale in, 485-87;
603
Germany: A Country Study
National People's Army in, 459, 487-
88, 489; under NATO, 439; number of
personnel in, 459, 488; ombudsman
for, 496; pay and benefits in, 498-99;
peacekeeping role of, 416, 432, 438,
452, 454-55, 461, 470, 503-4; person-
nel policies of, 496-97; popular opin-
ion of, xli; rearmament of, xliv, 1, 63-
64, 74, 93-96; reduced, 425, 428, 459,
460, 485; reform of, 30-31; reserves,
485; restrictions on, 437; training,
481-84; uniforms, ranks, and insignia
of, 491-94; wartime planning for, 471-
72; women in, 460, 498
Arminius, 463
army, East German. See National People's
Army
army (Bundesheer) , 472-77; conscripts,
472, 475; deployment of, 237; and
Eurocorps, 475, 476-77; and Franco-
German Brigade, 475, 476-77; of Ger-
man Empire, 41 , 464; headquarters of,
472; under Hitler, 61; materiel of, 475,
476; and NATO Rapid Reaction Force,
475; number of personnel in, 466,
472, 475; organization of, 472, 475;
ranks, 494; reduction of, 424, 466,
472, 475; reforms in, 38, 464; restruc-
turing of, 472; uniforms, 491-94
artisans, 250; under German Confedera-
tion, 36; under German Empire, 250;
health insurance for, 201; in revolu-
tions of 1848, 37
Aryan Paragraph (1933), 68
Association of Free Evangelical Congre-
gations, 179
Association of German Mennonite Com-
munities, 179
Association of Publicly Owned Enter-
prises (Vereinigung Volkseigener
Betriebe— WB), 103
associations (Verbdnde) (see also under indi-
vidual types of associations), 274-76,
389-97; influence of, 390; lobbying by,
389, 390; members of, 389; organiza-
tion of, 389; peak, 389; political par-
ties and, 390; role of, 274-75, 391
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
Augsburg, 141
Augstein, Rudolf, 399; arrested, 97
Austria, 26-28; annexed by Hitler, 64,
150; competition of, with German
states, xl, xli, 26; in Congress of
Vienna, 31; in European Union, 318,
322, 450; foreign residents from, 158;
in German Confederation, 32; in Holy
Alliance, 32; opposition to, 39; reli-
gious tolerance in, 28; in Thirty Years'
War, 25
Austria-Hungary: relations with, 46
Austro-Prussian War (1866), 39^0
automobile industry, 286, 287; and Euro-
pean Single Market, 320
automobiles, 301; export of, 287, 317,
337
Axis. See Berlin-Rome Axis
Baader, Andreas, 112; suicide of, 112,
514
Baader-Meinhof Gang (Red Army Fac-
tion), 112-13, 514-15
Bach family, 30
Baden, 39
Baden-Wurttemberg: Catholics in, 176;
elections in, xlv; foreign residents in,
158; Four-Power occupation of, 78;
higher education in, 236; industrial
development policies of, 271; industry
in, 286; population growth in, 157;
Protestants in, 177; religion in, 173;
right-wingers in, xlvi, 386, 404; topog-
raphy of, 1 40
Bad Godesburg Program, 107, 378
Bahr, Egon, 379,419
Baker, James, 423, 441
balance of trade. See trade
Balkan policy, 449
Balkan war (1990s): intervention in, 434,
453
Balkan Wars (1912-13), 47
Baltic Sea: pollution in, 146
Baltic states: trade with, 339
Bank Deutscher Lander, 255
banking, 248, 292-96; and European
Single Market, 320; role of, in econ-
omy, 292-96
banks, central (see also Bundesbank):
eastern German deposits in, 263;
postal, 294-95; role of, in corpora-
tions, 248, 250, 261, 295; services of,
294
Baptists, 178
604
Index
BASF, 288
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (constitution
of 1949), 348-49; amendments to,
349; armed forces under, 349, 436,
498; basic rights under, 88, 348, 512;
Bundesrat under, 89; Bundestag
under, 88; chancellor under, 88, 353,
431; citizenship under, 160; conscien-
tious objection under, 348, 496; draft-
ing committee for, 87-89; economy
under, 89; education under, 229;
emergencies under, 349, 351; federal
principle under, 349-51; government
under, 349, 350, 431; health care
under, 213; Lander under, 88-89; polit-
ical asylum under, 161; political par-
ties under, xliii, 89, 347-48, 373;
political stability under, xliii, 347-48;
president under, 88; promulgated, 87,
91; provisional nature of, 87, 89; reli-
gion under, 174; social security under,
89, 349; unification under, 347;
women under, 498
Basic Treaty (1972), xxxvii, 105, 379;
objections to, 110; signed, xxxvii, 110,
118
Battle of Austerlitz (1805), 30
Battle of Bouvines (1214), 13
Battle of Britain (1940), 65
Battle of Jena (1806), 30, 464
Battle of Koniggratz (1866), 39
Battle of Lechfeld (955), 9
Battle of Leipzig (1813), xl, 31, 464
Battle of Muhlberg (1547), 22
Battle of Nordlingen (1634), 24
Battle of Stalingrad (1942-43), 66
Battle of Tannenberg (1410), 15, 463
Battle of Teutoburg Forest (A.D. 9), 6,
463
Battle of the Bulge (1945), 69
Battle ofValmy (1792), 30
Battle of Waterloo (1815), 31, 464
Battle of White Mountain (1620), 24
Bavaria, 8, 25, 39; alliance of, with
France, 26; beer produced in, 284;
Catholics in, 176; foreign residents in,
158; Four-Power occupation of, 78; in
German Confederation, 32; industrial
development policies of, 271; industry
in, 286; political parties in, 375; popu-
lation density of, 155; population
growth in, 157; power of, 27; Protes-
tants in, 177; topography of, 140-41
Bavarian Alps, 141
Bavarian Forest, 141
Bavarian German Workers' Party, 57
Bavarian tribe, 3
Bayer, 287; subsidies for, 273
Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW), 287
Bayernkurier, 399
Bayreuth Festival, 303
BBU. See Federal Association of Citizens'
Initiatives on Environmental Protec-
tion
BDA. See Federation of German Employ-
ers' Associations
BDI. See Federation of German Industry
Bebel, August, 43
beer, 284
Beer Hall Putsch, 56, 58
BEK. See Federation of the Evangelical
Churches
Belgium: in International Authority for
the Ruhr, 92; Nazi occupation of, 65,
466; occupation by, of Ruhr, 55, 56;
support of, for Eurocorps, 446; troops
of, stationed in Germany, 502, 503
Bepos. See Readiness Police
Bereitschaftspolizei. See Readiness Police
Bergisches Land, 139
Berlin: access to and from, 108, 109; air-
lift, 86; airports at, 302; blockade of,
85-86; as capital, 134, 408-9; foreign
residents in, 158; Four-Power occupa-
tion of, 77-78; government in, 368;
housing prices in, 171; Jewish commu-
nity in, 179; mayor of, 107; partition
of, 86, 108-9; political parties in, xliv,
83, 388; political uprisings in, 36, 124;
population of, 45, 156; population
density of, 155; Protestants in, 177;
topography of, 135; tourism in, 303;
university in, 225
Berlin-Rome Axis: formed, 63; in World
War II, 65
Berlin University, 119
Berlin Wall, xxxvii, 104-5, 151; construc-
tion of, 74, 104, 117, 133, 151; demon-
strations against, 121; opening of,
125-28
Bertelsmann, 401
Berufsaujbauschule, 235
Berufsfachschulen, 235
Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von, 48
605
Germany: A Country Study
BfV. See Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution
Biermann, Wolf, 119
Bild am Sonntag, 399
Bild Zeitung, 398-99
birth control. See family planning
Bismarck, Otto von, 119, 465; anti-Catho-
lic campaign of, 42-43, 172-72; antiso-
cialist program of, 43; dismissed, 5, 46;
foreign policy of, 45-46, 418; opposi-
tion of, to Austria, 39; social welfare
under, 198, 200; unification under, xl,
4, 38-40
BKA See Federal Criminal Investigation
Office
Black Death, 15
Black Forest, 140; environmental dam-
age to, 285; tourism in, 303
Black Wednesday, 334
Blessing, Karl, 309
blitzkrieg, 65, 466
Blucher, Gebhardvon, 31, 464
BMW. See Bayerische Motorenwerke
BND. See Federal Intelligence Service
Bohemia: economic links with, 339; elec-
tor of, 14; under Frederick I, 12; occu-
pied by Hitler, 64; under Otto I, 9
Bohemian Massif, 139
Bohley, Barbel, 123
Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 49
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 173
Boniface, Saint, 7, 172
Bonn airport, 302
Borden, 136
border police, 462, 506, 507
borders, 418; with Czechoslovakia, 507;
inter-German, xxxvii, 124, 507; with
Poland, 428
Bosch, 287
Bosnia and Herzogovina: recognized,
449
Bourbon Dynasty, 24-25
Brandenburg {see also Prussia), 25, 463;
constituents of, 27; elector of, 14;
Four-Power occupation of, 78; politi-
cal parties in, 388; population density
of, 155; power of, 27; Protestants in,
177; topography of, 135
Brandenburg Gate: opened, 126
Brandt, Willy: background of, 106-7; as
chancellor, xliv, 107, 256, 368, 378,
379, 419, 439; as mayor of Berlin, 107;
Nobel Prize for, 107, 379; resignation
of, 107, 256; talks of, with Stoph, 107-
8; as vice chancellor, 98, 107, 376
Bread for the World, 179
Bremen: government in, 368; popula-
tion density of, 155; population loss
in, 157; port of, 302; right-wingers in,
386, 404; topography of, 135
Bremerhaven, port of, 302
Bretton Woods Agreement, 309, 315-16,
326; collapse of, 310, 311
Breuel, Birgit, 166
Britain: in Congress of Vienna, 31;
defense spending in, 490; denazifica-
tion under, 80; economic philosophy
of, 310, 323; in Four Powers, 73, 76; in
Group of Seven, 312; influence of, on
education, 226; investment in, 342;
materiel produced with, 500; occupa-
tion policies of, 79; occupation zone
of, 78, 79; opposition of, to Eurocorps,
445-46; petroleum imported from,
289; planned invasion of, 466; rela-
tions of, with France, 47; relations
with, 46, 47; in Triple Entente, 46;
troops of, stationed in Germany, 502,
503; and unification, xxxix, 127, 423,
426-28; war on Germany declared by,
64
Bruning, Heinrich, 58, 60
Bubnis, Ignaz, 162
Bulgaria: and NATO, 441; refugees
from, 405; relations with, 450; and
Western European Union, 443; West
German relations with, 110
Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen. See
Federation of the Evangelical
Churches
Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz. See
Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution
Bundesamt fur Wehrtechnik und
Beschaffung. See Federal Office for
Military Technology and Procurement
Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank),
248, 289-92; Central Bank Council,
331, 335; currency control by, 248,
290, 311, 331, 332-33, 335; and Euro-
pean Monetary System, 327; founded,
85, 255; and government, 291; philos-
ophy of, 292, 311-12, 330-31; role of,
606
Index
291,308, 331
Bundesgerichtshof. See Federal Court of
Justice
Bundesgrenzschutz. See Federal Border
Force
Bundesgrenzschutz-See. See Coast Guard
Bundesheer. Smarmy
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel
Office), 248, 255,269-71
Bundeskriminalamt. See Federal Crimi-
nal Investigation Office
Bundesmarine. Seen&vy
Bundesnachrichtendienst. See Federal
Intelligence Service
Bundespost, 302
Bundesrat (Federal Council), xlv, 41,
351, 356, 360-62; under Basic Law, 89;
committees of, 472; foreign policy
under, 432; legislation in, 356-57,
360-62; members of, 360; presidency
of, 360; role of, 360-62; sessions of,
360; veto power of, 362; voting in, 360
Bundestag, 356, 357-60; armed forces
under, 472; under Basic Law, 88; com-
mittees of, 358-59, 472; constituency
representatives in, 370-71; constituent
service by, 359-60; election of chan-
cellor by, 359; executive bodies of,
358; 5 percent rule in, xliii, 371-72;
foreign policy under, 432; Fraktionen
in, 357-58, 375, 380; legislation in,
356-57; members of, 357; no-confi-
dence vote in, 354-55; parties in, 375,
389; party representatives in, 371; ses-
sions of, 360; size of, 357, 371
Bundesverband Biirgerinitiativen
Umweltschutz. See Federal Association
of Citizens' Initiatives on Environmen-
tal Protection
Bundesverband der Deutschen Indus-
trie. See Federation of German Indus-
try
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ar-
beitgeberverbande. See Federation of
German Employers' Associations
Bundeswehr (armed forces) (West Ger-
many): buildup of, 94, 95; conscrip-
tion for, 468; Eastern Command, 488;
materiel, 468; missions of, 434-35,
459; in NATO, 74, 95, 459; officers in,
467, 468; origins of, 459, 467-68; per-
sonnel strength of, 428, 459; reduc-
tion of, 428, 459; restrictions on, 437;
training, 468; under unification, 459-
60; volunteers for, 467, 468
Bundnis 90. &<? Alliance 90
Bush, George H.W.,425
business administration schools, 278-80
business associations, 274-76, 390-91
business class, 32
businesses: competition among, 277;
cooperation of, with government, 248,
391; downsizing in, 415; mergers of,
269-70; role of banks in, 248, 250,
261, 295; social services role of, 197
BWB. See Federal Office for Military
Technology and Procurement
Byrnes, James F, 84
cabinet, 353-56; composition of, 355-56;
economic role of, 268-69
Cable News Network, 401
Caesar, Julius, 6
Calvinism, xxxix, 4, 23, 177; recognition
of, 25
Cambodia: United Nations peacekeep-
ing missions in, 416, 438
Canada: in Group of Seven, 312; troops
of, stationed in Germany, 502
canals, 302
CAP. See Common Agricultural Policy
capital: export of, 340; surplus of, 341
Carlsbad Decrees (1819), 32
Carolingian Empire (752-911), 7-8
Carstens, Karl, 120
cartels, 250-51, 295-96; number of, 250
Casablanca Conference (1943), 76
Catholic Church, Roman: alliance of,
with Frankish Kingdom, 7; alliance of,
with Salian Dynasty, 1 0; authority of,
176; Bishops' Conference, 395; Bis-
marck's campaign against, 42-43,
172-73; desire for reform of, 176-77;
lobbying by, 393, 395; organization of,
176
Catholicism, Roman, 172, 176-77; geo-
graphic distribution of, 172, 173; per-
centage of followers in population,
175
Catholic League, 23-24
Catholics, Roman, xl, 4; conflicts of, with
Protestants, 4; in East Germany, 176,
394; geographic distribution of, 176;
607
Germany: A Country Study
lapsed, 174, 175; number of, 176;
political parties of, 42; practicing, 176
CDU. See Christian Democratic Union
Center Party, xli, 42-43, 45, 91; constitu-
ency of, 42; in elections of 1930, 59; in
elections of 1932, 59; platform of, 42;
in Weimar coalition, 50, 53, 56
Central Bank Council, 291; members of,
291-92
Central German Uplands, 136-40; cli-
mate of, 142; elevation of, 136
CFE. See Conventional Forces in Europe
CFE Treaty. See Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty
Chamberlain, Neville, 64
chambers of commerce, 275-76
chancellor: armed forces under, 471;
authority of, 353; under Basic Law, 88,
353-56, 431; economic policy under,
267, 268; election of, 254, 359; vote of
no-confidence against, 354; in Weimar
Republic, 50
Charlemagne (768-814), xxxix-xl, 3, 7-
8, 463
Charles V: elected, 16; opposition of, to
Lutheranism, 21
Charles VI (1711-40), 26
chemical industry, 44, 286, 287-88, 317;
and European Single Market, 320;
exports by, 337
Chemicals, Paper, and Ceramics Work-
ers' Union, 393
Chemnitz, 157; industry in, 286
Chernobyl accident, 146
child allowance, 207-8
child care: availability of, 134, 164, 167,
169,211
children, 168; health insurance for, 213;
pensions for, 207; support assistance
for, 207
Christian Democratic Union (Christlich
Demokratische Union — CDU), xliv,
43, 74, 375-78, 386; in Alliance for
Germany, 126; in Anti-Fascist Bloc, 82;
auxiliary organizations of, 377-78; in
Bundestag, 375; in CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition, xliv, xlv, 74, 114-16, 376,
381, 382, 401; economic philosophy
of, 267; economy under, 257-58; in
elections of 1965, 98; in elections of
1969, 106; in elections of 1990, 377;
and foreign policy, 432; formed, 83,
375; funding of, 373; membership of,
xliv-xlv, 374; organization of, 377;
platform of, 197, 375, 394; and unifi-
cation, 420; as Volkspartei, xliii-xliv,
375
Christianity (see also under individual
denominations): conversion to, 7; in
East Germany, 1 73-74
Christian Social Union (Christlich
Soziale Union— CSU), xliv, 43, 74,
375-78; in Bundestag, 375; in CDU/
CSU-FDP coalition, xliv, xlv, 74, 114-
16, 376, 381, 382, 401; economic phi-
losophy of, 267; in elections of 1965,
98; in elections of 1969, 106; in elec-
tions of 1990, 377; in elections of
1994, 402; and foreign policy, 432;
founded, 83; membership of, xliv-xlv,
375
Christian Study Group Mulheim/Ruhr,
179
Christlich Demokratische Union. See
Christian Democratic Union
Christlich Soziale Union. See Christian
Social Union
churches, 393-95; declining member-
ship of, 174, 175; in East Germany,
122, 394; under Hitler, 62, 173, 393;
kindergartens of, 231; legal status of,
394; as lobby, 393; social-welfare activi-
ties of, 175, 176, 177-78, 199; subsi-
dies for, 176; support of dissidents by,
xxxviii, 122, 394
churches, free, 178-79; membership in,
179; persecution of, 178; tenets of,
178-79
churches, orthodox, 179
Church of the Nazarene, 179
church tax, 174, 176, 177, 394
CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent
States
citizenship: of ethnic Germans, 160; of
foreigners, xlix, 160, 405, 407
citizens' initiative associations, 396-97;
membership of, 396
citizens in uniform, 495
Civil Code (1900), 505
civil servants: career, 365-66; categories
of, 365; number of, 185, 365; status of,
365
civil service, 185, 365-66; ban on extrem-
ists in, 366; of early states, 29; in Ger-
608
Index
man Empire, xli; under Hitler, 61;
number of employees in, 185, 365;
purged, 61; social insurance for, 201
Clausewitz, Karl von, 465
Clay, Lucius D., 86
clergy: power of, 1 3
climate, 142-45; continental, 144; fdhn,
144; maritime, 142-44; precipitation,
145; temperature, 144
Clovis, 7
CNN, 401
coal, 250, 286, 288; exports of, 317; pro-
duction, 44, 289; subsidies, 272, 273,
288
Coast Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz-See) ,
507
coastline: of North German Lowland,
135, 136
Code of Criminal Procedure, 511; under
Third Reich, 506
codetermination (Mitbestimmung) , 282-
83; labor in, 283, 393; management in,
283
Cold War, 467; foreign policy in, 41 8; ori-
gins of, 73, 467
Cologne: airport at, 302; elector of, 14;
foreign residents in, 158; university in,
224
Colombia: materiel exported to, 500
colonies, 47; desire for, 45; relinquished,
49
Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance
Commerzbank, 294, 295
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
248-49, 285,319,451
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS): aid to, 430; petroleum
imported from, 289
communications. See telecommunica-
tions
communism: threat of, 93
Communist Party of Germany (Kommu-
nistische Partei Deutschlands — KPD) ,
53, 117; banned, 89, 374; in elections
of 1930, 59; in elections of 1932, 59;
growth of, 54; reestablished, 81
Communists: arrests of, 61; opposition
to, 81
Concerted Action in Health Care, 215,
222
Concordat of Worms ( 1 1 22) , 1 1
Confederation of the Rhine, 31
Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE) (see also Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe), 117-18; efforts to
strengthen, 452-53; established, 451;
Final Act of, 117; membership in, 417,
428, 453; and military action, 437,
441, 452, 453; Paris Charter, 452; sup-
port for, 452
Confessing Church, 173
Congress of Vienna (1815), xl, 4, 31;
members of, 31; objectives of, 31
Conrad I (911-18), 3; election of, 8
Conrad II, 9-10
Conrad IV, 13
Conservative Party, 42, 45; constituency
of, 42; platform of, 42
conservatives, 45
constitution of 1848, 37; committee for,
36
constitution of 1949. See Basic Law
constitution of Federal Republic of Ger-
many (1949). See Basic Law
constitution of German Democratic
Republic (1949): approved, 90; basic
rights under, 90; communist party
under, 421; drafted, 90
constitution of German Empire, 4
constitution of Weimar Republic, 50-53;
drafted, 50
consumer goods: East German, 103
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE):
talks, 425
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
(CFE Treaty) (1990), 460; armed
forces under, 472
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon), 102
Council of Economic Experts, 255
Council of Education, 228
Council of Europe: West Germany in, 93
Council of Ministers (Minister rat), 90
Council of State (Staatsrat) , 90
Counter-Reformation, 23-24
coups d'etat, attempted, 56, 58; of 1920,
54
courts: administration of, 362; constitu-
tional, 363, 364-65; criminal, 511-12;
Federal Constitutional Court, 364—65;
ordinary, 363-64; specialized, 363, 364
court system: in Third Reich, 506; trans-
609
Germany: A Country Study
formation of, in East Germany, 102,
512
crime: assistance for victims of, 202;
hate, 510; incidence of, 512-13; orga-
nized, 509, 513; solved, 513; types of,
512-13
Criminal Code: in Third Reich, 506
Criminal Investigation Police, 506
criminal justice system (see also judiciary:
see also under courts), 511-12; death
penalty in, 511; punishment in, 511
Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei — Kri-
pos), 509, 510-11; training of, 511
Croatia: guest workers from, 449; recog-
nized, 429, 449; tourism in, 449
Crystal Night. &*?Kristallnacht
CSCE. ^Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
CSU. See Christian Social Union
Cuba: guest workers from, 158
cultural institutions: under Hitler, 62
currency (see also deutsche mark; dollar):
under Bretton Woods, 309, 310, 311,
315-16, 326; Bundesbank control of,
248, 290, 323, 331, 332-33; common
European, 1, 329, 331, 332-33, 335-36,
446-47; in East Germany, 120, 127,
247, 423; under EMU convergence cri-
teria, 335; under European narrow
margins agreement, 310, 326; under
exchange-rate mechanism, 328, 334;
floating, 311; foreign reserves of, 314;
in German Confederation, 32; in Ger-
man Empire, 44; and interest rates,
314—15; international importance of,
307, 313-16; reform, 85, 252-53;
shortage of Western, in East Germany,
120; and unification, 424; valuation of,
309, 310, 311, 323; in Weimar Repub-
lic, 55, 56, 250-51; after World War II,
252
current account: surplus, 336-37
customs duties, 32
Customs Union (Zollverein) , 32
Czechoslovakia: border with, 507; and
NATO, 441; refugees from, 152; rela-
tions with, 450; seizure of, by Hitler,
64; and unification, 460; and Western
European Union, 443; West German
relations with, 110
Czech Republic: and European Union, 1,
451; investment in, 342; and NATO, 1;
relations with, 430-31
DA. See Democratic Awakening
DAG. See German White-Collar Employ-
ees' Union
Daimler-Benz, 270, 287; subsidies for,
273
Danube River, 1 41
DASA. See Deutsche Aerospace
Dawes, Charles G., 56
Dawes Plan, 56
DBB. See Federation of German Civil Ser-
vants
DBD. See Democratic Peasants' Party of
Germany
DBV. See German Farmers' Association
DDP. See German Democratic Party
death: causes of, 155; maternal, 223;
penalty, 511
debt. See government debt
Declaration of Peace and Cooperation
(1991), 441
Declaration on the Way to German
Unity, 422
defense policy, 472; of Europe, 443-44
defense spending, 472; budget, 472, 489;
cuts in, 490; per capita, 490; as per-
centage of federal spending, 489; as
percentage of gross national product,
489, 490
de Gaulle, Charles, 96, 444
Degenhardt, Johannes, 177
Delors, Jacques, 328, 448
Delors Plan, 328, 329
Democratic Awakening (Demokratis-
cher Aufbruch — DA): in Alliance for
Germany, 126
Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany
(Demokratische Bauernpartei
Deutschlands— DBD), 82
Democratic Women's Federation of Ger-
many, 102, 397
democratization, 81-83
Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutsch-
lands. See Democratic Peasants' Party
of Germany
Demokratischer Aufbruch. See Demo-
cratic Awakening
demonstrations. See political demonstra-
tions
denazification, 77, 79-81; of education,
610
Index
228; process of, 80
Denmark: Nazi occupation of, 65, 466;
opposition of, to Eurocorps, 445;
opposition of, to European Union,
447
Deutsche Aerospace (DASA) , 500
Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft. See
German White-Collar Employees'
Union
Deutsche Bahn, 298
Deutsche Bank, 294, 295; branches of,
339
Deutsche Bundesbank. See Bundesbank
Deutsche Demokratische Partei. See Ger-
man Democratic Party
Deutsche Industrie Normen. See German
Industrial Norms
deutsche mark {see also currency): in
Bretton Woods system, 315-16, 326; in
European Monetary System, 307, 332;
in European Monetary Union, 307,
447; in exchange-rate mechanism,
332; and exports, 313; and interest
rates, 314-15; international impor-
tance of, 307, 313-16; introduced into
East Germany, 127, 423; in European
narrow margins agreement, 332; pur-
chases of, 309, 310, 313-14; reserves
of, 313-14; stability of, 313, 323; trade
conducted in, 314; valuation of, 309,
310,313
Deutsche National-Zeitung, 387
Deutscher Bauernverband. See German
Farmers' Association
Deutscher Beamten Bund. See Federa-
tion of German Civil Servants
Deutscher Caritasverband, 176, 199
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. ^Fed-
eration of German Trade Unions
Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag.
See German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce
Deutsche Soziale Union. See German
Social Union
Deutsche Terminborse (DTB), 297
Deutsche Volkspartei. See German Peo-
ple's Party
Deutsche Volksunion. See German Peo-
ple's Union
Deutsche Wochen-Zeiiung, 387
Deutschnationale Volkspartei. See Ger-
man National People's Part)'
DGB. See Federation of German Trade
Unions
DG Bank, 294
Diakonisches Werk, 178, 199
Die Griinen. See Greens
diet, 222; health problems related to,
223
DIHT See German Chambers of Industry
and Commerce
DIN. See German Industrial Norms
disarmament: demonstrations for, 189
disease. See sickness
dissidents, 75, 394, 513-16; church sup-
port of, xxxviii, 122; East German pol-
icy toward, 119
divorce, 165, 167; church position on,
176; rates, 149, 168; in West Germany,
107
DNVP. See German National People's
Party
dollar: German support for, 309-10;
pegged to gold, 309
Donhoff, Marion von, 1 66
Dornier, 500
Dortmund-Ems Canal, 302
Draft Treaty on Political Union, 446—47
drainage, 141-42
Dresden, 157; housing prices in, 171;
industry in, 286
Dresdner Bank, 294, 295
Drewermann, Eugen, 177
drug trafficking, 508
DSU. See German Social Union
DTB. See Deutsche Terminborse
Duisburg, port of, 302
dukes (see also princes) , 11; election of
emperor by, 9, 11; election of king by,
8, 9; rebellion by, 10
Dunkirk, 65
Diisseldorf: airport at, 302
Diisseldorf Treaty (1955), 231
DVP. See German People's Party
DVU. See German People's Union, 386
East German State Bank, 261
East Germany. See German Democratic
Republic
Ebert, Friedrich, 49; as president, 50
EC. See European Community
ECB. See European Central Bank
economic depression (see also Great
611
Germany: A Country Study
Depression), 5, 44; of 1870s, 250; of
1992, 264; in Weimar Republic, 250
economic growth, 256, 257, 263; in east-
ern Germany, 261, 264; in 1975, 258;
in 1989, 258; in western Germany, 264
economic influence, 429
economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder),
xlii, 74, 85, 97, 247, 254-55, 336
economic policy, 323, 327; economist,
330-31; monetarist, 330; responsibility
for, 267; under Ulbricht, 100
economy (see also economy of East Ger-
many; economy of West Germany;
social market economy): banking's
role in, 292-96; boom in, 262-63; con-
tradictions in, 247; and cost of living,
262; export orientation of, 247; four
basic standards of, 255-56; of German
Empire, 4, 43-45, 250; history of, 249-
53; international, 63; medieval, 249-
50; modernization of, 38, 264-67; role
of government in, 267-71; and sav-
ings, 249; structural problems in,
xlvii-12; of Third Reich, 63, 252; in
Thirty Years' War, 25-26; and unifica-
tion, 258-64; of Weimar Republic,
xliii, 5, 54
economy of East Germany, xxxviii, 74,
247; and collapse of East Germany, 75;
importance of, in Soviet bloc, 247;
merged with West German economy,
xlvii-xlviii, 247-48; planned, 102-3;
privatization of, 166, 259
economy of Europe: cooperation in, 92
economy of West Germany, 74; under
Basic Law, 89; economic miracle, xliii,
74, 85, 97, 247, 336; four basic stan-
dards of, 255-56; government role in,
253-54, 257; merged with East Ger-
man economy, xlvii-xlviii, 247-48; oil
crisis impact on, 146, 247; under
Schiller, 256
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel
Community
ECU. See European currency unit
EDC. See European Defense Community
Edict of Nantes (1685), 28
Edict of Restitution (1629), 24
Edict of Worms, 19
education (see also schools), 223-42;
access to, 226, 238, 239, 242; adminis-
tration of, 229-30; budgets for, 230,
236; denazification of, 228; of East
Germany, 238-39; flexibility of, 223-
24; government responsibility for, 271;
historical background, 224—29; impor-
tance of, 250; improvements in, 187;
influences on, 226, 240; integration
of, 240; issues in, 240-40; in new
Lander, 238-40; orientation courses in,
233; planning for, 230; policy for, 229-
30, 231; postsecondary, 165-66, 230,
234, 236-37, 239; primary, 225, 231;
problems in, 224; reform of, 107, 225,
226, 228; restrictive quotas for, 234-
35; secondary, 231, 233-35; and social
advancement, 187, 225-26; system,
230-37, 238; under Third Reich, 62,
226; tracks in, 225, 231; under unifica-
tion, 197-98; vocational, 235-36, 238,
250, 280, 281; under Weimar Repub-
lic, 226; of women, 164, 165-66; of
workers, 280
EEC. See European Economic Commu-
nity
EFTA. See European Free Trade Associa-
tion
Egypt: Ulbricht's state visit to, 105
EKD. See Evangelical Church in Ger-
many
Elbe River, 141
elections, 369; in East Germany, 422,
423-24; 5 percent rule in, xliii, 371-
72; in German Empire, 41; of 1920,
54; of 1928, 58; of 1930, 59; of 1932, 5,
59; of 1933, 61; of 1946, 81; of 1949,
xliii; of 1953, 94; of 1965, 98; of 1969,
106; of 1980, 115; of 1983, 113, 115,
146, 370, 376; of 1987, 370; of 1989,
122; of 1990, 75-76, 126, 127, 370,
376-77, 380, 386, 388, 401, 422, 423-
24; of 1994, xlv, 370, 385, 386, 402-3;
of 1995, xlv; of 1996, xlv; schedule for,
369; turnout for, 369-70
electoral system, 369-73; objectives of,
370
electors, 14
electric power: power plants, 148-49;
sources, 288
elite class, 182-83; entry into, 183; under
German Empire, xli, 182; under Hit-
ler, 183; as percentage of population,
182, 183; power of, 182, 183
Elysee Treaty. See German-French
612
Index
Friendship Treaty
Emission Protection Law (1972), 146
employers' associations, 391
employment: on defense contracts, 499;
of disabled, 208-9; under Hitler, 63; in
industry, 44, 182, 286; rate, 254; in ser-
vices sector, 180; following unification,
262
Ems River, 141
EMU. See European Monetary Union
Enabling Act (1933), 61
energy, 288-89; nuclear, 146, 148-49;
shortages, 259
energy resources {see also electric power;
see also under individual energy sources),
288
Engholm, Bjorn, 380, 436
engineering, 287, 288
enlightened absolutism, 26-30
Enlightenment, 29
environment, 145^49; costs of restoring,
145; government policy on, 148; gov-
ernment role in, 271; interest in pro-
tecting, 145; laws relating to, 146
environmental groups, 111, 145, 384,
396, 460; demonstrations by, 189; and
European Single Market, 320-21;
issues pursued, 397; origins of, 113
environmental problems, 145, 148, 397;
caused by armed forces, 147; caused
by farmers, 148; caused by industry,
147; in eastern Germany, xxxix, 134,
147; in forests, 285; health problems
caused by, 154; improvements in, 146,
452; policy on, 429; summit on, 429
Equality Offices (Gleichstellungstellen),
166
Erfurt Program (1 891 ) , 43
Erhard, Ludwig, 98; cabinet of, 356; as
chancellor, 255, 310, 376; economic
plan of, 96-97, 252-53, 269, 337; resig-
nation of, 98, 255
ESCB. See European System of Central
Banks
Estonia: and European Union, 451; and
NATO, 441
Ethiopia: Italy's invasion of, 63
ethnic minorities, 162
Eurocorps, 444-46, 475, 476-77, 503;
missions of, 477; opposition to, 444-
46; origins of, 446, 476-77; role of,
446; support for, 446
Europe: cooperation in, 443-44; politi-
cal reform in Eastern, 123-24; reinte-
gration of Germany into, 92-93
Europe, Central: aid to, 429; economic
links with, 339; and European Union,
449-50; and NATO, 441
Europe, Eastern: aid to, 429; debt of,
340; Deutsche Bank in, 339; economic
links with, 339; and European Union,
339, 449-50; investment in, 342, 450;
and NATO, 441; relations of, with
West Germany, 419; threat from, 470;
trade with, 322, 450
European Business School, 280
European Central Bank (ECB), 329;
location of, 331-32; structure of, 329-
30
European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), 92-93; membership in, 307,
326
European Community (EC) (see also
European Union), 93, 415; East Ger-
man trade with, 119-20; European
Commission, 319; exports to, 317;
financial contribution to, 318; Ger-
man share of, 317-18; Germany in,
428; gross domestic product of, 317-
18; importance of Germany to, 317;
investment in, 317; membership in,
307, 316-19; objections to, 447; objec-
tives of, 446; policy of, toward Eastern
bloc, 449-50; support for, 446
European currency unit (ECU): estab-
lished, 327, 447
European Defense Community (EDC),
93-94
European Economic Area, 322; support
for, 322
European Economic Community (EEC):
creation of, 97; membership in, 97
European-Fesdand Fraternal Uniate, 179
European Free Trade Association
(EFTA),322
European Monetary Institute, 329, 336
European Monetary System, 316, 322-
29; benefits of, 323-26; deutsche mark
in, 307; and economic policies, 327;
effectiveness of, 328; established, 323-
26, 327; opposition to, 327
European Monetary Union (EMU) , xlix,
297, 329-30; convergence criteria,
330, 335; deutsche mark in, 307; tran-
613
Germany: A Country Study
sition to, 328-29
European narrow margins agreement
(snake), 310, 326; deutsche mark in,
332
European Parliament, 386; German
seats in, 318
European Recovery Program (Marshall
Plan), 84, 254; East German rejection
of, 90; objectives of, 84; Soviet rejec-
tion of, 84-85
European Single Market, 316, 319-22;
opposition to, 319-20; steps needed to
create, 319; support for, 319, 320
European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), 329; Bundesbank role in, 331
European Union (EU) (see also Euro-
pean Community), 1, 248, 285, 316,
322, 446-51; aid from, 318; and Bal-
kan war, 453; Common Agricultural
Policy, 248-49, 285, 319, 451; East
European applicants to, 339; formed,
415, 447; and German ministries, 318-
19; influence of, on German business,
270-71; members of, 318, 322, 416,
418, 450; opposition to, 386, 447, 448;
poverty definition of, 187; protection-
ists in, 321; subsidy programs, 248-49,
285, 451; trade with, 307, 317, 323,
450; voting in, 448
Evangelical Church in Germany (Evan-
gelische Kirche in Deutschland —
EKD), 177, 199, 395
Evangelical Methodist Church, 179
Evangelical Union, 23-24
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. See
Evangelical Church in Germany
exchange rate: crisis, 334-35; dollar-
pegged, 309; floating, 311; policy,
311-12
exchange-rate mechanism, 323; curren-
cies in, 328, 332, 334; effectiveness of,
328; established, 327
executive branch (see also president): for-
eign policy under, 438; principles of,
355
exports (see also under individual products),
337; of automobiles, 287, 317, 337; of
capital, 340; of chemicals, 288, 317,
337; and currency, 313; from eastern
Germany, 338; and economic policy,
311-12, 337; of electronics, 317; to
European Community, 317; impor-
tance of, 248, 249, 258; of investment
goods, 337, 340; of iron, 317, 337; of
materiel, 499-502; as percentage of
gross domestic product, 307, 31 7, 337;
as percentage of gross national prod-
uct, 451; of ships, 337; of steel, 317,
338; of textiles, 317
Fachabitur, 240
Fachgymnasium, 233, 234
Fachhochschule, 235-36, 239
Fachhochschulreife, 235
Fachoberschule, 233, 235
Falk, Adalbert, 172
Falk laws, 172-73
families, 167-70; with children, 168;
nonmarital, 169; size of, 149, 168-69
family planning: church position on,
176; in East Germany, 153
farmers: under German Confederation,
36; income of, 184; living standards of,
28; lobby of, 322, 395-96; number of,
184; as percentage of population, 182,
184; pollution caused by, 148; in revo-
lutions of 1848, 37; social mobility of,
188-89; subsidies for, 396
farming: production, 284
farms: collective, 103; number of, 284;
size of, 284; in western Germany, 1 84
FDGB. See Free German Trade Union
Federation
FDJ. See Free German Youth
FDP. See Free Democratic Party
Federal Administrative Court: military
division, 491
Federal and Land Commission on Edu-
cational Planning and the Promotion
of Research, 230
Federal Armed Forces Command and
General Staff College, 484
Federal Association of Citizens' Initia-
tives on Environmental Protection
(Bundesverband Burgerinitiativen
Umweltschutz— BBU) , 396
Federal Border Force (Bundesgrenz-
schutz) (West Germany), 468, 507;
antiterrorist activities, 507; estab-
lished, 507; materiel of, 507; missions
of, 507; personnel strength of, 507;
rescue by, of hijacked Lufthansa flight,
112; uniforms and ranks of, 507
614
Index
Federal Cartel Office. See Bundeskartel-
lamt
Federal Committee of Sickness Funds
Physicians and Sickness Funds, 220
Federal Constitutional Court, 364-65;
jurisdiction of, 365
Federal Convention, 351, 352
Federal Council. 5a? Bundesrat
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesge-
richtshof), 364, 365, 511; jurisdiction
of, 365
Federal Criminal Investigation Office
(Bundeskriminalamt — BKA) , 508
Federal Environmental Agency, 146
Federal Intelligence Service (Bundes-
nachrichtendienst — BND), 508
Federal Office for Military Technology
and Procurement (Bundesamt fur
Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung —
BWB), 490
Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfas-
sungsschutz— BfV), 387, 508
Federal Police Leadership Academy, 510
Federal Prison Act, 511
Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger-
many, Federal Republic of
Federation of German Civil Servants
(Deutscher Beamten Bund — DBB),
393
Federation of German Employers' Asso-
ciations (Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande —
BDA),276, 391
Federation of German Industry
(Bundesverband der Deutschen
Industrie— BDI), 275-76, 390-91
Federation of German Trade Unions
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund —
DGB) , 283; established, 392; factions
in, 393; members of, 392; principles
of, 392
Federation of the Evangelical Churches
(Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen —
BEK) , 395
Feldberg, 140
feminist movement. See women's move-
ment
Ferdinand I (1556-64), 22-23
Ferdinand II (1619-37), 24
fertility rate, 149, 152-53, 169
feudalism, 11
film industry: under Hitler, 62
Final Act of Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. See Helsinki
Accords
finance, international, 308-13, 323
financial system, 289-97; under Bretton
Woods Agreement, 309, 310, 311, 326;
nonbank, 296-97
Finanzplatz Deutschland, 296-97
Finland: in European Union, 318, 322,
450; materiel sales to, 476, 500
First Partition of Poland, 28
First Reich, 7-8
Fischer, Joschka, xlv, 386
fishing, 285
5 percent rule, xliii, 371-72
five-year plans: first, 102-3; second, 103
Focus, 399
fohru See climate
foreign assistance, 342-33; to Africa, 343;
to Americas, 343; to Asia, 343; criteria
for, 429; to Eastern Europe, 429, 450;
to former Soviet republics, 339, 429-
30, 449; as percentage of gross domes-
tic product, 343; to Russia, 339, 429;
from the United States, 85; from West
Germany, 120
Foreign Assistance Act (1948) , 85
foreign debt: of Eastern Europe, 340; of
Poland, 340; of Russia, 340; of Weimar
Republic, 56
foreign-exchange reserves, 309
foreign investment in eastern Germany,
260; in German stocks and bonds,
341-42; income from, 342; in West
Germany, 340
foreign military relations, 502-3
foreign policy, xlvii, xlix, 421, 429, 432-
36, 438; and balance of power, 417; on
Balkans, 449; during Cold War, 418; of
East Germany, 418; of Europe, 443-
44; formulation of, 431-38; of Ger-
man Empire, 41 , 45-46, 41 7; of Hitler,
62-64; influence of geostrategic situa-
tion on, 417-18; influence of parties
on, 432-34; influence of public opin-
ion on, 434-36; influence of unifica-
tion on, 421; of West Germany, 98,
418-19; on Yugoslavia, 429
foreign residents (see also guest workers) ,
xliii, 149, 158-60, 513; attacks on, 404,
405, 415, 510, 515; citizenship for,
615
Germany: A Country Study
xlviii, 160, 405, 407; contributions by,
159-60; controversy over, 160, 386,
387; geographic distribution of, 158;
married to Germans, 170; in 1994,
158; origins of, 158; population of,
xlix, 149, 159; poverty of, 182; social
assistance for, 207
foreign service, 431; diplomats in, 431
Forest Preservation and Forestry Promo-
tion Act (1975), 285
forestry, 285; production, 285
forests: damage to, 146, 148, 285, 397;
land area of, 285
founders' time. See Griinderzeit
Four Power Agreement (Quadripartite
Agreement) (1971), 108-9
Four Power Conference (1955), 95
Four Powers (see also Allied armies), 76;
authority of, 92; conferences of, 76-
77; denazification under, 80; occupa-
tion by, 73, 76-79, 83-86; occupation
policies of, 78; reparations to, 77, 102
Four-Year Plan, 63
Fraktionen (parliamentary groups), 357-
58; leadership of, 358; members of,
358
France: alliances of, with German states,
26; Allied invasion of, 69; in Congress
of Vienna, 31; defense spending in,
490; denazification under, 80; eco-
nomic philosophy of, 310; in Four
Powers, 73, 76, 84; in GATT talks, 316;
in Group of Seven, 312; influence of,
on education, 226; in International
Authority for the Ruhr, 92; invasion of
Germany by, 30; investment in, 342;
isolation of, 417; materiel produced
with, 500; Nazi occupation of, 65, 466;
occupation by, of Ruhr, 55, 56; occu-
pation policies of, 78; occupation
zone of, 78; opposition of, to Euro-
pean Union, 447; political uprising in,
36; protectionist policies of, 321; rela-
tions of, with Britain, 47; relations of,
with Germany, 321-22, 417; relations
of, with West Germany, 96, 444; repa-
rations to, 78; territory acquired by,
25, 30; in Thirty Years' War, 24; as
threat, 26; in Triple Entente, 46;
troops of, stationed in Germany, 502,
503; and unification, xxxix, 127, 423,
426; war on Germany declared by, 64
Francis I (1515-47): as threat to German
Empire, 21
Franco, Francisco: Hitler's support for,
63
Franco-German Brigade, 475, 476-77;
formed, 476
Franconia, duchy of, 8
Franconian Alb, 141
Franconian tribe, 3
Franco-Prussian War (1870), 40
Frankfurt am Main, 139, 140-41; hous-
ing prices in, 171; industry in, 286;
Jewish community in, 179; stock
exchange, 296; university in, 225
Frankfurt Documents, 87
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 398
Frankfurter Rundschau, 398
Frankfurt-Rhein Main Airport, 302'
Frankish Kingdom, 3, 8; alliance of, with
Roman Catholic Church, 7
Frankish tribes, 3; conquest of Gaul by, 7
Franz Ferdinand, 47
Frederick I (Barbarossa) (1152-90), 12;
as Holy Roman Emperor, 1 2
Frederick I of Prussia (1688-1713), 27
Frederick II (1215-50), 13
Frederick III (1440-93), 16
Frederick the Great (1740-86), 27, 119;
army of, 464
Frederick William (the Great Elector)
(1640-88), 27; armed forces of, 463-
64
Frederick William I (1713-40), 27; army
of, 464
Free Conservative Party, 42
Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokra-
tische Partei — FDP) , 381-83; and
armed forces, 437; in Bundestag, 375;
in CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, xliv, xlv,
74, 114-16, 376, 381, 382, 401; decline
in, xlv, 383, 403; economic philosophy
of, 267-68; in elections of 1969, 106,
381; in elections of 1983, 381; in elec-
tions of 1990, 382; in elections of
1994, xlv, 402; in elections of 1996, xlv;
and foreign policy, 432; formation of,
83, 382; membership, 374; organiza-
tion of, 383; platform of, xlv, 382; in
SPD-FDP coalition, 74, 106-14, 256,
376, 378, 379, 381, 382; and unifica-
tion, 420
Free Evangelical Congregations, 178
616
Index
Free German Trade Union Federation
(Freier Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund — FDGB), 101-2; women in, 165
Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche
Jugend — FDJ), 101, 117; women in,
165
Freiburg: university in, 224
Freie Demokratische Partei. See Free
Democratic Party
Freie Deutsche Jugend. See¥ree German
Youth
Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. See
Free German Trade Union Federation
French language: origins of, 8
French Revolution, 30-31; support for,
30
Frey, Gerhard, 387
Friedrich Wilhelm IV (1840-58), xl, 37
Frisian Islands, 135-36; Frisian speakers
in, 162
Froebel, Friedrich, 225
Fugger family, 16-19
Fulbrook, Mary, 23
Fusiongesetz. See merger law
G-7. See Group of Seven
gas, natural, 288; import of, 289
Gastarbeiter. See guest workers
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
Gaul: conquest of, 7
GDP. See gross domestic product
Geheime Staatspolizei. See Secret State
Police
Geissler, Rainer, 182
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 308, 451; Uruguay Round of,
313,316
General German Workers' Association,
43
General Staff, 465
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 111, 382, 437,
441, 452; role of, in unification, 382-
83, 423, 429
geostrategic situation (Mittellage), 418;
influence of, on foreign policy, 417-
18; influence of, on military planning,
468-71
German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und
Handelstag—DIHT), 275-76, 391
German Confederation (1815-66), 31-
38; components of, 32; created, 31;
dissolved, 39; economy under, 38;
reforms in, 32, 35; restoration of, 37-
38; trade in, 32
German-Czech Friendship Treaty
(1992), 430-31, 432
German Democratic Party (Deutsche
Demokratische Partei — DDP), 50; in
Weimar coalition, 50, 56
German Democratic Republic (East Ger-
many): access of, to Western media,
118, 400; access to and from, 119; age
distribution in, 151; agriculture in,
102, 103, 182, 249; associations in,
397; birth control in, 153, 164; Catho-
lics in, 176, 394; churches in, xxxviii,
394; collapse of, xxxviii, 75, 76, 421;
constitution of, 90, 118-19; court sys-
tem, 102, 512; criminal justice system
in, 511; currency in, 120, 127, 247,
423; economy of, xxxix, 74, 75, 102-3;
education in, 229, 238-39; elections
in, 127, 423-24; emigration from, xxx-
vii, xxxviii, 152, 421, 422; employment
in, 191; energy in, 259; environmental
problems in, xxxix, 134, 147; extra-
marital births in, 152-53, 169; fertility
rate in, 152, 153, 169; foreign aid to,
120, 127; foreign policy of, 418; forma-
tion of, xxxvii, xliii, 74, 89-91; health
care in, 154, 213, 223; housing in, 170;
infant mortality in, 154; infrastruc-
ture in, 260; life expectancy in, 154;
marriage in, 153; maternity leave in,
169; national identity of, 118; nation-
alization in, 103; opposition in, xxx-
viii, 75, 100, 122-23, 124, 178, 394;
paramilitary groups in, 103; popula-
tion of, 150; population policy of, 152;
privatization in, 133, 166, 259; produc-
tivity under, 259; property claims in,
259; prosecution of former officials of,
409-10; Protestants in, 178, 394; rear-
mament of, 74; recognition of, 105,
106, 379; reform of, 421; refugees
from, 75, 104-5, 120, 123, 133, 151;
relations of, with Soviet Union, xxx-
viii, 95, 105; relations of, with West
Germany, xxxvii, 75, 105, 107-8, 119-
22, 419; religion in, 122, 173-74, 394;
resignation of leaders of, 75; revision-
617
Germany: A Country Study
ist history in, 118; self-employed work-
ers in, 183-84; social identity in, 190,
191; social services in, 196-97, 201;
social structure of, 180-82; Soviet
forces in, 459, 502; subsidies in, 273;
telecommunications in, 259; trade of,
with European Community, 119-20;
unemployment in, 191; and unifica-
tion, xxxviii, 422; United Nations
membership for, 105, 110; universities
in, 238; wages in, 259; in Warsaw Pact,
418, 426; women, 164; work force in,
180-82
German Empire (Second Reich), xl-xlii,
4-5, 40-49; constitution of, 4; cur-
rency of, 44; distribution of power in,
41; economy of, 4, 43-44, 250; elite
class under, xli, 182; established, 40,
465; foreign policy of, 41, 45-46, 417;
government organization in, 41;
industry under, 250; infrastructure of,
44; opposition to, xli; political parties
under, 4-5; population growth under,
44-45, 149; threats to, 21, 26; trade
under, 44, 250
German Farmers' Association
(Deutscher Bauernverband — DBV),
276, 395-96
German-French Friendship Treaty
(Elysee Treaty) (1963), 96, 444
German General Staff, 465; abolished,
466
Germania (Tacitus) , 3
Germanic tribes (see also under individual
tribes): migrations of, 3, 6; military
operations of, 462-63; origins of, 6; in
Roman Empire, 3, 6
German Industrial Norms (Deutsche
Industrie Normen— DIN) , 277-78
German language: enrichment of, 29;
origins of, 20; publications in, 29
German National People's Party
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei —
DNVP), 50; alliance of, with Nazis, 58;
in elections of 1920, 54; in elections of
1930, 59; in elections of 1932, 59
German Non-Denominational Welfare
Association, 199
German People's Congress for Unity and
ajust Peace, 89, 90
German People's Party (Deutsche Volks-
partei — DVP) , 50; in elections of 1920,
54; founded, 55; in Weimar coalition,
56
German People's Union (Deutsche
Volksunion— DVU), 386, 387, 515;
founded, 387; platform of, 387; sur-
veillance of, 387; and violence, 387,
515
German Red Cross, 199
Germans, ethnic, 160-61, 430; citizen-
ship for, 160; immigration of, 158,
160-61, 405; integration of, 160-61
German Social Union (Deutsche Soziale
Union — DSU): in Alliance for Ger-
many, 126, 424
German White-Collar Employees'
Union (Deutsche Angestellten-
Gewerkschaft— DAG), 393
Germany: in Anti-Comintern Pact, 63;
demilitarization of, 77; denazification
of, 77, 79-81; invaded by France, 30
Germany, Federal Republic of (united
Germany): Allied troops in, 502-3;
containment of, 448; currency in, 332;
divisions between easterners and west-
erners in, xlviii, 191, 211, 402, 415;
employment in, 191; and European
Single Market, 319; foreign policy of,
421, 429; infrastructure of, 261; invest-
ment in eastern, 261; in North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization, 425;
population of, 428; relations of, with
Soviet Union, 426; trade by, 338-39;
unemployment in, 191; values in, 191
Germany, Federal Republic of (West
Germany), 467; access to and from,
119; Allied troops in, 502-3; contain-
ment of, 440; in Council of Europe,
93; economic philosophy of, 310;
economy of, 74; education in, 226-28,
229; extramarital births in, 169; fertil-
ity rate in, 152, 169; foreign assistance
from, 120, 127; foreign policy of, 98,
418-19, 421; formation of, xliii, 73,
86-89, 347; in Group of Seven, 312;
guest workers in, 151; health care in,
213; Honecker's visit to, 120-22; hous-
ing in, 170; infant mortality in, 154; in
International Authority for the Ruhr,
92; maternity leave in, 169; media
broadcasts to East Germany, 118;
migration to, 421, 422; missiles in,
120, 459; in NATO, 94, 120, 439;
618
Index
NATO forces in, 459; population of,
150, 151; rearmament of, 1, 74, 93-96;
refugees in, xxxviii-xxxix, 151; rela-
tions of, with Bulgaria, 110; relations
of, with Czechoslovakia, 110; relations
of, with Eastern Europe, 419; relations
of, with East Germany, xxxvii, 75, 105,
107-8, 119-22, 419; relations of, with
France, 96; relations of, with Hungary,
110; relations of, with Israel, 93; rela-
tions of, with Poland, 107, 108; rela-
tions of, with Soviet Union, 95, 107,
108, 419; religion in, 174; Saarland
returned to, 95-96; self-containment
of, 440; self-employed workers in,
183-84; social identity in, 190-91;
social insurance for, 201, 202; social
services in, 201; sovereignty of, 347,
439; terrorism in, 513-14; threats to,
468; treaties of, 107, 108, 110; United
Nations membership for, 110; United
States role in, 84; in Western Euro-
pean Union, 94
Gesamtschule, 228, 233; curriculum of,
234; number of, 234; opposition to,
229
Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung. See
statutory health insurance
Gestapo. See Secret State Police
Gesundheitsreformgesetz. See Health
Care Reform Act
Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz. See Health
Care Structural Reform Act
Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 327
GKV. See statutory health insurance
glasnost, 123-24
Gleichschaltung (synchronization), 61, 62
Gleichstellungstellen. See Equality Offices
Gleske, Leonhard, 336
Goebbels, Joseph, 59, 62
Goering, Hermann: trial of, 79; war strat-
egy of, 63
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 30
gold: dollar pegged to, 309
Golden Bull of 1356, 14
Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxxviii, 75, 126-27,
422, 423, 424, 487
government: under Basic Law, 349; and
Bundesbank, 291; business coopera-
tion with, 248, 250, 391; division of
power in, 350, 431; of early states, 28;
federal, 349-51; of German Empire,
xli-xlii, 40-42; legislative responsibili-
ties of, 350; local influence on, 368;
role in economy, 254, 257, 267-71;
subsidies, 249, 250, 252, 272-73; sup-
port for industry, 250, 253-54, 266-67,
287; of Weimar Republic, 50, 55
government, Land, 349-51, 366-69;
economy under, 271; education
under, 229, 230, 271; environment
under, 271; executives of, 350; hous-
ing under, 271; industry under, 271;
legislatures of, 350, 366-68; levels of,
368-69; medical education under,
220; policy areas of, 350-51; social ser-
vices under, 271
government, local, 366-69; economy
under, 271; education under, 230, 271;
environment under, 271; under Hitler,
61; housing under, 271; industry
under, 271; social services under, 271;
transportation under, 369; utilities
under, 369
government, regional, 349
government, state (see also government,
Land): under Hitler, 61
government budget: for defense, 472,
489, 490; deficit, 98; for social welfare,
203
government debt, 274; to finance World
War I, 48, 54; as percentage of gross
domestic product, 274
government spending, 273-74; on east-
ern Germany, 262; as percentage of
gross domestic product, 274; as per-
centage of national income, 273-74
Grand Coalition, 97-98, 107, 255, 376,
378; economy under, 256
Great Depression, xliii, 5, 58, 252; social
insurance during, 201
Great Inflation, 55, 248, 250-51
Great Interregnum (1256-73), 13; end
of, 14
Great Northern War (1700-21), 27
Greece: foreign residents from, 158, 179;
guest workers from, 151; materiel
exported to, 500; military assistance
to, 500
Greenpeace, 396
Greens (Die Griinen) (see also Alliance
90), xlv, 113, 383-86; in Bundestag,
383-84; in coalitions, 386; in elections
of 1983, 113, 146, 384; in elections of
619
Germany: A Country Study
1987, 384; in elections of 1990, 385; in
elections of 1994, 403; factions within,
113-14, 384; and foreign policy, 434;
formed, 146; platform of, 384; support
for, 385; women in, 114
Gregorian calendar, 23
Gregory VII, Pope, 10-11
Greifswald nuclear power plant, 148
GRG. See Health Care Reform Act
gross domestic product (GDP), 309; of
eastern Germany, 264; growth of, 254,
262,264; in 1975, 256
gross domestic product fractions: agri-
culture, 248, 284; exports, 307, 317,
337; foreign assistance, 343; govern-
ment debt, 274; government role in
economy, 257; government spending,
274; health care, 214; investment, 261;
research, 266; subsidies, 272
gross national product fractions: defense
spending, 489, 490; education, 230;
exports, 451; social services, 195, 203
Grotewohl, Otto, 81, 90
Group of Five, 308, 312
Group of Seven (G-7), 308, 312-13; aid
to Russia by, 312, 430; meetings of,
268-69, 312-13; members of, 312;
Russia in, 312, 339
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 502;
personnel strength of, 459; withdrawal
of, 460, 502
Gninderzeit (founders' time) , 44
Grundgesetz. See Basic Law
Grundschule, 231 , 239
Griinen, Die. See Greens
GSG. See Health Care Structural Reform
Act
Guard Detachment (Schutz-Staffel— SS),
61, 506
Guelf family. See Welf family
guest workers (Gastarbeiter), xliii, 281-82,
513; attacks on, xlvi; employment of,
182; number of, xlviii, 151; origins of,
151, 179, 449; recruitment of, xlix,
151, 158; resentment of, 387, 415, 510,
515
guilds, 249, 250, 389
Guillaume, Giinter, 107
Gustavus Adolphus, 24
Gymnasium, 233, 234, 239; curriculum
for, 225; educational tracks in, 225;
number of, 234; reorganization of,
228
Gymnasium Oberstufe, 234
Gypsies, 162
Gysi, Gregor, 388, 389
Habsburg Dynasty, xl, 14, 19
Halle: industry in, 286
Hallstein, Walter, 95
Hallstein Doctrine, 95, 98, 107
Hamburg: airport at, 302; foreign resi-
dents in, 158; government in, 368;
housing prices in, 171; political parties
in, 83; population of, 156; population
density of, 155; population loss in,
157; port of, 302; topography of, 135;
university in, 225
Handel, George Frederick, 30
Handelsblatt, 398
Hanover, 139, 157; annexed by Prussia,
39; industry in, 286
Hanseatic League, 15
Hardenberg, Karl August von, 30, 118
Hardt Mountains, 140
Harmel Report (1967), 439
Hartmannbund, 213
Hauptschule, 228, 233; curriculum of, 233
Havel, Vaclav, 441
Haydn, Franz Joseph, 30
health (see also sickness): public, 217, 222
health care, 201, 202, 211-23; adminis-
tration of, 213; benefits, 214; budget,
221; copayments for, 214, 215; cost
containment, 221; cost per capita,
214; dental, 214, 217; East German,
223; issues in, 222-23; as percentage
of gross domestic product, 214; pre-
ventive, 222; providers, 217-20; right
to, 214; spending on, 195, 203, 215;
visits for, 218; for women, 211, 214
health care professionals, 217; hospital
based, 218-19; income of, 218; num-
ber of, 217-18; office-based, 218-19;
professional associations for, 213;
remuneration for, 213, 218, 220-22;
training for, 220; unemployment of,
218; women as, 166
Health Care Reform Act (1989)
(Gesundheitsreformgesetz — GRG) ,
215
Health Care Structural Reform Act
( 1 993) (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz —
620
Index
GSG), 212, 215
health care system: development of,
212-15
health facilities, 217; admission to, 219-
20; church-operated, 176, 177; East
German, 223; licensing of, 220; oper-
ating costs of, 221; ownership of, 219;
reimbursement for, 221-22
health insurance, 97, 215-17; adminis-
tration of, 211-12; under Bismarck,
43, 200; coverage of, 211, 212, 214,
215; expansions of, 212-13; individu-
als without, 203, 211, 215; for pension-
ers, 201; premiums, 216; private, 217;
statutory, 212, 215
Health Insurance Cost Containment Act
(1977), 215
Health Insurance of Workers Law
(1883), 200, 212
Heidelberg University, 224
Heinemann, Gustav, 106
Helsinki Accords (Final Act of Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in
Europe), 117, 119, 439
Helsinki Summit (1992), 452
Henry I (919-36), 8, 9
Henry IV ( 1 056-1 1 06) , 9-1
Henry V (1106-25), 9-10; in Investiture
Contest, 10-11
Henry VI (1190-97): death of, 13;
elected king, 12
Henry the Lion, 12
Herder, Johann Gottfried, 35
Herrhausen, Alfred: murdered, 113, 514
Herzog, Roman, 353
Hess, Rudolf: trial of, 79
Hesse: Catholics in, 176; Four-Power
occupation of, 78; political parties in,
83; topography of, 136, 140
Hessian Corridor, 139
Heuss, Theodor, 83, 382
Himmler, Heinrich, 61, 68
Hindenburg, Paul von, 465; death of, 61;
as president, 5, 60-61, 466; in World
War I, 48
Hider, Adolf, xlii, 5, 57-60, 466-67; assas-
sination attempt on, 66-67; back-
ground of, 57; as chancellor, xliii, 60;
coup attempt by, 56, 58; foreign policy
of, 62-64; suicide of, 69; support for,
62, 64; war declared on United States
by, 65
Hizballah, 516
Hochschule fur Unternehmensfurung,
280
Hoechst, 287
Hoffmann, Theodor, 424
Hohenstaufen Dynasty (1138-1254), 11-
14; feud of, with Welfs, 11-12
Hohenzollern Dynasty, 463
Holocaust: deaths in, 68
Holy Alliance, 32
Holy Roman Emperor, 12; election of, 9,
11; origin of, 9; succession to, 13
Holy Roman Empire, xl, 3, 463; end of,
31; expansion of, 3-4, 12; founded, 9
homelessness, 172
Honecker, Erich, 106, 116-24; back-
ground of, 117; and Berlin Wall, 117;
prosecution of, 410; resignation of,
xxxviii, 124; visit of, to West Germany,
xxxvii, 120-22
Hoover, Herbert, 59
housing, 170-72; amount of, 171; con-
struction, 170; financial aid for, 171-
72; government responsibility for, 271;
ownership of, 171; price controls on,
97; prices of, 171; quality of, 170-71;
shortages, 170, 171; size of, 171; subsi-
dies for, 97, 208
Hugenberg, Alfred, 58
Huguenots, 28
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 119, 225
Humboldt University, 225
Hungary: and European Union, 1, 451;
and NATO, 1, 441; and Western Euro-
pean Union, 443; West German rela-
tions with, 110
Hus,Jan, 16
Iller River, 142
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
immigration, 157-62; from Eastern
Europe, 150, 157-58; of ethnic Ger-
mans, 158, 160-61; of Israelis, 162; in
1990, 158; in 1993, 158; restrictions
on, 161; following World War II, 150-
51
imports: from Eastern Europe, 322; of
materiel, 500; of petroleum products,
289
income: average monthly, 180; of blue-
collar workers, 186; of dentists, 218; of
621
Germany: A Country Study
farmers, 184; negotiated guidelines
for, 391; of physicians, 218; of self-
employed workers, 183; of teachers,
229-30
Independent Social Democratic Party of
Germany, 48, 50; end of, 54
Indonesia: materiel sales to, 476
industrial associations, 390-91
industrial growth, 36, 254
industrialization, 44, 149; government
support of, 250
industrial output, 258, 281; in eastern
Germany, 260-61; East German quo-
tas for, 1 00; quality of, 276
industrial policy, 271
Industrial Revolution, 44, 250
Industriegewerkschaft Medien, 393
industry, 97, 286-89; automotive, 286,
287, 317, 320, 337; chemical, 44, 286,
287-88, 317, 320, 337; competition
among, 277; cottage, 250; and cur-
rency policy, 311; downsizing in, 415;
in East Germany, 102, 103, 182; in eco-
nomic miracle, 254; electronics, 44,
320; employment in, 44, 182, 286;
environmental problems caused by,
147; government support for, 250,
253-54, 266, 287; iron, 337; Mittel-
stand, 287; nationalized, 103; reloca-
tion of, 340, 342, 415; research and
development in, 266-67; role of banks
in, 250, 261, 295; shipbuilding, 337;
steel, 44, 272, 273, 286, 288, 317, 322,
338; subsidies for, 250, 338; vocational
education under, 281
infant mortality, 149, 154, 223
inflation, 257; fears of, 248; under oil cri-
sis, 256, 379; in United States, 309; in
Weimar Republic, 54, 55, 248; after
World War II, 252
infrastructure: of eastern Germany,
xlviii, 261; East German, 260; invest-
ment in, 261
Ingolstadt, 141
Inner e Fuhrung (inner leadership), 495-
96
Innere Mission, 199
inner leadership. See Innere Fuhrung
Inn River, 142
Institute for Research on Capital Mar-
kets. See Institut fur Kapitalmarktfor-
schung
Institut fur Kapitalmarktforschung
(Institute for Research on Capital
Markets), 332
insurance: legislation of, 195; spending
on, 195; under Weimar Republic, 200
insurance services, 204; and European
Single Market, 320
interest rates, 263-4, 311, 334, 429;
refusal to lower, 448-49; and value of
deutsche mark, 314-15
internal security, 504-16; surveillance
for, 101, 122
International Authority for the Ruhr, 92,
93
International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion (Interpol), 508
International Monetary Fund (IMF);
established, 308, 309
International Olympic Committee, 105
International Red Cross, 199
Interpol. See International Criminal
Police Organization
Interzone Trading Agreement, 119
Investiture Contest, 10-11; legacy of, 11
investment: abroad, 340-41, 342; in
Americas, 342, 451; in Asia, 342; in
eastern Germany, 261, 287; in Europe,
342, 450; foreign, 340-42; as percent-
age of gross domestic product, 261
Iran: refugees from, 161; residents from,
180; troops deployed to, 504
Iraq: illegal arms exports to, 501; troops
deployed to, 504
iron, 250; exports, 337; production, 44
Iron Curtain, 73, 84
Isar River, 142
Islam, 180
Islamic terrorists, 516
islands, 135-36
Israel: immigrants from, 162; materiel
exported to, 500; relations with, 93;
reparations agreement with, 93
Italy: Allied invasion of, 66; in Anti-Com-
intern Pact, 63; economic philosophy
of, 310, 323; foreign residents from,
158; in Group of Seven, 312; guest
workers from, 151; invasion of Ethio-
pia by, 63; materiel produced with,
500; in Pact of Steel, 64; relations with,
46, 63, 64
Japan: in Anti-Comintern Pact, 63; attack
622
Index
by, on Pearl Harbor, 65, 467; in Group
of Seven, 312; investment in, 342
Jepsen, Maria, 177
Jesuits: expelled by Bismarck, 172
Jews, 162; arrests of, 61; attacks on, xlvi,
180; in Austria, 28; expelled, 68, 179;
exterminated, 68, 179; under Hitler,
61 , 67-68; practicing, 1 79
Judaism, 179-80
judges, 364-65, 511-12; in East Ger-
many, 102; education of, 363; selec-
tion of, 364-65; terms of, 364-65
judiciary, 362-65; under Hitler, 61; inde-
pendence of, 363; purged, 61
Jugendweihe (youth dedication cere-
mony), 175
Junkers, 464
Jura Mountains, 140
Kapp, Wolfgang, 54
Kapp Putsch, 54, 55
Kassel, 139
Keitel, Wilhelm, 76; trial of, 79
Keynes, John Maynard, 250
Kiel Canal, 302
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg: as chancellor, 98,
255, 376
kindergarten, 225, 238
Kinkel, Klaus, 321, 322, 443, 448, 454
Knights of the Teutonic Order, 14, 172,
463; vows of, 15
Knights' War (1522-23), 20
Kohl, Helmut: cabinet of, 356; as chan-
cellor, xliv, 1, 114-15, 254, 257, 268,
376, 436, 476; Maastricht Treaty pro-
moted by, 316, 322; and relations with
France, 321-22; role of, in Group of
Seven, 312; role of, in unification,
xxxix, 115, 126-27, 376-77, 402, 419-
20, 423, 425, 429, 487
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands.
See Communist Parry of Germany
Korea, Republic of (South Korea): mate-
riel exported to, 500
Korean War, 93, 254
KPD. See Communist Party of Germany
Krauss-Maffei, 500
Krenz, Egon, 124; resignation of, 126
Kriegsakademie. See Prussian War Col-
lege
Kriminalpolizei. See Criminal Police
Kripos. See Criminal Police
Kristallnacht (Crystal Night) (1938), 68
Krupp Mak Maschinenbau, 500
Kulturkampf, 42-43, 172-73
Kung, Hans, 177
Kurdish Workers' Party, 516
Kurds, 180
labor, 258, 280-82; and codetermina-
tion, 283; costs, 249, 282; culture of,
280; in economic miracle, 254-55;
forced, 66; legislation, 200; productiv-
ity of, 281; under unification, 281
labor unions, 391-93; organization of,
392; under Schmidt, 111; settlements
with, 200; under Weimar Republic,
391; women in, 393
Lafontaine, Oskar, xlv, 380
Lahn River, 141
Lake Constance, 141
Lambsdorff, Otto, 114
land area, 134, 155
Lander, under Basic Law, 88-89
Lander, new: crime in, 513; economy in,
262-64; education in, 238-40; exports
from, 338; gross domestic product of,
264; health care in, 212; integration
of, 415; social welfare in, 210-11
Landerkammer (Provincial Chamber), 90
Landpolizei. See police
Lassalle, Ferdinand, 43
Latvia: and European Union, 451; and
NATO, 441
Law for Promoting Stability and Growth
(1967), 255-56
Law on Parties (1967), 373
lawyers: in East Germany, 102; training
for, 363
LDPD. See Liberal Democratic Party of
Germany
League of Nations: admission to, 56, 57;
withdrawal from, 63
League of Schmalkalden, 22
Lebanon: refugees from, 161
Lech River, 142
legal system, 362-65, 504-6; basis of,
363, 504, 505
legislation, 360-62; process for, 356-57,
358
legislative branch, 356-62; under Basic
Law, 350; coordination of, 362
623
Germany: A Country Study
Leipzig, 157; demonstrations in, 124,
178; industry in, 286; university in, 224
Leipzig Basin, 139-40
Leipzig Industrial Fair, 120
Leistungswettbewerb, 276
Lessing, Gotthold, 29-30
Liberal Democratic Party of Germany
(Liberal-Demokratische Partei
Deutschlands— LDPD), 82; in Anti-
Fascist Bloc, 82
Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands. See Liberal Democratic Party of
Germany
liberals, xli, xlii, 35, 83; division of, 83
Libya: illegal arms exports to, 501
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 43
Limes (fortification), 6
literacy rate, 29
literature, 29; heroic epics, 6; medieval,
12
Lithuania: and European Union, 451;
and NATO, 441
living standards: in eastern Germany,
133; of farmers, 28
Locarno treaties (1925), 56, 57
Lombard rate, 334
Lorraine, 8; annexed by Prussia, 40, 46;
under French rule, 25; relinquished,
49
Louis I (814-40), 7-8
lower class, 180; under German Confed-
eration, 36; in revolutions of 1848, 37
Lower Saxony: Four-Power occupation
of, 78; Protestants in, 177; topography
of, 135, 136
Liibeck, port of, 302
Ludendorff, Erich, 48, 58, 465
Lufthansa, 302
Luftwaffe. See air force
Luther, Martin, 19-21, 119, 172; opposi-
tion to, 19; support for, 19-20; theses
of, 19; translations by, 19, 20
Lutheranism, 4, 177; resistance to, 21-
22; support for, 20
Luxembourg: in International Authority
for the Ruhr, 92; Nazi occupation of,
65; support of, for Eurocorps, 446
Luxemburg Dynasty, 14 >
Maastricht Treaty. See Treaty on Euro-
pean Union
Magyars: expansion of, 9
Main River, 140, 142; pollution in, 146
Mainz: elector of, 14
Maiziere, Lothar de, 126, 424
management culture, 248, 276-80; char-
acteristics of, 280; and codetermina-
tion, 248, 283; cooperation in, 248,
277-78; objectives of, 277-78; quality
emphasized by, 277
managers: backgrounds of, 278; cooper-
ation of, with workers, 248
Mannheim, 157
manufacturing, 286-88
Maria Theresa (1740-80), 27
marriage, 167-70; age at, 168, 169;
mixed, 169-70; rates of, 149, 153, 167-
68; women in, 165
Marshall Plan. See European Recovery
Program
Marxism, 43
mass organizations: East German, 101
materiel, 489; air force, 480-81; army,
468, 475, 476, 487; from Britain, 480;
domestic, 476, 480, 499-502; East Ger-
man, 487; export of, 476, 499-502; of
Federal Border Force, 507; under Hit-
ler, 63, 64, 66; import of, 500; from
Italy, 480; joint production of, 499-
500; navy, 478; nuclear, 476; of police,
510; procurement of, 499, 500; reduc-
tion of, 476, 489, 490; restrictions on
possession of, 439, 466; sales of, 476;
from the Soviet Union, 476, 489; traf-
ficking in, 508; from United States,
116, 468,480
maternity leave, 169, 201
Matthias (1608-19), 24
Maximilian I (1493-1519), 16; reforms
under, 16
Maximilian II (1564-76), 22-23
mayors, 368-69; of Berlin, 107
Mecklenburg: Four-Power occupation
of, 78
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: popu-
lation density of, 155; topography of,
135
media, 398-401; East German access to
Western, 118; newspapers, 398-99;
radio, 399, 400; television, 399-401
Meeting of Evangelical Free Churches,
179
Meinhof, Ulrike, 112,514
624
Index
Mein Kampf (My Struggle) (Hitler), 58
men: population of, 153; vocational
training of, 281
merger law (Fusiongesetz) (1973), 269
mergers: attempts to prevent, 269-70; of
eastern firms with western firms, 270;
number of, 269
Merovech, 7
Merovingian Dynasty (500-751), 7
Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm, 270, 500
Metalworkers' Union, 393
Methodists, 178
Metternich, Clemens von, 32, 35; exiled,
36
MfS. See Ministry for State Security
Middle Ages, xxxix, 7-16; economy in,
249-50; education in, 224; literature
of, 12; particularism in, 4; trade in, 15,
249
middle class, 180; blue-collar workers in,
186; entry into, 187; growth of, 187;
political preferences of, 45; white-col-
lar workers in, 185
Middle Kingdom, 3, 8
Mielke, Erich: prosecution of, 410
migration: to eastern Europe, 15; from
eastern Germany, 133, 152; of Ger-
manic tribes, 3, 6; from Germany, 150;
urban, 19, 45
military: assistance, 500; enlistment,
482-84; justice, 490-91; strategy, 63,
65, 471-72; threats, 470
military conscription, 468, 472, 478, 480,
497; alternative service to, 461, 462,
496; conscientious objection to, 348,
496, 497; exemptions from, 460-61;
term of, 460, 497
military conscripts: discipline of, 484;
pay and benefits, 498; requirements
for, 496; service obligations, 497-98;
training for, 482
military expansion: under Otto I, 9;
under Wilhelm II, 5
military missions, 468-71; participation
in, 503-4
military noncommissioned officers, 461;
pay and benefits, 498; postings of,
485-86; ranks of, 494; retirement of,
498, 499; shortages of, 497; training
of, 484
military officers, 460, 461; aristocrats as,
xli, 464; East German, 488; political
philosophy of, 488; ranks of, 494; ratio
of, to enlisted personnel, 497; reform
of, 464; retirement of, 498, 499; train-
ing of, 464, 484
military personnel: civil rights of, 490-
91, 495; from East Germany, 497;
political status of, 495; promotions for,
499; ratio of officers to enlisted, 497;
reduction in, 496; retirement, 499; ser-
vice obligations, 497-98; volunteer,
498
military training, 481-84; basic, 482; in
NATO, 482; by United States, 468, 482
miners: social insurance for, 201
Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit. See
Ministry for State Security
Ministerrat. See Council of Ministers
ministries: administration of, 356; con-
sultation of, with associations, 390
Ministry for Economics, 269; Board of
Advisers, 321; economic policy under,
267, 327; Foreign Trade Advisory
Council, 337; mergers under, 270; pol-
icy of, in European Union, 318-19;
roles of, 268-69, 431
Ministry for Finance, 268-69; economic
policy under, 267; foreign policy
under, 431; policy of, in European
Union, 318-19; roles of, 268-69
Ministry for National Defense (GDR),
103
Ministry for State Security (Ministerium
fur Staatssicherheit— MfS) (GDR),
101
Ministry of Agriculture: policy of, in
European Union, 319
Ministry of Defense, 468; Armaments
Division, 499; command and control
by, 471 ; military staffs of, 471 ; nonmili-
tary divisions of, 471; security policy
under, 431
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 382; duties
of, 431; policy of, in European Union,
318-19
Ministry of Interior: police under, 461,
507, 509
Ministry of the Environment, Nature
Conservation, and Reactor Safety, 146
Minnesang, 12
Mitbestimmung. See codetermination
Mittellage. See geostrategic position
Mittelland Canal, 302
625
Germany: A Country Study
Mittelschule, 225
Mitterrand, Francois, 321-22, 420, 476
modernization: of economy, 264-67;
problems with, 265-66, 267
Modrow, Hans, 126, 421, 422
Monopolko mission, 295
Moravia: economic links with, 339;
under Frederick I, 12; occupied by
Hitler, 64
Morgenthau Plan, 79
Morocco: guest workers from, 151
Moselle River, 142
Moselle River Valley, 139; tourism in, 303
Motoren und Turbinen Union (MTU),
500
Mozambique: guest workers from, 158
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 30
MTU. See Motoren und Turbinen Union
Muller, Ludwig, 1 73
Munich, 141; airport at, 302; housing
prices in, 171; industry in, 286; popu-
lation of, 156; university in, 225
Muslims {see also Islam): number of, xlix,
180,516
NACC. See North Atlantic Cooperation
Council
Napoleon, xl, 31
Napoleonic Code, 31, 505
National Assembly, 36
national debt. See government debt
National Democratic Party of Germany
(National-Demokratische Partei
Deutschlands— NDPD) (GDR), 82;
former Nazis in, 82
National Democratic Party of Germany
(Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands— NPD) (FRG): support
for, 98
National-Demokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (NDPD). See National Demo-
cratic Party of Germany
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (NPD). See National Democratic
Party of Germany
Nationale Volksarmee. See National Peo-
ple's Army
National Front, 90
national identity: of East Germany, 118-
19; search for, 189-91
National Insurance Code (1923): health
care under, 200-201
nationalism, xl-xli, 45
nationalization: of industry, 103
National Liberal Party, 42, 45; constitu-
ency of, 42; platform of, 42
National People's Army (Nationale
Volksarmee— NVA) , 103-4; absorbed
into Bundeswehr, 459, 487-89; con-
scription for, 104; created, 103, 468,
487; materiel of, 487; organization of,
487; personnel strength of, 104, 428,
487, 488; problems with, 487; social
insurance for, 201; Stasi in, 488; in
Warsaw Pact, 74, 103
National Socialism {see also denazifica-
tion; National Socialist German Work-
ers' Party; Nazis): rise of, 57-60
National Socialist German Workers'
Party (National-Sozialistische Deut-
sche Arbeiterpartei — NSDAP) (see also
Nazis), 5, 57, 82; alliance of, with
DNVP, 58; constituency of, 57-58; cur-
rency under, 85; in elections of 1928,
58; in elections of 1930, 59; in elec-
tions of 1932, 59; in elections of 1933,
61; growth of, 58; under Hitler, 57-58;
medical experiments under, 62; power
of, 61; propaganda of, 58; size of, 58
National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbei-
terpartei. See National Socialist Ger-
man Workers' Party
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation
natural resources, 288-89
Naumann, Klaus, 446
Naval Act of 1900,47
Naval Bill (1898), 47
navy, East German, 478; created, 103
navy (Bundesmarine) {see abo navy, East
German), 477-80; aircraft of, 478;
areas of operation, 477; bases, 480;
commands of, 478-80; conscripts in,
478; fleet of, 478; under Hitler, 63;
mission of, 477; mutiny in, 49; in
NATO, 477; number of personnel in,
466, 478; organization of, 478-80; in
Persian Gulf War, 416, 477, 503-4;
ranks, 494; reduction in, 466, 472-75,
478; training, 482; uniforms, 494;
under Wilhelm II, 46, 47, 465
Nazis: court system under, 506; police
under, 461, 506; prosecution of, 80-
626
Index
81; reintegration of, 82
NDPD. See National Democratic Party of
Germany
Neckar River, 142
Neckar Salt Union (1828), 250
Neisse River, 141
neo-Nazis: banned, 406; underground
network of, 407-8; violence by, 462,
515
Netherlands: in International Authority
for the Ruhr, 92; Nazi occupation of,
65, 466; opposition of, to Eurocorps,
445-46; recognition of, 25; troops of,
stationed in Germany, 502, 503
Neues Deutschland, 398, 399
New Economic System, 103
New Forum, 1 23
newspapers (see also media), 398-99; cen-
sorship of, 398; circulation of, 398,
399; political information from, 400;
suppression of, 62
NibelungenUed, 12
Niemoller, Martin, 173
Nine Assurances, 423
Noelle-Neumann, Elizabeth, 166
nomenklatura, 91
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC),441
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 439-42; Bundeswehr in, 74,
95, 436, 439; conference of 1979, 116;
defense spending in, 490; Dual-Track
Decision, 114, 115-16, 120, 379;
expansion of membership in, 1, 441;
expansion of missions of, 440-41;
functions of, 439-40; Germany in,
416, 418, 425, 428, 435-36, 446, 470-
71; importance of, 442; London Dec-
laration on, 441, 442; materiel pro-
duced with, 500; military training in,
482; missions of, 442, 470-71; naval
forces in, 477; Partnership for Peace,
442; Rapid Reaction Force, 470, 475;
relations of, with former Soviet satel-
lites, 441; Russian membership appli-
cation to, 441; threats to, 468; West
Germany in, 1, 94, 378, 439
North Atlantic Treaty Organization mili-
tary missions: in Bosnia, 416, 438; Ger-
man participation in, 416, 434, 436,
438
North German Confederation: formed,
39; opposition to, 40
North German Lowland, 135-36; coast-
line of, 135, 136; economy of, 250; ele-
vation of, 135; islands of, 135-36
North Rhine- Westphalia: Catholics in,
176; coal and steel in, 271, 286; elec-
tions in, xlv; Four-Power occupation
of, 78; foreign residents in, 158;
higher education in, 236; population
density of, 155; population growth in,
157; topography of, 135, 136
Norway: in European Union, 318, 322;
materiel exported to, 500; Nazi occu-
pation of, 65, 466; petroleum
imported from, 289
November criminals, 53, 57, 59
NPD. See National Democratic Party of
Germany
NSDAP. See National Socialist German
Workers' Party
nuclear energy, 288, 289, 397
Nuremberg, 157
Nuremberg Laws (1935), 68
Nuremberg trials, 79-81
NVA See National People's Army
Oberrealschule, 225
Obligatory Military Service Law (1956),
497
Occupation Statute, 87, 92; ended, 94
occupation zones: Bizone, 83-86; econ-
omy in, 84; established, 76-79; popula-
tion of, 84; Trizone, 84
Odenwald Hills, 140
Oder-Neisse line, 77, 84, 90, 141; recog-
nized, 108, 424, 426,428
Oder River, 141
OECD. See Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
oil (see also petroleum): deposits, 289;
import of, 289
oil crisis: economic problems caused by,
111, 146, 256, 307, 326-27, 379; and
environmental issues, 113, 146
Old Age and Invalidity Insurance Law
(1889), 200
Ollenhauer, Erich, 82
On War (Clausewitz) , 465
Operation Desert Storm, 416; participa-
tion in, 434, 454
Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
627
Germany: A Country Study
tion and Development (OECD), 85
Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) (see also Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe), 451-53; established, 451;
expansion of, 451-52; membership in,
417; role of, 452
OSCE. See Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
Ostpolitik, 107-10, 379, 419, 439;
assumptions of, 419; components of,
419
Otto I (the Great) (936-73), 3, 8-9
Otto IV, 13
Ottoman Empire: siege of Vienna by, 26;
as threat to German Empire, 21
Pact of Steel (1939), 64
Palatinate: elector of, 14
Palestinians, 180
Papen, Franz von, 60
Paraguay: materiel sales to, 476
paramilitary groups, 54; in East Ger-
many, 103
Paris: liberation of, 69; revolts in, 36
Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Federal Armed Forces, 496
Parliamentary Council, 87
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus.
See Party of Democratic Socialism
particularism, 4, 14; catalysts for, 13, 22,
25; decline in, 31; economy of, 249;
origins of, 4
Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei
des Demokratischen Sozialismus —
PDS), 372, 388-89, 403-4; in elec-
tions, xlvi, 388, 402; and foreign pol-
icy, 434; future of, 404; influence of,
xlvi; members of, 388; origins of, 421;
rejection of, 388
Parzival, 12
PDS. See Party of Democratic Socialism
Peace Council, 397
peacekeeping missions: in Cambodia,
416, 438; German participation in,
432, 454-55, 461, 470, 503-4; by
OSCE, 452; in Somalia, 416, 438, 461,
504; in Yugoslavia, 416, 438
peace movement, 122-23, 396, 397, 460;
demonstrations in, 189
Peace of Augsburg (1555), 22
Peace of Westphalia (1648) , xxxix, 25-26
Pearl Harbor: Japanese attack on, 65,
467
Peasants' War (1524-25), 20-21; sup-
pression of, 21
Penal Code (1871), 505, 511
pensions, xlix, 202; average monthly,
204; under Bismarck, 43, 203; disabil-
ity, 207, 208, 211; insurance programs
for, 97; origins of, 203-4; premiums
for, 207; reform, 204; soldiers', 499;
spending on, 195, 203; supplements,
207; survivor, 207, 211
People's Chamber. SegVolkskammer
People's Council: convened, 90
People's Police (Volkspolizei — Vopo),
103
perestroika, 1 23-24
periodicals, 29
Persian Gulf War: German participation
in, 416, 436, 438, 461, 477, 503; pro-
tests against, 397, 436
Petersburg Agreement (1949), 92
Petersburg Declaration (1992), 443
petroleum (see also oil): imports of, 289
Philip, King, 13
Pieck, Wilhelm, 81 , 90
Pioneer Organization "Ernst Thal-
mann," 101
Planning Committee for the Construc-
tion of Institutions of Higher Learn-
ing, 230
Poland: acquisition of German territory
by, 77; border with, 77, 84, 90, 108,
141, 426, 428; debt of, 340; economic
links with, 339; and European Union,
xlix, 451; foreign residents from, 158;
Hitler's invasion of, 64, 466; and
NATO, 1, 441; Nazi occupation of, 466;
under Otto I, 9; partitions of, 28, 65;
refugees from, 152; relations of, with
Germany, 426, 428, 450; relations of,
with West Germany, 107, 108; Soviet
occupation of, 64; territory of, lost to
Soviet Union, 77, 83-84; and unifica-
tion, 426, 428, 460; and Western Euro-
pean Union, 443
police (see also People's Police), 505-6;
administration, 505-6; administrative,
509; in Allied occupation, 506-7; bor-
der, 462, 506, 507; criminal, 509, 510-
11; federal, 507-8; Land, 508-11; orga-
628
Index
nization of, 508-9; protective, 508;
readiness, 509, 510; and right-wing
violence, 515-16; social insurance for,
201; in Third Reich, 461, 506; train-
ing, 509, 510; under unification, 462;
uniforms and ranks of, 509; in Weimar
Republic, 506; women as, 509-10
Polish Corridor, 49
Politburo, 90-91; dissolved, 126; duties
of, 90; members of, 91
political asylum, 161-62; restrictions on,
162,405
political demonstrations, 189; against
Berlin Wall, 121; casualties in, 100; in
East Germany, xxxviii, 100, 123, 124,
178, 422; against right-wing violence,
190; by students, 189, 514
political parties (see also under individual
parties), 373-89; and associations, 390;
banned, 348, 374, 405; under Basic
Law, xliii, 89, 347-48, 373, 383; cam-
paign advertising for, 374; candidates
of, 372-73, 377; confidence in, 374;
and foreign policy, 432-34; under
Four Powers, 73, 81-83; funding for,
373-74; under German Empire, 4-5,
42-43; Marxist, 43; membership in,
374; paramilitary forces of, 54; restric-
tions on, 374; roles of, 197, 373; scan-
dals in, 374; Volksparteien, xliii, 375,
378, 394; women in, 165
political unrest, 514; in 1848, 36; in
1918, 49, 53; suppression of, 53
political violence: deaths caused by, 516;
against foreigners, 405, 415, 510; gov-
ernment crackdown on, 405, 515-16;
left-wing, xliii, 54, 515; neo-Nazi, 515;
perpetrators of, 405; right-wing, 54,
405, 415, 462, 515; in Weimar Repub-
lic, xliii, 55
pollution: in eastern Germany, 134
Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine, 516
population, 149-62, 428; of Berlin, 45;
decline, 44 - 4 5, 149; density, 155; dis-
tribution of, 155-57; in eastern Ger-
many, 133; of elite class, 183; of
farmers, 184; foreigners in, xlix, 149,
159; killed in wars, 25; of men, 153;
refugees as percentage of, 151; urban,
156-57; of women, 153
population census: in 1200, 13; in 1300,
13, 15; in 1500, 15; in 1871, 44, 149; in
1891, 44; in 1910, 150; in 1914, 150; in
1939, 150; in 1950, 150; in 1989, 151;
in 1995, 155
population statistics: age distribution,
xlix, 149, 151, 153-54; birth rate, 44-
45, 133; fertility rate, 149, 152-53, 169;
gender ratio, 150, 153-54; growth
rate, xlix, 44-45, 149, 157; infant mor-
tality rate, 149, 154, 223; life expect-
ancy, 149, 154-55; mortality rate, 154-
55
Portugal: German industry in, 342; guest
workers from, 151; materiel exported
to, 500; military assistance to, 500
Postbank, 294-95, 303
Postdienst, 302
post office: cable television wiring by,
401; employees of, 365
Potsdam Accord (1945), 77
Potsdam Conference (1945), 77
poverty, 187; of foreign residents, 182;
under German Confederation, 36;
public assistance for, 201
president (see also executive branch),
351-53; under Basic Law, 88, 351;
duties of, 351; election of, 352-53;
powers of, 351-52, 353; qualifications
for, 353; successor to, 353; term of,
352; of Weimar Republic, 50
press {see also media; newspapers): cen-
sorship of, 398; freedom of, 398
prices, 262; supports for, 396
princes (see also dukes) , 11; power of, 12,
13, 14
printing (see also publishing): of books,
20, 29; and invention of movable type,
16, 20
prisoners: number of, 511
prison system, 505-6, 512-13; soldiers in,
490
privatization, 257; in eastern Germany,
133, 166, 259
production, 258; costs, 259; in eastern
Germany, 260-61; in East Germany,
100, 259
Progressive Party, 42; platform of, 42
Protective Police (Schutzpolizei — Schu-
pos), 508-9
Protestantism (see also under individual
denominations), 172, 177-78; geo-
graphic distribution of, 172, 173; lob-
629
Germany: A Country Study
bying by, 393; percentage of followers
in population, 175; support of dissi-
dents by, xxxviii; strengthening of, 172
Protestant Reformation, xl, 16-22; dis-
unity caused by, 4; education inspired
by, 224
Protestants, xl; conflicts of, with Catho-
lics, 4; in East Germany, 178, 394;
expulsion of, 29; lapsed, 174, 175;
opposition of, to East German govern-
ment, 178; practicing, 177
Provincial Chamber. See Ldnderkammer
Provisional Irish Republican Army, 516
Prussia {see also Brandenburg), 26-28,
463-65; competition of, with Austria,
xl, 4; in Congress of Vienna, 31; dis-
solved, 77; expansion of, 27-28; in
German Confederation, 32; in Holy
Alliance, 32; religious tolerance in, 28;
territory annexed by, 39; in war
against France, 30
Prussian General Staff, 465
Prussian War College (Kriegsakade-
mie) , 464-65
public opinion: on foreign policy, 434-
36
Public Services and Transport Workers'
Union, 393
publishing (see also printing) , 20, 29
Quadripartite Agreement. See Four
Power Agreement
radio, 399, 400; under Hitler, 62; politi-
cal information from, 400
RAF. See Red Army Faction
railroads, 298; construction of, 44;
employees of, 365; high-speed, 298;
maintenance of, 260, 298
Readiness Police (Bereitschaftspolizei —
Bepos), 509; materiel of, 510; organi-
zation of, 510; service in, 510
Rea Igy mnasiu m, 225
Realschule, 228, 233; curriculum of, 233
recession, 376; in eastern Germany, 262;
of 1992, 334
Rechtsstaat, 362
Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Frak-
tion — RAF) (Baader-Meinhof Gang),
112-13,514-15
Reformation. See Counter-Reformation;
Protestant Reformation
Reformed Church. See Calvinism
refugees, 513; attacks on, 404, 405, 415,
510; from Eastern Europe, 75, 76, 77,
120, 123, 133, 151-52, 158; expense
of, 161-62; Muslim, 180; origins of,
152, 161; as a percentage of the popu-
lation, 151; political, 151-52, 158,
161-62; resentment of, 386, 387;
restrictions on, 162
Reich, Jens, 123
Reichstag: destroyed by fire, 60; in Ger-
man Empire, xl, 40, 41; religious con-
troversy in, 23; reorganization of, in
1489, 16; role of, 26; in Weimar
Republic, 50-53, 60
Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (1887),
46
religion (see also under individual sects),
172-80; declining belief in, 174-75;
geographic distribution of, 172, 173
religious tensions, 23-24, 29
religious tolerance, 28, 29
REP. SeeRepublikaner, Die
Republikaner, Die (REP), xlvi, 386-87,
515; in elections, 376, 386, 403; and
foreign policy, 434; founded, 386; in
local governments, xlv, 386; members
of, 386, 404; platform of, 386-87; sur-
veillance of, 387, 516; and unification,
420
research: promotion of, 229, 230
retirement: age for, 200, 204, 211; and
health insurance, 213
Revolutionary Cells, 514
revolutions of 1848, 36
Rexrodt, Giinter, 335
Rheinischer Merkur, 399
Rheinish Uplands, 136-39, 142
Rhineland: demilitarization of, 56; occu-
pation of, 30, 49; religion in, 173;
remilitarization of, 63
Rhineland-Palatinate: Catholics in, 176;
elections in, xlv; Four-Power occupa-
tion of, 78; population density of, 155;
topography of , 136, 140
Rhine-Main area, 157
Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, 302
Rhinemetall Berlin, 500
Rhine-Neckar region, 157
Rhine River, 141, 142; clean-up of, 146-
630
Index
47; pollution in, 146
Rhine River Valley, 139; tourism in, 303
Rhon, 139
Ribbentrop, Joachim von: trial of, 79
Ridley, Nicholas, 428
right wing, xlvi, 404-5; demonstrations
against, 190; parliamentary represen-
tation of, 404; support for, 98, 386,
515; as threat to Weimar Republic, 53-
54; violence by, xliii, xlvi, 54, 387, 404,
405,405-7, 415,462,515-16
rivers: pollution of, 146, 147; transporta-
tion on, 15
roads: maintenance of, 260, 298, 300-
301; network of, 300
Robin Wood, 396
Rohm, Ernst, 57
Rohwedder, Detlev: assassination of, 113,
166,514
Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic
Church, Roman
Roman Empire: collapse of, 463; Ger-
many in, xxxix, 3, 463
Romania: Gypsies from, 162; and NATO,
441; refugees from, 161, 405; and
Western European Union, 443
Rostock, port of, 302
Rote Armee Fraktion. See Red Army Fac-
tion
Rothaargebirge, 139
Round Table, 422; talks, 126
Rudolf II (1576-1612), 23
Rudolf of Habsburg: election of, 14
Ruhe, Volker, 438, 441 , 443
Ruhr: coal and iron in, 250, 286; foreign
occupation of, 55, 56
Ruhr City: See Ruhrstadt
Ruhr River: clean-up of, 1 46-47
Ruhrstadt (Ruhr City): population of,
156
Ruhr Statute (1949), 92
rural areas: migration from, 19; popula-
tion in, 19; topography of, 141
Russia (see also Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States; Soviet Union): aid to,
312, 429, 430; application for mem-
bership in NATO, 441; in Congress of
Vienna, 31; debt of, 340; in Group of
Seven, 312, 339; in Holy Alliance, 32;
military agreements with, 441-42;
petroleum imported from, 289; rela-
tions with, 46, 416; in Triple Entente,
46; in World War I, 48
SA. See Storm Troops
Saarland: coal and steel in, 271; Four-
Power occupation of, 78; population
loss in, 157; religion in, 173; returned
to West Germany, 95-96; topography
of, 136
Saar Statute (1955), 96
Sacred Army in Germany, 1 79
Salian Dynasty (1024-1125), 9-11; alli-
ance of, with Roman Catholic Church,
10
Salzburg: expulsion of Protestants from,
29
Salzburg Alps, 141
SAP. See Socialist Workers Party
Saudi Arabia: materiel exported to, 500
Sauerland, 139
Saxon Dynasty (919-1024), 8-9
Saxon tribe, 3
Saxony, 8, 25; elector of, 14; Four-Power
occupation of, 78; in German Confed-
eration, 32; industry in, 286; political
parties in, 388; population density of,
155; power of, 27; Protestants in, 177;
topography of, 135, 136
Saxony-Anhalt: Four-Power occupation
of, 78; industry in, 286; topography of,
135, 136
scandals: in political parties, 374
Schabowski, Giinter, 124
Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, 30, 119, 464
Scharping, Rudolf, xliv, 377, 380, 402
Scheel, Walter, 107, 382; as president,
111
Schiller, Friedrich, 30
Schiller, Karl, 98, 255; as chancellor, 255,
256; resignation of, 256
Schleicher, Kurt von, 60; killed, 61
Schleswig-Holstein: agriculture in, 250;
annexed by Prussia, 39; coastline of,
135-36; Danish speakers in, 162; elec-
tions in, xlv; Four-Power occupation
of, 78; relinquished, 49; right wingers
in, 386, 404; topography of, 135
Schleyer, Hanns-Martin: kidnapped, 112;
murdered, 113
Schlieffen Plan, 47-48
Schmidt, Helmut: background of, 111; as
chancellor, 111, 256, 268, 327, 379,
631
Germany: A Country Study
436; no-confidence vote against, 114,
354, 376; role of, in Group of Seven,
312
Schonhuber, Franz, 386, 404
schools: attendance at, 224, 231, 235;
attrition rates in, 242; business admin-
istration, 278-80; church-run, 226,
231; curriculum of, 225, 233, 234, 239;
East German, 238-39; orientation
courses in, 233; postsecondary, 225;
primary, 225, 231; secondary, 225;
under Third Reich, 226; types of, 225
Schumacher, Kurt, 81, 82, 378
Schuman, Robert, 92
Schupos. See Protective Police
Schurz, Carl, 37
Schutzpolizei. See Protective Police
Schutz-Staffel. See Guard Detachment
Scientific Council, 230
SD. See Special Duty Section
Second Reich. See German Empire
Secret State Police (Geheime Staat-
spolizei — Gestapo), 506
Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei), 506
SED. See Socialist Unity Party of Ger-
many
Seeckt, Hans von, 466
self-employed, 182, 183-84; income of,
184; as percentage of workforce, 183-
84
Serbia: guest workers from, 179
serfs: living standards of, 28
services sector: employment in, 180, 188
Seven Weeks' War (1866), 39-40
Seven Years' War (1756-63), 27
sexual activity: church position on, 176;
of young people, 169
sexual orientation, 460
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 424
shipbuilding: exports, 337; subsidies,
272, 273
shipping, 298; inland, 302
Sicherheitspolizei. See Security Police
sickness: financial assistance for, 207,
209; occupational, 206
sickness funds, 200-201, 215-16; pri-
mary, 215; substitute, 215
Siegerland, 1 39
Siemens, 287; subsidies for, 273
Silesia: under Frederick I, 12; under Fre-
derick the Great, 27, 464
Singapore: materiel exported to, 500
Single European Act (1986-87), 446,
446
Six Power Conference, 87
Slavs, 179
Slovakia: and European Union, 451;
occupied by Hitler, 64
Slovenia: and European Union, 451; rec-
ognized, 429, 449
snake. See European narrow margins
agreement
social assistance, 202-3, 207; funding of,
207, 209; qualifications for, 207; recipi-
ents of, 207, 209; types of, 207, 209
social classes (see also under individual
classes), 180
social compensation programs, 202
Social Democratic Labor Party, 43
Social Democratic Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands— SPD), xliv, 42, 378-81, 386;
and armed forces, xliv, 436, 461, 496;
auxiliary groups of, 381; Bad Godes-
berg Program, 107, 378; Bismarck's
attack on, 43; in Bundestag, 375; in
East Germany, 81; in elections of 1920,
54; in elections of 1930, 59; in elec-
tions of 1932, 59; in elections of 1990,
377; in elections of 1994, 402, 403; in
elections of 1995, xlv; in elections of
1996, xlv; factions in, 379; and foreign
policy, 433; founded, 43, 378; funding
of, 373; growth of, 55; membership,
xliv, xlv, 374, 378; organization of,
380-81; platform of, 43, 197, 378;
problems in, 379; reestablished, 81,
82; in SPD-FDP coalition, 74, 106-14,
256, 376, 378, 379, 381, 382; and unifi-
cation, 420; in Weimar coalition, 50,
53, 56; in West Germany, 82
social insurance (see also health insur-
ance), 195, 203-4; accident, 200, 201,
206-7; administration of, 198, 199,
209; under Bismarck, 198, 200, 203,
204; contributions to, 206, 209; devel-
opment of, 198-202; disability, 207-8,
214; improvements in, 200; unemploy-
ment, 97, 201,204-6
Social Insurance Code (1988), 200
socialism: opposition to, 200
Socialist Environmental Management
Act (1968), 145
Socialist Party, xli
632
Index
Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische
Reichspartei— SRP) , 89; banned, 374
Socialists: arrests of, 61
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozial-
istische Einheitspartei Deutschlands —
SED) {see also Party of Democratic
Socialism), xlvi, 75, 201, 388; Anti-Fas-
cist Bloc, 81-82; under constitution,
421; education under, 228; founded,
81, 388; members of, 81, 388; meta-
morphosis of, 421; Politburo of, 90-
91; structure of, 91; women in, 165
Socialist Workers Party (Sozialistiche
Arbeiterpartei— SAP) , 1 06
social market economy, xliv, 96-97, 198,
253-54, 375, 378
social mobility, 187-89; opportunities
for, 188
social policy: debate over, 197
social reform: under Bismarck, 43; in
Prussia, 30
social security, 261; under Basic Law, 89,
349
social services {see also social welfare),
xlviii, 97; administration of, 195, 198;
under Bismarck, 198, 200; under
Brandt, 379; church-run, 176, 177;
deficiencies in, 196; development of,
198-202; financing of, 195
social services agencies: churches as,
175, 176, 177-78, 199; government as,
271; social services role of, 197; volun-
tary, 198, 199
social structure, 180-87
social welfare {see also social services),
xlviii, 196, 253; disparities in, 202, 210;
in eastern Germany, 210-11; financ-
ing of, 203; issues in, 210-11; origins
of, 250; provisions of, 202-11; spend-
ing on, 203; types of, 202
Society for Nature and the Environment,
397
Solidaritdt See solidarity
solidarity (Solidaritdt), 198
Somalia: United Nations peacekeeping
missions in, 416, 438, 461, 504
Sonderdienst ^Special Duty Section
Sonderschule, 233
Sorbs, 162
South Africa: illegal arms sales to, 502
Southern Germany, 140-41; economy of,
250
South Korea. See Korea, Republic of
Soviet Forces in Germany. See Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany
Soviet republics, former: aid to, 429-30;
threat from, 470
Soviet Union {see also Commonwealth of
Independent States; Russia): acquisi-
tion of territory by, 77; armed forces
of, in East Germany, 459, 502; block-
ade of Berlin by, 85-86; containment
of, 440; denazification under, 80; East
German relations with, 95, 105; in
Four Powers, 73, 76; Hitler's invasion
of, 65, 466; importance of East Ger-
man economy in, 247; influence of,
on education, 226; Marshall Plan
rejected by, 84-85; missiles of, aimed
at Central Europe, 115-16; and
NATO, 441; nonaggression pact with,
64; occupation by, of Poland, 64, 83-
84; occupation policies of, 78, 85;
occupation zone of, 78; political par-
ties reintroduced by, 81; reform in, 75,
123; relations of, with Germany, 426,
450; relations of, with West Germany,
95, 108, 419; reparations to, 78, 102;
threat from, 468; in Treaty of Berlin,
56-57; and unification, xxxix, 422,
423, 425, 426, 460; and Weimar
Republic, 466; withdrawal of, from
Allied Control Council, 86; withdrawal
of troops, 425, 460, 502; in World War
II, 65, 66
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands. See Social Democratic Party of
Germany
Sozialistiche Arbeiterpartei. See Socialist
Workers Party
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands. See Socialist Unity Party of Ger-
many
Sozialistische Reichspartei. See Socialist
Reich Party
Spain: German industry in, 342; guest
workers from, 151; materiel produced
with, 500; support of, for Eurocorps,
446
Spanish Civil War (1936-39), 63
SPD. See Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many
Special Duty Section (Sonderdienst —
SD), 68
633
Germany: A Country Study
Speer, Albert: trial of, 79
Spessart Hills, 140
Spiegel, Der, 399
Spitzenverbdnde, 389
Springer, Axel, 399
SRP. See Socialist Reich Party
SS. See Guard Detachment
Staatsrat See Council of State
Staatssicherheitsdienst. See State Secu-
rity Service
Stalin, Joseph, 77; death of, 98
Stasi. See State Security Service
State Security Service (Staatssicherheits-
dienst— Stasi) , 100-101, 462; in armed
forces, 488; dismantled, 421-22;
employees of, 101; espionage by, 101;
surveillance by, 101, 122
statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche
Krankenversicherung — GKV), 212,
215
steel: exports of, 317, 338; imports of,
322; production, 44, 286; subsidies,
272, 273, 288
Stein, Karl vom, 30, 118
stock exchanges, 275, 296; regional, 296,
297
stock market crashes: of 1873, 44, 45; of
1929,58; of 1933,296
Stoiber, Edmund, 318
Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 501
Stoph, Willi: prosecution of, 410; resig-
nation of, 124; talks of, with Brandt,
107-8
Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung — SA),
506; formed, 57; massacre of, 61
Strasbourg: seized by France, "26
Strauss, Franz-Josef, 98, 115, 120, 375
Stresemann, Gustav, 55-57; as chancel-
lor, 56; as foreign minister, 56
strikes: under Weimar Republic, 55
Structural Plans for the Educational System
(1970), 228
student demonstrations, 189, 514; and
the women's movement, 165
student movement, 111-13
students: denazification of, 228; female,
165; health insurance for, 213; num-
ber of, 228; ratio of teachers to, 238;
survivor pensions for, 207; under uni-
fication, 198
Study Group of Christian Churches, 178
StundeNull (Zero Hour), 73, 252
Sturmabteilung. See Storm Troops
Stuttgart, 157; airport at, 302; industry
in, 286
Subsidiaritdt See subsidiarity
subsidiarity (Subsidiaritdt), 199, 320
subsidies, 252, 272-73; for aerospace,
272, 288; for agriculture, 97, 248-49,
272, 285, 396; amount of, 272; for
churches, 176; for coal and steel, 272,
273, 288; in East Germany, 273; by
European Union, 248-49, 285, 451;
for industry, 250, 273, 338; for insur-
ance, 201; as percentage of gross
domestic product, 272; promises to
reduce, 272; for shipbuilding, 272,
273
Suddeutsche Zeitung 398, 401
Sudetenland: Hitler's occupation of, 64,
150
suffrage. See voting
Siissmuth, Rita, 166
Swabia, duchy of, 8
Swabian Alb, 140, 141
Swabian tribe, 3
Sweden: in European Union, 318, 322,
450; in Great Northern War, 27; in
Thirty Years' War, 24
Switzerland: materiel exported to, 500;
recognition of, 25
synchronization. See Gleichschaltung
Tacitus, 3, 463
Taiwan, 501
Tariff Agreement of 1879, 45
taxes: capital gains, 278; church, 174,
176, 177, 394; direct, 203; indirect,
203; social welfare, 203, 207; under
unification, 402; value-added tax, 203
teachers, 229, 239-40; benefits, 229;
denazification of, 228; income of,
229-30; ratio of, to students, 238;
under Third Reich, 226; training of,
236; under unification, 198; women
as, 166
Tehran Conference (1943), 76
telecommunications, 302-3; and Euro-
pean Single Market, 320; Germany as
hub of, 298
Telekom, 302-3
telephones, 303; in eastern Germany,
259
634
Index
television, 399-401; broadcasts to East
Germany, 118, 400; cable, 401; com-
mercial, 400-401; fees for, 400; politi-
cal information from, 400; private,
400; public, 399-400; satellite, 401
Ten-Point Plan for unification, xxxix,
126, 419-20,421
terrorism, 111-13, 462, 509, 513-16; by
Baader-Meinhof Gang, 112-13;
Islamic, 516; neo-Nazi, 462, 515;
police actions against, 507, 508; right-
wing, 462
terrorists: rights of , 5 1 2
Teutoburger Wald, 139
Thalmann, Ernst, 101
Thatcher, Margaret, 448
theological seminaries, 236
Third Reich (1933-45) {see also Hitler,
Adolf; Nazis), 60-69; armed forces
under, 466-67; churches under, 173,
393; concordat of, with Vatican, 173;
defeat of, 6; economy under, 252, 337;
education under, 226; elite class
under, 183; invasion of Poland, 64,
466; medical experiments under, 62;
police under, 461, 506; population in,
150; social insurance under, 201; ter-
ror under, 61-62
Thirty Years' War (1618-48), xl, 4, 22-26,
172, 463; deaths in, 25; economy
under, 25-26; France in, 24; military
campaigns in, 24-25; Sweden in, 24
Three Mile Island accident, 146
Thuringer Wald, 139
Thuringia: Four-Power occupation of,
78; industry in, 286; Protestants in,
177; topography of, 136
Tietmeyer, Hans, 291, 313, 314, 335
Tilly, Johann von, 24
Time Warner, 401
Tirpitz, Alfred von, 47
tobacco: consumption of, 222
topography, 135-41; of Alpine Foreland,
141; of Alps, 141; of Central German
Uplands, 136-40; of North German
Lowland, 135-36; of Southern Ger-
many, 140^11
tourism, 139, 303
trade {see also exports; imports): balance,
256, 336-40; with Baltic states, 339;
conducted in deutsche marks, 314; in
early states, 28; with Eastern Europe,
322, 338-39, 450; with European
Union, 307, 317; in German Confed-
eration, 32; in German Empire, 44,
250; medieval, 15, 249; philosophy,
336-40; surplus, 336-37, 338
trade unions, 283, 460; and European
Single Market, 320; under Hitler, 61;
social services role of, 197; strength of,
186
Transit Agreement (1972), 109
transportation, 297-302; by automobile,
301; Germany as hub of, 298; impor-
tance of, 297-98; infrastructure, 298;
motor vehicle, 301; railroads, 298,
300; roads, 298, 300-301; by truck,
298, 300; waterways, 15, 142
Treaties of Paris (1954), 94, 95-96
Treaty of Basel (1795), 30
Treaty of Berlin (1926), 56-57
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 49
Treaty of Moscow (1970), 105, 108
Treaty of Passarowitz (1718), 26
Treaty of Prague ( 1 634) , 24
Treaty of Rome (1957), 97
Treaty of Tilsit (1807), 30
Treaty of Verdun (843), 8
Treaty of Versailles (1919), 49, 150, 250,
466
Treaty of Warsaw (1970), 108
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
Treaty), 316, 322, 329-30, 442;
approval of, 322; containment by, 448;
Kohl's promotion of, 316, 322, 447;
objectives of, 447-48; opposition to,
322, 331, 447, 453; signed, 415, 442
Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partner-
ship, and Cooperation (1990), 426
Treaty on Monetary, Economic, and
Social Union (1990), xxxix; health
care under, 223; signed, xxxix
Treaty on the European Economic Com-
munity (1957), 450
Treaty on the Final Settlement with
Respect to Germany (Two-Plus-Four
Treaty) (September 1990), 126, 472;
signed, xxxix, 425-26
Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency), 166,
259, 260, 261, 514
Trier: elector of, 14
Triple Entente, 46
Tristan, 12
Trust Agency. See Treuhandanstalt
635
Germany: A Country Study
Tunisia: guest workers from, 151
Turkey: foreign residents from, 158, 180,
405; guest workers from, 151; materiel
exported to, 500; military assistance
to, 500-501; refugees from, 161;
troops deployed to, 504
Two-Plus-Four Talks, 126, 128, 423, 424
Two-Plus-Four Treaty. See Treaty on the
Final Settlement with Respect to Ger-
many
Ulbricht, Walter: background of, 100;
dismissed, 106; economic policies
under, 100; as general secretary, 98-
106; state visit of, to Egypt, 105
Ulm, 141
unemployment, 257, 258, 262, 264, 415;
assistance, 206, 207, 261; in eastern
Germany, xlviii, 133, 206, 260, 261,
402; under Grand Coalition, 98; and
health insurance, 213; insurance pro-
gram, 97, 201, 204-6; of physicians,
218; rate, 254; relief, 200, 206; under
Schmidt, 111; in Weimar Republic, 54,
58, 200; of women, 133-34, 167
unification {see also unification of 1990):
under Bismarck, xl-xli, 4, 38-40;
opposition to, 35, 42; support for, 35,
42, 94; trends toward, 32-36, 505;
West German desire for, 108
unification of 1990, xxxvii-xxxix, 73,
125-28, 347, 419-28; armed forces
under, 459-60, 487; under Basic Law,
347; economy under, 254, 258-64,
288, 424; education under, 197-98,
240; effect of, on Bundestag, 357;
effect of, on eastern German women,
167; financing of, 197; and foreign
policy, 421; foreign reaction to, 426-
28; Genscher's role in, 382-83; Kohl's
role in, xxxix, 115, 376-77, 402, 419-
20; labor under, 281; manufacturing
under, 288; opposition to, 127, 384,
393, 415, 420, 423, 460, 487; political
consensus in, 348; problems with, 133,
260, 402, 405, 408, 415; referendum
on, 75-76, 126, 127, 370, 376-77, 380,
386, 388, 401, 422, 423-24; social ser-
vices under, 203; and Soviet Union,
422, 423, 425; support for, 127-28,
380,393,401,423,460
Unification Treaty (August 1990), xxxix,
128,347,424
United Arab Emirates: arms sales to, 502
United Church, 177
United Nations, 454-55; East German
membership in, 105, 110; German
membership in, 417, 454; West Ger-
man membership in, 110
United Nations peacekeeping missions:
in Cambodia, 416, 438; German par-
ticipation in, 416, 432, 434-35, 436,
437, 438, 454, 461, 477, 503-4; in
Somalia, 416, 438, 461, 504; in former
Yugoslavia, 416,438
United Nations Security Council: Ger-
man seat on, 417, 455
United States: armed forces of, in West
Germany, 459; defense spending in,
490; denazification under, 80; foreign
currency reserves of, 314; foreign pol-
icy coordinated with, 98; in Four Pow-
ers, 73, 76; in GATT talks, 316;
German industry in, 342; in Group of
Seven, 312; Hitler's declaration of war
on, 66; inflation in, 309; influence of,
on education, 226; investment in, 342,
451; loans from, 56; materiel exported
to, 500; materiel from, 116, 468, 480;
military assistance from, 468, 482;
nuclear weapons of, in Germany, 379;
occupation policies of, 79, 84; occupa-
tion zone of, 78, 79, 80; opposition of,
to Eurocorps, 445; relations with, 428;
role of, in Europe, 415; troops in Ger-
many, 435, 502, 503; and unification,
xxxix, 127-28,423, 426
universities, 11, 236; attendance at, 228;
campus life at, 237; degrees from,
225-26; East German, 238; entrance
exams for, 225,228; expenses at, 231,
236; faculty, 229, 239-40; founded, 16,
29, 224-25; loans for, 236-37; protest
movements in, 112; reputations of,
237; restrictive quotas for, 234-35;
under Third Reich, 226; weaknesses
in, 240-42; women in, 165-66
Uplands of Hesse, 139
upper class, 180
Upper Rhine River Valley, 140
urban areas: birth rates in, 44-45; hous-
ing in, 170; population of, 156-57;
suburbanization of, 157
636
Index
urbanization, 13-14, 149
urban migration, 19, 45
value-added tax (VAT) . See taxes
VAT. A value-added tax
Vatican: Nazi concordat with, 173
Verbande. A associations
Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe. See
Association of Publicly Owned Enter-
prises
Vienna: Ottoman siege of, 26; political
uprisings in, 36
Vietnam: guest workers from, 158
villages: housing in, 170
Vogel, Hans-Jochen, 379
Vogelsburg, 1 39
Volga Republic, 430
Volkskammer (People's Chamber), 90,
126; elections to, 126, 423-24
Volkspartei (catchall party). Apolitical
parties
Volkspolizei. See People's Police
Volksschule, 225
Volkswagen, 287; subsidies for, 273
Vopo. See People's Police
Vorwarts, 399
voting: constituency representative bal-
lots in, 370-71; eligibility for, 369; 5
percent rule in, 371-72; in German
Empire, xli, 40; party ballots in, 370;
rights, 369; turnout for, 369-70; in
Weimar Republic, 50
WB. See Association of Publicly Owned
Enterprises
wages: costs of, xlviii, 282; in East Ger-
many, 259; in economic miracle, 254-
55; under Hitier, 63
Waldsterben (death of the forest), 148,
285, 397
Walesa, Lech, 441
Wallen stein, Albrecht von, 24
Wannsee Conference (1942), 68
War of the Austrian Succession (1740-
48), 27
War of the Spanish Succession (1701—
14), 26
war reparations, 49, 54; default on, 55; to
Four Powers, 77, 78, 102; to Israel, 93;
moratorium on, 59; payments of, 56
Warsaw Pact, 103-4, 418; created, 103;
National People's Army in, 74; threat
from, 468; withdrawal from, 426
Waste Disposal Law (1972), 146
Weimar coalitions, 55, 56; members of,
50
Weimar Republic (1918-33), 5, 50-60;
budget cuts in, 58-59; constitution of,
50-53; debts of, 48, 54, 56; economy
under, xlii, 5, 54, 250; education
under, 226; government structure of,
50; labor unions under, 391; opposi-
tion to, xlii-xliii, 53-54; police under,
506; problems in, xlii, 53; proclaimed,
xlii, 50; social services under, 200; and
Soviet Union, 466; support for, 50, 53
Weizsacker, Richard von, 121, 353, 420,
429
Welf (Guelf) family, 11; feud of, with
Hohenstaufens, 11-12
welfare. Asocial welfare
Welt, Die, 398, 399
Welt am Sonntag, 399
WeltpoUtik, 418
Wende, die (turning), 257, 268
Weser River, 141
Westdeutsche Landesbank, 294
Western European Union, 442-44; and
Balkan war, 453; and Eastern Europe,
443; and Eurocorps, 477; Germany in,
417, 428, 438; mission of, 442-43;
West Germany in, 94, 439
West Germany. See Germany, Federal
Republic of
white-collar workers, 184
widows, 154
Wiehengebirge, 139
Wilhelm I (1858-88), xl; army under, 41,
465; Bismarck government under, 38;
as emperor, 40; foreign policy of, 41;
General Staff under, 465
Wilhelm II (1888-1918), 46; abdication
of, xlii, 49; foreign policy under, 46-
47, 418; General Staff under, 465; mili-
tary expansion under, 5; navy under,
46, 49, 465
Wilhelmshaven, port of, 302
Wirtschaftsumnder. See economic miracle
Wittelsbach Dynasty, 14
women, 164-67; in armed forces, 460;
disadvantages faced by, 196; in eastern
Germany, 133, 164; education of, 164,
637
Germany: A Country Study
165-66; employment of, 164; health
insurance for, 213; in labor unions,
393; marriage of, 165; maternity bene-
fits for, 211, 214; opportunities for,
164; in police forces, 509-10; political
influence of, 114, 165; population of,
153; social assistance for, 207, 210;
rights of, 164; unemployment of, 133-
34; vocational training of, 281
women's associations, 396
women's movement, 165, 396, 397
workers: blue-collar, 185-87, 188, 200;
commuting from eastern Germany,
262-63; contribution of, to social ser-
vices, 203; culture of, 280; education
of, 280; under German Confedera-
tion, 36; insurance for, 200, 212;
retirement age for, 200; in revolutions
of 1848, 37; role of, in management,
248; self-employed, 182, 183-84;
skilled, 182, 186; taxes on, 203;
unskilled, 182, 187; vocational train-
ing of, 280-81; white-collar, 182, 184-
85, 200; women as, 187
Workers' Welfare Organization, 199
work force: blue-collar, 186; in civil ser-
vice, 185; on defense contracts, 499; in
industry, 44; self-employed, 1 83-84; in
services sector, 180; white-collar, 184;
women in, 164
working class, 186-87; elite, 186; insur-
ance for, 200; political influence of,
200; political parties of, xliv; skilled
workers in, 186; social protection of,
200; unskilled workers in, 187
World Bank, 308
World War I, 47-49, 465; casualties in,
150; defeat in, xlii, 5, 465; financing
for, 48, 54, 250; opposition to, 48; ori-
gins of, 5, 47; strategy in, 47-48
World War II, 64-69; beginning of, 6,
466; casualties in, 69, 73, 150; defeat
in, 5-6, 76, 467; Four-Year Plan for, 63;
preparation for, 63-64; strategy in, 63,
65; United States entry into, 66
Wiirttemberg, 39; in German Confedera-
tion, 32
Yalta Conference (1945), 76-77
Young, Owen D., 56
Young Pioneers, 101
Young Plan, 56; opposition to, 58
Young Socialists, 381
youth dedication ceremony. See Jugend-
weihe
Youth Welfare Act (1922) , 200
Yugoslavia: civil war in, 438, 447, 461,
470; foreign residents from, 158; Ger-
man policy toward, 429; humanitarian
operations in, 461; United Nations
peacekeeping missions in, 416, 438
Zero Hour. See Stunde Null
Zollverein (Customs Union), 32
Zugspitze, 141
Zwickau, 157
638
Contributors
Christa Altenstetter is Professor of Political Science at The City
University of New York, Graduate School and University
Center and Queens College, and the author of many
books and articles on public policy, including the forth-
coming Health Policy Reform: National Variations and Global-
ization.
Karen E. Donfried is Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign
Affairs and National Defense Division, Library of Con-
gress.
Jeffrey Gedmin is Research Fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, D.C., and the author of The Hid-
den Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany.
David E. McClave, formerly a Soviet affairs analyst at the Fed-
eral Research Division, Library of Congress, is an inde-
pendent researcher and writer on Central and East
European politics and evironmental issues.
W.R. Smyser teaches and writes about European political econ-
omy and is the author of The German Economy: Colossus at
the Crossroads.
Eric Solsten is Senior Research Specialist, Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress.
Bruno E Steinbruckner is Professor of German Studies at The
American University in Washington, D.C., and director of
its Vienna Semester Program.
Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has
written extensively on Western Europe for the Country
Studies series.
639
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