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Committee on National Security Systems

CNSS Instruction No. 3032



National Manager

1. (U) The Committee on National Security Systems Instruction No. 3032, "Operational Security Doctrine for VIASAT Internet Protocol (VIP) Crypto Version 1 (KIV-21)," prescribes the minimum security standards for the protection and use of the KIV-21.

2. (U) CNSS Instruction No. 3032 is effective upon receipt. It replaces the Interim Systems Security Doctrine for this equipment, which should be destroyed.

3. (U) Representatives of the Committee on National Security Systems may obtain additional copies of this Instruction at the address listed below.

4. (U) U.S. Government contractors and vendors shall contact their appropriate government agency or Contracting Officer Representative regarding distribution of this document.

5. (U//FOUO)-Questions regarding this Instruction may be sent directly to the National Security Agency.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN Lieutenant General, USAF

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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CNSS Instruction No. 3032

(U)OPERATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE FOR VIASAT INTERNET PROTOCOL (VIP) CRYPTO VERSION 1 (KIV-21)

TITLE

SECTION

INTRODUCTION	I
SYSTEM & EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	
CLASSIFICATION AND ACCOUNTING LEGEND CODE	
PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES	IV
KEYING	V
REMOTE MANAGEMENT	VI
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	VII
INSTALLATION & MAINTENANCE	VIII
INSECURITY REPORTING	IX

SECTION I - (U) INTRODUCTION

1. (U) Purpose - This doctrine contains minimum security standards for the protection and use of the VIP Crypto Version 1 (KIV-21) equipment, associated components, and COMSEC material.

NOTE: (U) Implementing Services, Departments, and Agencies of the U.S. Government may direct more stringent standards than those stated in this instruction, but may not delete, reduce, or diminish any standard contained herein.

2. (U) Application - The provisions of this doctrine apply to all Services, Departments, and Agencies of the U.S. Government and their contractors who handle, distribute, account for, store, or use the KIV-21 and its associated COMSEC material.

3. (U) Doctrinal Conflicts - Any conflicts between the requirements of this instruction and any other national-level doctrine shall be identified and submitted for resolution to DIRNSA, ATTN:

4. (U) Waivers - Requests for exceptions to any of the requirements of this instruction must be approved, on a case-by-case basis, prior to implementation. Each such request must present a complete operational justification and must be submitted through appropriate Service, Department, or Agency channels to DIRNSA, ATTN:

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CNSS Instruction No. 3032

5. (U) References - References are listed in ANNEX A.

6. (U) Acronyms - Acronyms are expanded in ANNEX B.

7. (U) Definitions - NSTISSI No. 4009 Revision 1 definitions apply to this doctrine. Additional specialized terms applicable to this doctrine are defined below:

a. <u>(U) Designated Approving Authority (DAA)</u> - An executive with authority and ability to evaluate the mission business case and budgetary needs for a national security information system.

b. <u>(U) Local Authority (LA)</u> - The individual responsible for network configuration of all KIV-21s within his/her domain.

c. (U) Security Administrator (SA) - The individual responsible for maintaining, monitoring, and controlling functions performed by the KIV-21.

SECTION II - (U) SYSTEM & EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

8. (U #FOUO)		
9. <u>(U#FOUO)</u>		
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Doc Ref ID: A3097355

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CNSS Instruction No. 3032 ·

a. (U) Physical Size and Weight - The KIV-21 is 15.3 x 3.4 x 17 inches, and weighs 12 pounds.

<u>ь. (U//FOUO)</u>	
c. <u>(U#FOUO</u>)	
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<u>SECTION III – (U)</u>	CLASSIFICATION
10. (U//FOUQ)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
a. (U)	
b. (U)	
11. (U#FOUO)	- -

SECTION IV - (U) PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES

12. (U) Personnel - Individuals requiring access to the KIV-21 equipment must possess an appropriate U.S. Government security clearance and must have a need-to-know for the equipment.

a. <u>(U) Designated Approving Authority</u> - As addressed in NSTISSI No. 1000, the DAA determines the acceptable level of residual risk for national security information systems that are secured by the KIV-21.

b. (U) Local Authorities - LAs are responsible for net planning and the network and security configuration of all KIV-21s in their domains.

c. (U) Security Administrator - SAs are responsible for maintaining, monitoring, and controlling all functions performed by each KIV-21. SAs interface with both the COMSEC Custodians and LAs for management of keying material. SAs are authorized to load key into KIV-21s. SAs configure the security functions of the KIV-21 by:

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CNSS Instruction No. 3032

- (U) Receipting for all KIV-21 key from the COMSEC Custodian.

- (U) Keying and zeroizing the KIV-21.

- (U) Ensuring that approved procedures are followed for storing, protecting, and handling KIV-21 key.

- (U) Notifying the COMSEC Custodian of reportable COMSEC incidents and ensuring that recovery actions are taken, when appropriate.

- (U) Retrieving and reviewing KIV-21 security audit data.

- (U) Specifying if and how often the KIV-21 audit log must be

reviewed.

NOTE: (U//FOUO

- (U) Prescribing the physical security requirements for KIV-21 terminal

areas.

13. (U) COMSEC Custodian - The COMSEC Custodian is responsible for ordering, receiving, and safeguarding KIV-21 key until it is issued to the SA.

14. (U) <u>Combining Functions</u> - Where it is operationally necessary, the functions of LA and SA may be combined and vested in one individual. Where necessary, the COMSEC : Custodian may perform one or both these roles.

SECTION V - (U) KEYING

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15. (U) Types of Key - The KIV-21 uses two types of COMSEC key:

a. (U//FOUO)

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		CNSS Instruction No. 3032
	NOTE: (U//FOUO)	
	b. <u>(U//FOUO)</u>	
		× .
L	16. <u>(U//FOUO)</u>	
	NOTE: (U) NSTISSI No. 4006 states the responsibilities of civil department and agency officials who serve as CAs for 0 provides guidance for fulfilling those responsibilities.	
	17. (U //FOUO)	· · ·
	NOTE: (U# FOUO)	
	18. (U) Cryptoperiods	
	a. (U//FOUQ)	
L	NOTE: (U//FOUQ)	
	b. (U// FOUO)	
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Doc Ref ID: A3097355

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CNSS Instruction No. 3032

c. (U//FOUO)

SECTION VI - (U) REMOTE MANAGEMENT

19. (U) Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) - The KIV-21 can be http-managed from either the Plaintext (PT) side or the Ciphertext (CT) side, but PT-side management is not encrypted. CT-side management is encrypted between the KIV-21 fronting the Manager and the managed KIV-21. If an Encryptor Manager (EM) Workstation is used for network management, operation must be controlled as follows:

a. <u>(U//FDUQ)</u>		
ь. <u>(U//FOUQ)</u>		
- (U #FOUO)		•
- (U #Fouo)		
- (U# FOUO)		
- (U //FOUO)		

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CN	SS Instruction No. 3032
SECTION VII – SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	(b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
20. (U) Accountability	
a. (U//FOUQ)	
NOTE: (U) NAG No. 71 sets forth the minimum security standards safeguarding, controlling, and using the EKMS Local Management D Processor, and NSTISSI No. 3021 sets forth the minimum security st the protection and use of the DTD.	Device/Key
b. (U//FOGQ)	
NOTE: (U) Operational KIV-21 TEKs and over-the-air test key are "CRYPTO", but bench test key and classroom training key are not. I material used for classroom training only is UNCLASSIFIED, is according locally, and may be used indefinitely.	Keying
c. (U//FOUO)	
21. (U) Transportation - KIV-21s must be zeroized prior to shipment accounts and must be shipped in accordance with provisions of NSTISSI No hipment zeroization is not possible, keyed equipment must be transported by NSTISSI No. 4005 for the highest classified key they contain.	. 4001. If pre-
22. (U//FOUQ)	

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CNSS Instruction No. 3032

	(b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
SECTION VIII – (U) INSTALLATION & MAINTENANCE	· ·
23. (U) General Standard - KIV-21s must be maintained in accordance with of NSTISSI No. 4000, which prescribes minimum standards for COMSEC equipme maintenance and maintenance training, and delineates responsibilities and established for enforcing those standards.	ent .
24. (U//FOUCH)	
a. <u>(U#FOUO</u>)	
b. (U //FOUO)	
c. (U //FOUO)	
d. (U //FOUO)	
e. (U //FOUO)	
f. (U //FOUO)	
g. (U //FOUO)	
NOTE: (U #FOUO) NOTE: (U #FOUO)	

25. <u>(U) Zeroization</u> - Malfunctioning KIV-21s must be returned unkeyed to the manufacturer (i.e., the KIV-21 must be actively zeroized). Zeroization and verification procedures follow:


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CNSS	Instruction	No.	3032	
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a. (U //FOUO)	
b. (U //FOUO)	
(11/(20110))	
c. <u>(U//TOUO)</u>	
d. (U //FOUO)	

26. (U) Warranty Support - Malfunctioning KIV-21s must be zeroized and returned to ViaSat, Inc., for repair or replacement. Any attempt at local repair invalidates the manufacturer's warranty.





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ANNEX A

(U) REFERENCES

(U) The following national-level references are cited in this Doctrine:

a. NSTISSI No. 4009, National Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Glossary, January 1999.

b. NSTISSI No. 4002, Classification Guide for COMSEC Information, 5 June 1986

c. NSTISSI No. 1000, National Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (NIACAP), April 2000.

d. NSTISSI No. 4001, Controlled Cryptographic Items, July 1996.

e. NSTISSI No. 4006, Controlling Authorities for COMSEC Material, 2 December 1991.

f. NAG No. 71, Interim Operational System Security Doctrine for the Local Management Device/Key Processor (LMD/KP) (KOK-22), April 1997.

g. NSTISSI No. 3021, Operational Security Doctrine for the AN/CYZ-10/10A Data Transfer Device (DTD), September 1997.

h. NSTISSI No. 4005, Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC) Facilities and Materials, August 1997.

i. NSTISSI No. 4004, Routine Destruction and Emergency Protection of COMSEC Material, 11 March 1987.

j. NSTISSI No. 4000, Communications Security Equipment Maintenance and Maintenance Training, January 1998.

k. NSTISSI No. 7000, Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities, 29 November 1993.

1. NSTISSI No. 4003, Reporting and Evaluating COMSEC Incidents, 2 December 1991.

A-1

ANNEX A to CNSS Instruction 3032

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ANNEX B

(U) ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	<u>EXPANSION</u>
ACL	Accounting Legend Code
СА	Controlling Authority
CCI	Controlled Cryptographic Item
COMSEC	Communications Security
СТ	Cipher Text
DAA	Designated Approving Authority
DTD	Data Transfer Device (AN/CYZ-10)
EIP	Embeddable INFOSEC Product
EKMS	Electronic Key Management System
НМІ	Human/Machine Interface
НТТР	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
KEK	Key Encryption Key
LA	Local Authority
РТ	Plain Text
SA	Security Administrator
ТЕК	Traffic Encryption Key
VIP	ViaSat Internet Protocol

ANNEX B to CNSS Instruction 3032

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